Notes from the Munger Africana Library, issued occasionally, are eclectic within the field of Africana.

Issues are generated from seminars by distinguished visitors, current field research, unpublished library manuscripts, work in progress at the California Institute of Technology, and other material deemed useful to Africanists.

The Editorial Advisory Committee is drawn from Africanists at the Institute who have themselves published research on African topics. They include: Robert Bates (PhD MIT) Political Science; Margaret Rouse Bates (PhD Harvard) Political Science; Robert Dilworth (PhD Caltech) Mathematics; Robert Huttenback (PhD UCLA) History; Edwin Munger (PhD Chicago) Political Geography, Editor; Robert Oliver (PhD Princeton) Economics; Thayer Scudder (PhD Harvard) Anthropology.

Assistant Editors: Monique Le Blanc (MA UCLA) African Studies; Joanne Goldmann (BA CSCLA) English.
Bibliographer: Edith Fisher (BA CSCLA) (On leave 1970-71)
Business Manager: Kathie Marcum

Needless to say, viewpoints expressed in these occasional notes are solely the responsibility of the individual authors and may or may not have the concurrence of the editorial advisory committee.

Correspondence should be addressed to:
The Munger Africana Library
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California 91109

Subscriptions are $10 a year. Prices of individual issues vary, but the total cost of all single issues during the year will be in excess of $10.
THE ANYA-NYA: TEN MONTHS' TRAVEL WITH ITS FORCES INSIDE THE SOUTHERN SUDAN

by

Allan Reed

ON THE COVER: Dan ceremonial drum. Provenance unknown but believed to have come from N'Zerekore region, Guinea. 28 inches. Photo by Floyd Clark.
INTRODUCTION

In a vast and largely remote section of northeast Africa, a fierce guerilla struggle has been carried on sporadically for almost 16 years. The Sudan, which stretches over approximately one million square miles, encompasses within its boundaries the Arab culture in the North and the Black African culture in the South. The proximity of these two cultures and their historical background has served to intensify the racial, cultural, and religious differences, which finally erupted into open conflict and war.

The underlying cause of the conflict between the Northern Arabs and the Southern blacks of the Sudan dates back to 1821, when it was conquered by the Turko-Egyptian government, under the rule of Mohammed Ali Pasha. Economic gain was the major objective, especially in the traffic of slaves for the Middle East market. It has been estimated that one million blacks were sold during that time.

Mohammed Ahmed, or the "Mahdi," who proclaimed himself the expected Messiah of Islam, overthrew Pasha in 1881. The Mahdi soon occupied much of the Sudan's hinterland. After the death of the British General Gordon, who was sent to evacuate the remaining Egyptian administration and soldiers, the Mahdi's victory was complete. Although he died a short time later, the new Mahdi, Khalifa Abdullahi, remained in power for the next 13 years. His reign was marked by warfare and slave trade, which effectively reduced the Southern Sudanese population.

Caught in the imperialistic scramble for Africa, the Sudan was put under English control by the invasion in 1898 by Lord Kitchener, with his Anglo-Egyptian army. A new form of government, the Condominium, of joint British and Egyptian rule, was then established. In an attempt to eradicate the slave trade and the economic and cultural exploitation of the blacks by the Arabs, the Southern Policy was inaugurated for the black population of the South. This policy virtually cordoned off the South. Northerners were prohibited entrance and Arabic culture was banned. Education was left in the hands of Christian missionaries, who encouraged vernacular schools and the use of British names. Economic development for the Sudan was restricted to the Northern provinces.

By 1946 Britain was facing increased nationalism in its colonies. Egypt, now independent and a junior member of the
Condominium, pressed England to grant independence to a United Sudan. Yielding to this pressure, Britain suddenly lifted its protective Southern Policy and called for independence talks. The South was not consulted in this decision. Although the South would have preferred a loose federation, which would have provided for control of local administration, the Arabs obtained a centralized administration. Efforts toward the Sudanization of government position led to Arab appointments in both the North and the South.

A few months before independence was to be declared, the South learned that the Equatorial Corps of the Sudanese army was to be disarmed and sent to the North, a decision from which once again the South had been excluded. This action precipitated the Mutiny of August 1955. Although it was soon suppressed, the Mutiny marked the first open resistance by the South against Northern domination.

In 1962, Southern political leaders were threatened with mass arrest and they were forced to flee the country. Other refugees, mostly professionally trained people, joined them, and they formed a political entity which later was called the Sudan African National Union (SANU). From the guerilla warfare activity emerged an organized military wing, called the Anya-Nya. The guerilla activities of the Anya-Nya mainly have been restricted to blowing up bridges, mining roads, or ambushing convoys. But Arab reprisals have been ruthless. Many Southern civilians have been killed and complete villages wiped out. Numerous people have been herded into forced labor camps, which the Northerners call "Peace Villages."

Sudanese political instability continually thwarts any attempts to solve the Southern problem. Southerners have hoped that at some time a regime would prove sympathetic to their cause. Though military activities seem to have intensified at present, obviously some political settlement must eventually be reached. The question remains, however, as to what kind of regional autonomy the Arab North would be willing to grant the South and whether or not its decision would be acceptable to Anya-Nya leaders. Meantime, at the tremendous cost of human life, financial resources, and further development within the Sudan, the devastating war continues.

M. L.
REED: My name is Allan Reed. I graduated in political science and history in 1965 from the University of California in Berkeley, where I stayed on for one year of graduate work before going to Ethiopia with the Peace Corps in 1966. I had originally been assigned in the Government School in Dembidolo, which is in Wollega Province near the western border, but they actually had more teachers than they needed there that year. However, they had never had any Peace Corps teachers in Gambela, as this was considered too political an area because of the Southern Sudanese refugees there. Also, at that time, the Ethiopian government did not recognize the status of these people who were living in their country.

The plane from Addis to Dembidolo lands at Gambela, and I saw this little village. It struck me the first time I saw it as quite a place. It was very, very different from the highlands of Ethiopia. I met the headmaster from the school there, and he suggested that I transfer down. So, after a semester wrangling with the Ethiopian Ministry of Education, at the beginning of 1967 I was assigned to Gambela.

Previously, Gambela had been a river port built up by the British. Most of the coffee from Western Ethiopia had been brought down to Gambela in the dry season. About 10,000 mules a year carried the coffee down where it was stored in great brick warehouses built in the town. In the summertime when the rains came, the Sobat and Baro Rivers would rise. Then steamers would come up from Malakal on the Nile River and take all the coffee out. But in the early 1960s, when the Anya-Nya began, they started to attack the boats. Ethiopia also began a policy of centralizing their exports through Addis, so Gambela became kind of a ghost town.

All of the schools had been closed in the Southern Sudan around 1964, and the buildings had been turned into army barracks for the Sudanese army, which was stationed in the South. So a lot of people who had come into Ethiopia hadn't had school since 1964, and they may have had only one to three years of school up to that time. During my time in Gambela I met a tremendous number of refugees who wanted to go into the Government School in the village. There were about 40,000 of them in the district, but many of these refugees were not able to go to school because they had no place to
stay. The old coffee warehouses were not being used, so I asked the people who owned them if they would donate them as a hostel for the refugee students. I administered that on my own, not through the Peace Corps. The American Embassy wasn't awfully pleased that an American was involved with refugees. Cory [the American Ambassador] was all right, but this other fellow who took his place—I've managed even to suppress the memory of his name—wasn't too pleased. But the Peace Corps was all right about it. I told them about it before the hostel was started. The Ethiopians in the school system knew about it, and they did not disapprove, as long as I didn't break any Ethiopian laws.

In Ethiopia the school system is conducted in Amharic up until the sixth grade. Eventually, the Sudanese hope to conduct their whole primary and secondary school systems in Amharic, for if somebody has finished the third year in the Sudan, he can't very well go into fourth year in Ethiopia because he would not know Amharic.

Many of the students were formerly in the Anya-Nya. They had been wounded, had come to Ethiopia for medical treatment, stayed on for a year or two to recuperate, and during this time they went to school. The school system in Gambela was flexible enough to let us conduct a special class to try and give these people brushup English and math so that they could take a seventh grade entrance exam. I'd say the average age of my seventh and eighth grade Southern Sudanese students was 19 or 20.

**QUESTION:** Was the population as a whole a young population?

**REED:** In the town of Gambela, yes. But there certainly were a lot of old people in the refugee camps below Gambela. During the summer I would spend some time in the camps, and I became very much acquainted with the problem of the Southern Sudan through living with the refugee. I stayed in the hostel with them and talked with them at school during the day.

When I finished my tour with the Peace Corps in 1969, the Anya-Nya, who often had people going into western Ethiopia to engage in black market activities, asked if I would like to go into Upper Nile. All of the three provinces—Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria—had been sealed off by the Sudanese government for a number of years. There really weren't any great number of foreign observers who could go in, especially beyond the main towns of Malakal, Juba, and Wau, where the Sudanese government very carefully did not allow the people to go off and see what life was like in
the countryside because the Anya-Nya controls most of it.

The lines on the map show the journeys that I took.* In October 1969 I went into Upper Nile, where I spent three months. I came out in January 1970 with quite a few pictures and returned to the States in April of last year. I went to NBC News and asked them, "You're a news agency. Why don't you cover this war? Because it is really pretty devastating." They said they would be interested in doing a film, but then they found that they didn't have any photographers who wanted to go over there, so they asked me to go. I hadn't operated any motion picture cameras before, so they gave me a Super-8 Instamatic camera and a couple days of training. Last year, with a tape recorder, the camera, and 75 rolls of film, I went into Equatoria for two months—September and October of 1970. I went from Central to Eastern Equatoria and came out in November of last year. After I had visited Upper Nile and Equatoria, the Anya-Nya in Bahr el Ghazal requested that I come up to Bahr el Ghazal after I finished touring the eastern bank of Equatoria. But I had finished all the film, so I came back to the States in December 1970.

NBC wanted to make a film with that footage, but I asked them to send me back because I didn't think that it was typical of the whole Southern Sudan. So in January of this year I returned and went into Western Equatoria. I spent five months walking throughout Bahr el Ghazal, and then came out. The route that I followed came up through Western Equatoria, up through Amadi to the Lakes District of Eastern Bahr el Ghazal near Yirol-Wau Road in the forest south of the road, up through Bahr el Ghazal to Wau. Then it went west of Wau to the Kangi railway camp, between Wau and Raga, where we crossed the railroad line, which the Anya-Nya had sabotaged. From there we went up north of Gogrial.** Originally the plan had been to go up even into Abyei in the northern Sudan, because there are Anya-Nya units there among the Dinka people as well, but my passport was due to expire in a few weeks, so unfortunately I just didn't have the time. I did want to get back to East Africa before the passport expired. I spent five months on this trip; altogether, about ten months in the South.

QUESTION: Were you traveling mainly on foot, or sometimes by bicycle or other means?

* See Map, p. 6.
** See Appendix I.
REED: All by foot. I traveled between two and three thousand miles. We would often spend a week or two in any given area, but averaged maybe 40 miles a day, on foot. Sometimes when we were near a Sudanese army post, we would walk for 20-21 hours to get out of that area.

QUESTION: Would you say the northern limit of the movement is the northern limit of the Nilotic peoples?

REED: Yes.

QUESTION: And the Shilluk are just as much involved as the Dinka in the North?

REED: Oh, yes. I traveled with some Shilluks on the first trip. In fact, in the Northern Sudan there has been within the last two years a growth of something called the United Sudan African Liberation Front. This is a grouping of the Nuba and the Fur people and others who are expressing African nationalism in the North, saying that the Sudanese government is controlled by the Arabs, which constitute maybe 37-38% of the population. The Sudanese government has always claimed that the conflict between North and South is one in which the North is a unit against the South, and that it is the majority of the country. But what this United Sudan African Liberation Front is saying is that they agree with what the Southern Sudanese are doing.

QUESTION: Aren't they much more vulnerable to Northern retaliation? Especially in the case of the Nuba?

REED: Yes. They tried to make some contacts with the Anya-Nya, but the Anya-Nya is very suspicious of some of these groups, particularly this man called Phillip Abbas Ghaboush. He had been a former member of Parliament from the Nuba Union and a member of Parliament from the Nuba mountains. He has formed an alliance with the former members of the Umma party and the Mahdists in the North. Consequently, the Southern Sudanese are very suspicious of him, because when the Umma party was in, they really did some awful things in the South. Although Abbas has made some overtures towards the Southern Sudanese, they will have nothing to do with him as long as he has connections with the Mahdists. But they do encourage him to engage in his activities in the Northern Sudan.

QUESTION: Is it your feeling, then, that Northern Sudan is by no means united behind Khartoum policy?
REED: No, it is not at all. In fact, a couple years ago--in 1968 or early 1969, before the coup--the Minister of Regional Administration, a Northern Sudanese Arab in the government, came out (and there have been others like him), and said that the Sudan was being bled so much by this war. He claimed that it takes up a third to a half of their budget, and, out of a population of five million, it has cost the Southern Sudanese an estimated one million dead and a half million refugees.

QUESTION: According to a Northern Sudanese Minister who went to the South, he feels that even a lower figure of 100,000 people being killed is absolute nonsense. He claims a maximum of 10,000 killed.

REED: This is not so. Even when I was teaching in Gambela, very frequently some of my students would appear very glum in class, and I would find out later that they had learned that their families had been killed in the most recent raids in Upper Nile. In all areas of the South that I have traveled in--and I have been pretty far--there is evidence of burned houses, some that have been burned as recently as the week before, or as far back as seven years ago, or at every stage of time in between.

QUESTION: With some of the people in them?

REED: Yes. For example in July last year, the Sudanese army attacked a refugee camp village, called Banza, which is just across the border in the Congo, about an hour's walk from Aba. They found some people in a church, and they tied them to the pews and then shot them. Twenty-seven people died, and they burned the church on top of them. This is not only true of the Southern Sudan. It happens in the neighboring countries, also. The same thing has happened frequently in Ethiopia. They hit not only refugee camps but Ethiopians as well. When I was in Gambela in 1967, a highland Ethiopian merchant who lived in a town on the Ethiopian side of the border near the Sudanese town of Akobo--this Galla merchant and two of his assistants were kidnapped by the Sudanese army. They were never seen again. At the time there was a demonstration about it in the village of Gambela against the Sudanese consulate.

Also, in 1969, Northern troops came over from the Southern Sudan and burned three refugee villages, kidnapping seventy-five refugees and forcefully taking them back to the Sudan. This has happened again this year in the same area.

QUESTION: Were they executed after they were taken back?
REED: Many of them were put in so-called Peace Villages. These are compulsory resettlement villages and their purpose is to prevent the civil population of the South from supporting the Anya-Nya. For example, occasionally somebody in the bush has a transistor radio and you can listen to the BBC and get outside news reports. In May of this year, I was near the town of Maridi, and there I heard a BBC correspondent who had been to Wau and Juba saying that there are 20,000 interned refugees who are happily living in these so-called Peace Villages. That same afternoon, I was sitting north of Maridi and copying the names of people who had been kidnapped by the Sudanese army this spring and forcefully taken into these Peace Villages. This BBC fellow was saying that in the district near Maridi alone that 20,000 had been forcefully settled in these villages just this year. But most of the population of the South is rural. They don't live in the towns; they don't live in the Peace Villages. They live in the forests or they live in villages that can be protected by the Anya-Nya. I'd say perhaps 90% of the population is out in the countryside, because the South is traditionally a rural population. In Biafra, the people were urban people. In the Southern Sudan, that is simply not the case. Even before this war was going on, educated Southern Sudanese chose to go back to the villages or to the rural areas. They didn't want to stay in the towns. And the towns are essentially Sudanese army centers. So the population in the towns is not even a quarter of the population of Southern Sudan.

QUESTION: Is there still conflict across the actual border?

REED: Yes.

QUESTION: In Uganda, most of the refugee camps are in the south in Mbarara, aren't they?

REED: There are some up in North Karamoja District. There is also a camp between Gulu and Karamoja. In fact, there are camps all over the Southern region.

COMMENT: Some of the camps were in the South with the idea that the Ugandans did not want them fighting back across the border, but they also wished to protect them from being raided.

REED: I think Bugoze camp near Kasese near the Congo border in Uganda has been closed recently because there was no water supply.

QUESTION: What about in the Congo itself? Are there any refugee camps in the Zande country?
REED: The Congolese have tried to move some of the refugees away from the border areas down towards Doruma, Niangara, Isiro. They have done the same in the Central African Republic. Bokassa recently closed down a big refugee project at Mboki near Obo. A few years ago, the Sudanese army invaded the refugee camps along the border at a place called Bambouti in Central African Republic. But they have raided refugee villages in all the countries that border the Southern Sudan.

QUESTION: Is the war continuing along the same vein now as it has over the last seven years?

REED: In 1969, when Nimeiri came to power, he talked about regional autonomy and that this was his offer to the South. I was staying among the refugees in Ethiopia at the time, and there seemed to be some hope that the North was finally talking sense. It is very similar, actually, to what was going on in 1964 and 1965, when the Southerners in exile were writing the Voice of the Southern Sudan and statements were being made by the SANU leaders before the organization of the Khartoum Conference. The 1965 situation is very similar to what was being said in 1969. Just transfer the dates, and you have the same kind of thing going on.

In 1965, after the Khartoum Conference attempted to bring the North and the South together, they didn't reach any conclusion in Khartoum. There were seven or eight African observer states present at the time, but it was announced there would be another Conference in three months. In the meantime, there were to be twelve resolutions carried out to ease tensions between the North and the South, so that when this Conference was reconvened they could come to a political solution. What happened was that shortly after the Conference a new government came into power in Khartoum, which claimed that the previous government had sold out the Arab cause and that they could not recognize the agreements, these twelve steps that would lead to a peaceful solution. The Khartoum Conference has never been reconvened. Those twelve steps have never been taken. Since that time, much has happened. For example, the Khartoum Conference was finished in March of 1965. By July of that year, the Sudanese army was actively trying to exterminate the Southern Sudanese intellectual class.

QUESTION: Just the ones who had participated in the Conference?

REED: Well, first they claimed that the missionaries had started
the troubles, then they said that the Southern Sudanese intellectuals were behind it. So in Juba in July of '65, the army circled the African section of the town, set the houses on fire, and shot anybody who was trying to get out. More than 1500 people were killed that night. The next day the army went around with lists of all the intellectuals' names. "Is this man dead?", then they would check him off, etc. So the Southerners felt that this was very much planned. This was genocide against the people as a whole, because it was indiscriminate killing. There weren't 1400 intellectuals who died in Juba.

In Wau, a couple of days after that, there was a wedding party attended by 80 people. All of them were the Southern Sudanese intelligentsia in Bahr el Ghazal. The wedding party was in a house right next to the Sudanese army barracks. One Southerner was getting married, and all of his friends came. They were people who were medically trained, or teachers, or administrators. The government troops surrounded the house, asked the four Arabs who were present to leave, and then shot and killed 76 of those 80 people. The four who escaped leaped over the wall and ran into the forest. On my most recent trip, I traveled with one of those survivors. He said that after this they just did not trust the Sudanese government. But when Nimeiri came to power in May of this year, there had been so much violence in the South from 1965 to 1969 that people really wanted some kind of peaceful solution. When regional autonomy was proclaimed, even though it wasn't defined, the Anya-Nya quieted down considerably to see what was going to happen. I think the Sudanese government interpreted this as weakness on the part of the Anya-Nya, and it stepped up the war. By December 1969, Egyptian Migs were bombing the cattle camps in Upper Nile. I passed through villages that were totally leveled, just a few months after Nimeiri had talked about regional autonomy. And this was before the Anya-Nya had restarted its activities. So, at that point, I think that any credibility that the North may have had in the South was really lost.

The Anya-Nya, however, says that it is ready to negotiate, provided that this takes place outside of the Sudan and provided that there are no preconditions. But they certainly doubt the word of any Sudanese government. In July of this year when Nimeiri was ousted for a couple of days and Hashem El Atta was in power, I think that the Communists were probably the last group in the North that could or would have been willing to reach a peaceful solution.
QUESTION: On principle? Because we have some accounts from East Germany that are very pro-North. Is it because they just wanted peace in the country?

REED: I think they realize that this is a disaster for the Sudan. There has been no development at all in the South. The schools, the clinics, have closed. The roads are completely overgrown. There is no economic development. The Zande cotton scheme was moved to the North. The economic development programs planned for the South have never been carried out. It is really a burden to the Sudan, not to mention the hatreds that are going on in that country.

QUESTION: To what extent is there evidence that the war slowed down the economic development of the Northern Sudan?

REED: The Sudan has to rely so heavily on foreign economic aid. Their budget has been in the red for several years.

QUESTION: Was the North dependent on the South for certain products?

REED: There has been no economic program in the South so, for example, the cotton that the Sudan relies on is mostly here in the Gezira scheme. But the Nzara cotton scheme has just as great an economic potential. In fact, that was one of the things that sparked off the first rebellion in 1955. When independence was approaching, the new Sudanese government was saying that they were going to arbitrarily fire 300 Southern Sudanese workers on that scheme, and replace them with Northerners. There was no justification for this made to the Southerners. The Southerners demonstrated, and during the demonstration the Sudanese army was called out. They opened fire on the demonstrators and killed 20 people. This incident, on top of several other things, increased the tension between North and South. Then, the Equatoria Corps of the Sudanese army, which was made up of Southern Sudanese in the Southern Sudan, found out that the Sudanese government wanted to transfer all of the Southerners in the army from the South to the North. They felt that if the Southerners in the army were armed in the South, this would provide an ideal base for them to break away from. When the Southerners in the army found out about this, they did not want to go to the North. So they mutineed in 1955. This mutiny sparked off a general uprising against the North throughout the South. Many Northern Sudanese were killed in August 1955 by the Southerners. There had been great resentment against the merchants, who still referred to
the Southerners as "abd"--"slave." This uprising took place just after Sudanization in which the posts that the British had held were being transferred over to Sudanese. Out of 800 posts, 796 went to Northerners, including posts in the Southern Sudan. So the Southerners viewed independence with great apprehension. They thought that the withdrawal of British colonialism simply meant that what they saw as Arab colonialism was taking its place.

So all of these incidents led up to the Mutiny of 1955. The British were still in the country at that time. The British Royal Air Force flew down 8000 Northern Sudanese army troops to the South, and Knox Helm, who was governor then, urged the Southerners to lay down their arms, to give up, and he would guarantee them amnesty. At this point the Southerners didn't trust the British very much, so many of them remained behind in the bush. All of those who did surrender were turned over by the British to the Northern Sudanese in the North. Then the British left. Most of those people who had surrendered were killed. There has been so much treachery on many sides in the Southern Sudan that there is no great trust between the North and South.

QUESTION: How about the unity within the Southern Sudan? Is this growing?

REED: Very much. From 1967 to the present I have had the opportunity of seeing this thing from different perspectives. For the first time, within the last year and a half, the Anya-Nya throughout the South is now one organized unified body. There had previously been an Anya-Nya in Upper Nile, one in Bahr el Ghazal, another in Eastern Equatoria, and another in Western Equatoria. They all had the same principles, but the leaders of these different groups had never met one another. They weren't coordinating their policies. Now they are.

QUESTION: Was Khartoum trying to divide and conquer the movement in any way, such as, perhaps, giving some concessions to one group and not to another?

REED: They have very much tried to divide it, both inside and outside the South. With the politicians in exile, they would try to encourage one group that really was not representative, so that this would cause a split among the politicians. With the average person inside the Southern Sudan, they use different tactics. Recently, for instance, in the area in Bahr el Ghazal, near Wau, the Sudanese
army gave an ultimatum in January saying that either the people from the Bongo villages, between Wau and Tonj, come into the Peace Villages within a week or they would be considered rebels, and their homes would be burned and their crops destroyed. Most of the people fled into the forest. When I passed through this area in March and April of this year, we found these people living in very, very crude conditions in the forest. They said that some of the villagers had gone into the towns because they were afraid, but the majority of the people had fled into the forest. Those who went into the Peace Villages found that there wasn't nearly enough food to feed them. What the Sudanese army was doing was giving them guns, but making sure that the Sudanese army was with them, and then they would tell these villagers, "If you want food, take us back and show the hiding places of the people who were left behind, because these people are rebels." The villagers really had very little choice. This was a policy used to divide the people.

QUESTION: How well organized is the Anya-Nya and are there links between the local coordinator leadership and the exiled leadership in London?

REED: The group in London is not considered an exile leadership group. They are together with the Anya-Nya and they are in constant communication with them. So it is not a matter of one political group over there and one military group inside the Sudan.

QUESTION: Is it a hierarchy or is it more a liaison?

REED: It is a military structure within the South now. Up until last year, there had been a political wing of the movement through the Nile Provisional Government inside the South. It was not an exile government. There have always been a few politicians in Kampala, in Nairobi, and other places, who sit in the capital cities. Some of them are legitimate, but then some of them aren't, and it is very difficult for any foreigner to know the difference between one politician and another, to know who is legitimate and who is not. There are both kinds. The NPG dissolved last year in order to promote military unity among the Anya-Nya, which there is now. There isn't the kind of political leadership that there was before, but the movement is entirely behind the Anya-Nya. There are five major officers. Major General Joseph Lagu is the overall commander, stationed in Eastern Equatoria. Together with him is Frederick Brian Maggott. He, incidentally, was in New York last November and December with Laurence Wol-Wol, the European political representative. They were presenting a petition to the United Nations.
Maggott is back inside the Southern Sudan now. In Western Equatoria is another officer named Habakuk. The commander for Bahr el Ghazal province is Emmanuel Abur. The second in command of the Anya-Nya is Brigadier General Joseph Akuon, from upper Nile. Habakuk is a Zande, Maggott is half Bari, half Dinka, Joseph Lagu is Mahdi, Joseph Akuon is Anuak, and Emmanuel Abur is Dinka. So you have the whole range. They are a fantastic group of people. Joseph Akuon is one of the most remarkable men I have ever met. These are younger people, in their thirties.

A couple of these men had been in the Sudanese army. Several of them have completed at least their secondary school and a few years of university in Khartoum and in neighboring countries. They are young, educated intellectuals who are now on the military side. Originally when the Anya-Nya began, and even until just a few years ago, the main officers were men who had run off into the forest in 1955. Many of them had no education at all. They have more or less handed leadership over to a younger generation, as this war has gone on for so long. This younger group of officers is very sharp. They are not only speaking in terms of unifying the military aspect of the movement. There are people like John Garang, who got his degree here in the States from Grinnell College a few years ago. He received his M.A. from Dar es Salaam. This year he had a full fellowship for a Ph.D. program at Berkeley offered to him, but he turned it down, saying he wanted to go back in the bush, start a political education program for his people, and present Southern Sudanese history as it has not been presented in the Mission Schools and in the Sudanese government schools. In fact, I have a copy of the petition that he recently presented to the OAU, which is very interesting. Unfortunately, I lost the last page. But these are very bright, very dedicated people who are coming back from the neighboring countries and from Europe, going into the bush and joining the movement.

**QUESTION:** Would you say that it is not so much the political movement giving precedence to the military as it is older uneducated leadership handing over leadership to younger educated people who also happen to be military?

**REED:** Yes. But there is the other element, too. There are certainly many people involved in the movement who are not Anya-Nya. It's just that the formal political structure hasn't quite been defined yet. I am sure that this will be done very soon.
QUESTION: To what extent are these young Southerners, the intellectuals who are taking over the movement, offset by other Southerners who over the years have moved north to Khartoum and in effect gone to the University of Khartoum? And to what extent has the government involved other Southerners in the Northern government?

REED: There have always been a number of Southern Sudanese involved in politics and in the underground movement in Khartoum. I spent a week in Khartoum in July, 1968, and I met many of the Southern Sudanese there, including both cabinet ministers at the time. It was unanimous among all of the Southerners whom I met there, even those who were in the government, that they were completely with the Anya-Nya. But they are taking a different approach, because they must know what is going on in Khartoum. For example, Brigadier General Akuon had been attending the American Technical School in Khartoum in order to finish his secondary school, and he was very much involved in the underground support that the movement was getting in Khartoum itself. Then he was offered a scholarship to the States. He was coming down through Upper Nile to go out through Ethiopia. When he came through the Anuak people--and he is Anuak, himself--they said to him, "You are going off, and you're not coming back, either." Because five or six years ago, there weren't too many intellectuals backing the movement. He was so disturbed by what these people said to him, he decided to forgo his education and remain in the bush. But he had been in Khartoum, as many of these people are today.

There have been a few Southerners like Joseph Garang who have been very much part of the Sudanese government. However, Garang was rejected by the Southern Sudanese. He was just hanged a couple of months ago after being implicated in the attempted coup against Nimeiri. I passed through Garang's own village west of Wau and asked the people in the Dyula village where he came from what they thought of this man. They said that he was not representative of them at all. In fact, in elections when Garang stood against other Southerners such as Clement Mboro, who was at one time Minister of Labour before Nimeiri's government, Mboro won very easily. Garang couldn't even be elected in his own district. When Garang became Minister of Southern Affairs, he had Mboro imprisoned because he had been his political rival. So there are some Southern Sudanese who have cooperated with the Northern Sudanese government. But there are very few people who are genuine sellouts. They are working
with Khartoum, but their sympathies are with the South.

QUESTION: Obviously the North must know this, and, therefore, all Southerners in the government must be under considerable suspicion, especially the Ministry of Southern Affairs.

REED: Many of the Southerners in the South view those people as being practically hostages. Even though they do cooperate with the government, there are few that they would call traitors. I don't know their present structure, of the kind of underground links between Southerners in the North and Southerners in the bush. There have been such links in the past, and I would not be surprised if they were continuing.

QUESTION: But you feel there is a basic empathy? Practically no Southerner working in the Khartoum government would be without real sympathy for the South, and perhaps he is rationalizing his action to himself because he is making a lot of money?

REED: Yes. After seeing many of these leaders in Khartoum, I really do think this is true.

QUESTION: Where does the equipment used by the Southern Sudan come from?

REED: They have been able to buy things on black markets in the neighboring countries. And they have a system of taxation throughout the country and get funds this way. They also take their cattle and sell it for profit in the neighboring countries in the Congo, Ethiopia, wherever they can take it, and they use those funds.

QUESTION: When you say taxation, do you mean that literally they have a regularized collection and that there is an understanding as to how much they are expected to pay?

REED: Yes. They are expected to pay 50 piastres [$1.25] a year per person. But it can be given in the form of grain. In many areas when the Anya-Nya comes through, I have seen the people donate grain without being asked and in addition to the taxation.

QUESTION: Isn't it extraordinary to get this tribal cooperation among people who must have been traditionally hostile to each other?
REED: That is very true. Up until just a couple of years ago, there was great hostility between the Zande and the Dinka. I traveled between Zande and Dinka land with Dinka troops. When we got to the Zande area not far from Maridi, I met the Zande chief there. While we were talking he asked me, "How is my friend who is back in Bahr el Ghazal now?" He was referring to a Major who had been the leader of the Anya-Nya in the Zande area, and even though he was a Dinka, was very popular with the Zande. I have seen Dinka troops in Eastern Equatoria and in Bahr el Ghazal.

COMMENT: This sort of thing isn't always extraordinary in times of war. In fact, this kind of coalition is one of the few good things that ever comes out of wars.

REED: It has been at a tragic price, but I think that there is a genuine Southern Sudanese nationalism now that crosses over tribal boundaries.

QUESTION: Do you think this nationalism will survive the price of independence?

REED: Yes, I think it would. There were groups, particularly among the Zande, who were speaking more of a pan-Zande movement, linking up eventually with Zande in Northeast Congo and Central African Republic. They called it the Sué River Republic. This was not a Southern Sudanese movement, but a Zande movement. The head of the Zande Anya-Nya now is a man named Habakuk. He is very well respected by the people of Zande. He is now saying that the Zande are part of the Southern Sudan, and that they must be completely integrated with other groups of people in the South. So the talk about linking up with Zandes in Congo and Central African Republic is simply invalid. Habakuk is now putting his eggs with the Southern Sudanese.

On this last trip, I was a little apprehensive going up into the northern Bahr el Ghazal because it is terribly open. This is the area where the Dinka people are, and the government has always said the Nilotics, particularly the Nuer and the Dinka, are not with the Anya-Nya, that they are hostile to this movement, and that they are sympathetic to the Sudanese government. I know the Nuer are very much with the movement. I traveled with Nuer Anya-Nya units. When we came up to this area, the Anya-Nya had been absent from the area around Wau, most of them. There was a residual defence force. But many of the Anya-Nya had been
engaged in black marketing along the Congo border for almost a year. During this time, the Sudanese army had opened up a number of small posts in the outlying districts. And I thought that they would have used this time to try and better their relations with the civil population. Therefore, I expected to find some hostility to the Anya-Nya.

We had been in the area around Wau for almost a month at the time the incident I am going to tell you about took place. We knew that the government was aware that the Anya-Nya had returned, and we knew that they were aware that myself, a foreigner, was traveling with them. I had a Dinka name, but I imagine they probably knew who I was. NBC had put a notice in the TV Guide that I was inside the Southern Sudan making films, which was really rather stupid.

Anyway, we had reached the area north of Gogrial. The Anya-Nya wanted to stay there for awhile, but they thought that this was really pretty dangerous territory for me to be in because it was so very flat and dry, and armored vehicles traveled in the dry season without using the roads. So Colonel Abur gave me five soldiers and sent me back to within twenty minutes of the road to Wau, just a few miles from Wau where it is forested and very secure. I was supposed to wait there for a few days, and then we were to rendezvous there shortly. On the way back to this position, we crossed the Jur River, the river that becomes the Bahr el Ghazal River, and we came upon a settlement of about twelve people. And these people were Dinkas. None of them had seen the Anya-Nya since their return. As far as I knew, they were hostile.

At this village along the Bahr el Ghazal River, it gets very hot in the dry season during the day. We arrived there around noon, and it was about 120°. We planned to spend the afternoon by this collection of huts. There were just a few trees and bushes right along the river bank, but they offered some shade. We were sitting there, chatting with the villagers, when all of a sudden on the other side of the river, only 300 yards away from us, there appeared eight giant Sudanese army trucks filled with more than 200 Sudanese army soldiers. So I asked the Captain of this group if maybe we'd better not subtly get out of there. We could see the army trucks, but they couldn't see us, and if we retreated straight behind us, we would get into the toisch, or the swamp area, and get out. But the Captain said, "No, I want to find out what they are doing here." So he asked the villagers, who
I didn't know from anybody and assumed that he didn't either, to go across the river, because the army soldiers had stopped there also to spend the heat. The villagers walked between us and the army all afternoon. Finally they came back and said, "Oh, yes, they're from Wau. Yes, they're looking for you. Yes, they're going to spend the day here." We sat within 300 yards of them the whole afternoon. We had a little transistor radio and listened to some rock music from Radio Voice of Germany and watched these guys, and they never saw us.

COMMENT: You could have been betrayed any minute!

REED: Exactly. That's the point. The villagers could have said, "You know those guys you're looking for? They're right across the river." And they would have been heavily rewarded. Those are the people the Sudanese government claims are hostile to the Anya-Nya. If that is what hostility means, there isn't any.

QUESTION: There are many stories circulating about Israeli support going through Uganda for the Anya-Nya, with the idea of opening up a second front against Khartoum, which would take the Sudanese pressure off the Middle East situation. What do you think of these reports?

REED: I have seen these reports. There is a fellow named David Robison who has written in European magazines about this, for example, in the Weekend Observer and in the German language newspaper out of Zurich. He said that there were twice-weekly flights from secret air bases in Ethiopia to Eastern Equatoria where great quantities of arms were being dropped. Robison has never been there. He wrote his report from Kampala. He had been in Biafra and was very much discredited by the Biafrans for writing rather poor releases. I spent six weeks in that place, and the only aircraft I ever saw were Soviet helicopters flying with the Sudanese army. Recently, in the Steiner trial in Khartoum, Steiner alleged that Robison is a CIA agent. So I don't know what his point is in writing these reports. But, as I said, I have been there for ten months and I haven't seen what he has been writing about. He has not been there.

COMMENT: Arms from Israel could be coming from anywhere, because there is a strong Israeli military mission to Uganda.

REED: Not only in Uganda, but in Ethiopia. In fact, when I was in Upper Nile, the Sudanese government found out that I had been
there. They were very upset, naturally, but instead of complaining to the Ethiopian government, because the Ethiopians did not know about it—that one American was taking photographs—they tried to say that there were six or seven Israeli mercenaries training the Anya-Nya in Upper Nile, and that Ethiopia had agreed to this. This was just absolutely rubbish. There had never been any foreigners in that area. There were no foreigners when I was there, and I kept in pretty close touch with some of my friends in the Southern Sudan. As far as I know, there aren't any there now either. But the Sudanese government has used this kind of thing to appeal to other Arab states, claiming that this is not a war against Southern Sudanese Africans, it is a war against Israel. Of course, that is ridiculous, because this war has been going on for so long. But I think the Southern Sudanese would certainly like the Israelis to help them.

**QUESTION:** But you have seen no evidence of Israeli advisors or Israeli arms?

**REED:** No. The only foreigner I ever saw in the Southern Sudan was Rolf Steiner, the German mercenary. In fact, he was actually on the Uganda side of the border, across from Central Equatoria. He had been there for almost a year and had come before the Anya-Nya was a single unit. He went to a district in Central Equatoria and said, "Look, if you let me stay here, and build an air strip, I promise that you will get plane loads of arms and relief aid from Europe." He apparently did not specify the exact country. So the people chopped down the trees and built a grass runway. I saw it there in Central Equatoria, between Yeit and Kajo-Kaji, south of the road between Yeit and Kajo-Kaji. It was completely overrun with weeds. The people said that no planes had ever come. Since Steiner is a German, the people figured that the arms would come from Germany, but they never did. It is really strange. It was quite a pathetic looking place. The Sudanese army, with 200 Libyan paratroopers, took that area in last September or early October of last year. They claim that there were great missile bases and sophisticated anti-aircraft equipment there, which is just not true.

The interesting thing about Steiner is that last year, when the Anya-Nya became unified under one command, he had been with a few dozen Anya-Nyas in that area. He was asked to go to the National Anya-Nya Headquarters to account for what he was doing there. So he had gone, I guess in late August or early September 1970, and had met Colonel Lagu, who was head of the Anya-Nya in
Eastern Equatoria at the time. Lagu is a Major-General and a sort of overall commander of the military side now. When Steiner came to their Headquarters, the Anya-Nya thanked Steiner for his sympathy, but they said that they would rather not have him doing this in the Southern Sudan, because they want to fight their own battles. And they asked him to please go. They do not want foreigners involved in this war. They would like to get some assistance if possible, but they do not want mercenaries.

Steiner came back from Eastern Equatoria to his little area in Central Equatoria, where he had almost built up a little personal kingdom. His headquarters were south of Torit. The people were very curious as to what had gone on between him and Lagu, but Steiner would not say anything about it. The people with whom I was traveling were Kakwa and other people from that area, and they told me what the people in Steiner's area were saying. Apparently, they were very dissatisfied that he hadn't produced anything that he had promised. He had been there for a long time, and they thought that Lagu had asked him to leave. But he came back from seeing Lagu, and he had been there for two weeks already, and he was making no indications that he was going to leave. Finally, he did leave a couple of weeks later, and he was arrested by the Uganda authorities. Obote was then in power. But, before Steiner left, when we reached this village, we found him sitting on the ground in this little hut, and he was patching up some infected wounds that some kids had. There was a whole long line of them, and he was doing a little basic medical work there. Of course, we didn't know that he was there, and we had just sort of stumbled upon him, so we could only talk to him for about an hour. He is a very strange guy. He was doing this little medical work on the one hand, and on the other he said that the only time he was ever happy was when he went into battle. His eyes lit up when he talked about it. He told me that he thinks of himself as a 17th century man. It seemed to me that he was there building himself a little kingdom.

QUESTION: As far as you know he wasn't being paid by any western intelligence agency?

REED: He says he wasn't being paid, but I think he was. I don't know by whom.

QUESTION: Did he have any evidence of having money or arms? He didn't deliver any goods. Any major western intelligence agency from the Israelis to the Americans could get him at least machine
guns or munitions.

REED: I really don't know why the man was there, or how he got there, and neither do the Southern Sudanese. He had been in Biafra before, but was kicked out of Biafra. Essentially the same thing happened to him in the Southern Sudan. He was kicked out there because he was not subordinate to the Southern Sudanese leadership. He wanted to be the king.

QUESTION: What about Ethiopian support? Where are the Anya-Nya getting their arms now?

REED: They are getting a lot of them the way they have traditionally always done so--by attacking the Sudanese army posts. In September 1963, in Equatoria and Upper Nile, and then a month later in Bahr el Ghazal, there was the beginning of the Anya-Nya movement as an organized guerilla force. They made a series of attacks on Sudanese army posts, armed only with their very crude traditional weapons. They managed to capture a few guns, and with these went on to make bigger raids. But it wasn't until the mid-1960s when the Simba rebellion collapsed in the Congo that the Anya-Nya made a real windfall. Because the Simba rebels had been pretty well supplied by China, with the help of Khartoum.

QUESTION: Hadn't the Sudanese government finally stopped the supply of arms to the Simbas because too many of them were leaking to the Anya-Nya?

REED: Right. And if it hadn't been for their collapse, the Anya-Nya probably wouldn't be as strong as it is today. When the Simbas collapsed, they fled into the Southern Sudan. The Anya-Nyas were waiting at the borders, and they said, "Would you like to come into our country?" They did a lot of trading with them as well.

QUESTION: What about the helicopters? Where did they come from?

REED: They are mostly Soviet supplied. Although the U.S. has supplied them in the past, I didn't see any American helicopters. Those that I did see the Anya-Nya told me were Russian. Very recently, I think, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were in Washington, and I am sure they were there to negotiate the beginnings of economic aid. If we don't supply them with direct military assistance, what I am sure we will do is give them enough loans and money so that they can buy from Germany.
QUESTION: Are Egyptian pilots involved as far as flying the helicopters and Migs?

REED: I have a photograph showing some Egyptian captain stars that were captured near Juba. An Egyptian officer was riding in a Sudanese army military convoy that was blown off the road by a land mine. They found the man's arm in a tree with his captain's stars. The photo compares Egyptian insignia with Sudanese insignia.

QUESTION: What do you think the overall political objectives of the Southern Sudanese are? Do they want independence, a state? In effect, what will they settle for?

REED: I have been able to meet a lot of very average Southern Sudanese people. On my last trip I picked up some Dinka, and I was traveling with these people for months. From what I have seen of the refugees, the people of Khartoum, and the political and military leaders, I think the opinion in the South is unanimous—if it is possible, they would like to have their own country. There have been several names suggested for it in the past—Azania, the Nile Republic, the Sác River Republic. But right now there is no particular name that they would give to the Southern Sudan. But having their own country is the common political goal of all Southern Sudanese. The paper by Garang is very interesting because he outlines the Southern Sudanese's view of their own history. It is very similar to what has been going on in Viet Nam: essentially, that they are a country that has achieved nationalism through fighting against external forces which have tried to rule them. Whether these external forces are Chinese or French or Japanese or American is not the important thing. Ever since the Southern Sudanese have had any contact with the outside world, they have suffered, beginning in 1820, with the Turkish-Egyptian government and the Arab merchants and European merchants who came in, took away hundreds of thousands of people into slavery, stole millions of cattle, desmated the countryside, took more than twenty or thirty million English pounds worth of ivory, and robbed and raped the land. Then came the Mahdia. The Mahdists came down and, in collaboration with Arab merchants, opened up the system of zeribas, or fortified districts, from which they conducted their slave raids. Later, they competed with the Belgians, the French, and the British in dividing up the Southern Sudan. After that came the British colonialists, just like the other people. The Southern Sudanese have resisted British colonialism up until the 1930s, when the British army was still sending warring units against
the Dinkas, the Nuer, the Latuka, Toposa, and the Murle people. All of the Southern Sudanese have resisted any kind of foreign domination in the past. And now they feel that what is going on today is simply the replacement of British colonialism by Arab colonialism.

QUESTION: When you refer to Arab colonialism, is this primarily a cultural difference rather than a religious one?

REED: That is right. I have met Anya-Nya leaders who are Moslems. For example, Major Makoi in Rumbek District of Central Bahr el Ghazal, who is one of the leading officers in Bahr el Ghazal, is a Moslem. There have been many other Moslems in the Anya-Nya and in the political movement as well. The Southerners do not see it as a religious war. The Northerners have seen it as a religious conflict, almost a jihad. When some of these conservative Northern Sudanese governments were in, they felt it to be their mission to go and spread Islam and the Arabic culture. In fact in January of this year, Nimeiri was giving an interview in El-Ahram, the newspaper in Cairo. In it he said that the Southern Sudan is the basis for the Arab thrust into the heart of black Africa, the Arab civilizing mission. Now, what difference is there between that and the British White Man's Burden? The Southerners resist this. They say that if they get their independence, they are not interested in going into the North. They say they do not want to occupy that land; all they want is to occupy the land that they have. What this movement has done, I think, is to create, particularly in the last decade, a much more cohesive, organized form of expression of this nationalism. Politically it emerged with the beginnings of the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union, which later became SANU, the Sudan African National Union, whose active wing was the Anya-Nya. These are expressions of Southern Sudanese nationalism. Whether they can ultimately reach this goal, I don't know. The Southerners say that if they cannot, they are willing to be exterminated--which is a pretty awful statement.

QUESTION: Are they very much cheered by Amin coming to power in Uganda? He may be a Moslem, but he seems to be more interested in them.

REED: Amin's background is Southern Sudanese. I think his father was Kakwa. There is certainly a natural sympathy throughout the area including the Congo, Central African Republic, northern Uganda, Kenya, and beginning to emerge in Ethiopia, although there
are no ethnic ties between traditional Ethiopians and Southern Sudanese. I think the average Ethiopian, in spite of the fact that he does not identify himself as an African, does have some sympathy for the Southern Sudanese, even though he may discriminate against them in his own country.

Up until the change of the Southern Policy in 1946, the Southern Sudan was even thought to be eventually part of East Africa. The Northern Sudanese had to have passports to go into the Southern Sudan. When the British instituted the Southern Policy, the idea was, I think, to encourage very much—perhaps by the Christian missionaries who wanted to hold back Islam—these so-called heathen people to be more prone to their own brand of cultural imperialism. But the British helped to prevent Northerners from going into the South when they prevented Arab merchants from the North from going into the South. Instead of allowing Southerners to have trading licenses, they brought in Syrians and Greeks. Instead of allowing Southern Sudanese names to be kept by Southern children who went to school, they replaced Ahmed and Mohamed with Peter and George, which are not Southern Sudanese names. Anybody who went to school had to be a Christian, and Christians had to have an English name, or an Italian name for the Catholics. They replaced Arab clothes with western clothes. Consequently, the Southern Sudanese viewed this Southern Policy not as any great benefit to them, but simply as one colonial power imposing its culture and holding back another.

The Northern Sudanese, on the other hand, tried to blame the whole present problem on the Southern Policy, which is absurd, because the problem was there long before the Southern Policy was put into practice.

**QUESTION:** Would that extend over to current African governments? For example, if an independent country were impossible, would they look for something like a union or federation with Uganda?

**REED:** I don't think Uganda would be in a position to come out openly for something like that at this point. The Sudanese army is much stronger than the Ugandan army.

**QUESTION:** I was not interested so much in the attitude of Uganda as I was in that of the Southern Sudan. Would union with another country be acceptable or would it have to be a country of their own?

**REED:** They would prefer to have a country of their own. At least initially. But they are pan-Africanists. I think that the Southern
Sudan, although it is a landlocked country and has not been developed at all since independence, is potentially a fairly rich area. For example, there is a tremendous market for Southern Sudanese cattle in the northeast area of the Congo. They like meat there, but they can't raise their own cattle because of tsetse flies. The Southerners would very much like to get a trade going between this cattle area and the Congo, and also with Central African Republic and parts of Ethiopia.

QUESTION: But with the federation now between Libya, Syria, and Egypt, and the Sudan with its rather love-hate relationship with Egypt, wouldn't the Arab world obviously always keep very high pressure on Khartoum not to let this area become completely autonomous, because this is the potential bread basket for the whole Middle East?

REED: That's right. In fact, that was one of the things that sparked the creation of the Anya-Nya. In the early 1960s, the Sudanese government was actually planning to settle 1-1/2 million Egyptians and Northern Sudanese as colonists in Upper Nile province. The Southerners exploded at this. The Southern Sudanese ex-members of Parliament fled the country, saying that if that was what the North had in mind, they would go outside and organize the Southern Sudanese.

QUESTION: But would they settle for a large almost complete autonomy?

REED: I don't think that the Umma party and the Mahdists would.

QUESTION: I am talking about the U.S. American policy. I would argue that American policy should favor independence of the Southern Sudan on the grounds that this would free the North to be itself more prosperous and independent of influence from Soviet Union or from Egypt.

REED: But is there an American policy toward the Sudan at all, qua Sudan, or is it just a policy in reference to the Russians in the Sudan?

COMMENT: I think it is basically involved in the Middle East.

REED: How would the Northern Sudan be independent of Egypt? I think if the South is free, the North would be swallowed by Egypt.
QUESTION: So in a sense you are saying the North is weakened by pouring so much of its resources into the South, and it really needs to get this off its back in order for it to prosper itself, and therefore not need all the military aid?

REED: There is a lot of opposition within the Northern Sudan itself to joining Egypt. That is traditional.

COMMENT: Still, it is hard to imagine a country voluntarily giving up 1/3 of its surface area.

REED: I don't think they will do it voluntarily. I don't think the Southerners really believe that they can militarily break away. But what the people in the Nile Provisional Government have always said is that the Anya-Nya is the military side of the movement, and it will put pressure on Khartoum to negotiate a settlement. What many of the Northern Sudanese fear in anything excepting a unitary Sudan with no federation, is that if there is federation between North and South, this is simply a step towards separation.

COMMENT: Unfortunately the OAU isn't likely to give the Anya-Nya very much support.

REED: And the organized block in the OAU seems to be North African, and they will not allow this thing to be discussed. When Amin was thinking of going to the June 18 meeting of the OAU in Addis before he found out he couldn't go, he said the first thing he was going to put on the agenda was the Southern Sudan.

COMMENT: So that is probably why he couldn't go to the meeting.

REED: Although I think that Amin was worried about the Obote guerillas who allegedly were being trained in Sudan by the Sudanese Government. Obote had been sympathetic in the past with the Southern Sudan. He has been very good with the refugee camps. But I think he felt drawn to Nimeiri because of his difficulties with Amin in the army in Uganda. It was a case of Nimeiri's radicalism and Obote's desire to become identified with the common man's charter, with some form of African socialism. But it was so ill defined.

COMMENT: It took place at the time when Obote had become almost paranoid because of assassination attempts on him.

REED: But I think that black Africa is eventually going to realize
that this problem is not just going to go away.

QUESTION: Would you say that black Africa may eventually come to recognize the fact that all the complaints it made about the stupidity of the European-made boundaries had some validity in it?

REED: Isn't that what Nyerere said before the OAU was formed?

COMMENT: He said the other way around. He said that the boundaries are just so absolutely stupid and crazy and inconsistent that it is impossible to change them. Once you try to change them, you open up a can of worms. But in the long run, there are some basic changes that really need to be made. The only thing is, everybody is scared to death to start.

REED: This is what Drum put out in their March issue.

QUESTION: Who publishes the Grass Curtain?

REED: The Southern Sudan Association in London. It is reasonably reliable.

QUESTION: Is it on the side of the people you were with?

REED: Yes.

QUESTION: What has the government done, if anything, about reopening clinics, schools, and bringing in any other kind of aid?

REED: When we were around Wau, we heard that there was a school opened there now. I think that there are clinics in some of these areas. But there are no clinics in the bush at all, except for the Anya-Nya. And there are no schools, except for the liberation movement schools. When we returned to Western Equatoria on the way out from this last trip, cholera had begun to spread from the eastern bank to Central Equatoria. The Anya-Nya dressers, the medical officers, said that they had reports from many of the civilians that when people went into the clinics with cholera symptoms at Torit and at Yei where the Sudanese army was, the Sudanese army medical officers would not give them treatment. Instead, they would take these people and move them out, for example, into the Moru area where there was no cholera, and tell them "to go live in that village or in that village," in order to spread cholera. At the same time they denied to the World Health Organization that there was any cholera in the Southern Sudan at
all. Yet, the Southerners allege that the Sudanese medical program in the South is helping to spread the disease in order to reach those areas where the army can't go. It sounds feasible. It is a type of germ warfare.

QUESTION: How are the herds doing? Is the government rounding up the Nilotic herds?

REED: Yes, it is. Recently in Fangak in the Central Upper Nile area, the government confiscated many of the Nuer cows. And there was not a great deal of Anya-Nya activity around there. Recently when I was in Europe, I met a Southerner whom I had met while I was in Khartoum in 1968. He cooperates with the government, but since he was out of the Sudan, he could speak freely. He told me that the government is really being stupid, because the Anya-Nya was mostly active in the Upper Nile, but not in the central area. Now the government is going in and confiscating the Nuer cows there, and the Nuers are getting pretty upset. They are saying that if this is what the government is doing, even when there is no Anya-Nya around, then they are going to join the Anya-Nya.

QUESTION: Has the Anya-Nya ever been able to strike into Gezira?

REED: The Anya-Nya has not been involved in any sabotage or any kind of military activity in the North. Its activities have always been within Upper Nile or Bahr el Ghazal.

QUESTION: You have just said, in effect, that the area is so great that the North cannot crush this out, and the South probably cannot gain complete autonomy, unless the North becomes fatigued.

REED: Yes, and that point probably isn't too far off. In 1968 the Minister of Regional Administration said that the country had been so bled by the war, and hatred was so high between North and South that the only thing he could see to resolve this dispute was to give the Southerners what they wanted, even if it meant independence and separation from the North. The Minister lost his job. Nevertheless, he had come out and said it, and I don't think he is alone in his opinion. I don't think Nimeiri would grant independence, because he is too nationalistic. Also, the Egyptians and Libyans who have been involved in this war in the South have lost their men and equipment there, and I don't think they would like to see Nimeiri turn around. The Egyptians have come out and
admitted this. In January of this year, the Egyptian Embassy in Addis Ababa came out and said, "Yes, we are aiding the Sudan militarily in its fight against the South."

**QUESTION:** Do you plan to go back?

**REED:** The Southerners suggested I go back and make some more films. But I don't think that would be wise, either for them or for me. On both of the trips I trained some Southerners in photography, and I gave all of NBC's equipment to them. So they now have the facilities and wherewithall to make their own films. Right now, I plan to edit the films I brought out and work on other materials, which will take me a few months.

**QUESTION:** What do you plan on doing after that?

**REED:** I would like to get back to Africa. I have a girl friend in Ethiopia, and she doesn't want to come to the States. I would like to find a job over there somehow, but the Ethiopians weren't awfully happy when I went traipsing off into the Sudan from their country. I would like to do some writing about my trips and the situation over there as well. I think it is necessary to have some followup after the television program. And I am also considering doing a book.
ANYA NYA Operations Bulletin

July - August 1971

A. General

1. Despite the limitations of the rainy season, the Anya Nya maintained constant pressure on Sudanese garrisons and vehicles in Equatoria and Upper Nile throughout July and August.

2. Reports arriving from Bahr el Ghazal indicate heavy fighting and large-scale operations by Anya Nya forces there.

B. Personnel

Brigadier Joseph Akwon has been appointed Deputy Commander in Chief of the Anya Nya by Anya Nya Commander Major General Joseph Lagu.

C. Selection of Combat Reports

1. Equatoria

   a. Eastern Section

   During late July and August 7 Sudanese vehicles were destroyed by Anya Nya mines and ambushes, and 7 more were hit, although their destruction was not confirmed. The main attacks took place near Okulu on the Torit-Magawl road, at a point 14 miles west of Torit, and at the Lohileri bridge on the Nimole-Torit road.

   b. Central Section
Fifteen enemy vehicles were destroyed by mines and ambushes at Kaya, on the Lainya-Meridi road, the Yei-Kajo Kaji road, the Juba-Yei road, and between Tali and Somaring.

Anyaa Nya forces attacked enemy troops at the Papa bridge on the Juba-Yei road, at the army camp of Aula, and at Nugentsdhoove in the Loka region. In this last attack Anyaa Nya forces suffered 4 casualties. At Morta, which had previously been evacuated by Anyaa Nya forces after a month-long battle, Sudanese troops finally yielded to continuing Anyaa Nya military pressure and evacuated the base.

c. Western Section

On 18 July part of the Ringasi bridge was sabotaged by Anyaa Nya sappers, under cover of attack.

2. Upper Nile

On two separate occasions in late July the enemy camp at Akobo was shelled by Anyaa Nya forces, and several buildings were burned. The Sudanese garrison at Nasir was also shelled.

3. Bahr el Ghazal

Couriers arrived recently at Anyaa Nya HQ in South Sudan, bringing news of extensive Anyaa Nya offensive activity in Bahr el Ghazal province. The following are among major actions:

a. Between 9 - 11 March 1971 heavy fighting took place in the Tead - Adol region. Approximately 200 enemy troops in 14 Armoured Personal Carriers (APCs) and an armoured car attempted to attack Anyaa Nya forces. In a series of counterattacks and ambushes, Anyaa Nya forces destroyed 2 troop - carriers at a point 27 miles from Wau on the Tonj - Wau road, and 2 more at a point 10 miles southwest of Wau. Enemy losses were placed at 86 dead.

b. In a second clash on 23 March the Anyaa Nya lost one dead and two wounded, and enemy losses were 12 dead and one APC.
c. In an attack on the Sudanese position at Tiar-Aliet (31 miles east of Awiel and 29 miles west of Gogreal), Anya Nya forces killed 21 enemy soldiers and policemen and wounded approximately 13. Anya Nya losses were 9 killed and 14 wounded. Arms and equipment were also captured by the Anya Nya.

d. In two attacks, on 16 and 28 April 1971, the railroad to Wau was taken out of operation for several weeks. In the first attack the enemy lost 32 dead, and 10 railroad cars were derailed.

In the second attack 30 yards of track were destroyed and 4 railroad personnel were killed. Following this incident other railroad personnel refused to operate the line for several weeks.
The color reproduction on the cover of these Notes is from the Victor Du Bois Collection of West African Art. The showing of this collection in April 1971 opened the new Baxter Art Gallery, the first permanent gallery of the Caltech Art Program. The exhibition had particular importance because, in launching a new phase of the art program, the show recognized the importance of work being done by various Africanists at Caltech.

Mr. Du Bois, a resident of the Ivory Coast and a member of the American Universities Field Staff, assembled the collection largely through his own trips into the African bush. A catalog of the collection may be obtained by writing Dr. David Smith in care of the Baxter Art Gallery. The price is $10.
1. **A Black Mauritian Poet Speaks**
   
   Edouard Maunick

   A highly praised poet from the island of Mauritius tells of his ancestry, how he was affected by the various racial feelings of his family and community, and the eventual influence upon him of Malagasy, West Indian, and African poets. He speaks eloquently of Negritude and how people from the islands must stop facing inward to the land but rather turn outward to the ocean and a wider world.

2. **South Africa: Three Visitors Report**
   
   Dr. George Kennan, Prof. Leon Gordenker, Dr. Wilton Dillon

   An historian, a political scientist, and an anthropologist survey the South African racial and political scene and come up with differing criticism and potential American policies based on their own personal interviews and observations.

3. **Choiseul Papers. Unpublished ms 1761**
   
   These secret reports from Dakar concerning the French and British maneuverings on the West Coast of Africa are filled with fact and intrigue involving the slave trade. The original manuscripts in French, reproduced in facsimile, are accompanied by an English translation. An introduction discusses the historical context of the papers and their origin, and the French Foreign Minister and his policies.

4. **How Black South African Visitors View the U.S.**
   
   A resume with ample quotations of how some sixty Africans from the Republic have reacted to educational, political, moral and other values they have encountered while visiting the United States. Previous statistical studies are summarized in four appendixes.

5. **Current Politics in Ghana**
   
   Dr. John Fynn, M.P.

   Political and economic priorities of the Busia government are outlined by Dr. Fynn, followed by a question and answer segment in which he throws fresh light on the Nkrumah era and the current activities of key figures who were in the Nkrumah regime. An informed observer in Ghana comments on Dr. Fynn's views.

6. **Walking 300 Miles with Guerillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola**
   
   Basil Davidson

   The famous British historian and journalist describes in detail his adventurous trek from Zambia to 100 miles inside the Angola border in order to assess the relative strength of the MPLA vs the Portuguese and vs other nationalist groups, the sources and extent of the MPLA arms, new Portuguese helicopter tactics, and the response of the guerillas. A sketch map of the military situation is included.