Echenique, Federico (2004) Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2). pp. 348-364. ISSN 0899-8256 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372
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I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.
|Additional Information:||© 2003 Elsevier Inc. Received 9 December 2001. Available online 21 November 2003. This paper is a revised version of Chapter 2 in my PhD dissertation at U.C. Berkeley. I am very grateful to my advisers, Ilya Segal, and Chris Shannon, for many helpful discussions. I also thank Bob Anderson, Rabah Amir, and Matthew Rabin for their comments. The paper is better thanks to the thoughtful comments of two anonymous referees.|
|Subject Keywords:||Strategic complementarities; Supermodular games; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Dynamic games; Tarski's fixed point theorem|
|Classification Code:||JEL classification codes: C72; C73|
|Official Citation:||Federico Echenique, Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2004, Pages 348-364, ISSN 0899-8256, DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-49BS9RM-7/2/717d88f55ddb3cfad1f06b569a63ac41)|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Shirley Johnson|
|Deposited On:||30 Sep 2010 16:57|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 12:29|
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