Koashi, Masato and Preskill, John (2003) Secure Quantum Key Distribution with an Uncharacterized Source. Physical Review Letters, 90 (5). Art. No. 057902. ISSN 0031-9007. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:KOAprl03
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We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol for an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis independent, a condition that is automatically satisfied if the source is suitably designed. The proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key extraction process is equivalent to a measurement in the sigma-hatx basis performed on a pure sigma-hatz-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the bit error rate is the same as that established by Shor and Preskill [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)] for a perfect source, indicating that the defects in the source are efficiently detected by the protocol.
|Additional Information:||©2003 The American Physical Society (Received 27 August 2002; published 6 February 2003) We thank David DiVincenzo, Peter Shor, Andy Yao, and especially Daniel Gottesman and Hoi-Kwong Lo for helpful discussions. This work has been supported in part by the Department of Energy under Grant No. DE-FG03-92-ER40701, by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. EIA-0086038, and by the Caltech MURI Center for Quantum Networks under ARO Grant No. DAAD19-00-1-0374.|
|Subject Keywords:||quantum cryptography; security; protocols|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Archive Administrator|
|Deposited On:||02 Mar 2006|
|Last Modified:||18 Sep 2014 18:11|
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