Camerer, Colin and Johnson, Eric (2004) Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction. In: The Psychology of Economic Decisions. Oxford University Press , pp. 111-129. ISBN 9780199251063 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069
![[img]](http://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
- Draft Version
See Usage Policy. 305Kb |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069
Abstract
Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological regularity to suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). Expressing these regularities in formal terms permits productive theorizing, suggests new experiments, can contribute to psychology, and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people better off.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2004 Oxford University Press. |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069 |
| Persistent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 22241 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz |
| Deposited On: | 03 Mar 2011 18:44 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Dec 2012 12:56 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
