Camerer, Colin F. (1990) Behavioral Game Theory. In: Insights in Decision Making. University of Chicago Press , Chicago, pp. 311-336. ISBN 9780226348551 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-100124500
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People deviate from the predictions of game theory in two systematic ways. They are not purely self-interested (they care about fairness and try to cooperate with others), and they do not always consider what other players will do before making choices. However, with experience, these deviations sometimes disappear. People learn when they can afford to be unfair and what others will do; their behavior often converges to a game-theoretic equilibrium. A behavioral game theory that explains the initial deviations (and their disappearance) could be useful, especially if the learning process is modeled carefully and better data are gathered.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||© 1990 University of Chicago Press. Thanks to Robyn Dawes, Howard Kunreuther, Keith Weigelt, and especially George Lowenstein and Robin Hogarth, for help. This research was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES87-08566.|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||08 Mar 2011 22:31|
|Last Modified:||30 Mar 2014 00:39|
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