Camerer, Colin F. and Ho, Teck-Hua and Chong, Kuan (2003) Models of thinking, learning, and teaching in games. American Economic Review, 67 (2). pp. 265-286. ISSN 0002-8282. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:CAMae03
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Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated “partner” matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).
|Additional Information:||Copyright © American Economic Association 2003. Discussants: C. Mónica Capra, Washington and Lee University; Colin Camerer, Caltech; David Cooper, Case Western Reserve University.|
|Subject Keywords:||NORMAL-FORM GAMES; PLAYERS|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Lindsay Cleary|
|Deposited On:||14 Aug 2008 22:56|
|Last Modified:||04 Mar 2016 22:33|
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