Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico (2015) The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (1). pp. 144-164. ISSN 1945-7669. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510
- Published Version
See Usage Policy.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.
|Additional Information:||© 2015 American Economic Association. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas’ Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance, and two anonymous referees for advice on revising our paper for the journal. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.|
|Group:||Social Science Working Papers|
|Subject Keywords:||Matching, Testable Implications, Coalition Formation|
|Other Numbering System:|
|Classification Code:||JEL: C78|
|Official Citation:||Chambers, Christopher P., and Federico Echenique. 2015. "The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1): 144-64|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Katherine Johnson|
|Deposited On:||08 Oct 2010 18:00|
|Last Modified:||20 Apr 2015 19:28|
Repository Staff Only: item control page