IMITATION AND THE RENAISSANCE SENSE OF THE PAST:
THE RECEPTION OF ERASMUS' CICERONIANUS

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Eugenio Garin is perhaps the most persuasive spokesman for the widely accepted position that a new sense of the past distinguishes Italian humanism and the Renaissance in general from the Middle Ages. What Garin calls the humanists' "historical-philological attitude" represents their principal contribution to historiography and intellectual history. In the Renaissance for the first time men become conscious of their remoteness from antiquity and attempt to understand it in its own terms. Or, as Myron Gilmore puts it, anachronism begins to become a historical concept in the Renaissance. Some scholars contend that this new sense of the past, contrary to Meinecke's belief, constitutes the beginnings of historicism. And in particular this awareness of the otherness of the past develops out of a rediscovery of philological method.

The essence of humanism is most clearly defined by its attitude to the civilization of the past. And that attitude is not confined to an admiration or a love for antiquity, nor to a greater knowledge of antiquity, but consists rather in a well marked historical consciousness. The 'barbarians' were not barbarous because they had remained ignorant of the classics, but because they had failed to understand them as a historical phenomenon. The humanists, on the other hand, discovered the
classics because they managed to detach themselves from them and comprehend their Latin without confusing it with their own Latin. . . . For this reason one should never seek to distinguish between the humanistic discovery of antiquity and the humanistic discovery of man -- for they amount to exactly the same thing. For the discovery of antiquity implied that one had learnt to make a comparison between antiquity and oneself, to take a detached view of antiquity and to determine one's relation to it. . . .

This point of view assumed concrete shape in the critical discussion which was started about the documents of the past. Such a discussion, whether or not it was to have any specific results, made it possible to establish a proper sense of distance between the humanists and the past. . . . The 'philology' of the humanists gave concrete shape to that crisis which was occasioned by the new awareness of the past as past, by the new vision of reality as something earthly and by the new attempt to explain history as the story of men. 4

A reader who turns from modern enthusiasm for the Renaissance discovery of the remoteness of the past to Renaissance philological studies and treatises on history will be singularly disappointed: theoretical awareness of change and of its significance for understanding past and present is very slight indeed. The gap between modern claims for the achievements of the humanists and their own theoretical pronouncements has led some scholars to explain away the absence of explicit statements of the otherness of the past:
The usual argument runs that this new sense of the past is implicit in the philological (and legal) studies of the humanists. An investigation, however, of one particular branch of Renaissance philology, treatises on imitation, calls into question the extent and significance of this Renaissance discovery of the remoteness of the past.

Treatises on imitation are a logical place to look for discussions of the relationship of past to present because they are concerned with using the writings of the ancients as models for contemporary composition. And since they are usually concerned with the stylistic possibilities of Latin, they almost always have to confront an inescapable fact of historical difference. As the humanists are fond of saying, no modern sucks in Latin with his mother's milk, as did men in the age of Cicero. But the most compelling reason for studying treatises on imitation for the light they throw on Renaissance conceptions of history is that one of the most important, Erasmus' Ciceronianus, contains a most forceful presentation of the difference between antiquity and the present -- a presentation which later writers on imitation largely ignore.
Erasmus' central argument against strict Ciceronianism depends on what one can call historical decorum. Bulephorus, the advocate of Erasmian eclecticism and emulation, extracts from Nosoponus, the slavish Ciceronian, agreement on the following points. First, Cicero spoke better than anyone else. Second, no one deserves the title of Ciceronian, that is to say, an excellent speaker, who does not speak like (similiter) Cicero. Third, no one speaks well who does not speak with decorum (apte). And fourth, we speak with decorum, "if our speech suits the people and conditions of the present." Hence the argument hinges on two propositions: good speaking depends on decorum (one of the cornerstones of classical and Renaissance rhetoric), and the person who speaks most like Cicero speaks best. After establishing agreement on these points, Bulephorus proceeds:

Does the present situation of this century seem to correspond with the ways of those times in which Cicero lived and spoke, since the religion, governmental power, magistracies, commonwealth, laws, customs, pursuits, the very appearance of men -- really just about everything -- have changed radically? . . . Furthermore, since everywhere the entire scene of human events has been turned upside down, who today can observe decorum in his speech unless he greatly differs from Cicero? . . . Wherever I turn, I see everything changed, I stand on another stage, I see another theatre, even another world. Therefore a speaker becomes most like Cicero by being different from him. Of course, the paradox is only apparent because Cicero redivivus would speak differently, especially when treating matters relating to the most important difference between his day and the present.
When discussing the style of Sadoleto's Commentarius in Psalmum L, Bulephorus says:

He didn't speak like Cicero? No, he didn't. Rather, he did because he spoke in the way in which Cicero probably would speak, if he were alive, about the same matters, that is, in a Christian manner about Christian matters. 10

Erasmus' objection to strict Ciceronianism rests on his conviction that good speaking and writing must accommodate themselves to the changed conditions of the world. His historical insight determines his position.

There is good reason to believe that Erasmus regards his historical argument as central to the struggle with Ciceronianism. A passage from his Life of Jerome, twelve years before the publication of the Ciceronianus in 1528, shows that his earliest thinking on Ciceronianism centers on the problem of historical decorum. Erasmus is defending the style of Jerome against the criticisms of Petrus Crinitus:

Just what is that Roman purity of style? He doesn't speak the same way as Caesar and Cicero? But how could it have happened that Jerome, speaking about very different matters, would nevertheless use the same words? The religion, mode of worship, the authorities were different; everything was new. And will you say that I am not eloquent unless I speak just as if I were living in the age of Cicero, since the principle praise of speaking is to observe decorum? 11
Here one finds the same conjunction of decorum as a principal element of good style with a consciousness of changed conditions of the world. Once again decorum is interpreted as accommodating one's style to the standards of the times in general, an implicit concern with the widest possible audience.

In his correspondence in the years before the publication of the *Ciceronianus* Erasmus returns to historical decorum as the rhetorical justification for rejecting strict Ciceronianism. In a letter to Andreas Alciati, which Allen dates 6 May 1526, Erasmus states his point briefly: "What, however, could be less decorous, since the whole world has been made over -- the religion, governmental powers, magistracies, names for places, buildings, fashions, customs -- than not to dare to speak differently from Cicero? If Cicero were alive, he would laugh at this race of Ciceronians." Several months later, 30 March 1527, he writes to John Maldonatus:

I hear that a new sect, as it were, of Ciceronians has arisen among the Italians. I think, that if Cicero were now living and speaking about our religion, he would not say, "May almighty God do this," but "May best and greatest Juppiter do this"; nor would he say, "May the grace of Jesus Christ assist you," but "May the son of best and greatest Juppiter make what you do succeed"; nor would he say, "Peter, help the Roman church," but "Romulus, make the Roman senate and people prosper." Since the principle virtue of the speaker is to speak with decorum, what praise do they deserve who, when they speak about the mysteries of our religion, use such words as if they were writing in the times of Virgil and Ovid?"
Assuming that the text is correct, one must take the second sentence as strongly ironic, as Erasmus' constant position is that Cicero would treat Christian matters in Christian terms because a master of eloquence always suits his expressions to the uses of the times in which he finds himself. As in the following sentence from a letter to Francis Vergara, 13 October 1527:

For them it is almost more shameful not to be Ciceronian than not to be Christian: as if indeed if Cicero were now alive, he wouldn't speak differently about Christian matters than he spoke in his day, since the principle part of eloquence is to speak with decorum.

These passages show that Erasmus continually resorts to the same line of argumentation to refute Ciceronianism in its own terms. Even if Erasmus' primary concern in writing the *Ciceronianus* is to expose renascent paganism disguising itself as Ciceronian classicism, he does not rely on religious appeals. The force of his attack comes from his use of the universally accepted criterion of decorum; he uses a rhetorical weapon against a rhetorical position. Erasmus' historicizing of decorum, his major contribution, to the
debate over Ciceronianism, opens the way for Estienne Dolet's attack on his own position in terms of a more specific conception of decorum. But before turning to that attempted refutation, I would like briefly to trace other contemporary reactions to this historical aspect of the Ciceronianus. Or rather the lack of reaction, for the curious thing about the reception of Erasmus' dialogue, from which, as Charles Lenient melodramatically put it in 1855, "a universal conflagration burned through all of Europe," is the almost total neglect of the historical reasoning which provides the backbone to Erasmus' dialogue.

The conflagration which the Ciceronianus kindled raged primarily over two issues: the supposed denigration of Cicero, and more importantly, the judgments of the Ciceronianism of contemporary authors. Lenient and Gambaro have sketched these polemics, of which the furor over the comparison of Budé and Josse Bade was the most surprising. The polemics provide a melancholy instance of a parergon usurping the attention due to the substance of a work. They provide a partial explanation of why Erasmus' historical argument is neglected: most readers were too incensed with the undervaluation of their own, their friends', or their countrymen's style to care to comment on other aspects of the work.

One Italian who did not take offense at the reference to himself in the catalogue or at a general libel on Italy wrote Erasmus
a letter which does not mention the theoretical sections of the *Ciceronianus*. Celio Calcagnini assumes that the catalogue of authors is the main point of the dialogue. He expresses his general agreement with Erasmus as follows: "Otherwise I strongly approve of your judgment in that book: namely that no one after Cicero has fulfilled all the aspects of eloquence." From this letter one would not realize that the *Ciceronianus* contains arguments for eclecticism and *aemulatio*, a competitive type of imitation which tries to surpass the model. Calcagnini's response is all the more surprising because he and Erasmus are in substantial agreement on the practice of imitation. Calcagnini's letter to Giraldi contains the most forceful advocation of *aemulatio* in the Renaissance and includes reasons for disagreeing with Giraldi's Ciceronianism. Neither letter, however, contains any indication of the significance of the historical differences between antiquity and the present.

Nicholas Berauld in 1534 and Francesco Florido in 1539 defend Erasmus and his advocacy of eclecticism without any reference to history or changed conditions. The opening of Berauld's *Dialogus* borrows heavily from the *Ciceronianus* by making fun of Ciceronianism as a new disease. Florido explicitly defends Erasmus against Dolet, who attacks Erasmus' conception of decorum, but does not consider the historical argument worth mentioning, although in the same chapter he shows an acute understanding of the "different periods of the Latin language" ("diversa Latinae linguae tempora"). Johann Sturm, in 1538, making a case for a moderate Ciceronianism and frequently insisting on the necessity of maintaining decorum, also neglects the difference between his day and Cicero's. At one point Sturm
discusses two types of *imitabilia*, because of nature and because of *tempora*. But by *tempora* he does not mean historical times; he is referring to the different ages of the student. When just beginning, a student cannot imitate an advanced author. Later in 1560 Bernardino Parthenio, in a lengthy discussion of imitation that almost turns into a complete *ars rhetorica*, fails to give any indications of being aware of the changes between antiquity and the present.

Ramus' *Ciceronianus* of 1557 provides a more interesting example of the neglect of Erasmus' arguments for historical decorum. For Ramus does approve using Christian words in Christian contexts: "The Christian religion and the form of the state have produced for us many things which the ancient Romans never heard of. Our Ciceronian will by no means fear to use the names of those things." This looks like an enunciation of a historical principle, but the context shows that it is not. Ramus' method in his *Ciceronianus* is to justify a program of study from Cicero's own practice. In this passage Ramus is approving Cicero's habit of using an obsolete word or expression or of adopting a Greek word if an ordinary Latin word is not ready to hand. It is worth noting, in addition, that Gabriel Harvey's *Ciceronianus* of 1577, which sings Ramus' praises and adopts several of his positions, does not even contain this permission to use Christian terminology if the occasion requires.

Before confessing his allegiance to a strict Ciceronian standard of style, Jacobus Omphalius, in his *De elocutionis imitatione ac apparatu* of 1537, summarizes three major objections of the eclectics. First comes Giovanfrancesco Pico's contention that every person has an innate inclination (*propensio*) to a particular style and that
an enforced conformity to the style of one author is bound to violate this natural disposition in some people. Second, granting such preeminence to Cicero amounts to an insult to all the other good stylists of antiquity such as Terence and Caesar. Third, Cicero's own eclectic practice, his imitating "Demosthenes' force, Plato's abundance, Isocrates' charm" in the interminably quoted judgment of Quintilian, argues against following one single model. Omphalius goes on to quote Poliziano's entire letter to Cortesi. No mention of Erasmus, whose De copia receives praise a few pages later, or of historical decorum. In fact Omphalius practically denies that any change of substance has occurred since Cicero's time. At least he asserts that regardless of the legal issue at stake one can almost always find appropriate arguments and examples in Cicero. He claims that it is partially true that one cannot imitate invention and disposition because new, unheard of disputes in civil cases springing up require a new disposition, a new collocation of topoi. But in my opinion at least, the person who has understood and thoroughly studied Cicero's admirable, varied disposition, which he has suited to the time, place, and circumstances, will not be much bothered about disposition, once he has understood the nature of the case. For hardly a topic occurs for which one cannot find an example in that greatest and most prudent arbitrator of civil disputes.
Omphalius first admits the existence of cases without precedent; then, however, he minimizes their existence by asserting precedents in Cicero. The possibility of a really new use is reduced to the odd exception: *vix.* 28

Bartolomeo Ricci advocates a moderate Ciceronianism as far as style is concerned. His *De imitazione*, first published in 1541, contains a revealing contradiction on the relation of past standards to the present. Ricci is defending Senecan tragedy against the charge that it violates the Horatian prohibition of onstage violence:

> In this he is not a rash author nor does he violate the rules of the theatre. For even if he stages Medea's murder of her children and likewise Hercules' children pierced by the arrows of their mad father, there are very reputable authorities who also allow this in accordance with the law of the story, and it is a fact that writers of Greek plays did this on their own judgment. But among the Romans Horace thought differently. But even if he was right, following his own nature and perhaps his times, to recoil from the cruelty of these sights, another age has ensued, and another mind has been given to writers. Certainly I do Horace no injury and make no new rule for myself, if I give my voice to the other of the two rules and do not follow his. As if indeed even Terence does not sometimes deviate from the comedians' rule by introducing, by no means ineptly, into a
play at some particular moment a good prostitute, a mother-in-
law well disposed to her daughter-in-law, and indeed other
unusual characters. 29

The historical insight is almost overwhelmed with evasions. For
reasons to be discussed later, Ricci seems to be anxious to avoid
elaborating his point. Rather than basing his case on "another age,"
Ricci offers another law from other authorities and from the practice of
Greek dramatists to counteract Horace's. The other law does not
result from the change in age; consequently Ricci does not even
really use the historical insight as part of his justification. That
rests on the existence of two laws and on the example of an approved
author who departs from a law "by no means ineptly." Ricci does not
advance beyond authorities, although he gestures towards a historical
principle that transcends authority.

In the paragraph before the one I have just quoted Ricci, while
defending Seneca, appears to allow each age its own stylistic standards.
He admits that Seneca's diction is faulty in places, but that was
excusable because of his age and country. 30
But Ricci is not willing to go as far as Poliziano, who defends silver Latinity against charges of degeneracy, "for if we investigate more closely, we will realize that eloquence in the first century was not corrupted and depraved, but that the mode of speech had changed."31 For Ricci, Seneca's departures from the style of the age of Cicero, although explainable in terms of his age, are evidence of inferiority; for Poliziano the departures are temporal differences. Ricci has the sensitivity to Latin style to recognize historical differences, but, once again, he only gestures towards a historical principle of judgment and refuses to desert classical authority.

Ricci, in this passage at least, is willing to offer an excuse based on age. Later in his treatise, however, he denies his own age certain privileges granted to antiquity. He approves the coining of new words for new things by Cicero and Horace, but moderns must try to accommodate the new to the old or resort to periphrasis. One of his examples is given by Erasmus as evidence for a new sect of pagans disgusted with Christian terminology. For excommunicate, Ricci says, one should use sacris or aquis or igne interdicere. If periphrasis and accommodation do not suffice, Ricci begrudgingly allows moderns to "corrupt" Latin as long as they add the excuse, "as we moderns say."32 In this discussion it never enters Ricci's mind to follow Erasmus' principle of historical decorum by arguing that "another age has ensued." Ricci's treatise ends with a defense of Longueil against Erasmus.

Erasmus' historical argument is not, however, completely neglected by writings on imitation. Two works published in 1531,
closer in time to the Ciceronianus than any work examined so far, do echo Erasmus' reasoning. Melanchthon's Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo is particularly concerned with propriety of language and clarity of style. For Melanchthon, avoiding ambiguity is the primary virtue of good writing. He opposes anything that introduces uncertainty, and for this reason he attacks allegorical interpretation of the Bible in a long digression. Allegory makes scripture have "nothing certain" ("nihil certi"): "This method of interpretation greatly undermines the authority of the scripture."33 One must approach Melanchthon's historical observation from the context of his obsession with the dangers of uncertainty:

One must avoid strangeness in speech, and in no way may we allow ourselves that license of coining new words, which they use immoderately in the schools. And yet sometimes one must use strange words. There is now another form of government and another religion than in Cicero's day. On account of the novelty of things, therefore, it is occasionally appropriate to use new words -- words which nevertheless usage has made less jarring, as judgment, meaning, and the norm of speech depend on usage.34

One uses these strange words to avoid obscurity, not out of a strong conviction that one must adopt one's modes of speech to the standards of one's times. Later in the treatise, in the section entitled "de imitacione," Melanchthon makes this clearer. Those who use persuasio
for fides or coelestis philosophia for evangelium are rightly ridiculed, since they are only creating unnecessary difficulties of interpretation (sig. g iii). Although Melanchthon does not mention Erasmus in connection with the use of Christian terminology (Erasmus is praised for the De copia and his knowledge of rhetoric), he is quite probably alluding to the Ciceronianus with "the fools deserve to be ridiculed." In 1531 the ridicule which Erasmus heaps on persuasio for fides must have been fresh in the minds of people interested in the Ciceronian controversy. In any event the other reference in 1531 to imitation and changes in history is a direct acknowledgment of Erasmus' argument:

As Erasmus excellently sums it up, all things have been changed.
As a result one cannot speak with decorum about things of the present if one does not dare to deviate a hair's breadth from Cicero.

Vives' entire conception of imitation is very close to Erasmus'. Both insist upon the insufficiency of mere imitation and advocate striving with the model, aemulatio. Both insist on historical decorum. And Vives offers the fairest assessment of the Ciceronianus: even though he was "slighted" in the first edition by not being included in the catalogue of contemporary writers. From his approbation one would think Vives fully subscribes to Erasmus' notion of historically
decorous imitation, a passage which I shall quote later, however, qualifies Vives' conception of historical change.

The two remaining responses which I wish to consider help to explain why, with the exception of Vives and to a certain extent Melanchthon, writers on imitation do not take Erasmus' arguments for historical decorum very seriously. I have already suggested that part of the reason for the neglect of this aspect of Erasmus' dialogue is that many people considered the judgments on the style of contemporary authors to be the heart of the dialogue. The polemical passions which the catalogue, a parergon as Erasmus later claims, roused diverted attention from Erasmus' statement of his case for eclectic aemulatio. The replies by Giulio Camillo Delminio and Estienne Dolet, however, raise actual difficulties with the position Erasmus takes.

The language of Delminio's "Della imitazione," which Weinberg dates around 1530, is nearly as important as any argument that it advances. Unlike the other treatises examined so far (except for Parthenio's), it is written in a vulgar language, Italian, rather than Latin. Delminio's main insight seems very obvious, but he draws
important consequences from it. Latin is no longer spoken; it has already finished its development. Delminio begins his essay by exhorting Erasmus to stop joking and to resume his real opinion; he claims he does not believe that Erasmus is really attacking Ciceronianism. Then comes the first argument:

So then I think that when you are willing to resume your true self, you will say, and much better than I can, that the Latin language, just like all other things in the world, has had its rising, its midday, and its setting. And just as one cannot deny that the sun has greater power and more apparent beauty at noon than when it rises or sets, we should firmly believe that all things which begin to exist, reach their zenith after a time, and finally set, are more perfect at their zenith than in the beginning or their decline. 38

The organic metaphor of rise and fall allows Delminio to maintain that one should resort only to the zenith of Latin, since Latin has run its course. After reading Delminio, one realizes that Erasmus' whole approach to the question of the best style rests on the assumption that Latin is a living language with as much adaptive power as a vulgar tongue, although Erasmus does admit that the opportunities for using spoken Latin have been greatly reduced. His accommodation to present conditions is open to the charge that Latin is no longer a condition of the present. The logical extension of his argument for historical decorum is not that Cicero redivivus would use a Latin updated by Christian modifications and additions, but rather would speak Tuscan or French or Dutch or some other vulgar language.
Erasmus' historical insight does not see far enough. He does not draw the conclusion that part of the "everything is new" of his day is the shift from Latin to the vulgar languages. He wants to allow his contemporaries to treat Latin as if they were native speakers. But the historical situation is radically different. As Delminio says, although the opponents of imitation are not speakers of Latin, they take the liberty of coining new words because men in Cicero's day, while Latin was in use and developing, allowed themselves that liberty. "Wouldn't you laugh, Frenchmen, if I, a foreigner, wanted to add words to your language?"\(^{39}\)

Although Delminio does argue that his contemporaries must respect the completed historical development of Latin, he does not advocate abandoning Latin for the vernacular. He does allow one to see, however, the contradictory tension in Erasmus' championing stylistic innovation in a language no longer spoken. Delminio's own position does not reject Latin, but builds a different argument from decorum on the base of his awareness of the historical situation of Latin. Delminio contends that one violates decorum by mixing words from different periods of Latin. Since Latin is no longer developing, one ignores history when one employs words and constructions from different periods as if they all belonged together. Delminio's
expression of the principle of decorum is implicit in the analogy he uses to emphasize the unnaturalness of disregarding the periods of Latin usage. He recalls watching an anatomist dissolve the flesh from a corpse in order to reveal the skeletal and nervous systems:

And just as it would displease the eye to see the head of such a body clothed with the flesh and skin of a young man, but the neck with the flesh and skin, all full of wrinkles, of an old man, and still more displeasing if in one part there were the virile flesh and skin of a male, in another the soft flesh and skin of a woman, and even more displeasing if the body had an arm of human flesh and the chest of the flesh of an ox or a lion, and was not all equal and such as it should be in its most flourishing age, likewise it would not please the ear and intellect to hear and understand a speech which did not have all its parts clothed with one language and was not all suited to itself, and which could not belong to one century.  

This grotesque vision is predicated on the death of the body and the death of Latin. It offers another conception of what historical decorum might be and thereby undercuts Erasmus' own conception and suggests why it does not find acceptance in the later literature on imitation. Erasmus' historical argument for a certain kind of imitation in Latin contains the seeds of an argument against using Latin at all.

Estienne Dolet, in his Dialogus, De imitatione Ciceroniana, adversus Desiderium Erasmum Roterdamum, pro Christophoro Longolio
of 1535, counters Erasmus' conception of historical decorum by emphasizing the importance of audience for decorum. One cannot tell if Dolet regards historical decorum as a crucial element in the Ciceronianus because his method in his own dialogue is to insert long verbatim passages from Erasmus into the mouth of Sir Thomas More, who is supposedly defending Erasmus. As a consequence every section of the Ciceronianus is discussed in some detail. Nevertheless Dolet's position deserves serious consideration, although even the fairest and most thorough student of imitation, Hermann Gmelin, claims that Dolet does not rise above the level of personal abuse.  

   Dolet tackles Erasmus on decorum in two different places, once specifically with regard to Longueil's speeches in Rome and once in general in the context of Erasmus' discussion of the "totally new scene of human affairs." Bulephorus attacks the decorum of Longueil's speeches after expressing the admiration he once felt for them. Dolet reproduces the major objection. Longueil's speeches have very little of Cicero in them because of the change in times. Cicero spoke with complete decorum, since the senate, tribunes and other political institutions were facts of life. Since they no longer exist, Longueil hardly can have spoken with decorum.
To Erasmus' implicit definition of decorum as accommodation to the historical conditions existing at the moment in which a speech is delivered Dolet offers an explicit, more conventional definition of decorum, which centers on the matter at hand. One must follow the case closely and say those things which fit the case.\textsuperscript{43} Dolet is concerned with the individual instance, the primary concern of Cicero's own discussion of decorum:

One kind of speech does not suit every case, audience, person, or time, for cases involving someone's rights as a citizen require a certain style, and cases dealing with private or small matters require another style.\textsuperscript{44}
Erasmus' and Dolet's quarrel over decorum comes down to different understandings of "tempori congruere" or as Cicero elsewhere defines decorum, "to be appropriate to time and person." They both believe "tempori congruere" essential for good speaking and writing, but Erasmus takes tempus in the general sense of the times or epoch in which one finds oneself, while Dolet takes it as the specific occasions of the speech. Dolet is closer to Cicero's own understanding of "tempori congruere": "The time makes a difference ... whether one of peace or war, of haste or of leisure." Since Dolet has his eyes on the circumstances of the particular occasion of the delivery of a speech, he pays close attention to another aspect of the traditional conception of decorum -- the audience. As Cicero states in Orator 71, "decorum . . . depends on the people, both those who speak and those who listen." Dolet's defense of Longueil's Roman speeches depends on the learned audience for which they were composed, although he also argues that terms like senatus still make sense because modifications of what they represented for the Romans still exist. But the audience is his most persuasive point:

Longueil was rightly able to use words of this sort, not in the presence of the ignorant multitude and the dregs of the plebs, but when his listeners were very learned and erudite men who certainly were not ignorant of those ancient words.
Not only does the learned audience understand the Roman terms to which Erasmus objects -- therefore Erasmus cannot complain of obscurity -- the audience requires them. If Longueil had abstained from those terms, which glorify the ancient and flatter the modern Romans, he would have exposed himself to the charge of detracting from the glory of Rome -- the very charge against which he was defending himself in the speeches under consideration. Longueil was trying to ward off invidia and adopted Ciceronian diction, "to adapt his speech to the pursuits and pleasure of men who still dream that Rome" is the ruler of the world. In other words Longueil was merely following the time-honored rhetorical principle of captatio benevolentiae; he wanted to dispose his audience favorably towards him.

Dolet's response to Erasmus' assertion that the totally new conditions of the modern world make an adherence to Ciceronianism a ridiculous superstition is again most persuasive when he resorts to decorum as accommodation to one's audience. He reproduces the "I see that everything has been changed" passage, which proceeds to describe an occasion on which one has to give a talk on Christian duties and principles to an audience composed of people of all kinds, including women. Since Cicero was not familiar with the praise of fasting, the utility of charitable works, and similar matters, his eloquence will be of no use: he is not familiar with either the things or the words for them.
Dolet's reply is simple. It makes no difference if a speaker to such an audience uses the purest Ciceronian Latin or intersperses his speech with all the ecclesiastical terms of Christian Latin because the audience does not understand Latin of any sort. But on the other hand, if one is speaking to a learned assembly and substitutes sacra concio for ecclesia or uses any of the other expressions which Erasmus ridicules, will one any the less teach, delight, or move his learned listeners? They will know that the words are not used literally and will say they are beautifully figurative; they will praise the allusions and admire a speech so finely ornamented and illuminated.51

Besides exposing Erasmus' neglect of the particular conditions of a speaker's audience, Dolet's criticism reveals the literalism of Erasmus' idea of diction. What Erasmus regards as obscure anachronisms reeking of paganism, Dolet considers charming metaphors and allusions.
Decorum is a double-edged concept not only with respect to tempus. An indecorous word or expression, when viewed literally, may become decorous when viewed figuratively. Erasmus' conception of historical decorum disguises the profoundly nonhistorical, nontemporal desire to fix the temporal flux of language, one manifestation of the incessant possible alternation between literal and figurative. Erasmus is trying to impose a literal and temporal stability onto the highly unstable play between literal and figurative.

Three reasons for the neglect of Erasmus' contention that the modern writer who aspires to the title Ciceronian or excellent stylist must be unlike Cicero because of the profound changes in the world between the Roman Republic and the present, since the primary virtue of good writing is maintaining decorum -- what I have been calling the argument from historical decorum -- have emerged from this study. First, the distraction from the theoretical parts of the Ciceronianus which the judgments on the Ciceronian styles of Erasmus' contemporaries caused. Second, the internal contradiction between erecting adaptation to the demands of the present as the central standard for good style and ignoring the volgari as the languages of the present. And third, the presentation of a generalized conception of decorum which fails to analyze the situation of the audience for which a speech or writing is composed.

The second of these reasons is probably the most important and in a sense includes the third, for failure to consider the
situation of the audience can amount to failure to analyze the linguistic demands of the present. Dolet's more general discussion of decorum relies on the ignorance of Latin by a certain class of contemporaries. The importance of the internal contradiction lies in its ability to undermine a major premise of most writings on Ciceronian imitation. Most authors can agree that they are pursuing the optimum genus dicendi; without making it explicit they assume that optimum means Latin. But the form of Erasmus' argument provides a weapon to prove that the best type of speaking and writing must not be Latin. Erasmus does not see the potential subversiveness of constructing an anti-Ciceronian argument on the historical insight, "uideo mutata omnia."

The Ciceronian controversy and other discussions of imitation form part of a larger issue, the sense of the past and of its relation to the present. At stake, for the men of the Renaissance, is the exemplarility of the past and the uses to which it can be put in the present. Not only does Erasmus' insight threaten the continuance of Latin as the language of eloquence, it tends to subvert a major Renaissance faith in history as philosophy teaching through example. From Petrarch to Valla to Poliziano to Robortello and Bodin, to mention only a few typical and important thinkers, history receives its justification in terms of the examples which it provides for conduct in and of the world. History's dignity resides in its more moving and effective exhortation to right action. History is the best way, besides a long life full of experience, to develop the faculty of prudence.
If everything has changed since antiquity, what relevance does it have for the present? What becomes of the exemplarity of the past? Questions like these reveal the dangers inherent in historical decorum. Unless the insight into the otherness of the past is repressed or domesticated, it undermines the common Renaissance defense of historiography. Since historical decorum is difficult to accommodate within traditional conceptions of imitation and history, it is not so surprising that it appears so infrequently. Even those willing to entertain historical decorum seem uneasy with it. I have already pointed to Ricci's tentative and contradictory assertion of different standards for different periods because of changes in taste and society. Vives offers a much better example because he is the only writer, to my knowledge, who embraces Erasmus' statement of historical change: "Res omnes, sicut praecclare Erasmus colligit, sunt mutatae." Elsewhere in De disciplinis one sees the dangers of "mutata omnia" and Vives' response. The passage appears in a discussion of prudence and history which contains most of the Renaissance commonplaces on historiography.

Nevertheless there are those who persuade themselves that the study of the past is useless because the whole way of living, dressing, lodging, waging war, and administering peoples and states has changed. That this opinion is opposed to the judgment of wise men is a great argument that it is also contrary to reason. To be sure, no one can deny that all those things have been changed and are being
changed daily — of course, those things which are subject to our will and industry. But nevertheless those things which are contained in human nature are never changed, that is to say, the causes of our mental emotions and their actions and effects. They are much more profitable to know than the manner in which the ancients built or dressed. For what practical wisdom is greater than to know from which things the emotions of men are excited or calmed? . . . Those very things which are agreed to have been changed, how many benefits do they provide? — either so that you can make use of something yourself, or so that you can understand the reason why something was done that way at that time, from which knowledge you could apply the same or similar method to your own actions, should the situation allow. For nothing from the ancients is so out of use and abolished that it cannot to a certain extent be adapted to our customs of living because even if the form is now different, nevertheless the use remains the same, as will be easy to grasp for one who examines individual cases. 53

Vives' uneasiness with these asserters of radical change appears in his first reaction; he resorts to the authority of the sapientes before attempting his refutation. The past turns out not to be so different after all. Only fashions have changed; the important aspects of human nature have remained constant. The end of the passage claims that even those things which have changed are not too altered to lose their utility for us. For Vives, when a historical awareness of the
difference between present and past threatens to subvert the examplarity of history, the past loses some of its difference, not its exemplarity. The confrontation of a nascent historicist view of the past with the traditional humanistic belief in the utility of history, here in Vives, helps to explain why the Renaissance discovery of the otherness of antiquity receives so little explicit formulation: the discovery calls into question the whole system of Renaissance beliefs based on the purposes of history and imitation.
NOTES


Aldo Scaglione, "The Humanist as Scholar and Politian's Conception of the Grammaticus," *Studies in the Renaissance* 8 (1961), 49-70, esp. 50: "Whereas the medieval man, philosopher or philologist as he might be, sought in ancient wisdom either a confirmation of or an introduction to contemporary, medieval truths and values, the *grammaticus* of Politian's school is primarily and ultimately concerned with the discovery of a pluralistic world made of relative, distinct, equally valuable viewpoints, to be reverently and 'scientifically' reconstructed in their unique, time-bound integrity. We have a fundamental historicism replacing a fundamentally monistic view of the world that tended to reconcile differences and varieties"; August Buck, *Die humanistische Tradition in der Romania* (Berlin and Zürich: Gehlen, 1968), p. 138; George Huppert, "The Renaissance Background of Historicism," *History and Theory* 5 (1966), 48-60; Peter Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (New York: St Martin's, 1969). Gilmore's "The Renaissance Conceptions of the Lessons of History," in *Humanists and Jurists*, deserves special mention as a particularly enlightening discussion of anachronism; cf. his *The World of Humanism 1453-1517* (1952; New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 201-3. After surveying several recent works on the Renaissance discovery of the past, Joseph H. Preston, "Was There an Historical Revolution?" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 (1977), 353-64, offers the following consensus: the Renaissance attitude towards history "was characterized by a growing secularism, emphasis on evidence, and a sense of anachronism; it received a considerable part of its momentum from philological studies."

6. See, for example, Scaglione's article or Kelley, p. 13.


9. "Uidetur praesens seculi status, cum eorum temporum ratione congruere, quibus uixit ac dixit Cicero, quam sint in diversum mutata religio, imperium, magistratus, respublica, leges, mores, studia, ipsa hominum facies, denique quid non? ... Porro quum undequaque tota rerum humanarum scena inversa sit, quis hodie potest apte dicere, nisi multum Ciceroni dissimilis? ... Quocunque me uerto, uideo mutata omnia, in alio sto proscenio, aliud conspicio theatrum, imo mundum alium" (p. 126).

10. "Non dixit tulliano more? Non dixit: imo dixit potius, qui eo modo dixit, quo probabile est iisdem de rebus, si uiueret, dicturum esse Ciceronem, hoc est de christianis christiane" (p. 274).

"Quae nam ista Romana puritas? Num eodem more dicere quo dixit Caesar aut Marcus Tullius? At qui fieri potuit ut Hieronymus, de rebus longe diversis loquens, iisdem tamen verbis uteretur? Alia religio, alia cultus, diversi auctores, novata omnia. Et tu me negabis eloquentem, nisi perinde loquar quasi Ciceronis aetate vivam; cum praecipua dicendi laus sit, apte dicere?"

13. *Opus epistolarum*, VII, 16:

"Audio novam proper sectam exortam apud Italos Ciceronianorum. Opinor, si nunc viveret Cicero, deque nostra religione verba faceret, non diceret 'Faxit hoc Deus omnipotens' sed 'Faxit hoc Iupiter optimus maximus'; nec diceret 'Aspiret tibi gratia Iesu Christi' sed 'Bene fortunet quod agis opt. max. Iovis filius'; nec diceret 'Petre, prospera Romanam Ecclesiam' sed 'Romule, bene fortunato Senatum Populumque Romanum'. Quum precipua virtus oratoris sit apte dicere, quid laudis merentur illi qui de nostre religionis mysteriis loquentes talibus utuntur verbis, quasi temporibus Maronis aut Ovidii scribant?"

13a. I suspect that one should conclude the second sentence with a question mark or change opinor to opinatur or opinantur.

14. *Opus epistolarum*, VII, 194:

"Apud hos propre turpius est non esse Ciceronianum quam non esse Christianum: quasi vero si Cicero nunc revivisceret, de rebus Christianis non aliter loqueretur quam aetate sua loquebatur, quum praecipua pars eloquentiae sit apposite dicere."
Compare the continuation of the passage quoted from the Life of Jerome: "Nisi forte parum Romanus videbor, si pro eo quod olim dicebant, 'faxit Iuppiter optimus maximus,' dixero, 'faxit Christus Iesus;' quod ad hunc modum non sit locutus M. Varro aut C. Caesar aut M. Tullius."

15. See Gambaro's preface to the Ciceronianus.

16. Lenient, p. 32.

17. Lenient, pp. 32-48; Gambaro, pp. LXXVIII-CVIII.


21. Nicolai Beraldi Aurelii Dialogus, Quo rationes quaedam explicantur, quibus dicendi ex tempore faciltas parari potest: deque ipsa dicendi ex tempore facultate (Lyon, 1534); Francescus Floridus Sabinus, Succisivarum lectionum libri tres, printed with his In M. Actii Plauti aliorumque latinae linguae scriptorum calumniatores Apologia (Basle, 1540). Florido's relevant chapter is entitled, "Qui authores sint legendi, quive imitandi," pp. 118ff.


27. "... propterea quod novae, inauditae exurgentesque causarum civilium controversiae novam desiderant dispositionem, novam locorum collocationem. Sed meo quidem iudicio, qui Ciceronis admirabilem, variam, temporis ac loci rerumque occasioni accommodatam oikovmati un animo cognitam atque pertractatam habet: non erit, intellecta causae natura, de dispositione admodum sollicitus. Vix enim eiusmodi thema incidunt, cujus non exemplum, apud summum illum civilium controversiarum disceptatorem prudentissimum reperiatur" (p. 50).

28. Omphalius' Ciceronianism is as strict as one finds in the Renaissance; he even speaks of imitating Cicero in religious terms. After reading other authors for matter, we should imitate only Cicero for disposition and elocution, "animo devotissimo et quadam veluti religione ex illius immortalis in dicendo viri alta ingenii gloria, et admirabili omnium virtutum laude propendentes" (p. 57).


"In quo neque hic exlex aut temerarius est auctor. Nam etsi Medeam coram populo nectantem filios inducit, item Herculis a patre furente sagittis confossos, licere hoc quoque per fabulae legem sunt qui gravissime testentur auctores, et, qui graecam scripsere fabulam, hoc suo arbitratu factitasse constat. At Horatius in Latinis aliter sensit. At etiam rectius senserit,
et naturam suam et fortasse etiam sua tempora secutus, ab horum spectaculorum immanitate abhorrerit; subsecuta est alia aetas, atque alius scriptoribus animus est datus. Certe neque Horatio iniuriam, neque mihi novam legem facio, si ad duarum legum alteram subscriptionem meam accommodo, eius non sequor. Quasi vero et Terentius a comicorum lege non interdum recedat, et non in fabulam bonam meretricem, socrum nurus cupidam, ac prorsus alienas personas ad quoddam certum tempus minime inepte introduct.

30. "Dictionis id quidem genus est quod satis tolerabile esse videatur: certe quicquid habet minus purgatae locutionis, et illi aetati et eius fortasse nationi potuit condonari, aut tanti omnino esse non debuit ut quae eius caetera multa sunt optima tam inique ex hominum lectione quasi delerentur, praesertim cum locutionis rationem pene totam aliunde petendum esse praeципiamus."


33. Phillipus Melanchthon, Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo (Wittenberg, 1531), sig. b v verso: "Haec interpretandi ratio maxime labefacit auctoritatem scripturae."

34. Sig. a v and verso: "Fugienda est in sermone peregrinitas, et illam licentiam gignendi novum sermonem nullo modo permittamus nobis, qua in scholis immodice utuntur. Tametsi alicubi peregrinis vocabulis utendum est. Alia forma nunc est imperii, Religio alia est, quam Ciceronis temporibus. Quare propter rerum novitatem interdum verbis novis uti convenit, quae tamen usus mollivit, quem penes arbitrium est et vis et norma loquendi." Cf. sig. g iii verso: "Serviendum est enim temporibus ac locis, quemadmodum Virgilius etsi ad imaginem Homeri se totum composituit, tamen illa prudenter vitavit, quae Romanis moribus non congruebant. Ac ne verba quidem repudiabit imitator, quamvis ignota Ciceroni, quae causa postulat, ut in controversiis Theologicis utendum est appellationibus Christi, Ecclesiae fidei pro fiducia, et aliis similibus."

35. Praise of De copia, Melanchthon, sig. d iii; probably allusion to Ciceronianus, sig. g iii: "merito ridentur inepti." Cf. Ciceroniano, p. 140.
36. **Joannis Ludovici Vivis Valentinī Opera Omnia** (1782; London: Gregg, 1964), VI, 176: "Res omnes, sicut praecclare Erasmus colligit, sunt mutatae, ut apte loqui de rebus praesentibus nequeat, qui a Cicerone *latum unguem* deflectere non audet."

37. "Erasmus librum justum de eo ipso [disease of Ciceronianism] scripsit iniquitate judiciorum permotus, in quo multa congruit acute consquisita, qui etsi nonnumquam argutatur magis, quam argumentatur, et ludit potius quam pugnat, nempe ex scripti illius ratione, nam dialogo *rem persequitur*, habet tamen, quantum ad hoc attinet, justam et piem querelam indignationis, multisque bonis ac fortibus argumentis praefiatur, quae quia nota sunt omnibus, etenim liber est in manibus, nos in praesens praetermittemus" (VI, 174).

38. Weinberg, I, 162: "Posso pensar, adunque, che quando tu vorrai ripigliar la vera persona tua, dirai, e molto meglio di me, che la lingua latina, si come tutte le altre cose del mondo, ha avuto il suo oriente, il suo mezzodi et il suo occaso. E si come non si puo negar che'l sol non abbia maggior virtù e piu aperta bellezza a mezzogiorno che quando leva o quando cade, cosi ci convien per fermo tener che tutte le cose che ad esser cominciano, e dopo alcun tempo vengono al loro colmo e finalement cadono, sian piu perfette nel colmo che nel cominciamento o nella declinazione."
39. "Non ridereste voi, Galli, se io straniero volessi aggiunger vocaboli alla vostra lingua?" (I, 171)

40. "E così come all'occhio dispiacerebbe veder che il capo d'un tal corpo fusse vestito di carne e di pelle di giovane, ma il collo di carne e di pelle di vecchio tutta piena di rughe, e più ancor se in una parte fusse di carne e di pelle di maschio tutta virile, in un'altra di femina tutta molle, e maggiormente se avesse il braccio di carne pertinente all'uomo et il petto di quella che si richiede al bue o vero al leone, e non fusse tutta equabile e qual doverebbe esser nella sua più fiorita età, così sarebbe ingrato all'orecchio et all'intelletto l'udir e l'intender una orazione che non avesse tutte le parti vestite d'una lingua, e non fusse tutta a se medesima conforme, e che non potesse esser richiamata ad un secolo" (I, 184).

41. Gmelin, p. 329. Usually Dolet is coupled with Julius Caesar Scaliger (Oratio pro M. Tullio Cicerone contra Des. Erasmum Roterodamum [Paris, 1531]; a second, more scurrilous oratio followed in 1537) in order to dismiss both as slanderous ruffians. Telle (see next note) is an exception.

42. Emile V. Telle, L'Erasmianus sive Ciceronianus d'Etienne Dolet (1535) (Gèneve: Droz, 1974), p. 27: "Eae [orationes] tamen totannis elaboratae, toties sub incudem reuocatae, toties criticorum censuram perpessae, quantulum habent Ciceronis? non quidem Longolij culpa, sed temporum. Aptissime dicebat Cicero, uix apte
Longolius, quandoquidem Romae nec patres conscripti sunt hodie, nec senatus, nec populi autoritas, nec tribuum suffragia, nec magistratus, nec leges, nec comitia, nec actionum forma, nec municipia, nec provinciae, socii, cives: Postremo Roma noua, Roma non est."

43. "Apte scilicet dicere, hoc non ipsum est causae servire, causae propria dicere . . . denique in ijs singulatim prudenter uersari, quae causae susceptae congruant, quaeque nos iuuent maxime, non argumento repugnent, aut per inertiam nostram adversentur" (pp. 28-9).

44. "Non omui causae nec auditori neque personae neque temporis congruere orationis unum genus; nam et causae capitis alium quendam verborum sonum requirunt, alium rerum privatarum atque parvarum..." (De oratore 3.210-1).

45. "Aptum esse consentaneumque temporis et personae" (Orator 74).

46. "Refert . . . tempus, pacis an belli, festinationis an oti" (De oratore 3.211).

47. "Quid deceat . . . positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt." Compare De oratore 3.211: "Refert etiam qui audiunt, senatus an populus an iudices: frequentes an pauci an singuli, et quales."
48. "Vocibus huiusmodi Longolius recte uti potuit, non apud imperitam multitudinem & plebis fecem, sed audientibus doctissimis eruditissimisque uiris, antiquorum istorum uerborum non ignaris" (pp. 29-30).

49. "... ut orationem ad hominum studia & uoluptatem accommodarit, qui adhuc Roman rerum dominam & et suorum magistratum ordine efflorescentem somniant" (p. 30).

50. See Dolet, pp. 176-7, which reproduces with insignificant changes Ciceroniano, pp. 126-8.

51. "... an doctos audientes, minus aut docebit, aut oblectabit, aut commouebit? Verba propria non esse scient & pulchre translata dicent, allusiones laudabunt, remque tam eximijs uerborum ornamentis illustratam illuminatamque mirabantur" (p. 180).

poetry over history by insisting on the superior persuasive powers of the examples of history. Poliziano begins his *Praefatio in Suetonii expositionem* with a discussion of the exemplarity of history. Robortello, *De historica facultate disputatio*, praises history for making men prudent and repeats the comparison of philosophy and history in favor of the more persuasive examples of history. Bodin, in his *Methodus*, bases the attempt to find universal laws for government on the exemplarity of history. Kessler's introduction to his collection of sixteenth-century *artes historicae* defends the humanist concern with exemplarity and Gilmore's "The Renaissance Conception of the Lessons of History" is a fine discussion of history as philosophy teaching through example.

*Opera omnia*, VI, 389-90: "Sunt tamen qui veteris memoriae cognitionem inutilem esse sibi persuadeant, quod mutata sit universa ratio victus, cultus, habitandi, gerendi bella, administrandi populos, et civitates; quae opinio, quoniam adversatur sapientum hominum sentenciae, magnum sit argumentum et rationi esse contrarium; nimirum, negare nemo potest omnia illa esse mutata, et mutati quotidianie, nempe quae sunt voluntatis nostrae atque industrie; sed illa tamen nunquam mutantur quae natura continentur, nempe causae affectuum animi, eorumque actiones et effecta, quod est longe conducibilius cognoscere, quam quomodo olim vel aedificabant, vel vestiebant homines antiqui, quae enim major est prudentia, quam scire quibus ex rebus qui hominum affectus vel concitatur, vel sedatur? . . . illa ipsa, quae mutata esse constat, quanta emolumenta suppeditant, vel ut aliquid in tuum usum revoces, vel ut causam intelligas cur quidquam tum
sic agebatur, quo eandem ipsam aut similem rationem ad actiones
			
tuas, quum res feret, applices? nihil est enim veterum adeo desuetum
et abolitum, quod nostris vivendi moribus accommodari quadamtenus
non queat; nam etsi forma jam alia, usus tamen idem manet, quod
eunti per singula facile erit deprehendere."