Echenique, Federico (2003) Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities. Economic Theory, 22 (1). pp. 33-44. ISSN 0938-2259 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-165802397
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The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.
|Additional Information:||© 2003 Springer-Verlag. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002. I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise.|
|Subject Keywords:||Supermodular games, Strategic complementarities, Mixed strategy equilibria, Learning|
|Classification Code:||JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Shirley Johnson|
|Deposited On:||30 Sep 2010 18:54|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 12:29|
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