THE METAPHORICS OF IMITATIO AND AEMULATIO

George W. Pigman
Writings on imitation offer such a perplexing variety of doctrines that one needs no Nietzsche to advise not to allow the unity of the word imply a unity of the concept. Even after one has set aside discussions of literary representation deriving from Aristotle and Plato -- not always that easy a procedure as the example of Giovanfrancesco Pico shows -- one still finds numerous approaches and attitudes to rhetorical imitation, the use of models in learning to write well.¹

Imitation appears in so many different contexts: as a means of enriching a vulgar language (du Bellay), as a path to the sublime ("Longinus"), as the surest or only way to learn Latin (Delminio), as the way to become vis bonus dicendi peritus, with an emphasis on character-formation (Ramus), as a method for enriching one's writing with stylistic gems (Vida), as a reinforcement of one's natural inclinations (Poliziano) or a substitute for undesirable inclinations (Cortesi), and as providing the competitive stimulus necessary for achievement (Calcagnini). By no means does this list intend to pin an author to only one position, nor does it exhaust all the positions taken during antiquity and the Renaissance. A study of the imagery and metaphors of writings on imitation allows one to sort out these positions and to grasp what all these precepts for language acquisition and literary production can teach someone trying to understand allusions in literary texts.
These topoi fall into three general classes, which I shall call transformative, dissimulative, and eristic. Transformative includes apian, simian, filial, and digestive metaphors. Bees, digestion, and the resemblance of son to father are presented as successful examples of transforming a model; the ape, and also the crow, as failures. Dissimulative imagery and explicit advice of dissimulation refer to concealing or disguising the relation between text and model. Eristic, a term borrowed from "Longinus'" description of Plato's wrestling with Homer and his quotation of Hesiod's agathe eris, covers not only struggle and competition, but also a large group of images connected with paths: following, surpassing, footsteps, leaders.

---

Because of the work of Gmelin and von Stackelberg the apian metaphor (Bienengleichnis) is probably the most familiar of all the images in writings on imitation. More importantly, the apian metaphor is perhaps the most misleading topos because it is used to present two opposed conceptions of imitation: the poet as collector and the poet as maker. In other words the apian metaphor is not always transformative. The "digression" into natural history in Seneca's epistulae morales 84, a central text for all later discussions of imitation, is essential:

De illis [the bees] non satis constat utrum sucum ex floribus ducant qui protinus mel sit, an quae collegerunt in hunc saporem mixtura quadam et proprietate spiritus sui mutent. Quibusdam enim placet non faciendi mellis scientiam esse illis sed colligendi (4).
Seneca strengthens his advice with the other major image of transformation, digestion, at which point one realizes that he has been discussing digestion all along. The bees convert flowers into honey by a process, for our purposes and I suspect Seneca's in this letter, similar to digestion in men. In fact, his first mention of the bees contains at least a submerged reference to digestion: "flores ad mel faciendum idoneos carpunt, deinde quidquid attulere disponunt ac per favos digerunt" (3). *Digero* can mean *distribute* or *arrange*, in which case *disponunt* and *digerunt* are synonymous, but also means *digest.* Macrobius, who follows this letter very closely, and whose practice is much more that of the excerptor than the transformer, removes any ambiguity by substituting *dividunt* for *digerunt* (*Sat.* 1. pr. 5).

Macrobius, in fact, appears to be the first author to assume that the major point of Seneca's apian metaphor is not the bees' ability to transform pollen into honey, but their eclectic gathering of pollen from different flowers. Since Petrarch, it has been customary to criticize the discrepancy between the theory and practice of imitation in Macrobius, who certainly does excerpt large portions of Seneca's letter without acknowledgment or substantial transformation. For Macrobius, however, imitation does not imply avoiding verbal repetition, a cardinal position in Petrarch and other later authors, but a rearranging of previous material. Despite his adoption of Seneca's apian and digestive metaphors in language that insists on making something new and different, Macrobius is more concerned with reducing a mass of material into a useful order. Macrobius' own digestive metaphor is more
revealing than his transcription of Seneca's:

nec indigeste tamquam in acervum congrissim us digna memorat u:  
sed varierum rerum disparilitas, auctoribus diversa, confusa  
temporibus, ita in quod dam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte  
atque promiscue ad subsidium memoriae adnotaveramus, in ordinem  
instar membrorum cohaerentia convenirent (1. pr. 3). 6

Seneca’s digestive metaphor, however, does receive one significant  
addition. Macrobius quotes ep. mor. 84.5-6 ("Quod in corpore . . .")  
with only insignificant variations (noted in Reynolds' apparatus of  
his OCT Seneca except for Macrobius' addition of male at 1. pr. 7)  
until he reaches "ne aliena sint," where he makes a small, but crucial,  
addition:

idem in his quibus aluntur ingenia prae semus, ut quaecumque  
hausimus non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint, sed  
in quandam digeriem concoquantur: alioquin in memoriam ire  
possunt, non in ingenium (1. pr. 7, my emphasis). 

Despite the ambiguity of digeries, I think Macrobius is here using  
it as Lewis and Short define it, citing this passage, "an orderly  
distribution, a disposition, arrangement." The addition reverses  
Seneca's passage in which complete metamorphosis and change of identity  
are the subject, not rearrangement. Macrobius' concern with organization,  
with ordo reappears in another addition to his transcription of Seneca:  
"nos quoque quidquid diversa lectione quaesivimus committemus stilo,  
ut in ordinem eodem digerente coalescat" (1.pr.6). This coalescing is  
not the transformation of pollen into honey, in which the pollen loses
its identity and becomes something else, but the redisposition of individual excerpts in an organized collection, a florilegium. Macrobius is culling flowers, not transforming, and consequently his practice is not that discrepant from his own conception of imitation, although he seems to have been unaware of the transformative implications of what he borrows from Seneca and only alert to the implications of eclectic gathering. After the passage from Seneca, Macrobius concludes: "tale [as in an orchestra and chorus] hoc praesens opus volo: multae in illo artes, multa praecipta sint, multarum aetatum exempla, sed in unum conspirata" (1 pr. 10). Macrobius lifts the second clause verbatim from Seneca (84.10), in whom it refers to a mind that has absorbed and transformed a varied program of reading and imposed unity upon it; here in Macrobius "in unum conspirata" means little more than well-organized.

Macrobius is an unusually complex example of the confusion of two opposed types of imitation inherent in the apian metaphor. Ordinarily one finds the flower-gathering and honey-making moments of imitation in different contexts. Poliziano's quotation of Lucretius offers two nontransformative uses of the apian metaphor:

Itaque cum maximum sit vitium unum tantum aliquem solumque imitari velle, haud ab e re profecto facimus, si non minus hos nobis quam illos praeponimus, si quae ad nostrum usum faciunt undique elicimus atque, ut est apud Lucretium,

Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant,
omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta. 7

Lucretius' own use of the metaphor, in the proem to his third book, asserts his dependence on Epicurus, his refusal of aemulatio; Lucretius
pictures himself as gathering wisdom from his spiritual father ("tu pater as, rerum inventor"), not as modifying what he reads. Collecting doctrine from all of Epicurus is the point of the comparison. Poliziano, strictly speaking, is only utilizing the aspect of gathering from everywhere, for elsewhere he disapproves of imitation without emulation and insists, by digestive metaphor, on transformative imitation. In the present passage, however, his primary concern is to justify his choice of Quintilian and Statius as worthy of study although inferior to Cicero and Virgil. Poliziano is arguing for eclectic imitation, the study and use of all good authors.

A few more instances of apian metaphors in nontransformative contexts may be quoted to show their general diffusion in the Renaissance. Since reading von Stachelberg's collection of Bienengleichnisse, one feels that only medieval authors use them to mean gathering. Ronsard uses the metaphor at least four times, in each case only in the sense of gathering material in eclectic fashion. The most revealing use is in "Sonnet, à M. des Caurres, sur son livre de Miscellanées":

Ainsi qu'au mois d'avril on voit de fleur en fleur,
De jardin en jardin, l'ingenieuse abeille
Voléter et piller une moisson vermeille
En ses pieds peinturez de diverse couleur;

De science en science, et d'autheur en autheur,
De labeur en labeur, de merveille en merveille,
Tu voles, repaissant diversement l'oreille
Du François, tout ravy d'estre ton auditeur.
Ronsard's sonnet is praising a *florilegium*, with which it appeared in 1575, as is evident from its full title: *Oeuvres morales et diversifiees en histories, pleines de beaux exemples, enrichies d'enseignemens vertueux et embellies de plusieurs sentences et discours; le tout tiré des plus signalez at remarquables auteurs grecs, latins et françois, qui ont escrit de tous temps.*

Des Caures is a gatherer, not a transformer, a virtuous thief (*piller*).

As the quotation from Poliziano may suggest, the apian metaphor appears in debates over the question whether or not Cicero alone is to be taken as the model for prose. The gathering aspect of the bees becomes a weapon in the eclectics' arsenal. Giraldi, a moderate Ciceronian, uses the metaphor as a typical argument of the eclectics; one notices how he passes over the bees' making (*condendo, condiant*) to focus on the variety of flowers:

Nam quoniam vix fieri posse opinantur ut unius industria omnia perficere potuerit, haec quae ad orationis candorem et stili gravitatem attinent, more apum hinc inde perquirenda arbitrantur. Nam veluti apes in melle condendo, non ex uno tantum, sed ex omnibus floribus id sibi colligunt ex quo mel ipsum condiant, ita a Cicerone schemata, epicheremata, parabolas, sales, a Quintiliano leporem, gratiam, energiam, a Salustio sanguinem, cutem, carnem, a Caesare nervos, cartilagines, ossa, a Plinio acumen, vim, spiritum, et, brevi, quaecunque orationem illustrem reddunt, a diversis exquirenda praecipiant.*

Giraldi at once attacks this position, but the importance of the passage lies in its purported exemplariness; it shows the diffusion
of the topos in its nontransformative application. A final example from Ramus: "Atque ut apes e variis variarum arborum floribus mellificant; sic e poetarum, historicorum, oratorum omninoque bene loquentium hominum dictis et scriptis, sermonis copiam et elegantiam comparabit." Ramus is discussing vocabulary acquisition and the enriching of the French language, and his Ciceronianus does not advocate transformative imitation, but advises students to take Cicero as a model to become vir bonus dicendi peritus, especially a vir bonus.

One need not dwell on the transformative application of the apian metaphor since von Stachelberg provides so many examples. One can sum it up with one sentence from Petrarch: "Neve diutius apud te qualia decerpseris maneant, cave: nulla quidem esset apibus gloria, nisi in aliud et in melius inventa converterent." Here the emphasis on transformation is complete. What's gathered must become aliud.

In Seneca the apian and digestive metaphors reinforce one another and are closely analogous. The digestive metaphor has just as long a history as the apian, but, with the exception of Cortesi, who uses it as an argument against eclecticism (indigestion from eating too many different foods at the same time), is always used to support transformative imitation. After Seneca, one finds it in Quintilian, Macrobius, Petrarch, Poliziano, Erasmus, Calcagnini, Dolet, Florido, Du Bellay, Sidney, and Jonson; I quote one of Erasmus' versions of the topos as representative:

Rursus imitationem probo non uni addictam praescripto, a cuius lineis non ausit discedere, sed ex omnibus autoribus, aut certe
praestantissimis, quod in quoque praecellit maxime tuoque
congruit ingenio decerpentem, nec statim attexentem orationi
quicquid occurrit bellum sed in ipsum animum uelut in stomachum
traiicientem, ut transfusum in uenas, ex ingenio tuo natum non
aliunde emendicatum esse uideatur, ac mentis naturaeque tuae
uigorem et indolem spiret, ut qui legit non agnoscat emblema
Ciceroni detractum, sed foetum a tuo natum cerebro, quemadmodum
Palladem aiunt a cerebro Iouis, uiuam parentis imaginem referentem,
nec oratio tua cento quispiam uideatur aut opus musaicum, sed
spirans imago tui pectoris, aut amnis a fonte cordis tui promanans.16

Although certain elements of this long sentence are peculiar to
Erasmus' conception of imitation, one can justly call it a representative
instance of the digestive topos for several reasons. First, the
metaphors which theorists of imitation use do not appear as incidental
ornaments; they usually carry the burden of what the theorist has to
say and come at the crucial moments of his argument. In this passage
Bulephorus, after having ridiculed extreme Ciceronianism and having
argued for eclecticism, is stating his own conception of imitation.

All of Erasmus' major concerns appear here with the exception of the
fear that Ciceronianism is a disguise for paganism, and even this is
implicit in the reference to decorum (congruit). For, as I shall show
later, historical decorum which forbids the use of exclusively pagan
terms in Christian contexts, is the central concept and concern of the
Ciceronianus. This sentence also states a preference for eclectic
rather than Ciceronian imitation, and Erasmus' insistence, unusual in
treatises on imitation, on sincerity ("spirans imago tui pectoris")17
as essential for good writing. The passage is also typical -- one
need only think of Seneca's ep. mor. 84 -- of the way in which
imitative metaphors come in clusters. Besides, of course, the digestive
metaphor one has a suggestion of via imagery (discedere), a reference
to mosaics and begging, and a child/parent comparison, all traditional,
although Erasmus uses the filial image unlike Seneca, Petrarch, and
Cortesi. Finally, Erasmus thoroughly emphasizes transformation
through digestion; a reader won't recognize (non agnoscat) Cicero as
model.

With non agnoscat a new class of imitative imagery and
doctrine appears: dissimulation. Theorists, as this sentence from
the Ciceronianus may suggest, often regard transformation as the means
to the end of dissimulation, although scholars have not paid much
attention to the persistent advice to disguise the relationship between
text and model. In a certain sense this advice is nothing more than
an extension of the adage ars est celare artem to imitation, as in
Erasmus:

An non hoc ipse docuit Cicero, caput artis esse dissimulare
artem? Itaque si feliciter Ciceronem imitari uolumus,
dissimulanda cum primis est ipsa Ciceronis imitatio (p. 84).

Before proceeding to the consequences dissimulation has for a reader
of imitative literature, I would like to give an idea of the extent
of dissimulative advice and imagery. Practically all of the important
doctrines and metaphors of imitation appear in Seneca's ep. mor. 84,
so it should offer no surprise that he counsels dissimulation: "Hoc
faciat animus noster: omnīa quibus est adiutus abscondat, ipsum tantum
ostendat quod effecit" (7). This exhortation, which Macrobius takes so literally that he transfers it, along with other chunks of Seneca's letter, to his *Saturnalia* without any hint that he is using Seneca, appears just after the apian and digestive metaphors: Seneca is the first to link transformation and dissimulation.

Petrarch, while developing Seneca's comparison of the proper similarity between text and model to the resemblance of father to son, also dwells on dissimulation. He is writing to Boccaccio about the difficulty of avoiding unconscious verbal reminiscence and casting himself as father to Giovanni Malpaghini, his young secretary, who often inserts Virgilian phrases into his own poems. In this case the son turns out to be only too like his father; Giovanni produces a line from Petrarch's own *Bucolicum Carmen* as a justification for lifting a phrase from Virgil. Petrarch's theory of unconscious reminiscence deserves more attention. Here, however, one notes how it spoils the insistence on concealing the model and how it leads Petrarch to reflect on human impotence: "quin multum semper humanis desit intentionibus" (*Fam.* 23.19.17). Nevertheless the dissimulative advice is fundamental:

Firmabit, ut spero, animum ac stilum, et ex multis unum suum ac proprium conflabit, et imitationem non dicam fugiet sed celabit, sic ut nulli similis appareat sed ex veteribus novum quoddam Latio intulisse videatur (10).

Here again one notices the combination of concealing and transforming: making something new from a variety of sources and then disguising the
process that has produced the proprium. Advice which Petrarch is following, for his sentence conceals an allusion to a famous line of Horace: "Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis/intulit agresti Latio" (epis. 2.1.156-7). A few lines later Petrarch restates his position on dissimulation:

Sic et nobis providendum ut cum simile aliquid sit, multa sint dissimilia, et id ipsum simile lateat ne deprehendi possit nisi tacita mentis indagine, ut intelligi simile queat potiusquam dici (13).

The nisi clause allows for partial dissimulation. The relation between text and model is not necessarily to be obliterated or completely disguised, the possibility of alluding in order to be recognized is left open.  

Petrarch's last-quoted pronouncement on dissimulation stops just short of addressing different audiences. Some later theorists take this step. Landino, for instance, in his Disputationes Camaldulenses, has Lorenzo de' Medici exclaim that he now understands why Dante descends to hell and purgatory before ascending to heaven. Alberti praises Lorenzo for seeing dissimulata in Dante's imitation of Virgil, to which Lorenzo replies:

Quamobrem nunc id demum intelligo, quod nos ex Ciceronis praeccepto saepenumero Landinus admonere solet: esse in aliquo imitando diligentem omnino rationem adhibendam, neque enim id agendum, ut idem simus qui sunt ii quos imitamur, sed eorum ita similes, ut ipsa similitudo vix illa quidem neque nisi a doctis intelligatur.  

20
Sturm states this imitation for the learned doctrine succinctly:
"Latet imitatio, non extat, occultat se, non detegit: neque intelligi vult, nisi ab erudito" (De im. oratoria 2.3).

Sturm, in fact, is the theorist most insistent on dissimulation, although Parthenio also offers specific advice on how to "nasconder la cosa." One of Sturm's chapters (3.1) in his major work on imitation, De imitatio oratoria, which Ascham requests to see in manuscript while writing his Scholemaster, is entitled, "De occultanda imitacione," Sturm's own schola to which reads:

Oportet imitatorem esse Σχλοκλέπτον, oportet κλέπτειν furari,
furem esse Σχλον, id est imitationis: sed ita tamen, ut ipsum furtum non apparet, ne ipsa scilicet, cornicula in furto deprehendatur, et risum moveat, et suis notetur coloribus.
Oportet nos imitatione, ex alieno facere proprium. Oportet κλέπτειν τον Σχλον, id est, κλάμπτειν, abscondere.

With this general principal in mind Sturm proceeds to list six "occultationis partes," ways in which an imitator can disguise his theft.

What can these transformative and dissimulative metaphors tell someone who is trying to understand an imitative poem? What help do they offer a reader who confronts, say, a passage in a Renaissance poem which strongly resembles one in a classical poem? What sort of expectations should such a reader have? Can one translate this advice for literary production into a guide for interpretation?
principle emerges. A reader must be very cautious in even calling a similarity between two texts an imitation or an allusion, much less in analyzing the use or significance of the similarity.

This less than inspiring principle, which could be fairly stated much more skeptically, confronts one at every turn. First, transformation of the model into something new and different, especially when transformation is conceived as the means of hiding a text's relation to its model, calls into question the possibility of identifying the model. A thoroughly dissimulated transformation would not be understood even "tacita mentis indagine"; the relation between text and model disappears. Or even if the relation is grasped by the silent searching of a learned mind, one wonders about a communicative intent that is so carefully concealed. The relation may be crucial for understanding the text's genesis or the author's reading, but insignificant for an interpretation of the text itself.

Assuming, however, that a reader has identified a model or models, another intentional problem arises. One way to approach it is to examine a conflict implicit in the apian and digestive analogies as Seneca uses them:

nos quoque has apes debemus imitari et quaecumque ex diversa lectione concessimus separare (melius enim distincta servantur), deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere, ut etiam si apparuerit unde sumptum sit, aliiud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est appareat. Quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere naturam ... (ep. mor. 84.5-6)
The "sine ulla opera nostra" of digestion makes all the difference. Does a similarity between text and model result from conscious intention ("adhibita ingenii nostri cura") or an unconscious process? The constant advice to digest or assimilate one's reading makes it highly probable that some unconscious absorption and reproduction will take place. Petrarch's story about Giovanni Malpaghini and the Virgilian phrase in Bucolicum Carmen 6 furnishes one instance of unconscious reminiscence, and another letter of Petrarch provides a disturbingly persuasive analysis of the consequences of complete assimilation, although one must make some allowance for Petrarch's obvious desire to impress Boccaccio with the paradox of the title: "sepe facilius his scribentem falli que familiariter novit."

Petrarch distinguishes between two classes of reading which he has done. On the one hand are authors like Ennius and Plautus, whom he read only once and quickly at that; if he memorized anything of theirs, its alienness to his own thoughts made it stand in his memory as another's. He describes his other reading as follows:

Legi apud Virgilium apud Flaccum apud Severinum apud Tullium; nec semel legi sed milies, nec cucurri sed incubui, et totis ingenii nisibus immoratus sum; mane comedi quod sero digererem, hausi puer quod senior ruminarem. Hec se michi tam familiariter ingessere et non modo memorie sed medullis affixa sunt unumque cum ingenio facta sunt meo, ut etsi per omnem vitam amplius non legantur, ipsa quidem hereant, actis in intima animi parte radicibus, sed interdum obliviscar auctorem, quippe qui longo usu et possessione continua quasi illa prescripserim diuque pro meis habuerim, et turba talium obsessus, nec cuius sint certe nec aliena meminerim (Fam. 22.2.12-3).
This aspect of unconscious reminiscence offers particular difficulties because it casts doubts on just those texts to which one would suppose an author would allude. For one usually feels most confident calling a similarity between two texts an allusion when the putative model is a famous work or a work known to be familiar to the author of the "alluding" text. An analogue from everyday experience may help clarify Petrarch's explanation and also remove any suspicion that he is exaggerating to make a paradoxical, epigrammatic "point." Most students have had an "original" idea that a later accident, for instance rereading lecture notes after some time has elapsed, has suddenly shown to have been their teachers', but the teaching had been so well digested by the students that it became a part of their thinking, not an element lodged in their memories.

The emphasis on transforming a model and then disguising the relationship to it, besides raising difficulties of interpreting intention (and in matters of imitation and allusion Petrarch's "quin multum semper humanis desit intentionibus" is particularly forceful), also calls attention to a necessary distinction between imitation and allusion. An imitation may not result in an allusion, but, then again, it may, and of course the crucial moment in interpretation involves choosing between the two possibilities. Nevertheless some imitations may only have importance as far as the genesis of a text is concerned; they may have no function in the text itself and indeed may disrupt the author's intended function of his text by not being well concealed. Consequently, as far as function is concerned, the interpreter who seeks relations between texts that contain similarities may be misguided.
The counsel of a dissimulated imitation only to be understood by
the learned suggests different kinds of function. Landino conceives
the highest kind of poetry (Virgil, Dante) as only written for the
learned, so that a hidden allusion, just like the hidden allegory of
_Aeneid_ 1-6 which Alberti so subtly develops, probably has considerable
significance. The fact of an imitation's concealment, therefore, does
not necessarily imply absence of function. In other cases, however, the
function may be no more than to allow the learned reader the pleasure of
recognizing a phrase from an ancient poet. E. K., for example, in his
letter affixed to Spenser's _Shepheardes Calendar_, mentions the poetic
custom of first trying one's powers with pastoral poetry and cites some
authors who followed this Virgilian progression, "whose foting this
Author every where followeth, yet so as few, but they be wel sented
can trace him out."24 This clause reads like an invitation to the
learned to listen for echoes of ancient pastoralists.

Besides the possibility of allusions only for the erudite, one
may encounter allusions, plays on words, designed only for the author's
pleasure — another type of imitation that may not function in a work.
Vida is explicit on this point: "Saepe mihi placet antiquis alludere
dictis, / Atque alius longe verbis proferre sub iisdem."25 Pleasure
for the learned or pleasure for the writer both may reduce imitation
to a matter of genesis. I don't mean to belittle studies of genesis,
but one cannot overlook the confusion created in failures to distinguish
questions of genesis and function.

The apian metaphor of eclectic gathering of vocabulary and the
specific advice of ways to transform and disguise good phrases are
symptomatic of a tendency in writings on imitation: the reduction of imitation to matters of elocutio. In his manuscript of Quintilian, next to 10.2.27, "Imitatio [autem], nam saepius idem dicam, non sit tantum in verbis," Petrarch wrote himself a note, "Lege, Silvane, memoriter."²⁶ Both Quintilian and Petrarch, however, devote more theoretical energy to discussing style than inventio or dispositio. They are typical in exhorting writers to extend imitation beyond elocutio and in neglecting to do much more than exhort. Vida treats imitatio primarily as a matter of diction, although he offers the customary admonition to imitate the other two parts of rhetoric: "rerum accipimus nunc clara reperta, / Nunc seriem" (3.214-5). He quickly returns to his main interest and shows himself an extremist by recommending the theft of "verba ipsa." Ordinarily theft belongs to the vocabulary of failed transformation and is used to attack.²⁷ Only, Vida, to my knowledge, exalts theft into a term of praise, although one finds a hint in Macrobius (Sat. 6.1.3)²⁸. In any case Vida's conception of imitation as theft, the extreme version of imitation as gathering stylistic beauties, indicates that some imitations are limited to style and do not bring the text and model into relation in any other way.

So far an examination of the transformative and dissimulative aspects of imitation has produced only difficulties, all relating in some way to the major hermeneutical problem of the possibility and importance of assessing authorial intention. The discussions of imitation call into question the possibility of identifying a model, or assuming agreement on the existence and identity of a model, the
possibility of positing or understanding the use of the model. No
method for progressing from the observation of resemblance between
two texts to an assertion of relation between them has yet emerged.
So far there is very little evidence, from the theorists of imitation,
to justify imitation as anything other than an element in the genesis
of a text. The third class of analogies for imitation, however,
eristic metaphors, does open the possibility of regarding an imitation
as an important function of the text itself.

-3-

The two most striking eristic analogies I have found raise
competition or strife to a necessary condition for creativity. In
"Longinus'" original and stimulating discussion of imitation one
finds this comment on Plato's indebtedness to Homer:

Nor does it seem to me that he would have excelled so much
in his philosophical doctrines or would have so often hit on
poetical subject matter and expression, had he not, by God,
with all his heart struggled with Homer for preeminence, like
a young competitor against an already admired one, perhaps
too contentiously and, as it were, breaking a lance with him,
but nevertheless not without profit. For, according to Hesiod,
"This strife [eris] is good for mortals." And truly this
contest for the crown of glory is noble and most worth winning,
in which even to be defeated by one's elders is not inglorious
(13. 4-5, my translation).

"Longinus'" optimism knows no burden of the past; he advises aspiring
speakers to imagine how Plato, Demosthenes, or Thucydides would have
treated a topic or to imagine their reactions to his speech. The very act of emulation (zelos) somehow raises the soul of the emulator towards the standards he imagines. "Longinus" attributes a certain mystery to emulation -- earlier he compares it to the inspiration of the Pythian priestess -- and this mystery also attaches to competition. How it works does not matter as much to "Longinus" as to the fact it does work.

Calcagnini closes his letter, de imitazione, to Giraldi with the story of the birth of Anteros. Venus, worried why Cupid (Eros), her newly-born son, was not growing, asked Themis for advice. Themis replied that Cupid would grow if Venus had another son for Cupid to compete with. And after the birth of Anteros, Cupid, of course, had a growth spurt. Calcagnini draws the moral in the closing sentences of his letter:

Ex iis puto facile colligas nulla praeclara ingenia posse ingentes profectus facere, nisi habeat antagonistem, ut Graeci dicit, quicum decertent, quicum colluctentur. Neque solum oportet ut cum aequalibus viventibusque contendamus, sed cum iis etiam qui olim scripserunt, quos "mutos magistros" appelamus. Alioqui futuri semper infantes (Trattati 1.220).

Imitation as competition with one's model receives no stronger formulation in the Renaissance.

Calcagnini's passage, however, contains two terms that are commonplaces in discussions of imitation, commonplaces that help justify a distinction between imitation and emulation: decertent and contendamus.
Forms of certo and contendo, often in opposition to forms of sequor, compose one large class of eristic metaphors and occasionally appear with the other major class, a cluster of images associated with paths, via (or callis or a similar word), dux, vestigium. Both classes are used to advocate both imitation and emulation, depending on the theorist's view of competition and the possibility of successful competition.

Before discussing the distinction between imitation and emulation and its consequences for reading imitative literature, I would like to give some indication of the frequency and divergent applications of the eristic metaphors because they have not received much attention.

Two important passages from antiquity discuss paraphrase and translation as competition. Quintilian's disagreement with Cicero's judgment on the usefulness of paraphrasing a speaker in the same language received considerable attention in the Renaissance; the possibility of paraphrase practically becomes a topos in Ciceronian debates on eclecticism. Quintilian supports his argument for competitive paraphrase by asserting that many paths lead to eloquence.

Neque ego paraphrasin esse interpretationem tantum uolo, sed circa eosdem sensus certamen atque aemulationem. Ideoque ab illis dissentio qui uertere orationes Latinas uetant quia optimis occupatis quidquid aliter dixerimus necesse sit esse dexterius. Nam neque semper est desperandum aliquid illis quae dicta sunt melius posse reperiri, neque adeo ieiunam ac pauperem natura eloquentiam fecit ut una de re bene dici nisi semel non possit. . . . An uero ipsi non bis ac saepius de eadem re dicimus et quidem continuas nonnumquam sententias? -- nisi forte contendere nobiscum possimus, cum aliis non possumus. Nam si
uno genere bene diceretur, fas erat existimari praeclusam
nobis a prioribus uiam: nunc uero innumerabiles sunt modi,
plurimaeque eodem uiae ducunt (10.5.5).
The possibility of different, but nevertheless excellent ways of
writing on the same subject is the theoretical basis for emulation
or competition. The eclectic position makes striving with oneself
and others possible.

In answer to a request for advice on a method for study Pliny
recommends translating from Greek to Latin or vice versa. Not only will
translation lead to a better understanding of what is read and improve
one's diction and invention:

Nihil offuerit quae legeris hactenus, ut rem argumentumque teneas,
 quasi aemulum scribere lectisque conferre, ac sedulo pensitare,
quid tu quid ille commodius. Magna gratulatio si non nulla tu,
magnus pudor si cuncta ille melius. Licebit interdum et notissima
eligere et certare cum electis. Audax haec, non tamen improba,
quia secreta contentio: quamquam multos uidemus eius modi
certamina sibi cum multa laude sumpsisse, quosque subsequi satis
habeabant, dum non desperant, antecessisse (epis. 7.9.3-4).
This contentio or certamen is far from a violent battle. Pliny is
certainly aware that contentiousness may be behind contentio. In his
frequent uses of aemulatio and imitatio one detects a mixture of the
moral and the technical, a point to which I shall return.

The juxtaposition of subsequi and antecessisse in this
passage from Pliny is one version of a common eristic opposition which
first appears in Lucretius:
O tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda uitae,
te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
ficta pedum pono pressis uestigia signis,
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
quod te imitari aueo: quid enim contendat hirundo
cyenis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi
consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi uis? (3.1-8)

Lucretius equates imitation with following the footsteps of his master
and rejects what will later be called emulation as contentiousness
("certandi cupidus") and because of the futility of striving
(contendat) with Epicurus. This type of following rejects transformation
of inventio; Lucretius' use of the bees as gatherers comes immediately
after the lines quoted above. Elsewhere in his poem, however, Lucretius
asserts the originality of treating such difficult subjects in Latin
verse -- "obscura de re tam lucida pango / carmina" (1.933-4=4.8-9) --
by reversing the uestigia topos: "avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius
ante / trita solo (1.926-7~4.1-2). Horace makes a different claim for
originality -- use of the metrics, not the matter, of Archilochus,
Sappho, Alcaeus -- in similar terms: "libera per vacuum posui vestigia
princeps, / non aliena meo pressi pede" (epis. 1.19.21-2).

Although one finds numerous examples of vestigia used to
state a preference for imitatio over aemulatio, the other instances of
the contendere / sequi opposition all support emulation. Quintilian's
brief discussion was probably the single most influential statement:32
Sed etiam qui summa non adpetent, contendere potius quam sequi debent. Nam qui hoc agit, ut prior sit, forsitan, etiam si non transierit, aequabit. Eum uero nemo potest aquare cuius uestigis sibi utique insistendum putat: necesse est enim semper sit posterior qui sequitur (10.2.9-10).

Quintilian is recommending *aemulatio* rather than *imitatio* and closes his chapter with another eristic term: "Nam erit haec quoque laus eorum, ut priores superasse, posteros docuisse dicantur" (28). The fact that he doesn't use *aemulatio* as a technical term here casts considerable doubt on Reiff's thesis that *aemulatio* emerges as a fixed term in Tiberius' time.

One of the few points of agreement between Pico and Bembo in their exchange of letters on imitation is a preference for striving to surpass rather than for following. Pico, after citing Plato's criticism of imitators and Horace's "servum pecus," asserts:

> Hinc videas omneis quicumque aliqua in re auctores celeberrimi extiterunt, aliunde quam ex imitatione gloriam, quae de rebus praecclare gestis exurgit, eamque comitatur ut umbra corpus, sibi ipsis quaesivisse. Ac potius vel intenta contentione adversatos prioribus vel adnixos longo eos intervallo praeterire, non sequi. Qui enim assecla cupit semper esse, primum sibi nunquam vendicabit locum ad quem videtur vel naturae propensio, vel nescio qua certe ambitio totis viribus anhelare (p. 25).

Bembo agrees that surpassing the model should be the goal, but believes this best accomplished by devoting oneself to one model (Virgil for epic, Cicero for prose):
Bembo is reversing Quintilian's statement that the follower must always be second. Bembo continues by proposing the following lex:

primum, ut qui sit omnium optimus, eum nobis imitandum proponamus: deinde sic imitemur, ut assequi contendamus: nostra demum contentio omnis id respiciat, ut quem assequuti fuerimus, etiam praetereamus. Itaque duas illas in animis nostris egregias plurimarum maximarumque rerum confectrices aemulationem atque spem habeamus. Sed aemulatio semper cum imitatione coniuncta sit: spes vero ipsa nostra non tam quidem imitationem, quam successum imitationis subsequi rectissime potest (pp. 56-7).

Pico and Bembo are coming very close to a distinction between imitation and emulation. For Pico imitation brings no glory and is equivalent to following; contentio and trying to surpass are superior. A few lines later Pico explicitly calls Virgil "aemulator veterum verius quam imitator," but not in the eristic terms he has just used. The third stage in Bembo's three-fold lex imitationis -- praetereamus -- represents aemulatio. The sentences which follow, however, show that he does not regard aemulatio as a technical term, but rather as a feeling like admiration. For a clear statement of imitation and emulation as different processes one must wait for Erasmus.

The vestigia topos, perhaps the most common of the common places, appears as a support for both imitation and emulation.
Statius uses it to express his admiration for Virgil and to admit his own sense of inferiority in his address to his book at the end of the Thebaid: "vive, precor; nec tu divinam Aeneida tempta, / sed longe sequere et vestigia semper adora" (12.816-7). Vida advises the aspiring poet to follow Virgil's footsteps: "Ergo ipsum ante alios animo venerare Maronem, / Atque unum sequere, utque potes, vestigia serva" (1.208-9). In addition one finds numerous passages in which someone is praised or approved for following footsteps or is advised to do so in such authors as Seneca, Pliny, Longueil, Vida, Dolet, Ricci, Parthenio, Ramus, Ascham, Sturm, and Harvey. Typical of these usages is Giraldi's remark to Calcagnini, "satis enim mihi lucrifecisse arbitror, si huius [Cicero's] vestigiis aliquando inhaerere mihi fas fuerit" (Trattati, 1.203).

Giraldi's admission prompts Calcagnini to a forceful expression of the vestigia topos and another vivid eristic analogy as an argument for emulation:

Alienis enim semper vestigiis haerere, et serperastris, ut ait Varro, eum uti, qui per aetatem stare possit atque ingredi, non modo turpe est, sed periculosum etiam. Quom non facile eorum vires coalescunt, qui alienis pedibus incedunt, alienis manibus pugnant, alienis oculis vident, aliena lingua loquuntur; sui denique obliti, alieno spiritu vivunt. Quippe hoc iis per me liceat qui nondum in suam tutelam venerunt, quique per aetatem praemanso adhuc cibo aluntur, quorum adhuc membra fasciis effinguntur. At quorum adulta est aetas, et firmiores lacerti, ii iam prodeant ex umbra, iam prosilient in campum, iam cum ipso lanista contendant, a
Calcagnini does not shy away from any contentiousness latent in emulation; he delights in his imagery of gladiatorial violence. The eristic close of his letter to Giraldi prevents one from slipping into any illusions about "generous emulation," a favorite phrase in the eighteenth century. One finds ferocity in imitative literature, not to mention in the vicious, ad hominem (one need only think of J. C. Scaliger's attacks on Erasmus) "debates" over Ciceronianism, which one combatant, Francesco Florido, by no means a mild man, justly characterized as follows:

*quae [imitatio] cum vehementer multorum animis non solum in Italia sed et in aliis regionibus, in quibus bonae litterae vigent, insederit, ita litteratorum ingenia torquet, ut nulla umquam de re acrius magisque capitali inter eos odio meo iudicio certatum sit.*

Petrarch makes avoiding the footsteps of his predecessors a central principle of his conception of imitation, even though he recognizes the difficulty of the task:

*Etsi enim mille passim talia in poetis sint, ubi scilicet alter alterius verbis usus est, michi tamen nichil operosius in scribendo nichilque difficilius se offert, quam et mei ipsius et multo maxime precedentium vitare vestiga* (Fam. 23.19.15).
In another letter to Boccaccio Petrarch reelaborates Seneca's *vestigia* topos, passages which also contain forceful examples of *dux* and *via* (*semita, callis*) used to prefer emulation to imitation:

> Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum *vestigia*? ego vero utar *via vetere*, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt (ep. mor. 33.11).

Petrarch's expansion of these lines from Seneca is a good example of his persistent attempt to make his practice conform to his theory. After quoting assertions of originality from Juvenal (7.53-5), Horace (*epis. 1-19.21*, quoted above), Lucretius (1.926-7=4.1-2, quoted above), and Virgil (*Q. 3.292-3*), Petrarch asserts his own originality by emulating Seneca:

> Quid ergo? Sum quem priorum *semitam*, sed non semper *aliena vestigia* sequi iuvet; sum qui aliorum scriptis non furtim sed precario uti velim in tempore, sed dum liceat, meis malim; sum quem similitudo delectet, non identitas, et similitudo ipsa quoque non nimia, in qua sequacis lux ingenii emineat, non cecitas non paupertas; sum qui satius rear duce caruisse quam cogi per omnia ducem sequi. Nolo ducem qui me vinciat sed precedat; sint cum duce oculi, sit judicium, sit libertas; non prohibear ubi velim pedem ponere et preterire aliqua et inaccessa tentare; et breviorem sive ita fert animus, planiorem callem sequi et properare et subsistere et divertere liceat et reverti (*Fam.* 22.2.20-1).

Petrarch follows his advice: "Utendum igitur ingenio alieno utendumque coloribus, abstinentum verbis" (*Fam.* 23.19.13). He only reproduces
the common phrase, "Quid ergo?", which by itself alerts no one to this passage in Seneca. He uses Seneca's figures -- vestigia, via, dux -- but changes the wording: "priorum semitam" for "priorum vestigia," "breviorem . . . planiorem" for "propriorem planioremque," "semitam" and "callem" for "via." He omits the contrast between "domini" and "duces." He preserves Seneca's general idea, but adds to it with his characteristic concern with theft. He even corrects Seneca by implying he did not go far enough, by suggesting that the rejection of "domini" is not enough. Petrarch wants a guide too, but one of a special kind. He wants his independence from his guide and by expressing his desire he is asserting his own independence from Seneca's text.39

-4-

The proliferation of eristic metaphors allows one to make a distinction between two types of imitation and emulation. Although such a distinction is implicit in writings on imitation from Horace's epist. 1.19 on, no one makes it explicitly, as far as I know, until Erasmus, who does not adopt emulation as a technical term.40 Usually the distinction emerges in the metaphoric contrasts I have been tracing: servile/free (in Horace), follower/competitor or surpasser, thief/borrower-transformer, ape/man. I would like to suggest that aemulatio does not emerge as a technical term for the freer, more competitive and transformative type of imitation at least partly because of its ambiguous moral significance.41
Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.17 gives both meanings of *aemulatio*:

*aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur . . . et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat.*

Nonius defines the envious aspect of *aemulatio* by contrasting it with *imitatio*:

*aemulatio ab imitatione hoc distat, quod imitatio simplex est et livorem atque invidiam non admittit; aemulatio autem habet quidem imitandi studium, sed cum malitiae operatione (437 M).*

Envy, contentious striving, jealous rivalry cling to *aemulatio* and hinder its usefulness as a descriptive term; an overtone of condemnation threatens to interfere. In Pliny, for example, who uses *aemulatio* in literary contexts much more frequently than his predecessors, it does not acquire the status of a technical term independent of *imitatio* and occasionally requires an apology. In *epist* 1.2 Pliny is sending a speech to a friend for correction:

*Temptaui enim imitari Demosthenen semper tuum, Caluum nuper meum, dumtaxat figuris orationis; nam uim tantorum uirorum, 'pauci quos aequus . . .' adsequi possunt. Nec materia ipsa huic (uereor ne improbe dicam) aemulationi repugnauit (2-3).*

Pliny here uses *imitari*, *adsequi*, and *aemulatio* interchangeably; he is following his models, not contending with them, imitating not emulating them. But when using *aemulatio* as a synonym for *imitatio*, he is afraid of laying himself open to a charge of presumptuous
contentiousness and excuses himself with "uereor ne improbe dicam" in accordance with rhetorical doctrine on using too daring an expression (e.g., Quintilian 8.3.37). In a passage quoted earlier from epist 7.9 Pliny is advocating aemulatio in translation. He qualifies his use of aemulus with quasi: "quasi aemulum scribere lectisque conferre."

Then he explains why this certare, this contentio is audax but not improba; it is a private exercise, not a public attempt to shine. In another letter Pliny rejects the moral excess of aemulari for the neutral imitari and sequi; he admits he was using Demosthenes' speech against Meidios:

Quam sane, cum componerem illos, habui in manibus, non ut aemularer (improbum enim ac paene furiosum), sed tamen imitarer et sequerer, quantum aut diversitas ingeniorum maximi et minimi, aut causae dissimilitudo patetur (7.30.5).

Regardless of the reasons why aemulatio does not become a technical term in antiquity, it has considerable usefulness as a designation for the type of imitation advocated by eristic metaphors. Erasmus, the first person to distinguish between imitatio and aemulatio, uses eristic diction:

Iam sunt arguti quidam qui distinguunt imitationem ab aemulatione. Siquidem imitatio spectat similitudinem, aemulatio uictoriam. Itaque si totum et unum Ciceronem tibi proposueris, non in hoc tantum ut illum exprimas, uerum etiam ut uincas; non praetercurrendus erit, sed relinquendus magis (p. 116).42
One would like to know who these clever fellows are, if Erasmus has someone particular in mind, is referring to an idea "in the air," or is just being casual without intending to be taken literally. In any event *aemulatio* for Erasmus is competitive, eristic. Towards the end of his dialogue he returns to the distinction after alluding to Poliziano's *vestigia* topos:

\[
\text{Rursus M. Tullium in parte studiorum, praecipuum ac primum esse uolo, non solum, nec sequendum tantum puto, sed imitandum potius, atque aemulandum etiam. Etenim qui sequitur, alienis ingreditur uestigiis, et seruit praescripto. Porro uere dictum est, eum non posse bene ambulare, qui pedem semper ponit in alieno uestigio: nec unquam bene natare, qui non audet abiicere suber. Imitator autem non tam eadem dicere studet quam similia, imo ne similia quidem interdum, sed paria magis. Aemulator uero contendit etiam melius dicere si possit(p.302).}
\]

At the very least *aemulatio* includes the attempt to surpass the model, and this attempt generally has important consequences for a reader of imitative poetry because it conflicts with dissimulative advice. *Aemulatio* calls attention to itself and deliberately challenges comparison with its model. The relation between text and model becomes an important element in the text itself. A passage from Vida shows how dissimulation yields to *aemulatio*; he regards them as mutually exclusive and concludes (3.243-4) by advocating open emulative theft:

\[
\text{Quum vero cultis moliris furta poetis, Cautius ingredere, & raptus memor occule versis Verborum indiciis, atque ordine falle legentes Mutato. nova sit facies, nova prorsus imago.}
\]
Munere (nec longum tempus) vix ipse peracto
Dicta recognosces veteris mutato poetae.
Saepe palam quidam rapiunt, cupiuntque videri
Omnibus intrepidī, ac furto laetantur in ipso
Depressī, seu quum dictis nihil ordine verso
Longe alios iisdem sensus mira arte dedere,
Exueruntque animos verborum impune priores.
Seu quum certandi priscis succensa libido,
Et possessa diu sed enim male condita victis
Extorquere manu juvat, in meliusque referre (3.217-30).

What Vida is here saying about style can apply to matters of inventio
and dispositio. The important point is that the rejection of
dissimulation reduces and potentially eliminates some of the
difficulties raised by transformative and dissimulative doctrine. A
reader can feel justified by this aspect of aemulatio in interpreting
a resemblance between two texts as an allusion. A reader can feel
justified in expecting a text to assert its difference from its model
and to make use of that difference.

Aemulatio, of course, is no panacea; difficulties remain. The
reader starts with a resemblance between texts, not with a map pointing
to emulations as opposed to imitations. Even if the author, Petrarch,
Poliziano, or Jonson, for example, has expressed a preference for
emulation, there is no guarantee that he may not borrow a phrase here
and there in a nontransformative, nonemulative fashion. For authors
who have not written on imitation/emulation one can only try to deduce
from their work which type of imitation they approve and practice.
Also, it is difficult to be sure if an emulation is striving with
the structure, themes, premises of its model or only striving with
the expression; the emulation may not extend beyond a stylistic trick,
as often in Vida. Frequently a major interpretive difficulty arises
in trying to determine if an emulation is reworking a particular
passage or a topos; one is not sure just what is being contended with.

Nevertheless the awareness of the emulative option can guide
one's interpretation of numerous ancient and Renaissance texts. But
can one learn more from eristic metaphors? I would like to propose that
they cast light on the way in which a text may differ from its model.
For the repeated emphasis on conflict suggests that the text may
criticise, correct, or revise its model. Petrarch's emulation of
Seneca's *vestigia* topos is a case in point. Petrarch implies that
Seneca's conception of having a guide (*dux*) is not rigorous enough:
a *dux*, too, may be a *dominus* unless the author is careful to preserve
his independence. A particularly striking example is Milton's use of
Satan to belittle traditional epic conceptions of heroism in his
attempt to write an epic of Christian heroism: "the better fortitude/
Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom/ Unsung" (*PL* 9.31-3) or "deeds/
Above Heroic, though in secret done" (*PR* 1.14-15). The example of
Milton shows that an emulative striving with a model or a tradition
may depend upon a profound awareness of historical change and difference.
An awareness of historical difference plays a crucial role in Erasmus'
conception of imitation and deserves separate consideration.
NOTES

1. For a good overview of different versions of imitation in antiquity see Richard McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Conception of Imitation in Antiquity," Modern Philology 34 (1936), 1-35.


4. Nevertheless Macrobius does change what he finds in Seneca. The most revealing additions are quoted in the text, but are not the only ones. The comparison in section 8 does not come from Seneca. Macrobius also omits large portions of Seneca's letter: the digression on natural history, the contrast between father/son and man/imago, the "magni vir ingenii" who impresses his own form on what he draws from others. The omission of the "magni vir ingenii" may be due to Macrobius' modesty (cf. his own concern over his ability to write good Latin, sections 11ff), but it might reflect his shift of emphasis from transformation to orderly management:
he does not want his material to be unrecognized, as Seneca asserts can happen. Also, the resemblance of father to son is irrelevant to Macrobius' transforming redisposition. These examples correspond to two of the major categories of change which Sturm, Ricci, Ascham and other Renaissance theorists use in analyzing imitation — _adjectio_ and _detractio_ — and one finds several examples of the third, _immutatio_: for example, the substitution of _dividunt_ for _digerunt_ or "in unius saporis usum varia libamenta confundit" (1.pr. 6) for Seneca's "in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere" (5). Consequently, Petrarch's criticism is not entirely just: "non enim flores apud Senecam lectos in favos vertere studuit, sed integros et quales in alienis ramis invenerat, protulit" (Fam.1.8.3).

5. Macrobius excuses his reproduction of others' words as follows: "nec mihi vitio vertas, si res quas ex lectione varia mutuabor ipsis saepe verbis quibus ab ipsis auctoribus enarratae sunt explicabo; quia praesens opus non eloquentiae ostentationem, sed noscendorum congeriem pollicetur" (1. pr. 4). Borrowing and its unscrupulous cousin, theft, like culling flowers are major images of nontransformative imitation.

6. Actually, Macrobius borrows _indigeste_ from Gellius, of whose preface he makes frequent use in his own preface. For this sentence see NA pr. 2-3. Willis notes other borrowings from Gellius in his Teubner edition of the _Saturnalia_. Macrobius' blending of Gellius and Seneca illustrates his own practice of imitation, eclectic reordering, not transformation, _florilegium_, not honey.

8. See the letter to Cortesi, Prosatori, pp. 902-4.


10. Marcel Raymond, L'influence de Ronsard sur la poésie française (1550-1585) (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1927), vol. 2, p. 190, refers to this work as "une pesante 'somme'" and calls des Caurres "un compilateur infatigable."


Fam. 1.8.23. One should not miss the pun, mel/melius. In fact, it is worth noting that the earliest appearances of the poet/bee comparison occur as puns: ἐνθέου διαφερεῖς μέλιττα / ἐφορίκεισθαι ἀναβροσίων μελέων ἀπεβούσκετο μέλην ἀπ' ἀκίνητος γλυκείαν ἠδὲν. (Aristophanes, Birds 748-50) and λέγοντες γὰρ διδοῦσιν πρὸς Ἰππιαίς οἷς ποιηταὶ ἀπὸ ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιφυτών οὐκ Μουσῶν κύπρον τινὸς καὶ ναξίων δραπέμενοι τὰ μέλη τινὸς φέρουσιν ὄσπερ ὡς μέλιται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως πετομένοι.

(Plato, Ion 534a-b). Marius Victorinus (Grammatici Latini, ed. Heinrich Keil, vol. 6 [Leipzig, 1884], p. 184), in a list of possible derivations of μέλος, offers the following: "quibusdam placet ab apibus, quae grecae μελισσαί dicuntur. nam sicut illae omni cura flores legunt; ut mella conficiant, καὶ ὧτε μέλει ἀταῖς hoc studium, μελισσαί dicuntur, in scriptura quoque quidquid floris est in sono vocis et rhythmis ad componenda colligimus, ut auribus tradamus, unde et Homerus, ὃ ὦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλυκόνοις μέλιτος γλυκίων βεέως ὑδῆι [ll. 1.249]. nam veluti gustu vocis aures pabulantur." (I owe this reference to v. Stackelberg, p. 277, n.5.) For perhaps the earliest extant comparison of poet and bee, which also contains a play on μέλισσα/μέλυς, see Simonides (Page 88) and Hermann Fränkel, Gnomon 25 (1953), 388, who is convinced that Horace Od. 4.2.27ff is alluding to Simonides. One also finds transformative apian metaphors not mentioned by v. Stackelberg in Giulio Camillo Delminio, "Della imitazione," Trattati 1.164-5 and "Timber," Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford, Percy and Evelyn Simpson, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947)

14. See the letter to Poliziano, *Prosatori*, p. 910: "Fieri enim non potest quin varia ciborum genera male concoquantur, et quin ex tanta colluvione dissimillimi generis inter se verba collidantur."


In order not to burden the text unnecessarily I will here list some examples of the monkey and crow metaphors, which always (with the exception of Villani, who calls Salutati "scimmia di Cicerone"
as a compliment) are used pejoratively to indicate particularly slavish, nontransformative imitation. For the ape see Horace, sat. 1.10.18; Seneca the Elder, contr. 9.3. 12-3; the three ancient and numerous medieval uses of simia cited by Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 538-40; Fillipo Villani, Le vite d'uomini illustri fiorentini, cited by Gambaro, Ciceronianiano, p. xxxii; Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.13; Poliziano, Prosatori, p. 902; Cortesi, Prosatori, p. 906 and "De hominibus doctis dialogus," in Philippi Villani Liber de civitatis Florentiae famosis civibus, ed. Gustavus Camillus Galetti (Firenze, 1847), p. 234; Giovanfrancesco Pico, pp. 29, 63, 70, 71; Erasmus, with whom simius is a favorite term of mockery, pp. 86, 100, 108, 118, 136, etc.; Sperone Speroni, Opere (Venezia, 1740), vol. 2, p. 365 (joined with a crow comparison); du Bellay, p. 107; Gabriel Harvey, Ciceronianus, ed. Harold S. Wilson (Lincon: University of Nebraska, 1945), p. 80, alluding to Erasmus, p. 100. Horace, epis. 1.3.19, reworks the Aesopian fable of the crow and the stolen plumage to dissuade Celsus from plundering the Palatine library for his writings. After Horace, the cornicula becomes a commonplace: Petrarch, Fam. 22.2.17; Pico, p. 34: Erasmus, p. 204; Calcagnini, Trattati 1.216; Speroni 2.365; Bartolomeo Ricci, De imitatione (Venice, 1545), p. 75; Johann Sturm, De imititatione oratoria (Strassbourg, 1574), schola to book 3, chap. 1 (quoted below); Harvey, p. 54 (perhaps alluding to Ricci).
16. Ciceroniano, p. 290. The representative nature of this passage is highlighted by the fact that it is one of the very few passages of which Dolet, in his attack on Erasmus, approves: "Docte monet et probe, quos ita ad imitationem hortatur, ut non quicquid arridet, orationi continuo attexant, sed quae ad imitationem a scriptoribus sumunt, in stomachum transiiciant, et bene concoquant, ut transmisuum in vaenas, velut nostrum renascatur, non videatur aliunde corrogatum" (p. 91).


18. Seneca, ep. mor. 84. 8; Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.11; Cortesi, Prosatori, pp. 906 (quoted by Erasmus, p. 298), 908. Pico criticizes Cortesi's comparison, p. 63.


20. Because of the inaccuracies of the printed editions of the Disputationes I cite from the manuscript, written by Pietro Cennini in 1474, preserved in the Laurentian Library (Plut. 53.28). This passage appears f. 197v.


29. One finds a strikingly similar bit of advice in Petrarch, who of course did not know *On the Sublime*, in *Seniles* 2.3. He tells Bruni to consider his own productions as if an enemy had written them; see Petrarch, *Opera* (Basel, 1554), p. 840.


31. One finds eristic expressions in later translators. See, for example, St. Jerome on Hilarius, "qui homilias in Iob et in psalmos tractatus plurimos in Latinum vertit e Graeco nec adsedit litterae dormitanti et putida rusticorum interpretatione se torsit, sed quasi captivos sensus in suam linguam victoris iure transposuit" (epis.57, quoted by Hans Eberhard Richter, *Uebersetzen und Uebersetzungen in der römischen Literatur* [diss. Erlangen, 1938], p. 41). Ermolao Barbaro, a close friend of Poliziano, prefaces his translation to Themistius with the declaration: "in plenum, non tam latinum: reddere Themistium, quam certare cum eo volui"
(quoted by Eugenio Garin, *L'umanesimo italiano* [1947; Bari: Laterza, 1975], p. 120.

32. For a formulation dependent on Quintilian see Daniel Barbaro, "Della eloquenza," *Trattati* 2.359.


34. Assecla reads like a direct slap at Cortesi, whom Pico criticizes in his second letter to Bembo (pp. 63-4). See Cortesi to Poliziano, *Prosatori*, p. 908: "ego malo esse assecla et simia Ciceronis quam alumnus aut filius aliorum."

35. Statius expresses his sense of inferiority vis-à-vis Virgil more explicitly after his imitation of the Nisus and Euryalus episode; see Th. 10.445-8.

36. Weinberg prints "semper astris" for "serperastris"; see Caelius Calcagninus, Opera (Basel, 1544), p. 275. Calcagnini is referring to Varro, de lingua latina 9.11.


38. In my opinion there is no doubt that Petrarch is emulating the passage from Seneca rather than just using a topos. Petrarch refers to ep. mor. 33.7, a section against "captare flosculos," in three different letters (Fam. 1.3.4, 4.15.17, 24.1.9). The second of these letters contains a long exhortation, based on Seneca, not to excerpt and paraphrases the via and vestigia sentence: "Placet ignota tentare, ubi sepe viam non inveniens aut vageris aut corruas; placet illorum segui vestigia . . ." (4.15.18). For Petrarch's thorough acquaintance with Seneca, especially the letters to Lucilius, see de Nolhac, vol. 2, pp. 115-26. It is ironic that Petrarch is violating his own advice against "captare flosculos" and excepting from commentaries in Fam. 22.2; his quotation from Lucretius comes from Macrobius (Sat. 6.2.3). Petrarch, as de Nolhac, vol. 1, pp. 159-60 shows, has no first-hand knowledge of Lucretius.
39. One final *vestigia* topos deserves citation because at least two other authors -- Erasmus, pp. 296, 302 (quoted below), and Parthenio, p. 107 -- approve and quote it. I refer to Poliziano's (*Prosatori*, p. 904): "Sed ut bene currere non potest qui pedem ponere studet in alienis tantum vestigiis, ita nec bene scribere qui tamquam de praescripto non audet egredi." — A few examples of dux to advocate or approve close imitation: Petrarch, *Fam.* 24.4.4-5; 24.7.3; 24.9.1; 24.12,3,18,22,23,24,42; Cortesi, *Prosatori* pp. 906, 910; Bembo, pp. 51,54, Dolet, p. 56; Ascham, letter to Sturm, p. 182; Levin to Harvey, *Ciceronianus*, p. 38. One finds path used similarly in Bembo, p. 56; Vida 3.185; Dolet, p. 66. Quintilian (10.5.7), Pico (p. 26), and Levin (Harvey, p. 38) use *via* to support emulation.

40. Reiff claims that *aemulatio* becomes a fixed critical term in the age of Tiberius (pp. 73ff). The evidence does not hear him out. Phaedrus' use of *aemulatio*, 2 ep. 7, is more plausibly explained as moral than technical; his prologues and epilogues are obsessed with envy and the criticism he may receive (*calumniari*, 1. prol. 5; *livor*, *obtrectare*, 2 ep. 10; *livor*, 3. prol. 60; *obtrectare* 4. prol. 15-6; *livor*, 4.22.1; *invidia*, 5, prol. 9). But the major objections to taking *aemulatio* as a technical term are that it often appears as a synonym for *imitatio* and that Quintilian in 10.2 and Seneca in *ep. mor.* 84, the two most extended and most important discussions of imitation in the first century (and perhaps in any other), discussions which Reiff curiously neglects,
do not use *aemulatio*, although they are advocating it. Quintilian's only use of *aemulari* in 10.2 occurs at section 17 in a list of imitators who fall into the *vitia* nearest to the *virtutes* of their models; the context shows that he is just varying his verbs, not using a technical term. At 10.1.61 Quintilian refers to Horace's "Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari" (Od. 4.2.1) as follows: "propter quae Horatius eum merits nemini credit imitabilem."

And Pliny, who frequently has *aemulor* and *aemulatio* to describe literary relationships, often uses it synonymously with *imitatio*, for instance in *epist.* 1.2.2-3 and 1.5.12-3, as Reiff admits (p. 85), and 8.6.13. At 6.11.2 Pliny makes *aemulari* and "meis instare vestigiis" synonymous. Pliny's joining of *improba* with *aemulatio* at 1.2.3 and 7.30.5 suggests that he has its ambiguous moral significance, not a technical literary one, in mind. I do not question the existence of varying conceptions of imitation in the first century, nor do I challenge the usefulness of *aemulatio* to describe one of them, provided that one realizes that it is not an ancient technical term. (For similar criticisms of Reiff, see the review by Manfred Fuhrmann, *Gnomon* 33 [1961], 445-8).


42. Cf. Erasmus' opposition of *sequi/praeire*, p. 172. After Erasmus, Ricci refers to a distinction between *imitatio* and *aemulatio* as well known. Ricci is about to discuss, at length, Virgil's emulation,
in his treatment of Dido, of Catullus' Ariadne, but prefaces
his remarks with the excuse: "... utriusque carmen in medium
descriptuam adducam, si mihi tamen prius a doctissimis viris
cavebo, ne mihi id vitio, aut etiam ignorantiae vertant, quod
quae aemulationis sunt, ea ego imitationi propria attribuam, nam
cum sequi, imitari, aemulari tria sint omnino specie diversa,
genere tamen quodam sit similia, ut quod sit alius, vicissim
ad alius commodatem sine vitio transferri potest ... ."
(p. 43v). Ricci himself does not strictly distinguish between
imitatio and aemulatio in his own usage; they are interchangeable
terms, e.g. p. 43: "Iam vero iterum Sannazarius, cum agit de
virginis partu, quam bellus est Maronis imitator, quam prudenter
videt quae aemuletur. ... ." Ricci's sequi/imitari/aemulari
formulation resembles Bembo's above-quoted progression from
imitandum to assequi contendamus to praetereamus, to which
Daniel Barbaro, a member of Bembo's circle in Venice, is indebted
in his "Della eloquenza" (1557): "Et in brieve, bisogna aprir
gli occhi e nello imitare i dotti et eccellenti uomini si richiede
considerare di che forma essi sieno più abondanti e di che meno,
accio che sapendo per qual cagione essi stati sieno tali, ancora
non sia tolto id potere agli studiosi di accostarsi loro, et
aguagliarli, e se possibile à (che pure è possibile al modo già
detto) di superargli" (Trattati 2.450). To those gradations of
imitation one can add Sturm's opposition between servile and free
imitation, De im. oratoria 1.2.
43. As observed earlier, Pico and Bembo come closest to making a distinction between *imitatio* and *aemulatio*. Perhaps Erasmus heard it during his stay in Rome in 1509, during which visit he heard the Ciceronian sermon which alarmed him so much (see *Ciceroniano*, p. lvii-lviii and pp. 128ff). In any event Erasmus claims that he did not know the correspondence between Pico and Bembo until after the publication of the *Ciceronianus*: see the letter to Vlatten, 24 January 1529, *Ciceroniano*, p. 326.

44. Gambaro, in his fine edition of the *Ciceronianus*, makes a curious omission in his note to this passage. He compares "bene natur et aliicere suber" with Horace's "nabis sine cortice" (*Sat. 1.4.120*). The more relevant reference is to Poliziano's *vestigia* sentence (see note 39), which Erasmus quotes p. 296; earlier in the same letter to Cortesi Poliziano writes: "tum demum velim quod dicitur sine cortice nates" (*Prosatori*, p. 904).