CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF AND OF "PERSONALITY"
IN THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY

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"Consider how, when you recently blundered before the brethren by saying one antiphon for another, your mind sought how it might blame the fault on something else, either on the book itself or some other thing. For your heart was unwilling to behold itself as it was."

So Guigo, prior of the Grande Chartreuse, writing for his own benefit in the desolate and windswept mountains near Grenoble, noted early in the twelfth century. The "you" in the quotation is Guigo himself, trying to stand apart from his "heart" or "mind" and to be aware of inner drives of which he had not initially been conscious. Even an apparently trivial slip in the choice of a liturgical formula was an occasion for self-examination. How far we are here from the barren internal world of the literary Roland and Oliver, who question each other, but who unselﬁconsciously follow their own imperatives, without reflecting on either the wisdom or the morality of their own acts.

Bernard of Clairvaux, preaching to his monks on the seven steps of confession, explained that the first was expressed in the celestial precept, "Know thyself." The attempt to follow the Delphic command, "Know thyself," had a long and by no means linearly progressive history from the time of Socrates to the twelfth century. Consciousness of self and of the inner life and motives of others in the twelfth century differed from what we find in Antiquity, but it would be hard to say that any authors in the middle ages understood their subjective world better than Catullus or Augustine of Hippo. Evidence of the sort which appears in this paper indicates, however, that the practice of self-examination was deeper and more widespread in twelfth-century Europe
than at any time since the destruction of Roman culture. The twelfth century was not a time of the "discovery of self" or "discovery of the individual."\textsuperscript{4} If a point in historic time is to be assigned to the origin of consciousness as we know it in the human species, to the beginning of introspection, of the reflective remembering of the self in relation to things past and imaginative projection into the future, that crucial point of "discovery" occurred in the distant past.\textsuperscript{5} In the century and a half which included the lives of Gregory VII and Francis of Assisi there did occur, however, a renewed commitment to the examination of the inner life and a development of modes of thought about the self and others which have profoundly affected our civilization. This change was a recommitment on the basis of new values and in the context of new forms of material life, rather than a revival of the self-examination of antiquity, but in its own way it was a renaissance.

The central matter of this essay is not to demonstrate that a shift in attitudes toward the self and other individuals occurred in the period centering on the twelfth century, for that interpretation of the available evidence has been amply presented elsewhere.\textsuperscript{6} Instead, our major concern will be to attempt to assess the nature and comparative level of self-awareness, concluding with some theories of why and how the psychology of the twelfth century differed so much from even so stable and wealthy an age as the Carolingian Renaissance.

Throughout the earlier middle ages clerics continued to read the Confessions of St. Augustine, a work of such profound self-examination that it has been said of a "history of self-awareness" in antiquity which concludes with Augustine that it "ends where it should begin."\textsuperscript{7}
Until the beginning of the twelfth century no reader of the Confessions dared or was moved to write a self-examination in the same mode.\(^8\)

About 1115, however, Guibert of Nogent, an ambitious author and abbot of an obscure Benedictine abbey near Laon, began to write in his Monodiae or memoirs, "I confess to Thy Majesty, O God, my endless wanderings from Thy paths." In that opening word confiteor, Guibert invited a comparison with Augustine, and he starts his work in the confessional mode.\(^9\) The correspondences between these two confessional autobiographies are, however, verbal, formal, topical; the two books are in no way equivalent in the quality of self-examination. Augustine stripped back the flesh and bared his soul to his God. Guibert begins bravely, but as the story of his life comes closer to the time of his writing, he hides himself from the monks he knows will be his readers in a mist of anecdotal history about external events. Where Guibert is most openly revealing, in what he writes of his mother, his long-dead father, his dreams and fantasies, he appears to be naive rather than self-aware. He is perhaps most revealing in what he hides, in what he fails or does not dare to tell us about himself.

In contrast to the confessional tradition which influenced Guibert, other authors developed the classical epistolary genre and wrote of themselves and their reflections in letters. From Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable to quite obscure correspondents, some of the most personal authors of the twelfth century revealed themselves in letters.\(^10\) Closely related genres were the apologia, like the defense against his detractors Gui de Bazoches dedicated to his mother, and the otium, of which a good example is the collection of meditations Hugh
Farsit of Soissons sent to his sister. The most famous autobiography since that of Augustine, the history of his calamities written by Abelard, appears as a letter, overtly of consolation but more accurately of self-criticism and justification. Whether this "letter" was actually sent to an anonymous friend or was composed as the introduction to a unified literary composition, and whether any portion of the work was reworked by another hand, are questions which have not been resolved. What is clear is that Abelard did set down for posterity his own errors (or at least some of them), shame and glory, as well as recounting the envy and hostility of his critics, the only explanation for opposition he and many other medieval authors were willing to admit. Part of Abelard's genius lies in his literary skill and ability to record evocative detail, part in his awesome sense of the importance of his own feelings and position. But while Abelard's autobiography stands out as an unparalleled masterpiece, it is also important to remember that in their letters many of his contemporaries matched or even exceeded his capacity for self-examination.

History provided a medium for other autobiographical writers, such as Gerald of Wales, who revealed much of his fiery and tempestuous personality in what he relates in the third person of his exploits, far more than in any self-criticism or discussion of his thoughts. Such distancing or reification of the self, of writing as if one were one's own biographer rather than autobiographer, was not used to obtain greater objectivity of analysis, but rather made the author appear as an actor in his own account. The Commentaries of Pius II are no more personal than the Commentaries of Julius Caesar, and the histories of Villehardouin and Joinville tell us little of the authors' subjective awareness.
of their historical roles. Margery Kempe regularly referred to herself as "this creature," and in all the torrent of words this fifteenth-century woman released upon her harrassed secretaries, she never revealed even the nature of the secret sin which she could not confess and which drove her out of her mind. Any reader who expects the frankness of a Rétif de la Bretonne from medieval authors will be sorely disappointed, for a great leap in subjectivity separates medieval Europe from the eighteenth century.

Dreams are today such a powerful tool for analysis of the self that the modern reader might expect medieval dream reports to be closely tied to autobiography or self-examination. On the whole, they are nothing of the kind. Guibert reports frankly on a few of his dreams or visions, as did Gilbert of Sempringham and Rupert of Deutz. The eleventh-century monk Othlo of Sankt Emmeram relates some in his Book of Visions, but in the Book on the Temptations of a Certain Monk, Othlo can never bring himself to record the specific content of the vivid, erotic dreams which tormented him from early childhood and made him wish an angel would pluck "from his viscera the fiery tumor" which was inciting his flesh. Most dreams or visions were recorded by others, as Orderic Vitalis reported the vision of the priest Walchelin, who on the night of 1 January 1091 was terrified by a hellish troop of the dead, including women riding on saddles covered with red-hot nails as a punishment for their mortal "obscene delights and seductions" and his own brother with fiery spurs to which he had been condemned because of his eagerness to shed blood in battle. Hundreds of reports of such experiences are extant, providing fascinating, if difficult, material for the psychohistorian. But though dreams may be used
to examine the inner life of the dreamer, in the middle ages they were
normally not considered psychologically creative but imposed experiences,
originating from such causes as poor digestion, carnal prompting,
irritating anxiety, or demonic or other external influences. 18

Dreams or visions, sometimes troublesome or indeed terrifying,
could also be accepted positively as divine inspirations, as they were
for Abbess Hildegarde of Bingen. Hildegarde was an effective
administrator as well as an intelligent student of science, a talented
poet and a devout contemplative, though from childhood until her
death at 82 she suffered from repeated and protracted illness which
has been described as "a functional nervous disorder" or "hystero-
epilepsy," or what today might be diagnosed as temporal lobe epilepsy. 19
Hildegarde read widely in the best scientific works available, Hugh of
St. Victor, Bernard Sylvester, the translations of Gerard of Cremona.
She incorporated this knowledge and then perceived it in visions which
seemed to her more "real" than her own thoughts: "From my infancy . . .
I had always seen this light in my spirit and not with external eyes,
nor with any thoughts of my heart nor with help from the senses." 20
Hildegarde, who combined intelligence and a passion for learning with
a fascination with deterministic systems and a comparative lack of
subjective consciousness, understood herself in terms of inspiration
rather than personal expression and is comparable to Joan of Arc, who
believed her life was directed by voices today called "hallucinatory." 21

Terms like "hystero-epilepsy" or "hallucinatory" may shock
when applied to functionally effective people like Hildegarde and Joan.
They are used here in order to remind the reader that in the application
of psychology to history there is an ever-present danger of concentrating only on pathology or imposing modern Western values on another culture. If, as in the middle ages, a significant portion of a population sees visions or hears "voices" and is indeed honored for doing so, there is no historical, moral, or psychological value in labeling either the individuals or the society as "sick" or "pathological." Nevertheless, when medical or psychological diagnoses can explain a person's inability to carry out a desired act, or thoughts or behavior which otherwise seem strange, they can be a useful tool for the historian. If Cuibert of Nogent's treatise on relics was shaped by an excessive fear of sexual mutilation, if Bernard of Clairvaux suffered from an acute gastritis which interfered with his duties as abbot and may have caused him such pain that when he rode a mule all day along Lake Geneva this unusually observant man did not notice the scenery (a limitation of sight which John Addington Symonds blamed on his monk's cowl, not his physical condition), or if Abelard, after calling for a confrontation at the Council of Sens, failed to defend himself because of either acute depression or Hodgkins disease, then the accurate diagnosis and understanding of either physiologic or psychogenic conditions can enrich history without turning it into a form of anachronistic autopsy.

An egocentric logic suggests that greater awareness of the self precedes and permits greater awareness of the individuality, the special characteristics and indeed the motives of others. Possibly, however, the process works in the opposite direction, or is more likely reciprocal, for greater understanding and more acute observation of others may permit by comparison deeper understanding of the subjective
self. Despite the example of Augustine, clearer delineation of individuality appears in twelfth-century biography than autobiography. The limitations of biography in the Carolingian Renaissance are demonstrated by the most notable attempt of that period, the Life of Charlemagne, in which Einhard follows Suetonius both in what he feels free to record and in his very choices of words. Einhard's sparkling image of Charlemagne is like a mosaic created by rearrangement from tesserae taken from the work of another author, comparable to a cento on Christ restricted to phrases from Virgil. The saints' lives of the earlier period, based on other models, reveal even less of "personality," but are formulaic, didactic, and inspirational. In contrast, in the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century we see a multi-colored flowering of biography. Eadmer's Life of St. Anselm, "the first intimate portrait of a saint in our history," tells us much more of Anselm than Einhard ever conceived of writing about Charlemagne, and in the process tells us much of the author himself.

One could continue for pages with the great biographies, some but not all of saints, the Life of Ailred of Rievaulx by Walter Daniel, the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond, which records the life of his abbot Samson of Bury St. Edmond, the Magna Vita of St. Hugh of Lincoln by Adam of Eynsham, to name only a few. These books are so untraditional, so personal, that we can even see the individual proclivities of their authors. Jocelin, for example, is humorous and enamored with words: he notes Samson's reputation as a "disputer," praises the abbot's eloquence in Latin, French and the dialect of Norfolk, himself fakes a Scottish accent as a disguise in Italy, or repeats with bemusement a weak pun on the name of the Muses. Adam, on the other hand, is both more pious and more visually oriented,
achieving his best effects through images of actions, showing us Henry II at Woodstock angrily sewing a bandage on his finger in silence "to avoid doing nothing" and then, pierced by a daring jest, lying on the ground dissolved in laughter, or an infant, entranced by Bishop Hugh, chuckling with continuous delight and stretching out his arms as if to fly. Adam also reveals his own attitude toward "personality" in the way in which he explains the baby's pleasure: "What could the infant have seen in the bishop which gave it so much delight, unless it were God in him?" 27

Both Abbot Samson and Bishop Hugh were outstanding individuals, but perhaps the most interesting new departure in biography is in the lives of rather ordinary men who happened to be saintly. Stephen, first abbot of Obazine in the region of Limoges, came from a family of modest means and had only a rudimentary education. The verbose author of his Vita tells us the obligatory hagiographic requirements of his virtues and miracles, but through the anecdotes he reports he also presents a realistic portrait of a man who laughed vindictively when fire broke out in a house of canons who had turned him away, wandered about the cloister picking up scattered vegetables, could terrify two playful bakers with a cough, punished breaches of discipline severely, was also quick to extend the consoling arm of charity, and criticized "indecent" spitting and showing one's teeth while laughing. Religious zeal and piety aside, Stephen must have been like a great many other rough, emotional, and authoritarian leaders of his day. We know these characteristics because his biographer showed the everyday side of a man he considered a saint. 28
The profundity of spiritual meditations like those of Guigo or Bernard of Clairvaux, the confessional nature of the most revealing autobiography, and the religious function of so much biography lead us to examine with special attention the spiritual climate which nourished these works, particularly by a growing and institutionalized concern with confession and penance. In the setting of examination of conscience, either by private meditation or with the aid of a confessor or spiritual director, we find our clearest evidence of the contribution of the twelfth-century Church to the nurturing and propagation of introspection. The term "introspection" as used here does not mean exactly the same thing as "self-awareness," for a person may ruminate compulsively on a thought or fault without learning anything from the experience. For Freud and his followers, guilt is one of the greatest inhibitors of self-awareness, but in the march toward an increased understanding of the subjective self, guilt may be a necessary stage, either culturally or individually. A person who obeys the directions of authoritative internal voices may not feel guilt, nor does one whose actions are determined solely by the shame or honor bestowed by his peers. Examination of conscience and reflection on one's own faults, fostered by both the immediate family and the Church, must have helped to cause the apparent shift which changed medieval Europe from a "shame culture" to a "guilt culture," to use the terms once favored by anthropologists, or more precisely, from a shame-dominated culture to one in which guilt played a rapidly increasing role.

The concepts of "shame" and "guilt cultures" conveniently and attractively summarize many of the differences observable in earlier and
later medieval society, and yet there is a danger in their uncritical use, for human societies are not homogeneous and individuals are motivated by both shame and guilt. The aristocratic audience of the *Song of Roland* enjoyed that great epic at the same time that Guigo wrote his meditations and Guibert confessed his sins to God.\(^3\) How many medieval authors, including churchmen, ascribe their misfortunes, not to their own weaknesses, but to the envy of their rivals, to the jealousy of losengiers! Up to the present time, honor continues to challenge moral virtue as a major determinant of human behavior.\(^3\) Nevertheless, in the twelfth century guilt and its expiation became increasingly dominant themes in the spiritual literature and institutions of the middle ages, and the values and judgments of European society were never again to be as simple as they had been in the shame-conditioned world of Gregory of Tours.

The assessment of guilt is for us closely tied to the concept of intention. Intention was a matter of legal and moral concern to jurists of the late Roman Empire and some Fathers of the Church, but when Germanic culture became dominant, the importance of intention was significantly reduced. In Anglo-Saxon law a principle of simple behavior modification prevailed: "He who sins unknowingly shall pay for it knowingly."\(^3\) The assessment of early medieval wergeld had been based both on the gravity of the offense and the rank of the injured party. The beginning of a new attitude can be seen in the argument made about 1080 by Master Pepo, the legendary founder of the school of law at Bologna, that the punishment for homicide should not be determined by the status of the victim, for what was at stake was
the value of a human life. But Pepo, though critical of earlier Germanic practice and fascinated by what could be learned from Roman law, did not make an issue of intention, of a *mens rea*.

Throughout the early middle ages intention was the concern of authors of penitentials, not of law codes and commentaries, and even in the penitentials far more attention was concentrated on sinful actions than thoughts. With the Gregorian Reform and the great expansion of penitential literature in the twelfth century, which brought an increased emphasis on penance to ever-widening circles of the laity, intention, the choices and desires of the conscious self independent of specific actions, again became a central issue.

The way in which one twelfth-century man weighed the ancient literature on intention is laid bare in the dialectical presentation of Gratian's *Concordance of Discordant Canons*, significantly, in the tract on penance (C. XXXIII, q. 3). Here the old, conflicting authorities are mustered and called forth, on the one hand "A vow is treated as a deed," on the other the *Digest* 's "No one shall suffer punishment for a thought."

Midway through his discussion, Gratian stated as a provisional conclusion, "It appears clearer than light that sins are remitted, not by oral confession but inner contrition." But such an emphasis on an inner state of mind, revealed only to the subjective self and the deity who knows "the hearts and reins of men," could also be opposed on both practical and theoretical grounds. In the end Gratian left the question of the necessity of oral confession to the judgment of his readers, "for both sides are supported by wise and pious men." Within a few years Peter Lombard used many of the same authorities to reach the conclusion that confession to God alone is not sufficient if it is
possible to make oral confession to a man, preferably a priest. By the early thirteenth century the role of the priest as confessor was settled and a new style of Liber penitentialis, such as that of Robert of Flamborough, specified how penance should be weighted according to the individual characteristics of the penitent.  

Gratian's initial emphasis on inner contrition and the primacy of intention accorded with a powerful current of thought in his age. For twelfth-century scholars concerned with either classical or patristic authors, determining the intention of the writer became a powerful tool of literary analysis. In the realm of moral philosophy conscience and intention were topics of intense debate at Laon and Paris, and the subject found its most daring exposition in Abelard's Ethics, called in the manuscripts Know Thyself. Abelard went too far, as he often did, and carried an idea of Anselm of Bec beyond the pale in arguing that the crucifiers of Christ were innocent of unjust action (culpa), for they knew not what they did. Were Abelard's extreme conclusions the product of his relentless logic alone? We may well ask, for an anonymous twelfth-century poem states that Heloise was innocent of crime, for she did not "consent." We are reminded here of the growing canonistic agreement that consent rather than coitus makes a marriage. Abelard never mentions Heloise in his Ethics, but we would see him at his most human if we could think that his doctrine of intention, which earned him an article of condemnation at the Council of Sens, was an extended defense of the innocence of his beloved wife before man and before God. Few Christians could excuse the killers of Christ, but the anonymous poet absolved Heloise on the basis of her intention rather than her actions.
In the visual arts a similar decline and then reemergence of interest in the individual are apparent, though on the whole artists lagged behind authors in the renewed concern with personal representation. Individualized portraiture had been widespread in antiquity, in the busts of the Greek philosophers and rulers, the widely disseminated statues of the Roman imperial family, the haunting painted faces of quite common people found on the mummies of Fayum. But as individualization receded from biography with the Germanic invasions, so it was also reduced to a modicum in art. Even the exquisite Carolingian statue of a mounted emperor now in the Louvre cannot be identified with certainty as Charlemagne, so unsure are we of the physical appearance of this preeminent man. We find no interest in individualization in the elongated Romanesque statues of the west facade of Chartres, where one king of Israel looks like the next. How radical is the change in style in the differentiated faces of Reims, carved in the early thirteenth century! Here again is a "renaissance" phenomenon, for it is hard to treat as coincidental the resemblance of St. Peter at Reims to the official imperial bust of Antoninus Pius. In the visual arts this fascination with individualization becomes evident late in the twelfth century and rushes forward through the thirteenth century, through the awesomely mimetic statues of the long-dead male founders of the cathedral of Naumburg, on to the tomb statue of Rudolf of Hapsburg at Speyer, carved during his lifetime, whose sculptor was said to have hastened to alter his work after he had noticed a new line in the king's face. But such funerary effigies made from
living subjects, which indicate a desire to remember the dead as they actually were, appear only at the end of the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{46}

Change toward individualization was not only slow in the twelfth century, as compared to the thirteenth, but it was also uneven in the work of an individual artist. Just as an early medieval artist could use a late antique style to represent angels and a "Byzantine" style for other figures,\textsuperscript{47} so in the later twelfth century Abbess Herrad of Landsberg (or her illustrator) drew the faces of the damned at the Last Judgment with more differentiation than she gave to familiar people, herself included. In the "group portrait" of her convent (fig. 1), Herrad represented herself at full length, but her face is similar to the faces of sixty equally similar nuns who stare away from her. Except for two nameless nuns who bracket the congregation like parentheses, each of these women has her name written above her head, her only identifying distinction. Herrad could address her flock as individuals, but she did not choose to portray them as such.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless, the beginning of medieval "portraiture" appeared in a few isolated instances in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance.

The most famous artistic representation of an individual made in the twelfth century is the gilded bronze head, probably created in the 1160s, which Frederick Barbarossa presented to his godfather, Count Otto of Cappenberg. The artist made use of symbolic and unrealistic conventions, but his representation of the emperor accords with the cut of the hair described by Rahewin and there is no reason to doubt that his contemporaries could recognize his work as a likeness of Frederick. The significance of the Cappenberg head is twofold, or indeed double-
edged. It exists, and therefore shows that in the classicizing environment of Frederick's court the antique tradition of imperial portraiture could be revived, providing an example of true "renovatio."

On the other hand, the uniqueness of the head and our consequent inability to compare it with other "portraits" of even such a prominent figure as Frederick I emphasize the comparative rarity of the presentation of naturalistic likeness in twelfth-century art.⁴⁹

To attribute the scarcity of portraiture to the incompetence of artists would be improper, for eleventh and twelfth-century artists knew perfectly well how to depict recognizable individuals. The proof of this statement is to be found in the representation of certain prominent saints. The convention that St. Peter had a short, curly beard and the balding St. Paul a longer, pointed beard, to pick the most common example, was established in early Christian art and never disappeared (fig. 2).⁵⁰ The two saints who crown Otto III in the early eleventh-century Bamberg Apocalypse (fig. 3) have precisely the same faces as the images of Peter and Paul which unchangingly represent the papacy on the bulls of Pascal II and all his medieval successors (fig. 4).⁵¹ In short, artists could produce "portraits" as instantly recognizable as those of a modern cartoonist when they saw a reason to do so, and their preference for the conventional and symbolic representation of living individuals was a matter of choice. In the twelfth century historians and other authors frequently described individuals in a detailed, personal, and naturalistic fashion, and though these verbal portraits were heavily influenced by literary sources and sometimes by flattery, they were probably reasonably accurate.⁵²
That artists of the same period so rarely showed the same concern with individualized depiction of their subjects is apparently due to differences between the traditions and functions of the two forms of expression.

Interest in the presentation of character is one of the outstanding developments of innovative twelfth-century imaginative literature. The change from epic to romance, the growth of "poetic individuality," are subjects both too large and too familiar to be treated here. Two illustrations will have to stand as indications of the available evidence. Chrétien of Troyes is a particularly attractive author today because of the "psychological" dimension of his work. When compared to Roland and Oliver, Lancelot had an inner life of conflicting desire and reason. We understand the meaning, the intention of Lancelot's choice to enter the shameful cart only after we have witnessed the debate of Reason and Love which went on within him. Here is a form of psychomachia absent from the medieval epic tradition, a device of classical antiquity which persists through the earlier middle ages in the literature of the vices and virtues and will balloon to over 20,000 lines of internal debate in the Romance of the Rose, where Nature plays a role similar to the Freudian id. Moving from French to German vernacular literature, consider the account and judgment of Isolde's ordeal by Gottfried of Strasbourg, Chrétien's equal if not his superior in both wit and
psychological insight. In a few ironic lines Gottfried makes clear that his subject is not God's unchanging wisdom but the protean twists of human intention, so much more important than observed behavior:

And so it was made manifest
and proved to all the world by test
that Christ's law can be made to strain
like any windswept weathervane. 57

For Roland and indeed for Lancelot the issue of shame is paramount, but in Gottfried's work guilt, known by the audience and by Tristan and Isolde themselves if not by the witnesses of the ordeal, has been brought to the fore.

A name, a simple phonemic expression, can evoke an individual human being, a specific character. Gottfried ignored -- indeed was surely ignorant of -- the obscure Celtic antecedent of Tristan's name and offers this etymology:

Triste means "sad," "forlorn";
and since to sorrow born,
Tristan to all men he became;
baptized he was, Tristan his name. 58

In literature a prophetic "baptismal" name can easily encapsulate character, but real life is not so simple, and numbers as well as meanings of names must be considered. At first it seems contradictory that as we move forward from the Dark Ages to the twelfth century, the variety of names given at birth decreases. So much diversity exists in the jumble of tongues we find in Gregory of Tours, the combination and recombination of meaningful syllables in Germanic "lending names,"
and so little in the baptismal names of the twelfth century, when
a banquet in Normandy was limited to knights named Guillaume and
110 men of the same name jammed into the hall.⁵⁹ We may be reminded of
a similar shift in another culture, when under the conformity-producing
influence of Islam the onomastic richness of the early desert Arabs
was reduced to the routine Muḥammads and ʿAlīs.⁶⁰

In Western Europe the paradoxical shift proves to be more
apparent than real, for the complex names of Germanic Europe were often
created to indicate lineage rather than personal characteristics, as
today breeders name horses and dogs. As conformity to a relatively
restricted list of the names of saints and recognized heroes became
more general, the need for accurate individualization produced added
appellations, frequently indicating not family or locale (though
these too were part of a "person") but recognizable characteristics.
In the 1140s three canons of the cathedral of Troyes named Peter sat in
the stalls together; their colleagues distinguished them as Peter the
Squinter (Strabo), Peter the Drinker (Bibitor or Potator), and Peter
the Eater (Comestor or Manducator).⁶¹ Peasants too developed highly
distinctive, personalized names through the use of cognomina or
nicknames, often more personalized than those used by the aristocracy:
Odeline la mignote, Emeline la fadoule, Odeline called Queen (dicta
Regina), Pierre bon genre, Isabelle la lardone, Jean lo conite, Robin
cor deqris, Etienne grant et bele, to pick a few from a thirteenth-
century serf-list.⁶² As family names for peasants became more routine,
characterization in naming was reduced, but we should not forget that
it grew in the twelfth century and flourished in the thirteenth.
"What's in a name?" is a question posed long before Shakespeare, for it lies at the heart of the debate over the meaning of universals. That question could rise, inflated with logic and learning, to explode catastrophically against the mystery of the Trinity, but in the schoolroom the most concrete topic for debate was the observable reality of personalized differences between individuals who still had something in common. How can the words homo or albus be predicated of Socrates or Plato? If we take "Socrates is white" to be the locating of the individual (in-dividuum) Socrates among other individuals, such as Plato, that are white, the statement makes no sense, for if Socrates is altogether indvidable, there is nothing that is common to both Socrates and Plato and no ontological basis for locating the two white things in a single group. And if we take "Socrates is white" to be the locating of whiteness in Socrates, we have pulled a thread that leads to the unraveling of the individual to an aggregate of properties, for "he" will turn out to be only an inexplicable congeries of universals. The problem faced by Abelard and his fellows was that the first approach erodes the universal, the second the individual. Though they phrased their arguments with ancient referents, early scholastic philosophers were as deeply concerned with the contemporary problem of understanding the relationship of the individual self to others as was the more mystical Bernard of Clairvaux preaching to his monks to know themselves.

The monasteries and the schools of the secular clergy differed with respect to dominant attitudes, for the former foster humility and obedience and based self-fulfillment on contemplation and community life, the latter thrived on intellectual pride and questioning. The contrast should not be overstressed, for Abelard spent the last and highly
productive third of his life as a monk and the brilliant Benedictine theologian Rupert of Deutz daringly asserted his reliance on his personal talents (proprium ingenium). Moreover, one may wonder if the questions of interiority so sharply debated in the twelfth-century schools by such masters as Gratian, Lombard, and Peter the Chantor could have been developed as they were if monastic culture had not prepared the way. The monasteries not only transmitted the learning and literature of antiquity but had applied themselves to an examination of the inner life in their own special way. Such profound psychologists as John Cassian and Evagrius Ponticus had directed early monastic contemplation to questions of will and the human passions and the regular reading of these authors, coupled with the discipline of community life, must have had a continuing effect on those prepared to be receptive. In many ways the twelfth-century concern with the self and others discussed in this essay can be seen as a spreading of monastic habits of thought to a larger world.

"The first degree of humility is obedience without delay," St. Benedict had written in his Rule, citing the Psalmist, "At the hearing of the ear he hath obeyed Me." In a Benedictine community the commands of the abbot could be treated as the voice heard by the Psalmist, and the Rule prescribed instant, unreflective obedience as the first step toward a life of Christian charity. Benedict expected that his monks had renounced their own wills; the authoritative voice of the abbot should ring out louder than the murmuring of monks discussing their interpretations of a written Rule. The Rule of St. Benedict is not simply an expression of a sixth-century mentality; it dominated the religious structure of monastic Europe till the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when it was partially replaced by new forms of organization.

Why did thirteenth-century men and women flock to the new mendicant orders? One reason may be found in simple economic reality,
for the religious expansion of the twelfth century had put heavy pressure on the resources of monasteries and collegiate churches, and it was much cheaper to establish a house for urban mendicants than to provide for monks, even hardworking Cistercians, or canons. But while financial considerations may have affected both benefactors and converts to the religious life, the new rules reveal an altered ideal of the relationship of the individual to a religious community. A comparison of the Rule of St. Benedict and the various redactions of the Rule of St. Francis shows dramatically how much change had taken place in the twelfth century. Francis of Assisi stressed vocation rather than organization, and he reveled in an absence of hierarchy in his "order." "Through spiritual charity let them render services willingly and obey each other mutually," he wrote in his first brief precepts. In the more formalized rule of 1221, when organizational requirements seemed to make "ministers" necessary, he limited their authority: "If any one of the ministers gives to his brothers an order contrary to our rule or to conscience, the brothers are not bound to obey him, for obedience cannot command sin." Francis was readier to accept authority than Peter Waldo, who eventually suffered excommunication for disobedience; he used commands as well as admonitions in his Rule, but he was reluctant to impose authority on the consciences of others. The Dominicans, adopting a modified form of the Augustinian Rule, found another, innovative way to limit the authority of superiors, introducing the election by majority vote of officers to serve for specified periods of time.

The attentive reader may have noted elements of metaphorical construction in this essay, such as the movement "outward" from meditation to autobiography to biography and so on, continuing on to institutional rules. This consciously created design is obviously set within a commonly acknowledged framework of "expanding" categories;
indeed, the idea of order itself is a human construction. The author has been "unconscious" of other assumptions, collective or personal, which have shaped his choice of words and ideas. Language and metaphor both limit and stimulate the ways we think, including the ways we think about ourselves. Freud's popularization of the concepts of the "id" and the "unconscious" has had an obvious effect on modern ideas of the self. Though there is a perfectly good Latin word for self, so that Fulbert of Chartres could write a poem *Ad se ipsum de se ipso*, there is no medieval word which has anything like the meaning of "personality" and *persona* was still defined in the twelfth century primarily in its etymological sense as a mask held before an actor. In this paper the word "personality" has always been enclosed in quotation marks as a reminder that a medieval person could never verbalize the idea of having a "personality." Nevertheless, one feature of the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century is the growth of precision in language and definition and the propagation of metaphoric terms like "microcosm" and "macrocosm" which facilitated new conceptualizations, indeed, new forms of consciousness. The treatises *De anima* which were recovered or written in this period encouraged and permitted a collective language of awareness.

Whatever the causes, European authors in the twelfth century had a clearer sense of their own inner life and their relations to others than their Carolingian predecessors. A heightened sense of history is a form of self-consciousness, and in both theology and in the study of *res gestae* the twelfth century was a great age of historical awareness. Investigation of the concept of "experience"
also forces special consideration of the role of the self.\textsuperscript{74} In scientific cosmology, Man self-consciously marked out his place in the universe. Perhaps increased political stability and material wealth encouraged an optimistic humanism, but the self-esteem, the positive view of the powers of human reason which we see in the best scientific and theological writing may also have helped to create a collective consciousness of human dignity.\textsuperscript{75}

These compressed pages have attempted to illustrate from a variety of fields a striking growth of self-awareness in the twelfth century, without suggesting that these people had a sense of subjectivity anywhere nearly as fully developed as our own. Two great limiting restraints in the mentality of the twelfth century are readily apparent.

In the first place, the conceptualization of the nature of self and of what we call "personality" differed from our own. To state the matter in a metaphor of direction, in the middle ages the journey inward was a journey toward self for the sake of God; today it is commonly for the sake of self alone.\textsuperscript{76} In the modern secular world, when a person sets out to "find himself," this quest is usually conceived of as a stripping away of the layers of conformity and contrived artifice and the psychological defenses which encrust, hide, and even smother the "true self." It is as if each wondrously unique infant were wrapped by its social environment in thick swaddling clothes which must be broken or cut away in order for the individual "personality" to appear most fully. In medieval thought the \underline{persona} was not inner but outer, and looking behind the individualized mask eventually brought
one closer to the uniqueness, not of self, but of God. Modern readers more concerned with personality than the soul find Dante's *Inferno* far more interesting than his *Paradiso*, but Dante's own pilgrimage was away from both hell and personality.

A second restriction was the availability of very limited and mechanical theories of what creates individuation or "personality" — and it should be noted that what creates individuality, not conformity, was the major question examined. When Matthew of Vendôme wished to explain why one of his academic rivals was a treacherous and scandalous scoundrel, the matter was simple: Arnulf of Orléans had red hair. This conclusion had all the authority of proverbial wisdom, "Never trust a red-head" (*In rufa pelle nemo latitat sine felle*). Other differences were created by "national character." Jacques of Vitry wrote early in the thirteenth century of the mutual "national" insults exchanged in the schools of Paris: the English were said to be great drinkers and had tails; the French were proud, delicate, and womanizers; the Germans were mad and given to obscenity at social gatherings.

Such simplistic views were too crude for the better scientific minds of people who observed differences among Germans, French, and English or even the red-headed. Physiological theories inherited from antiquity, which find their modern counterpart in Sheldonian somatotyping, explained differences of character in terms of the balance of the four bodily fluids or cardinal humors, blood, phlegm, and black and yellow bile, which when dominant produced the sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholic, and choleric temperaments. Different balances,
and the new combinations in children engendered by men and women of different humoral types, could create quite a sophisticated variety of physiologically determined character traits, as Hildegarde of Bingen explained in one of her treatises. 79

Alternatively, our fates could be found in the stars, as we are reminded by such terms for temperament as mercurial, martial, saturnine, or jovial. Since both humoral theory and astrology were developed in antiquity and transmitted, often by means of translations, to the twelfth century, this revival of learning must also be considered a "renaissance" phenomenon. 80 Since it was obvious to any reasonably informed scholar that the celestial bodies had an effect on climatic conditions, agriculture and the movement of the tides, it is not surprising that most people believed that they also influenced mutable human beings, and astrology was simply an attempt to set that belief on a sound theoretical foundation. Nevertheless, though physiological or astrological explanations of differences of character satisfied a large percentage of the population, they posed both a social and spiritual threat that was met by recourse either to free will or the will of God. Hildegarde placed her ultimate deterministic faith not in the power of the planets but the permission and decree of God, and Abelard, more conscious of the element of human choice, criticized humoral prediction and noted that astrologers would foretell on the basis of the stars what others would do, but were unable to predict intention and feared to make such a forecast directly to the person involved because he might prove them wrong by deliberately following an alternative course. 81
In determining the characteristics and destinies of humans, the concept of free will, which gives the greatest incentive for self-awareness and the choice of one's destiny, lies at one extreme. Mechanistic explanation of individual differences occupies a middle ground, and in its medical form with its possibility of altering the balance of the humors through diet or other means, it offers the hope of some conscious control of the differentiated self. We must not forget, however, that throughout the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century a dark and ancient substratum persisted, the belief that Fate determines all and can be discovered by magical practices, that individual selves have no meaning in a world where neither choice nor chance exist.

The survival of an ancient, unselfconscious system of belief can be seen in the practice of fortune telling or sortilege. It was, like witchcraft, condemned repeatedly by the Fathers of the Church, successive church councils and the medieval canonists, and was eventually forced underground though never eliminated. Its open practice in the twelfth century is clearly revealed in an English scientific miscellany. After illustrating the ancient "sphere of Pythagoras" and other predictive devices, the manuscript continues in a bold hand with a mass for telling fortunes by lot, including an episcopal benediction. The supplicant then casts three dice which determine one of fifty-six "fortunes," the sortes sanctorum, apparently derived from texts of the Hellenistic east, including such vague wisdom as "The winds are cruel" or "You have honey and seek vinegar." What is striking is not the banality of the "fortunes," but that in the twelfth century such a denial of conscious decision-making could be conducted with episcopal sanction. That such
practices eventually lost their official approval is shown by the same manuscript, since a late fourteenth-century hand has added a new litany and a set of rules for this form of sortilege, beginning with the instruction, "Whoever wishes to administer these fortunes should go into a secret room or a field, so that no one may disturb or come upon him. . . ." 83

The twelfth century was not as brilliantly self-conscious, or even interested in the search for self-awareness, as an isolated reading of Abelard's Know Thyself would suggest, but what is unquestionable is that changes, dramatic changes, did occur in spite of all the limiting factors. Qualitative judgments about a culture based on the examination of a few individuals are always questionable; if asked whether Augustine understood himself and his feelings better than Guibert of Nogent or Rousseau, we might well answer in the affirmative, but we would have to add that Augustine is a thoroughly unrepresentative figure of his own period, as it were a mountain surrounded only by hills. But if we look comparatively at the relative, quantitative indications of self-examination and concern with the inner life of oneself and of others, it is easy to see that there was significantly more of such interest in the twelfth century than in earlier medieval times. A quantitative graph, if one could be constructed accurately, would probably show a decline from the time of Augustine roughly coincident with the Germanic invasions, only a slight increase in the Carolingian Renaissance, a rise in the eleventh century which sharply increases in the twelfth, and then a continuing increase up to the present.

Comparison of this sort is relatively easy within one cultural
tradition. Comparison between differing cultures is much more difficult, for it is by no means clear what weight and significance to attach to different indications of the awareness of self. We have seen, for example, that twelfth-century Europe produced practically no individualized portraiture and that most evidence of concern with individual differences appears in writing. We have some grounds for comparing the levels of awareness of self and the determinants of individual differences found in Carolingian and twelfth-century Europe, but how could we compare either culture with the Merovingians' contemporaries in Peru? There Moche artists have left us stunningly differentiated sculptured pots, some of them apparently authentic portraits, but no written records at all. This extreme case is cited only as an illustration of the nature of the comparative problem. Even where extensive written records exist, the difficulty of comparing the level and nature of self-awareness of medieval Western Europe with the culture of Islam, Mediterranean Judaism, or even Christian Byzantium seem immense, though perhaps not insurmountable.

Where comparison is difficult, explanation is too, and yet some attempt at explanation should be made. For such complex phenomena as those discussed here we can scarcely expect a single explanation, for influences must surely have been reciprocal, but it should still be useful to consider explanations under separable headings. A change in psychology invites first a psychological explanation. If twelfth-century Europeans were more interested in themselves, more ready to take the risks of turning inward, then they probably had more self-esteem, or a different sense of self-worth, than their Merovingian and Carolingian predecessors. A sense of self-esteem, we know today,
is most easily formed in childhood, and we attribute that process in large part to the role of parents or their surrogates. Was love or "marital affection" between spouses more likely to be found in twelfth-century families than in earlier centuries? Did social restraints on infanticide leave surviving children with a greater sense of security? Were parents or nurses, or at least some of them, more nurturing in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries than they had been in a previous age?

Evidence of an increased concern with family life and the nuturance of children in the twelfth century can be found, though it is scanty and sometimes contradictory. In his discussion of the disadvantages of marriage in his autobiographical letter Abelard assumed that a child would be a noisy bother precisely because the baby would be cared for by a nurse in his own home and not sent out to a wet-nurse, and in one of his hymns he pointed out that the infant Jesus was more favored than the sons of kings because he was suckled by his own mother. The first biographer of Bernard of Clairvaux reported that the saint was nursed by his mother, though at the same time we must remember that Guillaume of St. Thierry was writing an idealized work of hagiography and that he quickly added that Aleth did not pamper her children with delicate food but toughened them with a coarse and common diet. The mother of Guibert of Nogent indulged her son with fine clothes, but he called her "cruel and unnatural" when she abandoned him when he was about twelve. Both men probably absorbed a sense of guilt along with whatever self-esteem they derived from their mothers, and as has been suggested before, guilt rather than
shame may be a necessary stage in the development of introspection. An evolutionary psychogenic theory of the development of personality fits much of the observed evidence and deserves serious attention. Such a theory is hard to test by traditional historical methods, however, for the central issue here may not be "causation" but "function," the question of how cultures in the past "used" childhood "to synthesize their concepts and their ideals in a coherent design for living." A second theoretical approach is political, tied more, it should be said, to the development of individual liberties, the passage from subject to citizen, than to the growth of self-awareness, though the two phenomena may well have an intimate relationship. If civil society is to remain coherent, recognition of individual differences cannot easily be dissociated from a right for those differences to exist, or at least for individuals to have a certain equality before the law. In twelfth-century Europe a notable increase in codified or customary liberties occurred, the libertas ecclesie, the granting of town and communal charters, the rights of free men as they were set down in Magna Carta and other great charters. These political developments had traceable political antecedents in the practices of the Germanic right of resistance and in the contractual aspects of feudal relations, and in the view of at least one theorist they created the conditions for a greater sense of self-worth among certain groups of men. But it does not seem likely that wide-spread and large-scale changes in attitudes toward the self were solely or even primarily produced by political changes. It is hard to believe that Guigo the Carthusian wrote his meditations because of changes in the political world from which he had fled, or that the sculptures of
the facade of Reims differ from those at Chartres because of the communal liberties possessed by the burghers of Reims.

An economic theory for the growth of "individualism" can be developed with greater rigor than the political theory previously mentioned. Since specialization of labor provides economic benefits, internal economic forces produce a growing social differentiation of labor. Not only do some fight, others pray, and others work, but among those who work a growingly differentiated economy supports the smiths, farmers, bakers, fletchers, tanners, weavers, carters, and others whose names, now capitalized, remind us that a specialized occupation is a form of identity. And as rural and urban labor both become more specialized and more productive, so towns grow larger and assume new productive functions. What effect the growing towns of the twelfth century had on the people who lived in them is indeed uncertain. Did they produce urban alienation or urban freedom and self-fulfillment? Probably both, depending on both class and personal differences. In any case, the towns provided a significant stimulus for social, intellectual, and religious change, whether we think of the heresies carried from town to town by itinerant weavers and others, or the growing advantage which increasing wealth gave to cathedral schools and the newly emerging universities. It is obvious that wealth facilitated the expression of self-awareness in durable form. It is equally clear, however, that great wealth was not essential for psychological development. Iceland was one of the poorest countries of Greater Europe, but by the thirteenth century it was producing literature crammed with finely drawn, highly individualized
portraits of great psychological profundity. The first settlers of Iceland knew who they were, as we can see from the Book of Settlements or Landnámabók; by the thirteenth century their best authors could perceive and express what manner of people they were in all their multi-faceted diversity. The case of Iceland points to a weakness in a purely economic theory of the growth of self-awareness, for it seems probable that their priests had more impact on the mentality of the Icelanders than did the growing number of sheep.

What, indeed, was the influence of religion over such a luxuriantly diverse economic, political, and cultural area as that which stretched from Iceland to the Mediterranean? Although all the evidence discussed so far has been taken from the dominant Christian culture, in evaluating the role of religion we should avoid the unwarranted assumption that the Christian religion was uniquely capable of fostering the development of consciousness and increased psychological awareness. If by some chance the Jewish Khazars or the Muslim Moors instead of the Catholic Franks had created an empire in early medieval Europe, interest in the examination of the subjective self might have recovered at the same rate, or perhaps even faster. This conclusion is based on the existence of a form of "control group," the small Jewish communities which shared much of the same cultural, economic, and even political environment as their Christian neighbors, though they differed both through the effects of exile, hostility, and persecution and in a greater devotion to learning, which one of Abelard's students observed with envy.  

Some four centuries before the time of Christ, the prophet Joel had recorded the Lord's command to "rend your hearts and not your garments."

Judaism maintained and developed its own institutions for both inner contribution and public atonement, and twelfth-century Jews, like their Christian contemporaries, practiced examination of conscience and suffered from a sense of guilt. Following traditional liturgical forms they questioned whether their own faults were the cause of their exile and even internalized the epithets hurled at them by Christians, as can be seen in a liturgical poem composed by Rabbi Eleazar ben Nathan of Mainz for the Sabbath between the New Year and the Day of Atonement:

Let us return to our God in the sorrow of our exile,
For Thou art righteous in all that befalls us.
We have been sent away from Thy face for our sin of avarice.
Cause us to return and we shall return.
"Exiles the sons of exiles," they call us with enmity,
"Filthy lucre," they name us in condemnation. . . .

Jewish leaders urged self-examination on their own communities, and the Rhenish martyrs of 1096 even trusted that in the future their persecutors would become more self-aware: "Then they will comprehend and understand and admit in their hearts that they slew us for a vanity." 97

Whatever effect another religion might have had if it had prevailed, in fact Christianity triumphed in medieval Europe and we must therefore examine its influence on the majority of the population. A central problem, however, is that Christianity is and has been many things to many people. One can find in the Gospels a stress on intention ("who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart"); a private and personal relationship to God ("and when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites"); a rejection of form and ritual ("this people honors me with their lips, but their heart
is far from me" -- in this case a quotation from Isaiah). And on the other hand, the same Gospels provide an ample and express textual basis for a concern with the power of baptism, salvation by faith, respect for the law, and external miracles.

Emphasis on ritual, sacraments, relics, collective worship, and community life is as much a part of the Christian religion as concern with interiority and individual self-examination. When Gregory of Tours recounts how a priest drove away a demonic fly with a sign of the cross or that oil consecrated at the tomb of St. Martin cured a rash of pimples, his pura credulitas may appear today to be rank superstition, but by the standards of his own time he was nonetheless Christian and could devoutly worship a thaumaturgic Saviour who had cured a speech impairment by spitting and touching the tongue of the afflicted man. Paul and even more Augustine stressed the interiority of their religion; many other Christians did not. Augustine readily stressed his own personal responsibility -- "I, not fate, not fortune, not the devil" -- and he put so much trust in informed Christian virtue that he could even advise, "Love and do what you wish," a statement often quoted in the twelfth century. If Christianity in the period of the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century once more served to foster self-awareness, it must have been because of changes in that religion itself.

We are therefore brought back to a problem of historical change. Why and how did Christianity develop a renewed concern with the interior life? The reasons behind the change require deep examination, but very likely they are associated with other cultural changes already discussed --
political, economic, and probably particularly psychological. The means of propagating a change in religion are far clearer, for with the Gregorian Reform the Christian Church became better organized and effective in spreading and indeed enforcing whatever modes of religious thought were then dominant. The effect of that reform was felt most strongly by the clergy in the late eleventh and early twelfth century, and in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Christian beliefs and practices of the time were then institutionalized and came to have more and more effect on a receptive European populace.

Different readers will weigh these, and perhaps other, explanatory theories differently, and far more must be known about self-awareness and consciousness of others in both medieval European and other cultures before solid statements about the relative importance of various causative influences can be seriously proposed. At this point, however, the author may state briefly his own tentative and personal conclusions. Germanic Europe's political tradition of "individualism" provided a fertile ground in which concern with the self and others could grow, though it is hard to see that early Germanic culture as a whole provided an environment favorable to self-awareness. Changing attitudes were nurtured and in some cases probably produced by changing economic conditions, particularly specialization of labor, greater wealth, and the growth of towns. Intellectual support was provided by both a "classical renaissance" and "reformed" religion, and while intellectual arguments on the nature of the individual were more likely influenced by other changes in society than their fundamental cause, the development of a richer and more precise vocabulary for the
discussion of the self surely had a cumulative effect on European consciousness. A shift from a culture in which shame and worth accorded by peers predominated to one in which a sense both of guilt and self-esteem became far more common profoundly affected the way in which individuals perceived themselves, and here we should distinguish between childhood and adult influences. For children changes in family structure, marital love, and maternal nurturance must be considered fundamental; for adults the most important influences encouraging self-awareness and examination were the institutions of the reformed Church. Childhood and adult influences surely were reciprocal, for the institutions of the Church had their effect on family life and child care, and every adult who legislated and enforced changes, exhorted and gave moral instruction, or nurtured children more or less well had been a child subject to the shaping influence of family life. The two stages of life cannot be separated, and as we seek to know more about the growth of self-awareness in the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century we should look most closely at the influence of Mother Church and biological mothers.
FOOTNOTES

Introductory note: For extensive discussion and criticism which has greatly aided the revision of this paper, I am indebted to the members of the conference on the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (especially the editors of this volume) and of the Group for Psychology in the Humanities at Caltech. Among other friends who have made major contributions to my thinking, I should name in particular Professors Elizabeth Brown, Gérard Caspary, Max Delbrück, and S. D. Coiteux.


3. Pierre Courcelle, *Connaiss-toi toi-même: de Socrate à saint Bernard*, Études augustiniennes (2 vols., Paris, 1974-75). Courcelle states (1, 231) that there was a break in the consideration of the topic in the West in the seventh and eighth centuries, and that John the Scot, who translated large portions of Gregory of Nyssa, was the only ninth-century occidental author to treat the precept at length.

4. I have treated the issue of "individualism" in "Individualism and Conformity in Medieval Western Europe" in *Individualism and*
Conformity in Classical Islam, ed. Amin Banani and Speros Vryonis, Jr. (Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 145-158. The present essay is intended to complement that lecture delivered at a conference where the theme and the effort at cross-cultural comparison were determined by an orientalist, Prof. S. D. Goitein.

5. In *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Boston, 1976), Julian Jaynes argues that consciousness is not an inherent attribute of the human condition but has had specific, historic origins in what he calls the breakdown of the bicameral mind, occurring at different times in different cultures, "bicamerality" being a condition in which the right hemisphere of the brain dictates to an "unconscious" left hemisphere. While I have found Jaynes' book heuristically stimulating, his theories that "consciousness" in humans developed relatively recently on the evolutionary scale and is closely related to a highly-developed, metaphorical language are not in accord with the findings of current split-brain research; cf. Roger W. Sperry, "Changing Concepts of Consciousness and Free Will," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 20 (1976), 9-19, and "Forebrain Commissurotomy and Conscious Awareness," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 2 (1977), 101-26.


The first "volume" has been translated as *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity* (2 vols., London, 1950 and Cambridge, Mass., 1951). In that *History*, 1, 8 (Geschichte, 1, 11) Misch says, "In a certain sense the history of autobiography is a history of self-awareness (menschlichen Selbstbewusstsein)."


12. Since publishing "Fraud, fiction and borrowing in the correspondence of Abelard and Héloïse" in *Pierre Abélard -- Pierre le Vénérable*, Colloques internationaux du C.N.R.S., 546 (Paris, 1975), I am much more willing to accept the view that the *Historia calamitatum* and the other letters in the correspondence attributed to Abelard are indeed his own compositions. My reasons for this change will be presented at the international conference on Abelard to be held at Trier in April 1979.

13. Passages from a number of works in which Gerald wrote about himself, notably *De rebus a se gestis*, have been edited and translated by H. E. Butler, *The Autobiography of Giraldus Cambrensis* (London, 1937).

In The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography (Chicago and London, 1978), Karl Joachim Weintraub states, correctly, I believe, "The full convergence of all the factors constituting this modern view of the self [i.e., the emergence of individuality as a self-conscious concern] occurred only at the end of the eighteenth century" (p. xv). The viewpoint of his survey of autobiographical literature from Augustine to Goethe differs significantly from this essay primarily because his major concern is individuality, not self-awareness. As he says on p. xiv, "St. Augustine produced in the Confessions an autobiographical form and a view of the self (though not of individuality) of extraordinary power for the subsequent story."

Othlo, Liber de tentatione cuiusdam monachi, Migne, P.L. 146, 47, and Liber visionum, ibid., 343-388; the religious rather than the psychological aspects of his life are stressed by Helga Schauwecker, Otlo von St. Emmeram, Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens und seiner Zweige, 74 (Munich, 1965).


18. Much material on visions has been brought together but not treated with psychological depth by Carolly Erickson, *The Medieval Vision: Essays in History and Perception* (New York, 1976). In his classification of dreams in the immensely influential *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, 1, 3, 1-8, ed. James Willis, *Bibliotheca Teubneriana* (Leipzig, 1970), pp. 8-10, Macrobius is interested only in oracles or visions, because they allow one to deal with or foresee future events; dreams which arise *ex habitu mentis* are of no concern because they have "no utility or significance."

19. The quoted diagnosis is that of Charles Singer, M.D., "The Visions of Hildegard of Bingen," in *From Magic to Science* (New York, 1928), pp. 199-239. Much research on temporal lobe epilepsy, which produces visual hallucinations of formed images, has been done since the time of Singer's essay.


21. The highly structured, geometric forms revealed to Hildegarde suggest the value of comparison with similar figures produced by visionary mystics like Joachim of Fiore (see Marjorie Reeves, *The Figurae of Joachim of Fiore* [Oxford, 1972]) and Ramón Lull (see Frances A. Yates, "The Art of Ramón Lull," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 17 [1954], 115-173), or a "certified"
hysterical neurotic like Opicinus de Canistris (see Richard Salomon, Opicinus de Canistris [London, 1936] and Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art [New York, 1952], pp. 118-127. Joan of Arc is mentioned here, not because her well-documented accounts of her voices are particularly unusual, but because she is the only medieval individual named in Jaynes' Origin of Consciousness (see pp. 74, 79), who suggests an explanation for those voices as right-hemispheric messages perceived (or "heard") by the left side of the brain.


23. Louis Halphen, Études critiques sur l'histoire de Charlemagne (Paris, 1921), pp. 91-95. In the twelfth century William of Malmesbury avoided the annalistic style by following the structure of Suetonius,
but he clearly felt much freer to digress than Einhard had; see Marie Schütt, "The Literary Form of William of Malmesbury's 'Gesta Regum'," _English Historical Review_, 46 (1931), 255-260.


26. _The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond_, ed. and trans. by H. E. Butler, Medieval Texts (Edinburgh and London, 1949), pp. 34, 40, 48, 130; in the final example, to decline _musa, musae_ was commonplace, for it was a paradigm in the _Ars Minor_ of Donatus.

of contrasts between guilt and shame, Herbert Morris, *On Guilt and Innocence* (Berkeley, 1976), p. 62, states that "shame connects with sight and guilt with hearing." Although this suggested contrast has a certain *a priori* plausibility, it is not supported by the two authors cited here, for the more visual Adam seems to be more concerned with guilt than the verbal Jocelin.


"qui inscienter peccat, scienter emendet" see *Leges Henrici primi*, ed. Leslie J. Downer (Oxford, 1972), c. 88, 6a (p. 270), c. 90, 11a (p. 282), and cf. c. 70, 12b (p. 222). King Alfred's well-known ordinance (Alf., cap. 36) that a man who killed another while carrying his spear in a "safe" manner over his shoulder owed payment to the victim's family but could purge himself of wite owed to the king seems more to be an assessment of a degree of criminal negligence than a judgment of innocence by virtue of an absence of criminal intent. Moreover, Alfred's distinction is most significant because of its exceptional character.


35. Charles M. Radding, "Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach," *American Historical Review*, 83 (1978), 577-597, treats in detail the absence of concern with intention in early medieval law and makes stimulating use of modern theories of the stages of moral development in children as studied by Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Elliot Turiel and others. Impressed by the fact that penitentials commonly quoted or paraphrased earlier authorities, he places less emphasis on
the importance of penitential literature than I am inclined to do:
"The penitentials, therefore, provided not an original moral sense, but an affirmation of belief in authority" (p. 589). In contrast, the position taken in this paper is that the availability of patristic and other "authorities" dealing with intention and examination of conscience meant that, unlike children, twelfth-century Europeans did not have to create a new, previously unexperienced moral stage, but instead renewed or increased a concern with interiority already known in late Antiquity. "Authoritative" moral statements surely carried more weight in the middle ages than "novelties." Thomas P. Oakley's still useful English Penitential Discipline and Anglo-Saxon Law in their Joint Influence, Columbia University Studies in Political Science, 107, 2 (New York, 1923), concludes (p. 200) with an approving quotation from Henry Charles Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1896), 2, 107: "It was no small matter that the uncultured barbarian should be taught that evil thoughts and desires were punishable as well as evil acts."

36. The citations from Gratian are De Pen. D.1 c.5 ("Augustine"); c.14 (Dig. 48.19.18); dict. p. c. 30 (Gratian); and dict. p. c. 89 (Gratian); ed. Friedberg, 1, cols. 1159, 1161, 1165, 1189. Although Gratian wrongly attributes to Augustine "Votum enim pro opere reputatur," the statement is a fair summary of much patristic thought; it is a paraphrase of Cassiodorus, Exp. in ps. XXXI, 5 in PL 70, 220

37. On the treatment of intentio by such commentators as Abelard, Honorius Augustodunensis, Gerhoch of Reichersberg and others, see the article in this volume by Nikolaus M. Häring, "Commentary and Hermeneutics," (pp. 145-16 of conference version). Bernard of Utrecht, writing at the end of the eleventh century, is the earliest author of an accessus known to have replaced the seven formal questions mandated by Priscian (quis, quid, ubi, etc.) with three new questions, of which one was the intention of the writer; see Conrad de Hirsau, Dialogus super auctores, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Brussels, 1955), p. 11.


39. Orleans, Bibl. mun. ms. 284 (olim 238), p. 183:

Sola tamen Petri coniunx est criminis expers,

Consensus nullus quam facit esse ream.
The poem is partially edited and translated with commentary by Peter Dronke, Abelard and Heloise in Medieval Testimonies, W. P. Ker Lecture, 26 (Glasgow, 1976), esp. pp. 45-46.


41. I am aware that many of the Egyptian mummy "portraits," particularly from the third century A.D. and beyond, are not actual portraits, but there are some which seem to have been painted from life. See David L. Thompson, The Artists of the Mummy Portraits (Malibu, Calif., 1976), p. 12.


44. Hans Jantzen, *Die Naumburger Stifterfiguren*, Reclams Werkmonographie (Stuttgart, 1959) and E. Schubert, *Der Naumburger Dom* (Berlin, 1968). It is worth noting that the male faces in the choir at Naumburg show greater "individuality" than the three women.


46. It is curious that the tomb of Rudolf of Hapsburg is as far as I know the earliest for which there is direct, independent evidence of funerary sculpture made from life, since death masks were made at the beginning of the period we are considering; for the death mask of Hildegard of Bürten (d. 1094), now in the Musée de l'Oeuvre Notre-Dame at Strasbourg, see *Die Zeit der Staufer*, ed. Reiner Hausscherr et al., Württembergisches Landesmuseum, Katalog der Ausstellung (4 vols., Stuttgart, 1977), 1, 270, no. 385 and 3, 344.

47. For example, contrast the "classical" style of the attendant angels with the "Byzantine" style of the Virgin and Child at S. Maria in Trastevere at Rome, illustrated in Prof. Kitzinger's paper for this conference, figure 10.

Landsperg (Stuttgart, 1818), plate XII; a reproduction from a hand-colored copy of the Engelhardt plate will appear in the new Warburg edition of the Hortus prepared under the direction of Dr. Rosalie Green, who has generously aided me with advice about this picture. Although the original manuscript was destroyed in 1870, the similarity of the faces in the "group portrait" can also be seen in the tracing in Paris, B.N., Cabinet des Estampes, Coll. Bastard, Ad 144a folio, fol. 323r, p. 122 (kindly located for me by Prof. James Greenlee). For the damned at the Last Judgment see plate LXXI of the Straub and Keller edition. In plate Vbis (fol. 38 recto) the faces of Pharaoh and King David are practically identical. In his introduction Canon Keller remarks (p. vi) that "les physionomies en général se ressemblent et n'ont pas de caractère individuel."

49. On this uncommon effigy see Herbert Grundmann, Der Cappenberger Barbarossakopf (Cologne and Graz, 1959), and Horst Appuhn, "Beobachtungen und Versuche zum Bildnis Kaiser Friederichs I. Barbarossa in Cappenberg," Aachener Kunstblätter, 44 (1973), pp. 129-92 (with bibliography), and Prof. Sauerlander's paper for this conference, p. 000, where the head is reproduced as fig. 0. For Rahewin's description see below, n. 52.

50. The medallions illustrated in fig. 2 are from a late fifth-century mosaic in the archiepiscopal chapel at Ravenna, but a wealth of other early representations could have been used, such as the sixth-century Syrian silver vase found at Emesa (now in the Louvre) or the
sixth-century ivory diptych from Constantinople (now in the Staatliche Museum in Berlin), both illustrated in Age of Spirituality: Late Antique and Early Christian Art, Third to Seventh Century, ed. Kurt Weitzmann (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1979), no. 474, pp. 528-30 and no. 82, pp. 615-17.

51. On the Bamberg Apocalypse see Heinrich Wölfflin, Die Bamberger Apokalypse. Eine Reichenauer Bilderhandschrift vom Jahre 1000 (Munich, 1918). The bulls illustrated in fig. 4 are of Popes and , but the choice is un consequential, for the representations of Peter and Paul remained practically static from Pascal II (1099-1118) to Pius II (1458-1464); see Camillo Serafini, Le monete e le bolla plumbee pontificie del Medagliere vaticano (4 vois., Milan, 1910; repr. Bologna, 1965), 1, 25 and 124 and plates H and M.

52. Most of Rahewin's "portrait" of Frederick I is drawn from the descriptions by Apollinaris Sidonius of Theodoric II, Einhard of Charlemagne, and Jordanes of Attila the Hun, with a few words of his own on Frederick's hair; see Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, 4, 86, ed. Georg Waitz and Bernard von Simson, MGH, SS rer. Germ. in usum schol. (3rd ed., Hanover and Leipzig, 1912), pp. 342-44. Far more realistic and concerned with character is Peter of Blois in writing of Henry II, see ep. 66, P.L. 207, 195-210 and the curious dramatic dialogue between the king and the abbot of Bonneval, ibid., 975-988. Erich Kleinschmidt has gathered material on the conventions
of the *descriptio personarum* and its application to rulers in
Herrscherdarstellungen: Zur Disposition mittelalterlichen
Aussageverhaltens, untersucht an Texten über Rudolf I. von Habsburg,
Bibliotheca Germanica, 17 (Berne and Munich, 1974), pp. 11-90. For
the highly formalized conventions of personal descriptions in
literature see Alice M. Colby, *The Portrait in Twelfth-Century French
Literature* (Geneva, 1965).

53. This point is discussed in the section on "style" in Durant W.
Robertson, Jr., *A Preface to Chaucer: Studies in Medieval
Perspectives* (Princeton, 1962). For a much fuller treatment of
twelfth-century literature, which deals with "inner awareness" as
well as individuality, see Robert W. Hanning, *The Individual in

54. See, for example, the concluding section, "From Epic to Romance,"
in Richard W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (London,
1953) and Peter Dronke, *Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages:

55. The term "psychological" is useful, but only if we remember how
different medieval ideas of psychology were from our own, that
character was treated as static rather than as something an author
should "develop" and that the concept of *tout comprendre est tout
pardonner* was foreign to medieval moral thought. D. W. Robertson
criticizes the idea that even the *Roman de la Rose* is a "psychological novel" in *Preface to Chaucer*, pp. 98 ff.


60. S. D. Goitein in Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam, pp. 6 and 14.

61. Jacques Laurent, Cartulaires de l'abbaye de Molesme (Paris, 1907-11), 2, 379, no. 334, incorrectly dated 1125 instead of 1145. Unless we assume that Petrus Potator was known for imbibing knowledge, it is hard to believe that the more famous Petrus Comestor received his name because he devoured books.


63. Abelard's investigation of the problems of predication is discussed in detail in Norman Kretzmann's paper for this conference, "The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter Abelard." The preceding four sentences summarize a memorandum kindly prepared for me by Prof. Kretzmann at the close of the conference.

64. Rupert's introduction to his commentary on the Apocalypse, PL 169, 827-828.

by Catherine Misrahi as *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* (New York, 1974).


69. For example, until I began these lines I had not realized that in the first draft of what I had written I placed a high positive value, often economic, on diversity, frequently calling it "rich" rather than, let us say, "confusing," and had used visual metaphors like "multi-colored," suggesting pleasurable stimulation, rather than auditory terms which might indicate a babble. I have now become aware of these personal and collective structures because the writing of this paper has "forced" me to do so.

71. In his theological dictionary Alan of Lille followed Boethius in his definition of *persona*: "Etiam apud illos qui tractant comoedias vel tragoedias persona dicitur histrio, qui variis modis personando diversos status hominum repraesentat, et dicitur persona a personando" (PL 210, 899), cited by Hans Rheinfelder, *Das Wort "Persona."* Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie, 77 (Halle, 1928), p. 19.

72. Harder to evaluate, because linguistic interaction had existed before, is the heightened consciousness of different "selves" which occurs when one speaks different languages, as well as the enrichment of vocabulary created by works like Burgundio of Pisa's translation of *De natura hominis* of Nemesius of Emesa, newly edited by Gérard Verbeke and J. R. Moncho (Leyden, 1975).


74. See the works cited by Dom Leclercq in his paper for this conference, "Le renouveau de la théologie," n. 42.


80. Haskins begins his chapter on Hugh of Santalla, the translator of Albumasar and Messahala, with a reference to "the renaissance of the twelfth century" in *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), p. 67. He used the same term in the first version of that essay in *Romanic Review*, 2 (1911), 1.


82. A fine historical survey, amply supported by quotations from the sources, is given by Odon Lottin, "Libre arbitre et liberté depuis saint Anselme jusqu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle," in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 4 vols. in 6 (Gembloux, 1948-1957), 1 (2nd ed., 1957), 11-389; cf. 3 (1st ed., 1949), 606-620.

83. Manuscript formerly at San Juan Capistrano, Calif., Honeyman MS. Gen. Sci. 1, fols. 48-50 (put up for sale by Sotheby's 2 May 1979). on the practice, see Pierre Courcelle, "Divinatio," in *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, 3 (Stuttgart, 1957), 1235-51 and

84. Although Christopher B. Donnan, Moche Art of Peru (Los Angeles, 1978) is concerned with art as a means of symbolic communication and does not discuss individuation in his catalogue, some of the portrait head bottles in figs. 1-9 illustrate my point.

85. The possibilities as well as some of the difficulties of comparative treatment can be seen in the essays collected in Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam (see above, n. 4) and East-West Studies on the Problem of the Self, ed. Poolla T. Raju and Albury Castell (The Hague, 1968). Alexander Altmann has collected material on "The Delphic Maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism" in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 1-40, a study to be compared with that of Pierre Courcelle cited in n. 3. For recent literature on Islamic autobiography (and to some extent biography) see Rudolf Sellheim, "Gedanken zur Autobiographie im islamischen Mittelalter," Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, supp. 3, 1 (1977), 607-12. The richest treatment of personal life in medieval Mediterranean Judaism is vol. 3 (1978) of S. D. Goitein's A Mediterranean Society (4 vols. projected, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967-), which deals with the family; vol. 4 will conclude with a section on "The Mediterranean Mind."
86. In spite of all that has been written about "courtly love" and adultery, what seems to me most interesting about new developments in the twelfth century is the growing attention paid to love between married spouses; see John T. Noonan, Jr., "Marital Affection in the Canonists," Collectanea Stephan Kuttner, 2, Studia Gratiana, 12 (1967), 479-509, and J. F. Benton, "Clio and Venus: An Historical View of Medieval Love" in The Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. Francis X. Newman (Albany, 1968), pp. 19-42. Literary specialists who often seem to be surprised that adultery is a relatively minor theme in their sources should now see William D. Paden, Jr., et al., "The Troubadour's Lady: Her Marital Status and Social Rank," Studies in Philology, 72 (1975), 28-50.


Szövérffy (2 vols. Albany, N. Y. and Brookline, Mass., 1975), hymn 32, p. 88; Abelard underlines the mercenary or even servile character of wet-nurses by the phrase "subacta nutricum ubera."


91. I am particularly impressed by the approach taken by Lloyd deMause in his introduction to *A History of Childhood*.


94. These ideas of the effect of increasing wealth and specialization of labor on "individuation" are presented in my own formulation. They require no special annotation, for they are commonplaces of late nineteenth-century economic and sociological theorists, such as Karl Marx in *Formen die der kapitalistischen Produktion vorhergehen*, written in 1858, published in Berlin in 1953 and interpretatively

95. Detailed, comparative study should be made of self-awareness in medieval Christian, Jewish and Islamic cultures, with particular attention to points of intercommunication and influence. In a private communication, Professor S. D. Goitein has suggested to me the Jewish pietists in Germany were influenced by their environment and that in the matter of self-awareness something new really began in western Christendom in the twelfth century. If Jewish introspection and self-awareness was significantly more advanced in Northern Europe than in the world revealed by the records of the Cairo Genizah (and in fact Maimonides seems to have had no time for introspection), then the Northern European environment, including its particular forms of Christianity, played a determining role in the development of consciousness of self. For the remark of Abelard's student on Jewish learning, see *Commentarius Cantabrigensis in Epistolas Pauli e Schola Petri Abaelardi*, ed. Artur M. Landgraf (Notre Dame, Ind., 1937), 2, 434, cited by Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford and New York, 1952), p. 78.


Gregory's story about the fly reported only a simple exorcism, but Guillaume de Saint-Thierry records that St. Bernard actually excommunicated some flies (Vita prima, 1, 11) and the debate over the excommunication of animals continued long into the modern period; see, for example, Jules Desnoyers, "Excommunication des insectes et d'autres animaux nuisibles à l'agriculture," Bulletin du Comité historique des arts et monuments, 4 (1853), 36-54 and Ernest Gelée, "Quelques recherches sur l'excommunication des animaux," Mémoires de la Société ..., de l'Aube, 29 (1865), 131-171.

100. "Ego, non fatum, non fortuna, non diabolus" in Enarr. in ps. XXXI, 15 in PL 36, 268. The Latin text in Tractatus in Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos, VII, 8 (PL 35, 2033) is "Dilige, et quod vis fac." The quotation is cited in its original and correct form by Abelard in Sic et non, prologue, ed. Blanche Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago, 1976-77), p. 98, line 221. The possible ambiguity of dilige was avoided in the version quoted (or created?) by Ivo of Chartres, prologue, PL 161, 48 B: "Habe caritatem, et fac quicquid vis." This reworking was preferred by Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and other twelfth century authors; see Sic et non, prologue, ed. Boyer and McKeon, p. 98, lines 217-18 and notes, and Benton, "Individualism and Conformity," p. 150, n. 22.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

For evidence of medieval self-awareness the best large-scale work, which goes beyond the apparent limits of its title, is Georg Misch, Geschichte der Autobiographie (2nd ed., 4 vols. in 8, Frankfurt am Main, 1949-69). Briefer and more recent is Karl Joachim Weintraub, The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography (Chicago and London, 1978), which for its medieval chapters is based on material already treated by Misch.


A recent cluster of books has treated the theme of the "individual" or "individualism," which should be carefully distinguished from the topic of this essay: Colin M. Morris, The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200, Church History Outlines (London and New York, 1972); Walter Ullmann, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Baltimore, 1966); Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam (which also goes beyond its title for comparisons), ed. Amin Banani and Speros Vryonis, Jr. (Wiesbaden, 1977); Peter Dronke, Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages: New Departures in Poetry, 1000-1150 (Oxford, 1970);


An introduction to twelfth-century ideas of the self and of others can, however, probably best be gained from careful attention to biographical studies and the works of medieval authors and artists
themselves, such as Guigo the Carthusian, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hildegarde of Bingen, Guibert of Nogent, Hermannus Judaeus, Peter Abelard, Jocelin of Brakelond, Christina of Markyate, Gerhoch of Reichersberg, Rupert of Deutz, and many, many others. For the visual arts, fine works by Erwin Panofsky have excellent plates which permit long-range comparisons, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art (Stockholm, 1960), which is particularly recommended, and Tomb Sculpture (New York, 1964).
Fig. 1: "Group portrait" of the convent of Hohenburg under Abbess Herrad of Landsberg (see note 48).
Fig. 2 Sts. Peter and Paul from a late fifth-century mosaic in Ravenna.

Fig. 3 Bulls of Pope Pascal II (1099-1118) and Innocent III (1198-1216)

Fig. 4 The Coronation of Otto III
(Bamberg Staatliche Bibliothek, MS. 140, fol. 59v)