Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Shmaya, Eran (2010) General Revealed Preference Theory. Social Science Working Paper, 1332. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-161538346
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Abstract
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences)are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result "explains" classical revealed preference theory, as applied to individual rational choice. We obtain new applications to Nash equilibrium theory and Pareto optimal choice.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||
| Funders: |
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| Subject Keywords: | Falsiability; Axiomatization; Revealed preference; Testable implications of Nash equilibrium; Model Theory | ||||
| Classification Code: | JEL classication numbers: A10,D00 | ||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-161538346 | ||||
| Persistent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-161538346 | ||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||
| ID Code: | 20145 | ||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||
| Deposited By: | Shirley Johnson | ||||
| Deposited On: | 28 Sep 2010 16:22 | ||||
| Last Modified: | 26 Dec 2012 12:27 |
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