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Coordination in Organizations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Camerer, Colin F. and Knez, Marc (1996) Coordination in Organizations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective. In: Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge Series on Judgement and Decision Making. Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, pp. 158-188. ISBN 9780521481076 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110222-085140253

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Abstract

Classic literature on organizations recognizes that the paramount function of an organization is the coordination of physical and human assets to produce a good or service (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Chisholm, 1989; Schein, 1985). Coordination in this early literature was defined broadly, as for example by Mooney (1947, p. 5): "Coordination therefore, is the orderly arrangement of group effort, to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose." Mooney argues further that coordination is the first principle of organization and that any other organizational principles "are simply principles through which coordination operates and thus becomes effective" (p. 5). The landmark work of Thompson (1967) distinguished kinds of interdependence that give rise to coordination problems and ways in which coordination might occur - for example, by standardization, planning, or mutual adjustment. Coordination also plays a central role in recent thinking about the economics of internal organization (Becker & Murphy, 1992; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), the history of business organization (Lamoreaux & Raff, 1995, esp. p. 5), core competencies in business strategy, mutualism and legitimation in organizational evolution, macroeconomics (Cooper & John, 1988), and other fields.


Item Type:Book Section
Additional Information:© 1996 Cambridge University Press.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110222-085140253
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110222-085140253
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22397
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Mar 2011 18:02
Last Modified:29 Mar 2014 04:10

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