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General Revealed Preference Theory

Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico and Shmaya, Eran (2010) General Revealed Preference Theory. Social Science Working Paper, 1332. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences)are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result "explains" classical revealed preference theory, as applied to individual rational choice. We obtain new applications to Nash equilibrium theory and Pareto optimal choice.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:Falsiability; Axiomatization; Revealed preference; Testable implications of Nash equilibrium; Model Theory
Classification Code:JEL classication numbers: A10,D00
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-161538346
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:20145
Deposited By: Shirley Johnson
Deposited On:28 Sep 2010 16:22
Last Modified:26 Dec 2012 12:27

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