Camerer, Colin and Ho, Teck-Hua (1999) Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: Estimates From Weak-Link Games. In: Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates , Mahwah, NJ, pp. 31-51. ISBN 9780805826586 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-133118558
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How does an equilibrium arise in a game? For decades, the implicit answer to this question was that players reasoned their way to an equilibrium, or adapted and evolved toward it in some unspecified way. Theorists have become interested in the specific details of how adaptation and evolution work. Much of this interest revolves around models in which players change their strategies or learn, and what equilibria might result under various learning rules. Our research is motivated by a different question: Which learning models describe human behavior best? This chapter proposes a general experience-weighed attraction (EWA) model and estimates the model parametrically using a small set of experimental data.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||© 1999 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. This research was supported by NSF grants SBR-9511001 and SBR-9511137. We have had helpful conversations with Bruno Broseia, Lief Gkioulekas, Yuval Rottenstreich, Roberto Weber, two referees, and Ido Erev; excellent research assistance from Hongjai Rhee; and comments from participants in the Society for Mathematical Psychology conference (July, 1996), the Russell Sage Foundation Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics (July, 1996), and the Economic Science Association meetings (October, 1996).|
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|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||08 Mar 2011 21:43|
|Last Modified:||08 Mar 2011 21:43|
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