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The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico (2008) The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers. Social Science Working Paper, 1298. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510

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Abstract

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching ν, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = ν(i), then ν is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the assignment game has nonnegative values.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980. Author's copy: November 2, 2009.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0751980
Subject Keywords:Matching, Testable Implications, Coalition Formation
Classification Code:JEL classication numbers: C61,C71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:20355
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Shirley Johnson
Deposited On:08 Oct 2010 18:00
Last Modified:26 Dec 2012 12:30

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