Knez, Marc and Camerer, Colin (1994) Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in 'Weakest- Link' Games. Strategic Management Journal, 15 (S1). pp. 101-119. ISSN 0143-2095 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093
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Abstract
We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what the minimum will be are an 'expectational asset' (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Helpful comments were received from Ed Zajac and from participants in the lively working conference for this issue, held at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, June 1994. |
| Subject Keywords: | Coordination, experimental economics, resource-based view, group norms |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093 |
| Persistent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093 |
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| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 22130 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz |
| Deposited On: | 10 Mar 2011 20:58 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Mar 2011 20:58 |
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