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Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction

Camerer, Colin and Johnson, Eric (2004) Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction. In: The Psychology of Economic Decisions. Oxford University Press , pp. 111-129. ISBN 9780199251063 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069

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Abstract

Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological regularity to suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). Expressing these regularities in formal terms permits productive theorizing, suggests new experiments, can contribute to psychology, and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people better off.


Item Type:Book Section
Additional Information:© 2004 Oxford University Press.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110216-101607069
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22241
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:03 Mar 2011 18:44
Last Modified:26 Dec 2012 12:56

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