Camerer, Colin F. and Ho, Teck-Hua and Chong, Juin Kuan (2004) Behavioural Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching. In: Advances in understanding strategic behaviour : game theory, experiments, and bounded rationality : essays in honor of Werner Güth. Palgrave Macmillan , New York, pp. 120-180. ISBN 1403941521 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-100847116
- Published Version
See Usage Policy.
PDF (Author's copy)
- Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-100847116
Game theory is a mathematical system for analysing and predicting how humans behave in strategic situations. Standard equilibrium analyses assume that all players: (I) form beliefs based on an analysis of what others might do (strategic thinking); (2) choose the best response given those beliefs (optimization); and (3) adjust best responses and beliefs until they are mutually consistent (equilibrium).
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||© 2004 Palgrave MacMillan. This research was supported by NSF grants SBR 9730364, SBR 9730187 and SES 0078911. Thanks to many people for helpful comments on this research, particularly Caltech colleagues (especially Richard McKelvey, Tom Palfrey and Charles Plott), Monica Capra, Vince Crawford, John Duffy, Drew Fudenberg, John Kagel, members of the MacArthur Preferences Network, our research assistants and collaborators Dan Clendenning, Graham Free, David Hsia, Ming Hsu, Hongjai Rhee and Xin Wang, and seminar audience members and referees (especially two for this book) too numerous to mention. Dan Levin gave the shooting-ahead military example of sophistication. Dave Cooper, Ido Erev and Guillaume Frechette wrote helpful emails.|
|Group:||Social Science Working Papers|
|Subject Keywords:||experimental economics, game theory, behavioral game theory, bounded rationality, behavioral economics, learning|
|Classification Code:||JEL Classifications: C7, C9|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||02 Mar 2011 20:20|
|Last Modified:||03 Mar 2016 18:36|
Repository Staff Only: item control page