Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2004) Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2). pp. 358-376. ISSN 0022-0531 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-153536535
- Published Version
Restricted to Repository administrators only
See Usage Policy.
PDF (Author's preprint)
- Accepted Version
See Usage Policy.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-153536535
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.
|Additional Information:||© 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). Received 4 October 2002; accepted 21 February 2003. Available online 11 June 2003. We are grateful to Jinpeng Ma, Ruth Martínez, and Alejandro Neme for their helpful comments.|
|Subject Keywords:||Matching; Core; Lattice; Stability; Algorithm; Complexity; Substitutability; Tarski's fixed point theorem|
|Classification Code:||JEL classification: C78|
|Official Citation:||Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo, Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 115, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 358-376, ISSN 0022-0531, DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-48TM8DB-6/2/6e503ff095df38649381a8fe71f273ab)|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Shirley Johnson|
|Deposited On:||30 Sep 2010 16:47|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 12:29|
Repository Staff Only: item control page