Knez, Marc and Camerer, Colin (1994) Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in 'Weakest- Link' Games. Strategic Management Journal, 15 (S1). pp. 101-119. ISSN 0143-2095. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093
Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093
We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what the minimum will be are an 'expectational asset' (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.
|Additional Information:||© 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Helpful comments were received from Ed Zajac and from participants in the lively working conference for this issue, held at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, June 1994.|
|Subject Keywords:||Coordination, experimental economics, resource-based view, group norms|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||10 Mar 2011 20:58|
|Last Modified:||03 Mar 2016 17:52|
Repository Staff Only: item control page