Camerer, Colin F. and Hsia, David and Ho, Teck-Hua (2002) EWA learning in bilateral call markets. In: Experimental Business Research. Kluwer Academic Publishers , Boston, MA, pp. 255-284. ISBN 9780792374831 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110217-111301805
Full text not available from this repository.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110217-111301805
This paper is about learning in bilateral call markets. In these markets, a buyer and a seller are privately informed of their values and submit their bids anonymously. If the buyer's bid is (weakly) more than the seller's ask, they trade at the midpoint of their bids. Understanding learning in bilateral call markets serves as a foundation for studying learning in more complex market institutions such as posted offers and double auctions. It also forces a generalization of learning models developed for simpler games to environments in which learning contingent on one realized random variable, such as a buyer's valuation in one trial. Similarity-based generalization is a natural way to extend what is learned locally, which is undoubtedly important when people learn in very complex environments (which has not been thoroughly explored experimentally).
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Thanks to James Walker and Terry Daniel for supplying data and to Amnon Rapoport for valuable comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. This research has been supported by NSF grant SBR 9730364 and a MacArthur Foundation Preferences Network postdoctoral fellowship to David Hsia.|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||09 Mar 2011 18:48|
|Last Modified:||09 Mar 2011 18:48|
Repository Staff Only: item control page