PARADIGMS OLD AND NEW*

In The Forest People the anthropologist Colin Turnbull presents a sensitive account of life among the Mbuti Pygmies, one of the few remaining hunting and gathering cultures left in the world. The Pygmies live in a dense forest where immense trees and heavy brush envelop them. Toward the end of his stay with them, Turnbull takes Kenge — the young Mbuti who has served as his friend and guide — for a tour of the world outside the forest, a world that the Pygmies barely know. They drive over a ridge and come upon a vast open plain where many animals can be seen, including a large herd of buffalo grazing a few miles away. "What insects are those?" asks Kenge, pointing to the buffalo. Turnbull realizes that Kenge has lived his entire life in surroundings where trees limit his range of vision, so that he has never learned to use the cues that we rely on when making judgments of size over distance — for, after all, the distant buffalo do look tiny. He attempts to explain that they are large buffalo, but far away, only to be laughed at and called a liar by his Pygmy friend. As they drive down among the animals, Kenge becomes frightened, and Turnbull, "... was never able to discover just what he thought was happening — whether he thought the insects were changing into buffalo, or that they were miniature buffalo growing rapidly as we approached. His only comment was that they were not real buffalo and he was not

*Chapter 2 of Freud's Unfinished Journey: Conflict Between Conventional and Critical Paradigms in Psychoanalytic Theory.
going to get out of the car again until we left the park" [1961, p. 253].

This interesting vignette shows how an aspect of our perception of the world that we learned at an early age and perform automatically -- making compensations for the size of objects in terms of their distance from us -- is not automatic for a perceiver with different prior experiences. It shows that what anyone automatically and naturally sees as *real*, and regards as independent of himself, is neither automatic nor natural but a function of his perceptual *set*, his framework or paradigm. One might argue that Turnbull's view of the buffalo was the "real" one -- was more valid, true, scientific or whatever -- but that would be equating the real with the perceptual framework of a particular culture. As he found when he lived in the Pygmies' forest world, many of the sets, frameworks and assumptions that he inevitably brought with him as a western anthropologist interfered with his ability to function in the well-adapted way they did with their cultural sets. Within the forest, the Pygmy perception of reality worked very well indeed while, obviously, Turnbull's is better suited to life among television, automobiles and supermarkets. The example also calls attention to the fear that can be aroused when an established set is challenged; it is indeed frightening when the "reality" that one knows so well begins to change or act in unexpected or unpredictable ways.

This small example is meant to illustrate a much larger point: our perception of reality is a transaction between something "out there" and something "inside" -- the something inside being variously labeled *set*, *framework*, *schema*, *paradigm*, *guiding image* or
world view. The psychology of perception contains numerous
demonstrations of the role of such sets. So does the large-scale study
of the development of cognition or intelligence, carried out by Jean
Piaget and his many followers. Piaget's work is both based on, and
provides much evidence for, a transactional approach to reality. It
shows how crucial it is to understand the changing schemes that affect
the apprehension of reality, how the child lives in a shifting series
of different cognitive-perceptual "worlds" as his schemas undergo
successive stages of development. For the infant the world consists
of sensations and actions; it ceases to exist when he does not see,
hear, feel, taste or act on it. The young child apprehends the world
through intuitive, fantasy-laden schemas: he cannot clearly distinguish
his idiosyncratic imaginative view from the shared or consensual view
of others. And, for the adolescent and adult, a more abstract,
reasoned, socialized mode of thought is possible. At each major stage
of development the child lives in a somewhat different "reality"
because the schemas he has available for transaction with the world
are different.

A related position is outlined by the linguist-
anthropologist Benjamin Whorf (1956) with respect to language. Any
particular language contains certain tendencies -- certain
predispositions to see, think, categorize and define -- which influence
the speaker/listener's apprehension of reality. Like the sets of
perception and the schemas of intellect, the structure of language plays
its role in our transaction with the world.
CULTURAL PARADIGMS

These examples of the constructive role of set, schema and language structure in the apprehension of reality open up an approach that we may now explore in a more general way. Any culture, subculture, society or historical period can be characterized in terms of its sets, paradigms or world views -- the guiding assumptions, beliefs, values and categories that determine the way "reality" is constructed. The members of a society have their own version of its world view, a version that is shared with others in the group, while also containing idiosyncratic features that result from the person's unique life experience. In what follows, I wish to explore this general model of social and personal paradigms and then apply it to Freud, his society and the development of psychoanalytic theory.

Thomas Kuhn's [1962] analysis of the role of paradigms in the development of physical science is well known and will serve as a good starting point. Kuhn contrasts his historical study of science with that found in the typical science textbook. Textbooks are written as if there is a reality "out there" that scientists discover more and more about as their techniques and theories progressively advance. Kuhn calls this the "accretion" view and, as we can see, it rests on an assumption very different from the transactional or constructivist position just examined. The traditional position -- and many scientists still share this view -- tends to neglect the role of the belief structure of the scientist-observer or, what is the same thing, assumes that the particular way reality is perceived is how the world "really" is. Kuhn argues that the historical study of progress
in a variety of scientific fields does not support this textbook account. Rather, he finds that scientists are powerfully influenced by their belief structures, the paradigms which are acceptable at the time they are working. Each paradigm defines what is worth observing (and therefore leaves out much else), specifies the correct methods and acceptable procedures for gathering data (and assumes other methods to be worthless), and dictates what is known and what questions remain to be answered. In short, the scientist works in a world which is narrowly hemmed-in by his paradigm and this narrowness is useful for the progress of what Kuhn calls "normal science" -- progress within an established field such as physical mechanics after Newton, chemistry after Lavoisier, or electromagnetics after Maxwell.

Large advances in science -- what Kuhn calls "scientific revolutions" -- usually do not arise within the relatively closed world of an accepted paradigm, but, rather, come about when great innovations -- arising from a Newton, Einstein or Darwin -- force a shift to a different paradigm. Once such a shift is made, what were before peripheral or unimportant observations can take on new significance, while old puzzles and questions are resolved or become less interesting. Whole new areas, along with new methods, are often opened up. Examples would be physics after Newton or, after the invention of Quantum Mechanics, biology after Darwin, or genetics after Mendel. The great leaps in science are often matters of paradigm shift rather than the gradual accretion of knowledge within an existing framework.

Kuhn's analysis is one of several that demonstrates the role of paradigms in science. During the "normal science" phase,
when research proceeds within accepted boundaries, the paradigm itself is more or less invisible. It operates like the automatic sets of perception or the structure of a language that is taken for granted by the fluent speaker. Scientific revolutions, because they involve a shift in paradigms, can create an awareness of these typically invisible assumptions and values. This is important, for many who are taken with science are unaware that even such seemingly objective fields as physics, chemistry or biology do, in fact, involve subjective factors: the scientist's paradigms. Indeed, there is a tradition in the West that gives special status to the "reality" defined by science, that sees it as equivalent with the "real" or "objective" world. Yet, even here, we see how "reality" is a construction, how it is only known through the subjective belief structure -- the paradigm -- of the observer.

Kuhn's account of paradigms and paradigm shifts is confined to physical science. If we step back from the fields he surveys, we see that science itself -- even with its many shifts and revolutions -- constitutes a larger paradigm or world view. It consists of a particular way of approaching, "seeing" and working with reality that contrasts with other, quite different, approaches. A perceptive account of these larger paradigms is provided by my friend and colleague, the philosopher W. T. Jones [1971, 1972] who calls them "world views." As he puts it:

For me a paradigm is simply the world view that happens to be dominant in any society at any particular time. It includes the way of doing science at a particular time and also the particular set of beliefs about the world that are held to be
"true" at the time, but it includes more than that -- it is the whole perspective, learned at mother's knee and then refined and corrected at school and college, from which one looks at the world. It is a complex lens through which we view the world. This perspective is so pervasive that most of us, most of the time, see through the lens without noticing it. That is, most of us are, metaphysically speaking, naive realists: We assume that the world we see through the lens of our particular paradigm is "out there" just as we happen to see it. To loosen a paradigm is precisely to become aware of the lens, to become aware of the fact that the world we are seeing is merely the world as seen from a particular perspective. [Jones 1977, p.5]

Two central world views are those that Jones calls **Naturwissenschaft** and **Geisteswissenschaft**. The first is associated with the values and practices of the natural sciences; within its framework the world is viewed in terms of discreet entities -- whether atoms, cells, chemical elements, or behaviors -- which are to be isolated and manipulated, as "variables" in experiments, for instance. The goal of such work is the discovery of general or abstract explanatory and predictive theories. The other paradigm -- associated, for instance, with the Romantic movement of the last century, the Existential tradition in philosophy, literature and drama, or with certain forms of religion -- tends to view the world in terms of dynamic, continuous processes which cannot be meaningfully isolated from their context. The emphasis here is on the invididual, on immediate and concrete experience, as contrasted with the abstractions of the first paradigm. Jones argues that the **Naturwissenschaft** view has long been dominant in the West with the **Geisteswissenschaft** a counterpuntal minority voice. As one can see, these two broad world
views overlap with the two psychoanalytic frameworks that I began to outline in the last chapter. In these terms, Freud begins with the world view of science — of Naturwissenschaft — and moves toward an appreciation of the submerged values of Geisteswissenschaft. Psychoanalysis is not be equated with this second paradigm, however, but with the attempt to explore and understand all paradigms from a position of "neutrality" and openness to multiple points of view.

But this begins to sound terribly impersonal and abstract and psychoanalysis is, if anything, a very intimate, personal enterprise. How is this side of analytic work to be brought in? This question can be approached with the idea of personal paradigms — the aspect that Jones refers to as "learned at mother's knee." For a world view is not confined to one's work, profession or scientific theory; it pervades all sides of life. Like the perception of reality within a scientific paradigm, we tend to be naive realists with respect to our personal-cultural paradigms; that is, we unconsciously assume that the way we see and feel about core areas of human social experience are the way these areas "really" are. In order to appreciate the role of our personal paradigms, we must, figuratively speaking, get outside of them. There are different ways to do this; one is by examining, in as open-minded a fashion as possible, the formation of world views in cultures or historical periods very different from our own.

As examples, I am going to describe two areas of childhood experience — the feeding of infants and the imposition of discipline — in two very different societies: the !Kung Bushmen of Southwest Africa
and the seventeenth-century France. But first, let me say why I have chosen these areas and these societies. Few would disagree that the satisfaction of hunger comprises a core motivational system for all human beings. Whether one calls hunger an instinct, a drive, a primary motive or whatever, it is clearly one of the central energizing and organizing forces of human activity. Along with this motivational primacy we find great variability across cultures and persons in how they satisfy this basic need. The obtaining of food, its distribution and the way it is consumed are involved in all sorts of religious rituals, from the potlatches of the Northwest Coast Indians to Hebrew dietary laws. Having a lot to eat or very little, being obese or thin, eating with refined manners or with little concern for appearance — all illustrate how hunger, food and its consumption are interconnected with considerations of beauty, prestige, power, anxiety, morality and love. In short, the feelings of hunger, the activity of eating, and the results in physical appearance, are all perceived through value systems — through paradigms. The unthinkable food taboos of one culture are the sacred rites of another.

The very different food practices of different societies begin with the feeding of infants. And, from the individual's point of view, his first experience with hunger and its satisfaction gives an initial stamp to the personal-cultural paradigm that will later have wide connections with his perception of the human world as nurturant or frustrating, loving or indifferent, trustworthy or unstable.

A similar analysis can be applied to the child's first
experience with discipline and the imposition of social rules. All cultures train their children, but the range with respect to when it is begun, who does it, and how it is carried out is enormous. There are societies that believe infants must be disciplined in the first months of life and those which don't seem to bother much for several years. Practices range from the most severe to the most lenient, and the areas selected as the targets of discipline -- toileting and cleanliness, "manners," sexuality, the expression of anger and aggression, adherence to cultural taboos, rites and rituals -- vary most widely. Again, as with early experiences with hunger and feeding, the child's first encounter with discipline gives an initial form to a personal paradigm that will encompass the perennial conflicts between individual autonomy and social conformity. So an examination of feeding and discipline in different societies should illuminate the range of paradigmatic variation in these core personal areas.

But why the !Kung and seventeenth century France? I have selected these as examples from the myriad other societies and historical periods because they are particularly clear examples of two broad types of cultural organization. The !Kung are a small hunting and gathering society whose mode of life closely approximates the form of human social organization that was characteristic of our species for many thousands -- probably hundreds of thousands -- of years. While Homo sapiens in its modern form has been here for 60,000 years, students of human evolution agree that the essential features of culture -- language, the use of tools, fire and social organization -- go back at least ten times that far. For most of this long period
of time members of the human species lived in small nomadic bands, hunting wild animals and gathering wild vegetation. This hunter-gatherer existence is the earliest form of human culture that we know anything about. It is only within the past 10,000 years, a short time by archeological standards, that men began to domesticate plants and animals and, as recently as 2,000 years ago -- a time we associate with the Roman Empire and the beginning of Christianity -- one-half of the human population on earth still lived in hunter-gatherer societies. The !Kung are one of the few hunter-gatherer societies to survive relatively intact into modern times. Excellent accounts of !Kung life have been given by several sensitive anthropologists and my examples of feeding and discipline will be drawn from these studies.\(^1\) This is probably as close as we will ever come to primitive man: to a picture of life before the beginnings of civilization.

As a contrast to the !Kung I have chosen seventeenth-century France to represent the immense range of civilized societies. These spread from the African and Middle Eastern "states" to ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome, through the Middle Ages, to the contemporary societies of Europe and America. And this is just in the West; one might trace related geneologies in China, Japan, India and Latin America. I chose to focus on France of the "Early Modern" period, the seventeenth century, for several reasons. One is the availability of fairly extensive and reliable information on feeding and discipline during this period.\(^2\) But more important, is what this society represents. France in the seventeenth century was emerging from the Middle Ages; it was one of the first of the modern European states.
Many of the practices we will examine display, in crude and sometimes exaggerated form, the characteristics of these new, centralized and powerful nations. Over the next two centuries, these countries came to dominate the world; and the values -- the paradigms -- of nineteenth century Europe, the context of Freud's early work, began here. Thus, another reason for the choice of this particular society: the paradigms inculcated in children in seventeenth-century France, which contrast so sharply with those among the !Kung, are crude early versions of the world view of Freud and the members of his culture.

The first encounter we have with our society occurs shortly after birth when, as infants, we are cared for by our mothers. Let us begin with a comparison of feeding and infant care in these two different societies. !Kung infants are in more or less continuous contact with their mothers' bodies from birth onwards. When separations begin, they are initiated by the infant when he is old enough to begin exploration, and not by the mother. Feeding is from the mother's breast on a complete and continuous demand basis. The infant nurses as much as he wants, whenever he wants: average time between onset of fretting and beginning of feeding is six seconds. Supplementary feeding and/or solid foods are not introduced until the second or third year and weaning from the breast does not occur until the next pregnancy, usually when the infant is three. Weaning from being carried by the mother occurs around age four when the next infant is born. The vigorous breast feeding, in combination with diet and other factors such as the mother's body weight, produce a contraceptive effect so that new pregnancies are delayed. This delay
and the resulting wide space between infants allows the mother to devote a great deal of time and attention to each child for the first three to four years of its life.

This long period of nurturance and secure attachment exists within a society where such practices are viewed as completely natural -- as demanded by human nature, we might say; it is supported by the adult members of the group who had experienced it in their own infancies, of course. From the infant's point of view, food from mother's breast is immediately forthcoming when he is hungry; there are very few frustrations, delays or inconsistencies. What is more, such experiences are not confined to nursing; physical contact with the mother and other members of the band are available in a similarly consistent and nonfrustrating way, and there is a good deal of open sensual play and stimulation. All of these early experiences give an initial direction to personal paradigms; they foster what Bowlby terms "secure attachment" or what Erikson calls a sense of "basic trust" in relation to one's own body, to other persons, and to the environment. One sees the spread of this trust and security in the !Kung's feeling about the world. As adults they live and feel themselves to be in a trusting ecological balance with their fellows and the surrounding environment. They are on "intimate" terms with the animals they hunt and exhibit little anxiety over food, even during periods of drought or poor hunting. They have extensive personal knowledge about food resources -- wild animals and plants -- and feel them there, ever present, for the taking. These experiences with nursing, physical contact and secure attachment play an important early part in the
formation of this wider world view. The !Kung, much more than the members of many Western cultures, experience themselves as part of nature, as connected to, rather than alienated from, the world around them. They are much closer to the Geisteswissenschaft than the Naturwissenschaft type of paradigm.

The feeding of infants in seventeenth-century France contrasts sharply with the practices just described. France at this time was a monarchy emerging from the feudalism of the Middle Ages. It was a power-oriented culture that valued males and male activities over the female, the rich over the poor, and those who possessed important resources -- land, title, social position -- over those who did not. The distribution of food in infancy was strongly influenced by these class and power relations. Adequate diet, secure nursing and a stable attachment during the earliest years of life were very uncertain. The infant mortality rate ranged from 25 to 75 percent, and infanticide was practiced in both overt and subtle forms. There seemed little faith that a mother could simply nurse her own child: many practices and beliefs interfered with the establishment of an adequate nursing bond. A gruel, of dubious nutritional value and almost certainly contaminated with germs, was introduced early into the infant's diet. The wealthier families gave their infants out to wet nurses -- often to peasant families in the country -- and sometimes did not see either child or nurse for several years. And poor mothers were forced to share their milk with the infants of the rich. For many mothers, a new pregnancy every year was the rule placing a heavy burden of child care on them. Nursing, and maternal activities more generally, were
depreciated as part of the generally male-centered value system that
infused the society at large.

As in the case of the !Kung, we must think in terms of a
cyclical or interactive process. The experience of the seventeenth-
century French infant induced frustration, high levels of anxiety over
food, love, maternal care, and the human environment more generally.
Those who survived infancy were well on their way to becoming anxious,
angry, insecure, grasping individuals who feared for the sustenance
necessary for survival -- a character structure, motivational set, or
paradigm that may have very well prepared them for life in this French
society.

Now, let us turn our attention to discipline and the imposition
of social control in these two cultures. Here is a typical example from
the !Kung, as reported by the anthropologist Patricia Draper:

One afternoon I watched for two hours while a father hammered
and shaped the metal for several arrow points. During the
period his son and his grandson (both under four years old)
jostled him, sat on his legs, and attempted to pull the arrow
heads from under the hammer. When the boys' fingers came
close to the point of impact, he merely waited until the small
hands were a little further away before he resumed hammering.
Although the man remonstrated with the boys (about once every
every three minutes), he did not become cross or chase the boys off;
and they did not heed his warnings to quit interfering.
Eventually, perhaps fifty minutes later, the boys moved off
a few steps to join some teenagers lying in the shade.

[Lee and De Vore, 1976, p. 206]

What a wealth of insight into father-child relations is
captured in this scene! Would one of us ever act this way? We live in
a world where adult "work" -- which is deemed important -- is segregated from children's "play" -- which is assumed to be of little value. Children who interfere with a man's work are likely to be disciplined: "Hands off," "Can't you see Daddy's working?" and so on. The !Kung father doesn't act this way because he operates from an entirely different value system concerning work, play and the interconnection of the world of children and adults. He is not driven to work hard, either by others or himself -- there is no "work ethic," no valuing of work as a good thing in itself -- and he does not feel guilty when he is free, or playing or just sitting around. Hence he is accepting of the children's curiosity and does not resent their freedom; he does not feel the need to control, shape, train or discipline their curious, playful or "unsocialized" impulses since he was not disciplined this way himself and does not have such an inner orientation toward his own impulses.

The permissive and nonpunitive approach of this !Kung father is typical of their more general approach to discipline. There is nothing at all like our cleanliness or toilet training: as they grow, children learn to defecate away from the camp by imitating older children. The curiosity and exploration that is so much a part of every child is encouraged and almost never punished, as the above example illustrates. Even the child's anger and aggression toward adults is handled in a way far different from what we know.
For instance, the child who has a temper tantrum when his mother refuses to nurse or carry him is allowed to spend his rage in cries and blows which the mother fends off. The mother is not threatened,
she does not consider the attack an affront to her dignity, and the child is not stopped immediately nor punished, either of which would induce further frustration. Since the !Kung do not value or encourage interpersonal fighting, children must eventually learn to channel their aggression elsewhere, for instance into hunting. But they do not react to the child's rage at frustration as something "bad" which must be trained or disciplined out of him.

The general effect of the !Kung's approach to discipline is to create personal-social paradigms of a relatively guilt-free nature. Their early experience with a permissive, nonpunitive social world leads to a valuation of individuality over compliance, to personal autonomy over conformity. Primitive societies do not have leaders or chiefs and nothing like laws or tight social restrictions.

As was the case with feeding, the area of discipline in seventeenth-century France provides a sharp contrast with that observed among the !Kung. Infants were routinely swaddled -- wrapped in tight bindings that prevented them from moving their legs and arms. Thus, beginning in the first year, there was an attempt to control the child's autonomy. Such attempts became pronounced from the second year on -- a period at which children become more curious and, of great importance, when they begin to test their independence and "will" against the adult world. French parents at this time saw the child's newly emerging autonomy as potentially dangerous "willfulness" and "disobedience" and it was routinely the object of harsh disciplinary measures. Indeed, the goal of such training was to make children obey adults, and defiance -- even minor or symbolic acts of
the child -- became the excuse for blows, deprivations, whippings and other forms of brutality. The Dauphin, later Louis XIII, whose childhood is extensively documented, was administered a daily whipping, whether he had misbehaved or not, as a way of "breaking his will."
His father, King Henry IV, who had been subjected to such whippings as a child, simply felt he was doing his parental duty by having his son whipped, -- doing what was required to stamp out evil childish willfulness. Such practices were widespread -- they were not confined to France and continued in Europe into the twentieth century -- and they left their mark on the developing child. The child, exposed to these disciplinary practices, would come to feel anxious and guilty about his autonomous-independent strivings, as well as about his anger toward the oppressive authorities.

To sum up: each society, the primitive !Kung and the seventeenth-century French, feeds, cares for, disciplines and trains their children in ways that both arise from the society's world view -- the way male and female, mother and fatherhood, love, hunger, nurturance, autonomy, obedience and disobedience are conceived -- and passes these defined views into the next generation by creating the culturally appropriate paradigms in the developing child. These experiences with feeding, physical contact, love, permissiveness and discipline, begun in infancy and repeated through childhood, form the individual's intuitive basis for his feelings about his own nature, as manifested in the most basic processes of body and human interaction. This core personal paradigm then becomes elaborated, within the context of family and society, into a deeply
ingrained set of predispositions, a world view concerned with human impulses, feelings and actions. Clearly, if our prototypical !Kung and French infants each grew up to be psychological theorists, they would formulate very different theories on the basis of their deeply ingrained person-cultural experience.

PRIMITIVE AND CIVILIZED WORLD VIEWS

Let me now attempt a more general statement of the world views inculcated by these two very different forms of experience. The primitive lives in a world of close and intimate contact with other persons and the surrounding world of nature. His own inner nature -- hunger, the need for physical contact and attachment, sensual or curious actions, even anger and aggression -- meets with generally accepting responses from the adults he encounters. These experiences, repeated through the life cycle and supported by others in the group, form the core of a world view which may be called human-within-nature. This orientation extends both outward and inward; that is, it colors his perception of both the outside world, toward which the primitive feels a close attachment, and his experience of his own impulses, emotions, fantasies and actions, which are felt as potentially harmonious with social life.

The contrasting experience of western man of the past few centuries produces a very different world view, one which may be called man-against-nature. Repeated experiences of frustration, insufficient nourishment, disrupted attachment, constricted autonomy and harsh discipline lead to the perception of the world of other
persons -- and the environment more generally -- as untrustworthy, dangerous, punitive, ungenerous; in short, as enemies against which one must wage war in order to survive. A similar orientation towards one's own nature results from the experiences typical of the new state. That is, repeated frustrations, punishments and inconsistent gratification create feelings of anxiety and guilt about one's own hunger, sensual-sexual urges, autonomous strivings and anger at authority; these too come to be experienced as enemies that one must combat in order to survive.

I am deliberately using the terms "human" and "man" in labeling these two world views to capture another aspect of the values involved. In the primitive mode of life, there is much greater equality of the sexes and much less overevaluation of one sex, or the qualities associated with it, at the expense of the other. These societies are not androgynous: men know they are men and women women, and there are many defined activities and social groupings along sex lines. Yet they are less anxious and rigid about sex-role distinctions; they are more accepting of "feminine" qualities in men and "masculine" qualities in women. Western culture, on the other hand, has a long history in which special valuation is given to men -- to a male god, to fathers, to sons over daughters -- and to qualities associated with masculinity: aggression, toughness, what can be termed the warrior-hero ethos. Along with this male-centered value system, there has been a rather rigid enforcement of sex-role segregation and a good deal of anxiety over threatened sex-role blending. Thus, the "man" in man-against-nature is meant to emphasize that the world view of the modern state
contains these patricentric values; and it is typically the creation of men: of kings and rulers, of male philosophers and scientists.

These two broad world views -- the human-within-nature, and the man-against-nature, -- are characteristic of these two broad forms of social-cultural organization. The first is found in primitive society -- the hunter-gatherer form of cultural organization, seen in the long early period of our existence as a species. It has also been found, to one degree or another, in various societies, subcultures, families, individuals, religious movements and backwaters of the modern state. The second world view is associated with western culture and can be seen most strikingly in the states which consolidated themselves in Europe and America during the last four hundred years and which now -- as modern industrialized nations -- dominate the globe. This is the world view which conceives of the human species as special, as set off from the natural world, as constructing its own environment as a protection against what is felt to be a hostile, grudging nature.

Those living in accord with this view have always singled out some major sphere of human impulse -- willfulness, sexual pleasure, curiosity, anger -- and made it the object of disciplinary attacks.

The personal or experiential quality of these two broad orientations can be described in terms of wholeness versus alienation. The primitive feels himself to be a connected part of an integrated whole; he is attached to the other persons in his band, to the world of plants and animals, and to his own impulses, cravings and actions. Alienation, splitting, the suppression, repression or separation of man from the world -- and from aspects of his own experience -- are
integral parts of the rise of the modern state. And just as the "war against nature" is never "won," so the attempt to split off or repress aspects of one's own nature is never completed. Those parts of the person deemed enemies -- sexuality and the "feminine"; autonomous, willful and rebellious potentials; childlike, free and playful qualities -- live on in the unconscious. They are felt as unwanted, foreign intruders, ever trying to gain entry into the civilized-socialized self.

At this point the reader may complain that I am slipping in a large and very speculative argument under the cover of a general discussion of the nature of paradigms. And he would be right -- for I have moved from that general discussion to a consideration of the idea of personal paradigms, to examples from one primitive and one modern society, and then taken a great leap to a discussion of the world views characteristic of primitive and civilized life, in the broadest terms. And I have indulged in some impossibly large generalizations. Not all primitives are exactly like the !Kung nor, clearly, is seventeenth-century France typical of the great range of western societies of the past four hundred years. One could undoubtedly find many counterexamples and points of disagreement. Nevertheless, I will stand by my general thesis: there are clusters of values, child-rearing practices, orientations toward male and female, and toward sexuality, aggression and childhood -- in short, world views -- that are characteristic of these two broad cultural types. I argue, further, that these two world views are regularly accompanied by the two kinds of personal styles: the holistic, human-within-nature and the alienated, man-against-nature. And I believe a survey of the
anthropological and historical evidence would give general support to this thesis, though obviously I cannot present that material here without writing a whole additional book. I ask the reader to provisionally accept the thesis from the small amount of evidence presented so far, in order to see how it bears up when applied to the topic that is our central concern: the transition in paradigms in psychoanalytic theory.

Having completed a general discussion of paradigms or world views and the transactional or constructive approach to reality, and having sketched out the world view characteristic of the modern state, we are now ready to pick up the discussion begun earlier and examine the society and values were Freud's work began.

THE WORLD VIEW OF THE MODERN STATE

The intellectual climate of nineteenth-century Europe was dominated by the triumphs of physical science, by the conquest of "backward" societies by the technologically superior European states and by the glorification of man's intelligence -- of reason -- as a virtue or end unto itself. At the same time, the various scientific, philosophical and popular versions of this world view existed in societies which had many of the trappings of authoritarian and militaristic rule. Freud's Vienna was the capital of an empire and, while democratic freedoms were certainly increasing in comparison to earlier periods, only a minority of the population benefitted from them. Most of the European states were, as many have recently stressed, male supremist societies in which the roles and activities open to women were
decidedly limited. Marked differences in wealth kept the poor in a similar position of inferiority and limited opportunity. And if children were not as harshly treated as they had been in seventeenth-century France, they were still subjected to a considerable amount of authoritarian and often quite punitive and frightening discipline. Sexuality, as Freud's own work was to show, was a hotbed of conflict, anxiety and guilt. The double standard of male-female sexual conduct was everywhere in evidence: women were expected to remain chaste and pure, or were cast into the world of prostitution. While men were allowed much greater sexual freedom, they suffered their own forms of guilt and conflict. The sensual pleasures of childhood had become the bête noire of reform-minded adults, who seemed gripped with a kind of "masturbation insanity:" they saw the autoerotic activities of children as the cause of illness, character faults and mental weakness of all kinds and directed severe disciplinary efforts at stamping them out.

In these and many other ways, these European societies valued men over women; work and discipline over the erotic and play; toughness and success over softness, love and freedom; in general, a set of qualities associated with male-aggression over maternal love -- not surprising since they were in the line of two thousand years of patricentric Western Civilization, butressed by the Judeo-Christian tradition with its powerful male deity. This picture of nineteenth century morality mainly characterizes the middle classes, of course. Aristocratic men and women were not bound by it, nor were many peasants and members of the lower classes. But, as Taylor (1954, 1958) and other historians have pointed out, it was precisely this middle class
morality that more and more came to dominate European culture; so it is valid to see its dictates as the defining values of the period.

By the nineteenth century western culture had, if anything, become more competitive, status oriented and aggressive. Scientific and technological progress not only led directly to the manufacture of armaments, but was part of the "conquest" of nature and the "exploitation" of natural resources, described in fittingly warlike imagery. And the productivity of industrial nations required workers who were disciplined and reliable, who could serve as efficient cogs in the factory, the bureaucracy and the army. Compulsory schooling was the norm and, along with a cluster of related child-rearing techniques, helped inculcate the work ethic, the guilt and anxiety, self-discipline and postponement of the pleasures of the present for an ever-receding future, all required by life in the industrial state.

Civilization was not so one-dimensional as the above account makes it seem, of course. There were always countercurrents and countervoices. The nineteenth century saw the romantic movement -- which came to include major figures in the arts -- poets, writers, painters, playwrites -- which gave expression to a set of "feminine" qualities quite at odds with the dominant values of the state. And the turn of the century saw further developments in art, drama, literature and philosophy that broke with traditional forms to explore the world of feeling, subjectivity and the nonrational. And, of course, there were many democratic and socialistic movements for reform -- women's rights, child labor laws and related efforts to soften the treatment of children, attempts to humanize the factories and the
institution of social welfare programs in the cities. Even when the
dominant value system was in force, there were always individual
exceptions: strong women who refused to accept a passive role, men
who criticized and objected to authority and warfare, and families
that attempted to raise their children with a greater balance of love
and acceptance over harsh discipline. But these remained exceptions,
countercurrents against a strong and clearly more powerful set of
values. And it was this dominant world view -- a view that extolled
science, reason, work and the masculine virtues -- that prevailed
during Freud's formative years.

Let us examine one specific illustration of these trends
and countertrends, one that directly impinged on Freud's own
developing ideas. The triumphs of science and technology gave
tremendous impetus to a cluster of values associated with a
physicalistic-materialist approach to life, an approach that strongly
valued reason and objectivity. Many who were committed to these
values were firmly convinced that real progress in many fields was
equivalent to the spread of science. Thus, there were attempts to
extend the scientific approach from physics and chemistry into biology,
psychology and the study of society, and even the traditional preserves
of religion: ethics and moral philosophy. This attempt to make the
scientific ideal a defining standard did not go unchallenged. It was
countered by those who argued that human life was different, that the
approach of physical science was inappropriate to the study of man
and society. They spoke of an élan vital, a vital or life force, that
distinguished the living from the inorganic and that demanded a
different form of understanding. This challenge to the spread of rationalist-materialist values drew on vitalistic and nature philosophies associated with the romantic movement. Those concerned with extending the scope of science saw these vitalistic and romantic values as a regressive pull toward the religious, mystical and unreasoning past, and they strove to combat them. In the fields of biology and medicine, for example, a group of prominent scientists came together in common opposition to what they feared were dangerous vitalistic trends and declared their allegiance to science in what came to be known as the Helmholtz School of Medicine. An 1842 statement by the physiologist du Bois-Reymond captures the flavor:

Brücke and I pledged a solemn oath to put into power this truth, no other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism; that, in those cases which cannot at the time be explained by those forces one has either to find the specific way or form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical method, or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion.  

We see the strength of the commitment -- "a solemn oath" -- and the conviction that reduction to the content -- "physical-chemical forces" -- the methods -- "physical-mathematical method" -- and principles -- "forces of attraction and repulsion" -- of physical science was the only legitimate course. Brücke, a member of the Helmholtz group, was the leading physiologist at the University of Vienna, and Freud spent several years doing neurological research in his laboratory. As Ernest Jones notes in his biography, Freud spoke
of Brücke as "the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my whole life" [Jones, 1953, p. 25]. The direct personal influence of Brücke and the values he stood for gave great force to this set of ideas and Freud was, early in his career, powerfully taken with them. They left their mark on many aspects of psychoanalytic theory.

THE EMERGENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

While Freud was personally steeped in the values of science and reason, and while his early life and career followed a conventional professional and scientific course, there were, even during the prepsychoanalytic period, other tendencies active within him -- sides that ran counter to rationalist-materialist values. He dabbled with cocaine, went off to France to study hypnosis, and became involved with Breuer and his new approach, his "talking cure": all activities on the fringe of respectable medical science. Throughout his life he read widely in literature, poetry and drama, was drawn to Shakespeare and Goethe, to the study of history and anthropology, and made increasing use of these sources in his later work. And while he repeatedly chastised "philosophers" and other idle speculators, his late essays became quite speculative indeed.

The great turning point for Freud, both personally and professionally, of course, was the creation of psychoanalysis itself. One can trace a steady progression in his development of the psychoanalytic method from its origins in the scientific world view to its new form. Freud started as the objective scientist, tracing neuronal pathways with the traditional microscopic methods in Brücke's laboratory.
He began his medical practice and at first attempted to treat patients suffering from "nervous diseases" with physical methods: electrical stimulation, warm baths, and the like. He was open-minded enough to see that these methods -- widely recommended by the medical authorities of his day -- had no lasting effects, and he initiated his collaboration with Joseph Breuer, whose approach of letting patients "talk out" their problems seemed promising. Yet in this early work, the patient was still treated as an object of medical manipulation; hypnosis and suggestion were employed to "remove" symptoms, for instance. Freud's further development of the psychoanalytic method took it further and further from its medical-scientific origins. Hypnosis and suggestion were abandoned and the importance of the free flow of associations established. Much of the work was directed at the analysis of impediments to the flow of associations -- with an increased understanding of the importance resistance, defense and anxiety. The complex nature of the living relationship between analyst and patient moved to center stage with the establishment of transference -- and countertransference -- as the core of analytic treatment. From an early, simple view of therapy as the removal of symptoms -- or the removal of resistances and defense -- analysis becomes, in its later, developed form, the complex reexperiencing of the patient's life -- and especially of conflict-laden and poorly integrated early portions of that life -- within the confines of a specially constructed and carefully nurtured human relationship.

It is not my intention to discuss the intricacies of psychoanalytic technique here; I have given this very brief description
simply to illustrate the transition from a medical-scientific approach to a way of working with persons that is fundamentally different. Freud created a method that defines -- or embodies or requires -- a new paradigm, one not tied to the particular valuation of reason and objectivity, controlled observation and physicalist reductionism associated with the paradigm of science. Yet this was not apparent, particularly in the early, creative transition period, and there was much mixing of terms and assumptions as the new method took shape.

The transition in paradigms may be illustrated in yet another way. During the years when Freud was developing the technique of psychoanalysis, he also undertook his self-analysis, using his own dreams as the primary vehicle. This represents a major break with the objective and rationalist spirit of his day, which not only viewed dreams as worthless, nonphysical, "unreal" dross, but gave little credit to an enterprise like a self-analysis. But for Freud himself, the psychological discoveries made in the self-analysis -- an intrinsically subjective endeavor in which observer and object of observation are one and the same person -- were striking "evidence" for the validity of his new psychoanalytic propositions. He remained convinced of the central power of the repressed Oedipus complex, for example, not because he always "found" it in all his patients -- for it is by no means always clear in his case studies -- but because he "found" it within himself. I put "found" in quotation marks because the discovery is an act of self-interpretation that has little to do with a scientific discovery such as finding a new planet or isolating a new chemical element. Again, the point is that this sort of discovery or truth is of a different
character than the discoveries and truths of science: it both comes from and requires a different paradigm.

The new psychoanalytic method moved away from the scientific world view in many ways. Both the self-analysis and the psychoanalytic work with patients immersed Freud in personal material -- dreams, neurotic suffering, anxiety, suppressed rage, masochism and sadism, insanity, and the living versions of all these in the transference -- that made the traditional sort of scientific objectivity beside the point. A neurone under the microscope was an object; so, conceivably, might be a physically ill person whom one examines and treats with medicine or surgery. But the weeping-raging-loving patient on the couch could not be objectified in the same way. And this was especially so as Freud found the essence of the treatment to reside in the development, understanding and interpretation of the transference. For to work in this medium, the analyst must be a participant -- not in the ordinary way, to be sure; he does not "act out" with the patient -- but his own feelings and associations, must be sufficiently involved -- there must be empathic understanding -- in order to effectively analyze the patient's tranference reactions. And, again, the point is that such work requires the abandonment of the ideal of a rational, objective observer who is separated from the object of his scientific scrutiny.

THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY

We may now turn our attention to a brief consideration of the reasons for Freud's difficulty in making the transition from the conventional paradigm to the new psychoanalytic world view. Why does
the journey remain unfinished, even in his late work? I wish to suggest two sorts of reasons, one operating in the more or less conscious sphere, and the other having more powerful, dynamic or unconscious roots.

Along the line of the first, it seems always the case that any new discovery -- any new scientific theory, philosophical system, religion, or approach to art, literature or music -- shows the imprint of its origins. Even the most creative and original workers are influenced by those who precede them: Dostoyevski's early stories resemble Gogol's, Picasso's early paintings look like Puvis de Chavannes', the Beatles began by imitating Elvis Presley. So Freud's early works are well within the neurophysiological tradition of his day. The new work both shows the influence of predecessors and the imprint of the creative innovator as the old style, materials, or words are used in progressively modified ways. So we see Freud taking ideas and concepts from his neurologist past and reworking them into a new psychological theory: "physical force" becomes emotional force; neural, electrochemical energy becomes libido or psychic energy; the barriers to transmission of nerve impulses become psychological resistance, and so on. Such carryovers of old terms are widespread in the creation of a new field and do not, in themselves, represent any unnecessary ambivalence or hesitancy about moving forward. One has to start somewhere -- not even the most creative genius is born fully formed -- and one typically reworks familiar materials and concepts that are ready at hand. If there are no other factors impeding the forward progress of the new work, the old terms eventually become understood in new ways. And this is the case with some of these transitional
concepts in psychoanalytic theory: when one today speaks of "resistance," one refers to certain characteristics of the patient's mode of communicating -- or not communicating -- ideas, feelings and fantasies to the psychoanalyst and to himself. The fact that Freud originally took the term from a neurological model of the mind-brain in which it referred to the electrical "resistance" that a nerve impulse encounters at a synapse is of only historical interest.

But there were much more powerful forces at work that made the transition from the old to the new paradigm a difficult one, forces that can be called unconscious. In part, these arose from the strength of the man-against-nature world view and the widespread acceptance and prestige of science and reason. To openly question these values would indeed put one in a lonely, isolated position. This was one reason why Freud was reluctant to sever his ties with science. And behind this, there was an even more potent issue -- an issue that may be stated thus: using the new method of psychoanalysis, Freud found himself confronted with the horrible underside of civilization. Sexuality and love corrupted by guilt and anxiety; the mistreatment of children in the most respectable families; fathers seducing -- literally and symbolically -- their daughters; women taking revenge on their male oppressors in the way they treated their sons; separations, losses and deaths, so badly mourned, so incompletely dealt with; and insanity itself, with its terrifying pain and fear. The suffering of his neurotic patients -- and his own neurotic side as he came to see in the self-analysis -- bore a relation to the very "progress" of civilization that so many outwardly extolled. What he discovered in
the unconscious, in other words, could lead to a very critical -- even a most radical or revolutionary -- appraisal of his civilized society. To fully pursue the implications of these discoveries would have placed him in a very isolated position. It was one thing to be a doctor with a slightly odd new method, or even one who talked too much about sex -- and psychoanalysis received plenty of criticism for this in the early days -- but at least one could still claim to be a part of medicine and science. It would have been quite another thing to mount a critical analysis of the dominant value system of one's society. Freud was quite hesitant about this latter course; he had little personal taste for it, as his letters make clear. Yet his ultimate honesty -- and his persistence in doing psychoanalysis and remaining in contact with the evidence found in the unconscious -- kept him moving in this direction, even though he clung to aspects of the old world view for support.

In sum, I think the primary reason for the failure to complete the transition from the old to the new paradigm was that it was too revolutionary a step, implying, as it did, that the very virtues of civilization -- of objective science, of reason, of "progress" -- were directly implicated in the genesis of neurotic suffering. Freud eventually does state this -- indeed we owe this crucial insight to him -- yet he rarely says it directly or without qualifications and counterarguments.

Much more needs to be said about the complex interweaving of paradigms in Freud's theories and in the chapters to come, the main components of the theory will be considered in detail. But first, it
will be necessary to discuss the question of the "scientific" status of psychoanalysis at greater length. What does it mean to say that psychoanalysis is a science or to assert that it is not? If it is not science, as traditionally understood, what then is it?
FOOTNOTES


2. This discussion of feeding and discipline in seventeenth-century France is based on David Hunt's excellent study, Parents and Children in History, 1970, and on Marvick, 1974.

3. The historian Gordon R. Taylor (1954, 1958) traces the cyclic patterning of what he calls "patrist" and "matrist" religious value systems through Western civilization. The patrist -- similar to what I call the man-against-nature world view -- is associated with a male deity, authoritarian political and religious structures, the repression of emotion and playfulness, and a fear of homosexuality. Matrist religions -- related to what I call the human-within-nature world view -- are associated with mother-deities, equalitarian social organization, the positive evaluation of passion, and a fear of incest. Taylor's analysis is very valuable in showing how Western civilization is not simply a
monolithic patriarchal culture, but one which has alternated between periods of patrist and matrist influence. It is also clear from his account how patrist groups repress and dominate the matrist and how, in the last few hundred years certainly, they have maintained political and social control.