Camerer, Colin F. (1998) Behavioral Economics and Nonrational Organizational Decision Making. In: Debating rationality : nonrational aspects of organizational decision making. Frank W. Pierce Memorial Lectureship and Conference Series (10). Ithaca, NY , ILR Press, pp. 53-77. ISBN 9780801433788 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110218-150112514
Full text not available from this repository.
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110218-150112514
My chapter focuses on behavioral economics, and some of its potential contributions to understanding behavior in organizations. First I define what makes economic analysis "behavioral," and then turn to two sorts of ideas about systematic departures from the conventional rationality assumptions in economics-experimental studies of game-playing behavior, and unorthodox assumptions about incentives and labor economics. (The game theory studies are a small part of a broad research program that will result. I think, in a very different sort of theory which is more descriptive than that of current theorizing.) The two strands are then loosely tied together in an alternative account of why LBO (leveraged buyout) restructuring of firms in the 1980s appears to have worked.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||© 1998 ILR Press. Support from the Russell Sage Foundation during my visit there in 1991-1992, and from NSF grant 90-23531, is very gratefully acknowledged. Comments from the editors, from many conference participants, and from long talks with Chip Heath, Marc Knez, Martin Weber, and Daniel Kahneman (and other accomplices named in the paper), were very helpful.|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||08 Mar 2011 23:54|
|Last Modified:||08 Mar 2011 23:54|
Repository Staff Only: item control page