Chambers, Christopher P. and Miller, Alan D. (2011) Rules for aggregating information. Social Choice and Welfare, 36 (1). pp. 75-82. ISSN 0176-1714 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110422-130535138
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We present a model of information aggregation in which agents’ information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.
|Additional Information:||© 2010 Springer-Verlag. Received: 25 November 2009; Accepted: 12 May 2010; Published online: 29 May 2010.|
|Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Tony Diaz|
|Deposited On:||29 Jun 2011 22:50|
|Last Modified:||29 Jun 2011 22:50|
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