Camerer, Colin and Issacharoff, Samuel and Loewenstein, George and O'Donoghue, Ted and Rabin, Matthew (2003) Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism". University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3). pp. 1211-1254. ISSN 0041-9907. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110204-153355929
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Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regulations are aimed entirely at redistribution, such as when we tax the rich and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to counteract externalities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an individual basis but yields net societal benefits. A good example is taxation to fund public goods such as roads. In such situations, an individual would be better off if she alone were exempt from the tax; she benefits when everyone (including herself) must pay the tax.
|Additional Information:||© 2003 University of Pennsylvania. Our thanks to participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Symposium on Preferences and Rational Choice, the University of Southern California Olin Workshop, the Columbia Law School faculty workshop, the Columbia Center for Decisional Sciences Workshop, and the Russell Sage Foundation roundtable for their comments. Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin thank the National Science Foundation for its financial support through grants SES-0078796 and SES-0079266. The authors received helpful comments from Ehud Kamar, Ed McCaffrey, Kristin Madison, and Ed Rock. Michael Fischer, Dina Hamerman, and Todd Lundell provided excellent research assistance.|
|Official Citation:||Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism" Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 151, No. 3 (Jan., 2003), pp. 1211-1254 Published by: The University of Pennsylvania Law Review Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3312889|
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|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||28 Mar 2011 18:29|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 12:54|
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