Chambers, Christopher P. and Miller, Alan D. (2011) Rules for aggregating information. Social Choice and Welfare, 36 (1). pp. 75-82. ISSN 0176-1714 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110422-130535138
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Abstract
We present a model of information aggregation in which agents’ information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Springer-Verlag. Received: 25 November 2009; Accepted: 12 May 2010; Published online: 29 May 2010. |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20110422-130535138 |
| Persistent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110422-130535138 |
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| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 23426 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz |
| Deposited On: | 29 Jun 2011 22:50 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2011 22:50 |
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