Echenique, Federico (2004) A characterization of strategic complementarities. Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2). pp. 325-347. ISSN 0899-8256 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-154731523
![[img]](http://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF
- Published Version
Restricted to Repository administrators only See Usage Policy. 301Kb | |
|
PDF (Author's preprint)
- Accepted Version
See Usage Policy. 266Kb |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-154731523
Abstract
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show that: (1) generic 2×2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2) generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2003 Elsevier Inc. Received 1 April 2002. Available online 21 November 2003. I thank an associate editor and a referee for their comments. I also thank Elvio Accinelli, Bob Anderson, Juan Dubra, Paul Milgrom, StephenMorris, Charles Púgh, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Satoru Takahashi, Xavier Vives, and seminar participants at Arizona State and Stanford Universities. A conversation with Ted O’Donoghue and Clara Wang prompted me to work on the research presented here. The nonstandard proof of Theorem 3 owes a great deal to Bob Anderson; I am deeply grateful for his help. I worked out the results in Section 8 in response to Stephen Morris’s very stimulating questions. Finally, part of this paper was written while I visited UC Berkeley’s Economics Department, I appreciate Berkeley’s hospitality. Any errors are my responsibility. |
| Classification Code: | JEL classification codes: C62; C72 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-154731523 |
| Persistent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-154731523 |
| Related URLs: | |
| Official Citation: | Federico Echenique, A characterization of strategic complementarities, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2004, Pages 325-347, ISSN 0899-8256, DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00118-0. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-49BS9RM-3/2/38229d97a07040bcff83f5ed5abc10ea) |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 20228 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Shirley Johnson |
| Deposited On: | 30 Sep 2010 16:38 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Dec 2012 12:29 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
