Jackson, Matthew O. (2005) A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and E±ciency. In: Group formation in economics: networks, clubs, and coalitions. Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, UK. ISBN 0521842719 (In Press) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:JACgfe04
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I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||This was written for the volume Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, which is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. I thank Jernej Copic, Gabrielle Demange, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anne van den Nouweland for comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged.|
|Subject Keywords:||Networks, Network Games, Network Formation, Game Theory, Allocation Rules, Pairwise Stability, Efficient Networks|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Archive Administrator|
|Deposited On:||24 Dec 2008 17:01|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 10:40|
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