THE UGANDA COUP AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

James H. Mittelman
Munger Africana Library Notes, issued occasionally, are eclectic within the field of Africana.

Issues are generated from seminars by distinguished visitors, current field research, unpublished library manuscripts, work in progress at the California Institute of Technology, and other material deemed useful to Africanists.

The Editorial Advisory Committee is drawn from Africanists at the Institute who have themselves published research on African topics. They include: Robert Bates (PhD MIT) Political Science; Margaret Rouse Bates (PhD Harvard) Political Science; Robert Dilworth (PhD Caltech) Mathematics; Robert Huttenback (PhD UCLA) History; Edwin Munger (PhD Chicago) Political Geography, Editor; Robert Oliver (PhD Princeton) Economics; Thayer Scudder (PhD Harvard) Anthropology.

Assistant Editors: Monique Le Blanc (MA UCLA) African Studies; Joanne Goldmann (BA CSCLA) English.
Business Manager: Kathie Marcum

Viewpoints expressed in these occasional notes are solely the responsibility of the individual authors and may or may not have the concurrence of the editorial advisory committee.

Correspondence should be addressed to:
Munger Africana Library
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California 91109

Subscriptions are $10 per volume. (A volume consists of all the issues published during a particular school year.) Prices of individual issues vary, but the total cost of all single issues in one year will be in excess of $10.

The color reproduction on the cover is taken from the Victor Du Bois Collection of West African Art. Photo by Floyd Clark.
THE UGANDA COUP AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

by

James H. Mittelman

© 1972 California Institute of Technology

FRONT COVER: Guro mask. Wood. 23 inches long.
This study is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented to
the fourteenth annual session of the African Studies Association in
Denver (November, 1971). I have benefitted greatly from comments
by and discussions with Kenneth W. Grundy, Locksley G. E. Edmondson,
Ali Mazrui, Donald Rothchild, and Aaron Segal.

Dr. James H. Mittelman
Introduction

Africanists have long noted, with considerable bemusement, the tendency for their specialized knowledge of one, two, or a few countries, to engender assumptions of truly continental expertise. And yet that tendency is grounded in more than myth or naivete alone. Africa is not only a geographical entity. Nor is it merely a convenient category for scholars engaged in comparative research. African countries share certain similarities of history, and of current situation as well. Perhaps even more importantly, they share a sense of identity and community, which is not only cultural and psychological, but also political. And in organizations such as the East African Community and the OAU, that sense takes concrete form. As a consequence, social scientists interested in African nations must attempt to specify the nature of such interactions, and pursue their ramifications for both national and international behavior.

Dr. Mittelman, who is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, has spent two and a half years in East Africa. He was in residence at Makerere University, in Kampala, in 1970-71. His scholarly interests encompass the relationship between internal political violence and political development, and the issues of international relations, organization, and law. In this paper, he combines the two with his field experience. Thus he considers the Uganda coup of 1971, and its aftermath, in terms of its effects on the essentially fluid, but nonetheless important, system of inter-African relations.

Dr. Mittelman's analysis is significant at three successive levels of generality. First, he traces the international ramifications of the coup. Then he assesses its potential impact on the norms and mechanisms for interaction among African states. Finally, the very nature of the inquiry forces consideration of a classic question of social inquiry: What is the nature of the linkages between unique, individual actions—whether of persons or of states—and broader patterns of shared experience and acknowledged influence? By raising that question in the context of the Ugandan coup, Dr. Mittelman does more than increase our knowledge of a particular incident and its implications. He further suggests that we must broaden, and deepen, the understanding which we demand of ourselves as students of the African scene.

M.R.B.
THE UGANDA COUP AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Milton Obote's self-confident assertion that he could not be overthrown
by a coup is reminiscent of Julius Nyerere's boast that he would not be
subject to an army mutiny. In his Letter to a London Friend, Obote
claimed, "As regards the position of the Uganda Army, I am perhaps
the only African leader who is not afraid of a military takeover. . . ."1
Speaking in 1960, the Tanganyikan leader maintained, "There is not
the slightest chance that the forces of law and order in Tanganyika will
mutiny."2

Both prophecies proved to be inaccurate. On 25 January 1971, while en
route from the Singapore Commonwealth Conference to East Africa,
Obote was unseated by a military coup d'état. Three and one-half years
after Nyerere's statement the First Battalion of Tanganyikan Rifles,
stationed near Dar es Salaam, mutinied. One day later, 21 January 1964,
the Second Battalion of Tanganyikan Rifles at Tabora followed suit.

It is more than coincidence that in the next two days two companies of
Uganda's African Rifles and the Eleventh Battalion of Kenya African Rifles
also engaged in mutinous activities.3 As events in Uganda following the
25 January 1971 coup indicate, the extranational consequences of political
violence can be the most momentous aspect of rapid political change.

Insofar as recent events in Uganda serve as a microcosm of social and
political change in much of the Third World, the coup of 25 January and
the quest for post-coup consolidation provide a useful case study of the
international dimensions of military intervention in politics. We begin
with the premise that salient boundaries of political significance extend
beyond the spatial dimensions of civil strife. The interpenetration of
subnational, national, and international politics, converging in the vortex
of Ugandan politics, is illustrative of a set of evolving norms character-
ing African international relations -- integration, integrity, and non-
intervention. In the case of Uganda, as soon as Obote was deposed, the
matrix produced by these norms, the internal struggle for power, and

1 A. Milton Obote, Myths and Realities -- A Letter to a London
1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form Tanzania.
3 "The Brushfire in East Africa," Africa Report, IX, No. 2
(February, 1964), 21-25.
the national interests of foreign powers had immediate international implications with regard to: (1) the importance of recognition as an act of legitimation, (2) Uganda's relations with neighboring states, (3) accentuated cleavages within the OAU, (4) prospects of the demonstration effect in African politics, and (5) invitation to great power involvement. The long-term consequences of internationalizing political violence are liable to include: (1) a major shift in the East African balance of interests, (2) a movement toward fluctuating alignments and counteralignments within Africa, (3) portentous indications of what may prove to be a counterrevolutionary trend in African politics, (4) a summons to reorder African international organization, and (5) clarification of African diplomatic norms.

In a world in which 700 million non-Western, ex-colonial, poor, colored people have gained their independence since World War II, the significance of this case study extends well beyond this immediate set of norms, implications, and consequences. Due to the sudden break with traditional patterns of behavior, uncertain efforts to mobilize new groups into emerging political systems, the efforts to implement development plans which are telescoped into development decades, relentless increases in population, the ever-widening gap between rich nations and poor, and the consequent frustrations produced by the revolution of rising expectations, the challenges of modernization in an increasingly interdependent world have heightened the potential for international instability by alarming proportions.

In the case of military intervention into domestic politics, generals claim that the armed action is a result of the politicians' inability to provide solutions to the problems of modernization.¹ Once the army enters politics, precedent is set; a process has begun; a countercoup is likely. The chastity of the polity in its relationship with the military is similar to a woman's virginity: once the original condition is violated, it can never be restored.²

Military intervention in politics may assume a variety of forms and techniques: threat, ultimatum, armed insurrection, mutiny, assassination, and coup d'etat. Each technique is a manifestation of political violence. If violence refers to the legal or illegal use of force, political


violence is the utilization of force to maintain or upset the prevailing mode of allocating values authoritatively. Of course, not all violence is political. The indiscriminate use of force perpetrated by an individual or individuals may be personal, anomic, and politically inconsequential. Insofar as violence has an intended or unintended impact upon the authoritative allocation of values, acts of violence are deemed political. 1

Beginning with the assumption that coups occur not only within a national system but within an international system as well, we note that political violence frequently originates as anti-governmental behavior and results in intergovernmental discord. 2 In the literature on military intervention into the politics of developing areas, academicians focus attention on anti-governmental behavior but neglect the resultant intergovernmental discord. Scholarly analysis, in addition to suffering from the general shortcomings of modernization theory, 3 concentrates almost exclusively on the domestic aspects of military intervention in politics. Except in cases of overt, armed incursion or subversion from abroad, the international dimensions of military intervention into Third World politics are largely ignored. 4


3 For example, structural-functional analysis, employing system-maintenance as the dependent variable, makes no allowance for external disruptions producing internal eruptions. The desiderata for academic analysis of military intervention are (1) detailed case studies and (2) middle-range hypotheses. For a similar point of view, see Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development," Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), especially pp. 213-32.

The term "internationalization" refers to a process whereby a discrete series of events within a nation-state are generalized and externalized, both existentially and potentially, to the level of interstate and transnational relations. Conversely, interstate and transnational relations impinge upon domestic politics, thereby acting as a further determinant in the ongoing process of the internationalization of the initial phenomena. More specifically, we employ the term "internationalization of political violence" to analyze the impact of one coup on interstate relations and in political relations among individuals and groups at the transnational level. Emphasis must be given to the point that the significant phenomena for concern are not merely the constituent acts of political violence which actually occur in space and time, but the extent to which political violence bears the potential for internationalization. The analysis of potential, as well as demonstrative internationalization, entails examination of the role of extranational actors, their reactions and/or input to the series of events in question, and the nature of the linkages between national actors and extranational actors.¹

One of the reasons for scholars' inability to explain and predict the phenomenon of political violence in general and the coup in particular throughout Africa is the failure to note the linkages -- and the nature of the linkages -- between a myriad of individuals and groups transcending national boundaries. In order to specify linkage patterns, it is necessary to go beyond state-centric models of international relations. In addition to analyzing the behavior of nation-states (the conventional unit of analysis for the student of international relations), one must deal with kaleidoscopic patterns of interaction among a variety of actors -- individuals, groups, governments, international and transnational organizations.²

II

Since the onrush to independence slightly more than one decade ago, two sets of principles have been employed to define permissible behavior in


inter-African diplomacy. The first, general international law, has been criticized as having sanctioned colonialism, being based on European standards of behavior, and using, as its foundation, a unit of organization (the nation-state) foreign to African tradition. Thus, African statesmen have been working to develop a supplementary set of standards. "Pan-African Law" represents a set of standards to govern the relations between African states.  

"Pan-African Law," as codified in the OAU Charter and as developed in practice, includes an evolving set of African ethics as well as specifically African notions of legitimacy. An example of African ethics is to be found in the requirements for membership in the OAU. In principle, membership is open to all African states.  

In practice, all African states do not have an equal right to join the Organization. According to African notions of legitimacy, African states must not only be in effective control of their territory, but must recognize the right of all people to self-determination and call for the complete eradication of colonialism.  

One of the most important determinants shaping the evolution of inter-African ethics and principles of legitimacy is the coup d'état.  

The first ethical principle influenced by the phenomenon of the coup is Pan-African integration. Few would argue with Legum's definition of Pan-Africanism -- "a movement of ideas and emotions"; however, there is a great deal of disagreement as to the exact nature of Pan-African norms for inter-African diplomacy. 

At a high level of abstraction, African statesmen recognize the right of territorial integrity. Asserting the unimpaired right of each state to exercise sovereignty and carry on the process of self-determination, the principle of integrity is endorsed in the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the OAU Charter. The symbol of national integrity

---

4. Tandon, loc. cit.
is diplomacy, i.e., the conduct of foreign relations qua sovereign state, the badge of which is the right to a seat in regional and global organizations.

The foremost threat to national integrity is extranational intervention. One of the most ambiguous and controversial principles in general international law, intervention can be defined as coercion internationally directed against a foreign state.

In Pan-African Law, on the one hand, there are indications that intervention is regarded as impermissible behavior. When the OAU was founded in May 1963, the Summit Conference of Independent African States adopted a Charter reflecting the dominant position of the Brazzaville-Monrovia Group. In contradistinction to the proposals advanced by the more radical Casablanca Group, the Brazzaville-Monrovia Group succeeded in establishing a conventional interpretation of state sovereignty and agreed to grant only minimal functions to a supranational organization. (As a concession, the Casablanca Group was granted the inclusion of strong anti-colonial provisions.) Following the January 1963 assassination of Sylvanus Olympio, the President of Togo, and subsequent reports of Ghanaian complicity, the OAU repudiated political assassination and subversion as techniques in Inter-African diplomacy.\(^1\) Moreover, the Ghanaian coup of 1966 brought an end to Nkrumah's allegedly subversive tactics aimed at the governments of neighboring states.

On the other hand, despite the normative and historical rationale for the proscription of intervention in Inter-African diplomacy, one cannot conclude that intervention per se is necessarily regarded as moral or immoral, legal or illegal. Many Africans condemned extra-regional intervention in the Congo but condone intervention in South Africa. Others pronounced foreign powers guilty of intervention in Nigeria but called for humanitarian measures to relieve Biafra.

The principles of intervention and nonintervention can also be given a second definition, one which is broader in scope and more subtle as an interpretation of international politics. Given the interdependent nature of international relations, whenever a state has the capacity to intervene, the restraint of one state has an impact on the affairs of another state and is, therefore, interventionary. If State X intervenes in the domestic affairs of State Y, the failure of State Z to counterintervene in response to X's initial intervention can be considered as a form of interventionary behavior. Techniques of "interventionary diplomacy" include, inter alia, threats, diplomatic asylum, use of the media, representation at inter-

\(^1\)Ibid., Article III, 5.
national conferences, grants and aid, and the act of recognition.  

III

In Uganda, as soon as Obote was overthrown, the internal struggle for power was complicated by the ethics of inter-African diplomacy. Uganda's new Head of State, Major-General Idi Amin Dada, was quick to appreciate the importance of recognition by foreign governments as a means of establishing legitimacy. Immediately after the coup, the new Government sent delegates to secure the recognition of neighboring states. Former President Obote, insisting on the illegality of the new regime, lobbied with Kenyan, Tanzanian, Zambian, Ethiopian, and Congolese officials.

On the fifth of February, the diplomatic scales tipped in favor of the Amin Government. Britain, followed by Liberia, accorded diplomatic recognition to Uganda's military regime. A few other states -- Ghana, Malawi, Zaire [formerly Congo (Kinshasa)], and Nigeria -- were quick to voice their support. Others let it be known that irrespective of how a government comes to power, recognition does not necessarily require a formal act; de facto recognition could be assumed. Still others, aware of the possibility of a countercoup à la Nigeria, followed a wait-see policy.

Wary of the stigma of the label reading neocolonialism, General Amin would have preferred to have an African state bestow the first act of recognition. African states, however, were hesitant; they appeared to wait for a big power to take the lead. As the first Government to recognize the new regime in Kampala, London's calculated diplomatic gesture can be attributed to a variety of interrelated factors: Britain's historical ties with Uganda, Obote's policy of partial nationalization of foreign companies, the plight of Asians carrying British passports, the former President's expressed disappointment over the electoral victory of the Conservative Party in England, the Tory Government's obvious pleasure with the overthrow of the increasingly radical Obote, and the expressed wish of the new Head of State for close ties with the former metropole.

---

1For some of these points, I have borrowed from Richard A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), especially pp. 143-80. Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems," Journal of International Affairs, XXII, No. 2 (1968), 183, suggests that interventionary politics are particularly characteristic of periods when the distribution of effective power changes more rapidly than the distribution of other values.
One of Uganda's East African neighbors was initially apprehensive; the other, hostile. Kenya, with a moderate and capitalist-oriented government, although probably pleased by the coup, refused to take a public stance for a month. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, announced on 26 February that Kenya's policy is to recognize states rather than governments and, thus, virtually recognized the Amin Government. Leaders of Tanzania's Government, alarmed by the overthrow of a fellow social revolutionary, expressed undisguised hostility.\(^1\)

Nyerere asked how could he sit at a conference table with a murderer who had seized power by force. General Amin's supporters argued that not only had Obote become President by a coup d'état\(^2\) but Sheik Abeid Karume, Tanzania's First Vice-President (until his death by assassination in April, 1972) became the Zanibari leader via a revolutionary coup in which thousands were slaughtered. In addition to Tanzania, the Governments of Zambia, Somalia, and Sudan expressed their hostility to the new regime.

As early as 27 January 1971 the Ugandan press reported the mobilization of the Tanzanian military for the purpose of invading Uganda. In response to the alleged mobilization, the Ugandan Army and Air Force announced military maneuvers with live bombing, strafing, and rocketing in Uganda near the Tanzanian border. For several months the Ugandan press published accounts of clashes between the Ugandan Army, on the one hand, and Tanzanian forces, dissident Acholi and Langi guerrillas loyal to Obote, and Chinese advisors, on the other. Newspaper accounts acknowledged that at least 1,000 Ugandan soldiers died, but relatively few Tanzanian deaths were reported. It is evident that the killing -- mostly of Acholi and Langi -- took place within the Ugandan Army. Amongst continuous but unverified reports of intra-army ethnic strife, the most serious incidents include the July killings (acknowledged by Amin as an attempted coup), which occurred at Mbarara in the south, Moroto in the north, and Magamaga and Jinja in the east, and the alleged mass murders

---

\(^1\) E.g., "We Will Never Recognize Amin -- Nyerere," Daily Nation (Nairobi), 22 February 1971.

\(^2\) In 1966, then Prime Minister Obote, responding to the challenge of separatist sentiment from the Baganda (Uganda's largest, wealthiest, and best educated tribe), assumed all powers of Government, arrested five Ministers, suspended the Constitution, appointed himself President, and stormed the palace of the Kabaka (King of the Baganda).

The Uganda crisis of 1966, of course, does not represent a typical coup d'état. Obote, as Prime Minister, was the effective political leader prior to the crisis, and the Presidency then was not an executive Presidency.
at Mutukula Prison in January and February, 1972. In order to validate his claims about the role of foreign advisors in the "battles" between Uganda and Tanzania, General Amin publicly displayed the corpse of an alleged Chinese Colonel serving the Tanzanian army. The Tanzanian Government identified the body as that of Hans Poppe, a senior police officer of German-African descent.

The Ugandan press also reported that the leftist military Government in the Sudan was preparing to attack from the north. Despite Obote's willingness to harbor Southern Sudanese refugees, immediately prior to the coup in Uganda there were indications of a move toward rapprochement between the Ugandan President and President Jaafar al-Nimeiry. As a result of the Revolutionary Government's relaxation of forced Islamization, the policy by which Khartoum attempted to erase Southern identity, Obote began to repatriate refugees settled in Uganda's northern district. Obote also turned over the German mercenary Rolf Steiner, who was accused of having worked with the Anyanya, and after June, 1967, began to disassociate his Government from its formerly pro-Israeli diplomatic stance. However, following the coup of 25 January, General Amin -- a member of the small Kakwa tribe which resides in both Uganda and the Southern Sudan -- protested that 500 pro-Obote guerrillas had crossed from the Southern Sudan and clashed with Ugandan troops. In view of President Nimeiri's continued support for the Obote cause, Amin expelled the Sudanese Ambassador from Kampala.

Stories of would-be invasions from external enemies were intended to perform domestic functions in Uganda. In an attempt to stir up a nationalist response to external enemies, Amin sought to unify the citizenry of Uganda behind him. Moreover, the threat of armed invasion from without was used to legitimize military rule and to justify Uganda's rapidly increasing defense expenditures.

By emphasizing the illegality of governmental change by force in neighboring Uganda, the Tanzanian President was playing a domestic card as well. In addition to his genuine grief for a close personal friend and ideological ally, it is likely that destabilizing factors within Tanzania contributed to Nyerere's insistence on the propriety of adherence to constitutional procedure. At the very time of the coup d'état in Uganda, seven individuals were on trial for treason in Dar es Salaam. (Another

---


treason trial was being conducted in Zanzibar). The Dar es Salaam trials came to an end in February, 1971. In the plot in which Oscar Kambona (former General Secretary of TANU and former Foreign Minister) was alleged to have conspired to overthrow the Government and to assassinate President Nyerere, six of the seven accused were found guilty. Moreover, Nyerere was subject to increasing criticism from the left and moderates. His former First Vice-President and President of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council, Sheikh Abeid Karume, criticized the application of policy barring office holders from owning remunerative property. Yet, Karume said, private citizens -- largely Asians -- have been permitted to do so. Hinting that perhaps Nyerere was not radical enough, Karume argued that citizenship should be restricted to black Africans and that all foreigners should leave by 1972. From the other end of the political spectrum, it was inevitable that those with entrenched interests would resent socialist attempts (e.g., nationalization of housing) to stem privilege and prerogative.

A psychological factor also helps to explain Nyerere's obdurate reaction to the Amin-led coup. President Nyerere's hostility to military intervention in politics is related to the humiliation suffered in 1964 when he went into hiding and called in British troops to put down the Army mutiny. Although the 1964 mutiny was not an attempt to take over the Government, the Army's action left little doubt about the fragility of Tanzania's political institutions. Having given prior consideration to not having an army in Tanzania, in 1964 Nyerere expressed his attitude to the military in the following terms: "Those who brought this shame upon us are those who tried to intimidate our nation at the point of a gun."\(^1\) Aware of the dangers of military intimidation, it is likely that Nyerere proposed a people's militia as a potentially competitive source of power which could block armed intervention into politics.\(^2\) Furthermore, dispatching Tanzanian troops to the Ugandan border served the function of removing the military from the capital at a dangerous point in time.

\(^1\)Quoted by Ali A. Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII, No. 3 (September, 1968), 273. Professor Mazrui, pointing out many of the military idioms used in Tanzanian politics, argues that Tanzania has displayed an increasing militancy in regard to international problems of colonialism and racism, on the one hand, and a fundamental distrust of military solutions to domestic problems, on the other.

\(^2\)First, *op. cit.*, p. 429, indicates that similar attempts to create countervailing forces to neutralize the army have not been successful. Resort to special military formations in Ghana, Mali, Algeria, and Congo-Brazzaville, incited the army to protect itself from other centers of armed autonomy.
Although there is little doubt about the mobilization of troops, reports of a Tanzanian invasion lacked credibility. Military, geographic, logistic, and political factors tended to restrict Dar es Salaam's choice of action. According to Booth's figures for African military strength (1970),

Uganda's defense expenditure for 1968 was 143 million shillings (U. S. $20,030,000); Tanzania's, 78 million shillings (U. S. $10,900,000); Uganda's military manpower includes 6,700 armed forces and 7,000 police; Tanzania, 7,900 armed forces, 8,500 police, 100 man navy, and 4,000 reserves. According to Booth, Uganda's air force has a total strength of 450 men including 19 combat aircraft; Tanzania, 300 men and no combat aircraft (Soviet MIG-17 interceptors expected).

Tanzania and Uganda share a common border only across Lake Victoria and in the remote area west of the Lake. Wanting in air power, possessing a navy of only 100 men and 4 patrol boats (which are stationed on the Indian Ocean, not Lake Victoria), lacking a bridge or ferry across the Kagera River, a land invasion through Karagwe or Bukoba's rough terrain being next to impossible (particularly in terms of supply lines), it is not clear how a Tanzanian invasion of Uganda could be mounted.

With the exception of the Algerian-Moroccan War of 1963, the duration of which was only one month, full-scale international wars in Africa are virtually without precedent. The ideological theme of Pan-Africanism, as embodied in the Charter of the OAU, contributes to the illegitimacy of interference by one African state into the affairs of another. Nyerere has been one of the first to assert that African unity is of greater priority than support for ideological allies. In 1966, after Sekou Touré's announcement that Guinean troops would march on Ghana to reinstate Nkrumah, Nyerere advised:

Whether a Government is popular or unpopular or brought in by constitutional or unconstitutional means, it remains only the duty of citizens of that country to accept or change that Government. It does not justify any interference.

Another political factor and perhaps the most important deterrent to a Tanzanian invasion has been the prospect of a damaging and irreparable impact on the East African Community. Built on the foundations of a

---


2 Border skirmishes hardly qualify; scholars agree that the conflict potential of border skirmishes is minimal. E.g., see Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics, XVIII, No. 4 (July, 1966), 656-73.

3 The Reporter (Nairobi), 25 March 1966.
regional colonial relationship, the Community, *inter alia*, merges mail and telegraphic services; administers common airline, railway and harbor systems; offers a common market relationship; collects taxes and duties jointly; and attempts to balance industrial development.

In the nationalist struggle Mwalimu Nyerere became a symbol of East African unity. In June 1960, Nyerere announced that he would be willing to postpone Tanganyika's independence for a few months "rather than take the risk of perpetuating the balkanization of East Africa," ¹ "We must confront the Colonial Office with a demand not for the freedom of Tanganyika and then for Kenya and then Uganda and then Zanzibar," he declared, "but with a demand for the freedom of East Africa as one political unit." ² Nyerere warned:

To those people who would wait until the countries are separately independent I say that they do not know human nature. You must rule out the question of federation after we take our seats as sovereign states in the United Nations. ³

His prophecy was correct. The centrifugal tendencies of competing nationalism have had a divisive impact on attempts to forge Pan-African unity as a viable political force. Whereas Nyerere could offer to postpone independence in 1960, one year later his attention necessarily turned to Tanganyika's plethora of national problems. "In this sense," Nyerere said, "independence made us less free." Nyerere resigned as Head of Government (for two months) in order to reorganize the Party (TANU). Diverging increasingly from the policies of Uganda and Kenya, Nyerere made trade unions an adjunct of Government (by placing a Minister at the head of the labor movement), reorganized the Army on a political basis, established a *de jure* one-party state, and adopted the Act of Union joining Tanganyika with Zanzibar.

The Tanzanian reaction to the Ugandan coup marks the fulfillment of Nyerere's prophecy. The evidence indicates that Tanzanian hostility has had the net impact of provoking a rightist reaction within Uganda. Whereas the first foreign policy announcements of the new Government reaffirmed Obote's "progressive" foreign policy, some of the subsequent

---


statements called for the closest ties with the former colonial metropole, reversed Obote's militant stance on arms sales to South Africa, and endorsed the need for a dialogue with South Africa. Although one cannot establish a causal relationship, the identification of Tanzania (as well as other radical states opposed to the Amin regime) with socialism also represents a contributory element in Uganda's move to the right in domestic affairs. Speaking at Lira Stadium in June 1971, Amin said that Tanzania's socialist policy of nationalization of churches, mosques, and housing -- property built out of people's sweat -- "is wrong and should be condemned." Amin added that his Government does not intend to construct empty theories akin to the Common Man's Charter and the Arusha Declaration. "We are not interested in political ideologies and slogans to deceive people." 

In a political, nonfunctional sense, the East African Community appeared to be doomed to collapse unless a face-saving solution could be reached. Tanzanian officials accused Amin of sabotaging the Community by usurping power not only in Uganda but in East Africa as well. While the Amin regime assailed the Tanzanian Government for preventing the new Director-General of the East African Harbours -- Mr. Disamunyo -- from entering his office, officials in Dar es Salaam insisted that Amin had violated Articles 74 and 75 of the Treaty for East African Cooperation by appointing two Directors-General (Airways and Harbours Corporation) to his entourage of Ministers and by replacing the Chairman of the East African Railways Corporation with a new "appointment." The Treaty of Cooperation stipulates that the appointment of the Chairman and Director-General to Community Corporations is the responsibility of the East African Authority, which is composed of the legal Heads of State of the three member states. Since Amin's nominations had not been approved by the Authority, Nyerere insisted that they were illegal.

Amin's initial reaction was something less than conciliatory. He said that Uganda must have assurance that the property belonging to the Community located in Tanzania would not be nationalized like other buildings in that country. Having accused Tanzania of preventing the East African Minister for Communications, Research, and Social Services -- Z. H. K. Bigirwenkya (a Ugandan) -- from performing his duties, the Amin Government declared the East African Community Minister -- John Malecala (a Tanzanian) -- as persona non grata; and the Director-General

1 "President Amin Condemns Nationalisation," People (Kampala), 21 June 1971.
2 Standard (Dar es Salaam), 19 February 1971.
3 Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial, and Technical Series), VIII, No. 6 (31 July 1971), 2065A.
of the East African Development Bank -- Idi Simba (also a Tanzanian) -- was ordered to leave Uganda. Borders between Uganda-Tanzania and Uganda-Rwanda were closed; East African Airlines flights connecting Uganda and Tanzania were discontinued; and all movement of vessels on Lake Victoria between Tanzania and Uganda was brought to a halt. Amin indicated that he would not sign the East African Community Appropriations Bill unless Tanzania would demonstrate that it wanted the Community to continue. Moreover, Amin advanced strong objections to the decision of the Secretary-General of the Community, which was made with the tacit approval of Kenya and Tanzania, to appropriate the 303 million shillings ($43,000,000) budget and to cover the salaries of 15,000 Community officials.

As the polemics continued, the positions of the two leaders appeared to be increasingly difficult to reconcile. Nyerere maintained that there was a distinction between "the necessary compromises" to avert the collapse of the Community and recognition of an illegal regime; however, in tacitly acknowledging Amin as the man whose signature was needed on the Appropriations Bill, Nyerere was offering a form of de facto recognition. Amin insisted that if Uganda was to cooperate within the Community, Nyerere must state in writing his "commitment" to the "letter and spirit" of the Community. In effect, Amin was demanding de jure recognition.¹

Within Uganda manifestations of continuing ethnic divisions were becoming increasingly apparent, particularly in terms of intra-army strife. Having had little success in his efforts to utilize external threats as a means to forge internal unity, Amin came to realize that the normalization of relations with neighboring states would be a more viable strategy in the quest for legitimacy. With President Kenyatta serving as a mediator, a compromise was reached in November. Nyerere approved Uganda's nominees for various posts in the East African Community; Amin signed the Appropriations Bill and lifted the ban on Tanzanian officials of the Community entering Uganda. Antedating the Uganda-Tanzania accord, in June a new Secretary-General, Charles Maina of Kenya, was named as the successor to Z. Bigirwenkya. Despite the fact that the East African Treaty of Cooperation stipulates that the Authority is vested with the power to appoint the Secretary-General, the announcement of Mr. Maina's appointment referred not to the Authority but to the Community. It is instructive to note the Community's flexibility in establishing a means to make crucial decisions in the face of acrimonious relations between two member states. Paradoxically, emerging from a situation which almost produced the demise of the Organization, the

Community may be much stronger for having weathered this threatening storm.

The internationalization of political violence in Uganda extended beyond the subregional realm to the regional (continental) unit of organization as well. In response to Nyerere's hostility, the Uganda Government sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee of the OAU in Dar es Salaam informing members that, due to the intractable diplomatic posture of Tanzanian leaders, Uganda would not be represented at the Liberation Committee meeting. In a subsequent statement, General Amin announced that in view of the continuing border skirmishes with guerrillas, Uganda would discontinue its Sh. 500,000/($71,000) annual contribution toward financing guerrilla training in Tanzania. Already operating with a meagre budget (and many contributions outstanding), badly divided over the issues of dialogue with South Africa and inertia among liberation movements, and handicapped by a lack of commitment from member states,¹ the OAU was presented with another knotty problem.

Prior to the coup of 25 January 1971, the next meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government had been scheduled to be held in Kampala in June 1971. With Yugoslav workers laboring day and night to complete a $10,000,000 conference hall in Kampala, the structure itself having become an important symbol in Amin's quest for recognition, the Council of Ministers came to a stalemate on the issue of whether to seat the Amin or Obote delegation in Addis Ababa. Unable to come to agreement on Ugandan representation, the February session of the Ministerial Council adjourned sine die on March 1.

Many of the leaders of states opposed to Uganda's military Government understood that convening the meeting in Kampala would provide a form of de facto recognition for the new regime. If the June meeting of Heads of State and Government had been held in Kampala, there is little doubt that Guinea, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, and the Sudan would have refused to attend. Moreover, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was due to chair the June meeting. This awkward situation was compounded by the fact that Kaunda had expressed solidarity with the militant position advanced by Obote and Nyerere at Singapore, and has established a reputation for his radical stance in maintaining Zambia as the southern frontier of black power in Africa.

President Kaunda lobbyied to hold the Summit meeting in Lusaka, Addis,

or Kinshasa. Accusing OAU officials of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior vis-à-vis the new Government in Uganda, Amin's delegation to the Ministerial conference issued an ultimatum, withdrew the ultimatum, and threatened to pull out of the Organization altogether. Ultimately, the venue of the Summit conference was changed to the Organization's headquarters in Addis Ababa. General Amin argued that the OAU Charter had been violated and boycotted the June meeting. Uganda's new Minister of Foreign Affairs contended that half of the forty governments seated in the OAU came to power via coup d'état; he asked whether Zambia and some of the other anti-Amin states could be certain to be without a coup before June.

Foreign Minister Kibedi, aware of Zambia's domestic problems of increasing subnationalist sentiment and of charges of widespread corruption within the Government, may have been thinking of the well-known demonstration effect in African politics whereby political violence in one country sets off a chain reaction in others. Boumediene's Algerian coup of 19 June 1965 (which took place while an extravagant conference hall was being built in Algiers for a meeting of neutralist and nonaligned states) heralded a rash of coups in Zaire, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Ghana, and Burundi. In early 1971 it remained to be seen whether the first military coup occurring in Africa in more than a year and the first ever in East Africa would serve to trigger the aspirations of generals in other African states. Insofar as grievance is generalized, a climate favoring military opportunism is pandemic to Africa. Thus, any one coup is a potential catalyst for emulative behavior.

Although one cannot establish a causal relationship between the Uganda coup and subversive behavior in Kenya, it is likely that the events of 25 January 1971 did not pass unnoticed by the individuals who plotted to unseat the Kenyatta Government. It is difficult to say how Nyerere's stance against Amin contributed to the perception and motivation of the conspirators in Kenya; however, they were said to have dispatched a

---

1 Amin made reference to the fact that Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda led the Summit meeting, Somalia's Omar Arteh chaired the Ministerial conference, and Guinea's Diallo Telli is Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization.

Kenyan Senior Lecturer from Makerere University, Kampala, to seek aid from the Tanzanian President. Asked to provide 39 machine guns, moral support, and military presence on the border, Nyerere categorically refused. He is quoted as having replied: "Not against Mzee's Government. If it was Malawi, I would think about it. But not in Kenya, and certainly not when Mzee is still alive."\footnote{Uganda Argus, 5 June 1971.} One of the conspirators testified that the Chief of Defence Staff in Kenya was also approached. Another conspirator indicated that an MP was helping to recruit Kelenjin-speaking tribesmen in the armed forces for the purpose of attempting to overthrow the Government.\footnote{Ibid., 8 June 1971.} Thus, one can only conclude that the linkages between the Uganda coup and subsequent political violence in Kenya are tenuous at best; however, it is evident that the individuals convicted of plotting to overthrow the Kenya Government did entertain the notion that Nyerere would be willing to consider providing support for action against moderate governments.

Finally, the potential for the internationalization of Ugandan political violence included extra-regional dimensions. In view of Obote's militant stance at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference on the issue of British arms sales to South Africa, London and Pretoria were delighted with the change of government in Kampala.

Just a week before the coup in Uganda, 700 British troops were dispatched to the east coast of Kenya. The reasons for the British presence and the timing of arrival remain controversial. Government officials in London explain that the troops were posted to East Africa for regular, joint exercises with Kenyan forces. Yet it is quite probable that the soldiers were sent to protect British lives, if need be, in the event of violence following Heath's announcement of arms sales to South Africa. (According to another interpretation, the posting of the troops to East Africa is indicative of British involvement in the Uganda coup. There is simply no evidence to support this final point of view.)

The British press treated the ouster of Obote as a \textit{cause célèbre}. \textit{The Times} of London commented: "The news of a coup d'état comes as a surprise only because it has been so long delayed." \textit{The Daily Express} editorialized: "It would be absurd for Britain to base her policy on the shrill cries of leaders who are here today and gone tomorrow." In an article entitled "Good Riddance to Obote," \textit{The Daily Telegraph} described the Obote regime as "corrupt, racist and cruel." Similarly, the political correspondent of \textit{The Star} (Johannesburg) concluded his account of the Uganda coup with the gratuitous suggestion that the events of 25 January
"underlined the tremendous role South Africa could play in helping Africa towards economic, social and political stability." 1

Some of the opinion within the Tory Party, as well as within the Afrikaner regime, veered toward the argument that Africans can't govern themselves; if they can't govern themselves, how can they proffer advice on matters of British foreign policy?

If Amin's early statements on Britain and South Africa provided any indication of the future directions of Ugandan foreign policy, the Tory Party and Afrikanerdom has good reason to be pleased. After announcing that he would not leave the Commonwealth over arms sales, Amin said that some African leaders like Obote could not solve their problems at home. He continued, "How can they, therefore, start talking about solving the problems of South Africa or Rhodesia." 2

Everybody is talking of South Africa but we have another South Africa in Southern Sudan where Catholics and Protestants are not allowed to go to Church. When worshippers went to Church in Southern Sudan, people with machine guns killed them and burned their houses. This must be solved first before arms to South Africa. 3

Coming out in favor of a dialogue with South Africa, Amin said that he would be willing to visit Pretoria if the OAU approved. Subsequently, he offered to send a 10-man fact-finding mission to South Africa, an offer which Prime Minister Vorster rejected. In a less conciliatory vein, General Amin suggested that Uganda serve as a training base of land and air forces for the defense of Africa. He also extended an invitation to 10 young South African and Namibian students for study in Uganda. It remains to be seen whether these overtures merely represent the impulsive gestures of a military leader unschooled in diplomacy or a coherent strategy -- whether well- advised or ill-advised -- for bringing an end

---


2 Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social, and Cultural Series), VIII, No. 2 (15 March 1971), 2027C. In June Amin thanked the British colonial administration for establishing sound administration in Uganda and, also, for working hard to educate "our children." "'Political' Civil Servants Face the Axe," Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 20 June 1971.

3 "We Won't Quit Commonwealth Over Arms," Uganda Argus, 24 February 1970. Issued just two days before the Ministerial conference at Addis Ababa, it is likely that this statement had a major impact on the thinking of many of the delegates.
to Pretoria's policy for Bantustanization.

Moreover, the events of 25 January 1971 produced theories of involvement of one (directly) if not both (indirectly) of the protagonists in the Middle East conflagration. Obote's supporters accused the Israelis of duplicity, if not complicity, in the ouster of the former President. There are five bits of evidence, albeit circumstantial, unsubstantiated, and unconfirmed, for Israeli involvement.

The close personal friendship between General Amin and Colonel Bar-Lev, Israel's former head of military mission in Uganda, was a well-known fact. In addition to military functions, the Israeli mission in Uganda served in an advisory capacity to the intelligence operations of Obote's aide, Akena Adoko. Colin Legum reported that in the months immediately preceding the coup the relationship between Adoko and the Israelis cooled noticeably, whereas Amin and the Israelis drew closer together. 1 Second, just after the coup, the proponents of this theory argue, Uganda's Moslem Head of State displayed little reluctance to show his pro-Israeli posture. On at least one occasion, General Amin, driving his jeep around Kampala without a bodyguard, had been accompanied by only one companion. The companion was identified as an Israeli. Third, in a display of military might following the mobilization of the Tanzanian Army, five French-designed, Israeli-built Fouga aircraft flew in neat formations over Kampala. Sources in Kampala insist that the pilots were Israeli. Fourth, at the 5 February swearing-in of Ministers ceremony, Israeli officials were prominently seated in the front ranks. Fifth, Obote's delegates to the OAU Ministerial Council accused the Amin delegates in Addis Ababa of relying on six Israeli advisors. 2

In order to further their strategy of keeping the Sudanese Army tied down by aiding Southern rebels, did Israel participate in the ouster of the pro-Khartoum, Obote Government? 3 Was Israel trying to establish Uganda

---

1Observer, 30 January 1971.


as the southern front of its Middle East campaign? Did Israel hope to locate a striking force at the source of the Nile?

On balance, there was no doubt about Israel's initial pleasure with the coup. While it is easy to hypothesize as to would-be Israeli motives for involvement, hard facts implicating the Israelis are unavailable. General Amin, facing the pressing tasks of post-coup consolidation, needed advisors. Insofar as the Israelis (a) were pleased with the coup, (b) provided expertise, and (c) lacked ethnic ties to political forces in Uganda, the new Government turned to them as potentially valuable allies. The evidence, however, does not indicate that the Israelis had a hand in planning the coup.

Fourteen months after the coup, Ugandan-Israeli relations took a sudden turn. Amin left little doubt about the future role of Israeli advisors in Uganda: The Israeli Embassy in Kampala was closed and all Israeli advisors were asked to leave.

The official story is that an Israeli newspaper, Davar, reported that Amin cancelled a trip to Egypt because of mounting opposition at home. Amin regarded this article as confirmation of the fact that Israelis were planning subversive activities and maintained that the newspaper account was obviously based on intelligence reports coming from the Israeli Embassy in Kampala.

A number of other reasons have been advanced for the expulsion of the Israelis. One account suggests that on a trip to Israel, the Ugandan President -- a devout Moslem -- asked that he be flown to Mecca. As the story goes, Amin was offended by the refusal of his Israeli pilots.

A contributory factor to the rupture of Ugandan-Israeli relations was the inconsistency of General Amin's genuine devotion to Islam and the desire to establish himself as a Moslem leader, on the one hand, and reliance on the Israelis, on the other. Clearly the extent of Israeli influence in Uganda obviated Amin's credibility in the Moslem world.

A further factor was the monetary crisis, viz. the increasing debt owed to Israel, Uganda's badly depleted foreign exchange reserves, and the prospect of receiving aid from oil-rich Libya. Indeed when Amin visited Libya in February, 1972, he joined Colonel Muammar El Qaddafi in condemning Israel as the aggressor in the Middle East and in supporting the

structures are weak and the future political role of the army cannot be underestimated, Israel follows a strategy of attempting to befriend those individuals who have the greatest potential influence.
Arab "struggle against Zionism and imperialism."\textsuperscript{1} Finally, a key reason for Amin's volte-face vis-à-vis Israel was the changing political climate within the Sudan which, in turn, provided additional rationale for a shift in Ugandan foreign policy. The settlement of the conflict in the Southern Sudan removed the binding force in Ugandan-Israeli relations. As long as the civil conflict in the Sudan continued, Amin and the Israelis had common objectives. After the settlement, however, Uganda's national interests could be served best by improving relations with its neighbors to the north. Thus, a rapprochement between Uganda and the Sudan is linked to the diminution of Israeli influence.

Prior to Amin's repudiation of the Israelis, the potential for the internationalization of Ugandan political violence extended yet one step further. Certainly Israeli decision-makers have been aware of the danger of the extension of Egyptian influence through the Southern Sudan and East Africa to the Indian Ocean. Israel's uneasiness over the increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean coupled with Obote's pro-Arab diplomatic stance after June, 1967, served to enhance the importance of keeping the Sudanese army tied down in the South. Tel Aviv deemed it advantageous to have a neighbor friendly to the Israeli-assisted Anyanya rebels, particularly in view of the fact that Egypt and Libya supply aircraft to Khartoum. Insofar as much of Israeli weaponry is purchased in the U. S. and Egyptian arms are largely supplied by the U.S.S.R., there was a period when political violence in Uganda had been internationalized to provide an invitation to great power involvement.\textsuperscript{2}

In the second half of the twentieth century protracted political violence between major powers characteristically takes place within a single nation, most typically through surrogates in the Third World.\textsuperscript{3} While injecting an added element of instability into international relations, political violence in Uganda has displayed the potential to escalate well beyond East Africa.


\textsuperscript{2} The U.S. became more directly involved with the disappearance of an American newspaper reporter and an American university lecturer. Investigating a story about a massacre at an army barracks near Mbarara, the two Americans are said to have been tortured and murdered on the orders of Lt. Col. W. F. Ali, Commander of the Simba Battalion.

\textsuperscript{3} Falk, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 70.
The consequences of the internationalization of political violence in Uganda must be viewed within the context of the fluidity of African international relations. Inter-African diplomacy is conducted among relative equals, and the distribution of power within Africa is highly diffuse rather than hierarchical or polar.\(^1\)

The fluidity of inter-African diplomatic relations is marked by a shift in the balance of interests and forces in East Africa. The Amin-led coup represents the completion of one full rotation whereby each of the three East African countries has taken its turn as the most divergent from its East African neighbors. (Noting that each state is different from the others according to the variables selected, we can rely on certain indices which appear to be the most salient for international integration at a given period in time.) In the immediate post-colonial period, Uganda took the first turn as the most divergent state: Uganda was the least Swahili, away from the coast, smallest in size, and most opposed to federation.\(^2\) When Obote created a unitary form of government, established a one-party state, and directed the "Move to the Left" via socialism, Kenya -- the least centralized, wealthiest, and most capitalist of the three -- became the exception. With the takeover by a moderate regime in Uganda, radical Tanzania assumed the role of odd-man-out.

Whereas Uganda is more dependent on Kenya than vice versa (particularly in terms of road and rail links to the sea), the two moderate East African states have a community of interests which outweighs existent reasons for discord. Furthermore, Uganda shares a common border with Zaire which also happens to have a moderate military regime. With Uganda moving to the right in inter-African diplomacy, Tanzania casts its diplomatic nets towards the only other remaining member of the militant Mulungushi club, Zambia, and to Somalia to the north. (Whereas the ideological proclivities of Sudanese leadership incline toward the radical states, nonideological criteria of national interests include avoidance of subversive measures directed from the territory of its southern neighbor. Hence, a normalization of relations with Uganda would tend to preclude entrenched Sudanese alignment with a Tanzanian-Zambian-Somali grouping of states.) The scenario of fluctuating alignments and counteralignments, the nuclei being composed of Uganda-Kenya-Zaire and Tanzania-


Zambia-Somalia bears resemblance to Africa's "protobalance of power" period (roughly 1959-1963): a mobile pattern of alliances and counter-alliances in which no one group of states is able to dominate the system. Although unlikely to ossify into formal alliance systems, the contagion effect could take hold, spill over to the continent at large, and contribute to polarization between moderate and radical states.

A projection of recent trends in African international relations indicates that the spiral of alignments and counteralignments would probably spin in a counterrevolutionary direction. Among the most important international events in Africa in the year prior to the Ugandan coup were: Portugal, employing Guinean exiles and hiring mercenaries to overthrow a black sovereign state, escapes international retribution; two powerful Western States (Britain and the U. S.), claiming to be champions of human rights and self-determination, withdraw from the UN Special Committee on Decolonization; Britain, under the pretext of honoring the Simonstown Agreement, announces its decision to sell arms to South Africa; some of the conservative Francophone states (with fluctuating support from Busia's Ghana and the unequivocal backing of Malawi, Lesotho, and Mauritius), receiving encouragement from France which is also a seller of arms to Vorster's Government, endorse the need for a dialogue with South Africa argument; and South Africa, while attempting to seduce African states to engage in diplomatic relations, offers the perfidious sham of a plebiscite in Namibia.

The desideratum for African states opposed to these counterrevolutionary trends is to institutionalize progressive change. The institutionalization of progressive change requires a realization that: (1) certain problems are the inevitable by-products of modernization, not merely the doing of corrupt, misguided politicians; (2) as a consequence of these problems,

---

1 The "protobalance of power" period, during which two competing alliance systems (the Casablanca and Brazzaville-Monrovia Groups) vied for hegemony, is described by I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966).

Only five weeks after the coup reports of increased functional cooperation between Uganda and Kenya, as well as between Uganda and Zaire, began to appear in the press. E.g., "500m/-Pipe Project," Uganda Argus, 5 March 1971 and "Uganda-Congo Tours Link," Uganda Argus, 3 March 1971. In a subsequent meeting between Presidents Mobutu and Amin, proposals were put forward to establish a joint technical commission for study of the proposed Trans-African Highway, a hydroelectric project on their common border near the northern end of Lake Albert, and steps to improve cooperation in commerce, communication and tourism. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial, and Technical Series), IX, No. 1 (29 February 1972), 2265 B, C.
political violence will characterize Africa for years to come; and (3) if political violence is to be localized rather than internationalized qua protracted insurrection, the individualized capacity of national governments to recognize other governments -- one of the prerogatives of a state system superimposed on Africa from without -- must not be allowed to perpetrate a system of sheer opportunism.

Political violence in Africa can be institutionalized either à la Latin American (i.e., "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose") or by organizing progressive change. Insofar as the latter is the more desirable alternative, there is a clarion call for reordering African international organization. The imbroglio produced by the Uganda coup is suggestive of an initial step: Questions of recognition should be institutionalized as a collective responsibility of the OAU. In view of the subtle ambiguity surrounding intervention and nonintervention, the OAU should use its moral influence to proscribe intra-regional intervention -- whether diplomatic or military -- committed by national actors; specific acts of intervention should be identified and termed impermissible behavior.¹

Although the legality of the interventionary practices of a group of states acting in concert is a matter of considerable controversy in jurisprudence, it is evident that the force of sheer numbers does not confer legality on an act which would otherwise be illegal. There is little reason to believe that if a group of states commits an act of intervention, that act can be deemed to have greater legality than when performed by one state. From a legal point of view, however, several states may organize to form an international juridical community and accede to a multilateral treaty; if the treaty stipulates that each state agrees to accord the right of intervention to that juridical community, in certain situations and under specified circumstances, intra-community intervention in pursuance of that treaty is legal.²

Nevertheless, as a form of "interventionary diplomacy," recognition is not so much a question of jurisprudential principle as a matter of political discretion. In the absence of a competent international organ to ascertain the existence of international personality, the prevailing practice in general international law is that each state performs this function for itself and, hence, grants or refuses recognition according to national interests.

¹ For a discussion of collective recognition, see Falk, op. cit., p. 138.
In Africa, if progressive change is to be institutionalized, it is in the best interests of the states concerned to provide a new mechanism for the individualized, decentralized, and uncoordinated practice of recognition in general international law. There is little reason for Africa to fall in line with the international community by assuming all of the appurtenances of a system of diplomacy patterned after the experience of European statecraft.

But is inter-African diplomacy consensual to the extent that recognition practices can be collectivized? Does collectivization presuppose a high degree of political integration? Would an unsuccessful attempt at international institution-building weaken the foundations of Pan-African unity? Rather than serve as an instrument for inducing stability, might efforts toward collectivization come to symbolize the absence of international order? If an OAU organ for collective recognition were created, might a situation arise in which OAU policy would be at odds with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which stipulates that regional arrangements, agencies, and their activities must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the global organization? Given the counterrevolutionary trends in African international relations and the numerical predominance of moderate states, would the chances of institutionalizing progressive change be better if recognition practices were collectivized under the auspices of global international organization? Finally, is there a possibility that a Pan-African organ vested with the power of recognition might have an interventionary impact such that it becomes a coup-maker in its own right?

These portentous questions must be balanced against the potential advantages of the prescription. Collectivization of recognition prevents the delictual situation whereby states grant premature recognition and thereby practice diplomatic intervention. Conversely, collectivization precludes states from denying the legitimate right of international personality to other states. Hence collectivization has the advantage of obviating the anomalous case in which a community exists as a state in relation to some states but not others. Thus, collectivization is one technique which can be employed to avoid the weakening of international order caused by the individualized use of state power.

Of course, the constitutional and legal details would have to be worked out very carefully. A position of Realpolitik advises that the collectivization of recognition should be regarded as a desirable but unlikely alternative. History demonstrates that drastic structural change in international affairs is precipitated by shock treatment, and more often than not the

---

1 H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), pp. 8, 9, 66, 68, and 142-44.
requisite degree of shock treatment must be of the magnitude of international or world war. ¹ Although lacking the extent of physical injury of an all-out international war, the Amin-led coup may have provided a sufficiently destructive impact on an already badly divided state system to initiate debate on restructuring inter-African diplomacy. However, in view of the ideological differences and recurring cleavages marking the nine-year history of the OAU, it is legitimate to ask if attempts to restructure could go beyond mere debate. And, even as a modest first step, is the recommendation for collective recognition realistic?

At first glance it appears that the Uganda coup and the internationalization of political violence contributed to the deterioration of the OAU as a viable force in inter-African diplomacy. Closer inspection of the implications, however, indicates that the Uganda crisis may have created a fleeting opportunity to reform the OAU, while satisfying both radical and moderate member states. The opportunity must be grasped at a point in time (a) sufficiently proximate to the series of events which served to stimulate debate on issues of long-term importance, and (b) sufficiently distant from the initial series of events to provide a modicum of detachment from the immediate crisis. Admittedly, the balance is delicate. Using the Uganda coup and the internationalization of political violence as the issue underlining the need to collectivize recognition practices as a function of the OAU, the long-term reordering dimension would be consistent with the ideological interests of radical states and moderate states would agree to at least the short-term implications. Radical states have long demanded stepped-up functions for the OAU, and moderate states realize that in Uganda-type situations the increased authority of the OAU, as long as it is bound to the will of the majority, would lend support to the moderate position.

At this juncture, there is a choice. African statesmen can allow similar crises to occur such that divisive tendencies are left unchecked. Or they can capitalize upon converging interests in a post-coup crisis to affirm and encourage integrative behavior. Heretofore, unless tension has erupted into outright conflict and a member state has brought a complaint directly to the OAU, the Organization has tended to refrain from searching for solutions to pressing problems. ² Insofar as the OAU has been effective in conflict-management functions, success has been achieved in the normalization of relations among African states; however, the OAU's performance can be faulted in the post-crisis phase of finding

¹ Falk, op. cit., pp. 8 and 35.
long-lasting settlements to disputes. Andemicael notes that by failing to deal with certain problems, the OAU may be bypassing opportunities to solve problems which exacerbate existing tensions. In good part, the reluctance of the OAU to expand its functions can be explained by the classic dilemma of international organization: If sufficient consensus exists for the performance of conflict-management functions, is there any need for international organization? On the other hand, if consensus does not exist, is international organization rendered ineffective for conflict-management?

Yet the circularity of this argument is too rigid. As Ernst Haas argues, crises giving rise to tension between organizational objectives and hostile or competing environmental pressures can be manipulated to have an integrative impact. Politics being the art of the possible, leaders can manage stress between international organization and the challenges posed by conflictual situations to further the growth of international community. It follows that in the tension between the aspirations to build political Pan-Africanism and the internationalization of political violence arising out of the Uganda coup, the creation of an OAU Committee on Collective Recognition might be a modest step in "upgrading the common interest" and encouraging "creative leadership," thereby serving as a catalyst for integrative behavior. If successful in securing compliance on recognition practices, the Organization might be upgraded to perform additional integrative functions. In this sense, the Uganda coup cannot be said to have initiated "the politics of destruction," but

---

1 Ibid., pp. 50, 54.
2 Ibid., p. 50.

5 Semakula Kiwanuka, one of Amin's delegates to the Ministerial conference, is of the opinion that the practices occurring in Addis Ababa in February, 1971, could destroy the OAU in the long run. He warned that the Organization could be crippled by the determined politics of destruction and brinkmanship which dispense with the Charter if and when it is convenient. ("The Politics of Destruction and the Organization of African Unity," a lecture delivered at Makerere University, Kampala, by Semakula Kiwanuka, 8 March 1971.)
as having provided the opportunity for the construction of more resolute Pan-African unity.

But why this coup? Given the frequency of governmental change in Africa via coup d'état, what makes the Uganda coup different from others? Surely the Togolese coup of 1963, the Ghanaian coup of 1966, and the Nigerian coups of 1966 gave rise to many of the same issues. The Uganda coup became a highly contentious issue in African international relations because of its timing (i.e., immediately after Obote's adamant stand at Singapore) and the consequent ramifications for Pan-Africanism. The sudden ouster of one of Africa's militant leaders brought the practicality of the radical cause into question. The very doubt cast on the ability of the radicals to maintain momentum helps to explain the intransigent reaction of other radical statesmen. Yet it was not merely the ouster of a leader who advanced highly principled stands on issues of foreign policy that caused deep concern throughout Africa; indeed many senior statesmen in Africa disagreed with Obote's foreign policies. The overthrow of the Ugandan President caused dismay among many African leaders, for Obote had succeeded in holding the reins of power for nine years in an African state characterized by highly politicized ethnic cleavage. Insofar as the latter problem is pandemic to Africa, the Amin-led coup precipitated an urgent crisis which assumed generalized international significance.

Irrespective of whether the suggested reordering measures come to fruition, the Uganda coup will make its mark on regional order as additional precedent for African diplomatic norms. Compared to relations between "established" states, inter-African relations are characterized by normative ambiguity. Relations between the super-powers display a general adherence to codified rules of international law as well as to tacit, unwritten understandings necessitated by the ominous spectre of nuclear weaponry. In 1956 the sympathy of the American public was overwhelmingly on the side of the Hungarian rebels. American decision-makers, however, realized that the Soviet Union deemed its vital interests involved in this sphere of influence. Thus, there was little serious consideration given to dispatching American troops. Similarly, in 1962, decision-makers in Moscow recognized that Washington would go to war over Cuba, and therefore withdrew the missiles. At times the boundaries of tolerance are fuzzy, e.g., Khrushchev installed missiles, but the threshold exists.

In the African subsystem of international relations norms are inchoate. The internationalization of political violence generated by the Ugandan coup represents one more precedent-setting step in inter-African diplomacy. In the Ugandan case, the potential manifestations of internationalized political violence were of far greater significance than demonstrative
expressions of interstate, physical violence. Nevertheless, the impact of the Ugandan coup on inter-African diplomacy indicates: While non-intervention and respect for a state's territorial integrity may be desirable norms, these doctrines are simply too ambiguous. In order to promote both international order and progressive change, the collectivization of recognition practices under the auspices of the OAU could represent a first step in inducing international integration.

Of course, one cannot equate the creation of viable structures of international cooperation with progressive change per se. Such an equation would be fatuous at best: In view of the fact that the majority of African states are "moderate," it is conceivable that international organs in Africa -- while "progressive" in terms of the development of international law -- could be "counter-progressive" in terms of promoting social change in Africa. Moreover, it would be a surrealistic design in political institution-building to suggest that the collectivization of recognition practices would automatically or necessarily spill over to promote integrative behavior. Ultimately "spill over" must be demonstrated rather than asserted.

On the other hand, although one cannot equate international organs for cooperation and progressive change, there appears to be a reciprocal relationship between these two desiderata for African international relations. In view of the pervasive balkanization characterizing Africa, the promotion of progressive change presupposes the creation and utilization of more viable structures for international cooperation. In short, progressive change is unlikely to develop on a piecemeal basis in Africa.

Hopefully, the Uganda coup will not be regarded as merely one more in a series of disruptive episodes in African international relations. In the wake of this coup, modest measures for reordering African international relations could be adopted and perhaps upgraded to spill over to other forms of cooperation as well. The ultimate significance of the Uganda coup lies in its potential contribution to forging international integration through seemingly disintegrative national behavior.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


African Recorder.


East African Standard. (Nairobi).


Daily Nation. (Nairobi).


Observer. (London).

People. (Kampala).

Reporter. (Nairobi).


Standard. (Dar es Salaam).

Star. (Johannesburg).

Sunday Nation. (Nairobi).


The Times. (London).

"Transnational Relations and World Politics." *International Organization*, XXV, No. 3 (Summer, 1971).

Uganda Argus. (Kampala).


Young, Oran R. "Intervention and International Systems," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXII, No. 2 (1968), 177-87.


Munger Africana Library Notes, issued occasionally, are eclectic within the field of Africana.

Issues are generated from seminars by distinguished visitors, current field research, unpublished library manuscripts, work in progress at the California Institute of Technology, and other material deemed useful to Africanists.

The Editorial Advisory Committee is drawn from Africanists at the Institute who have themselves published research on African topics. They include: Robert Bates (PhD MIT) Political Science; Margaret Rouse Bates (PhD Harvard) Political Science; Robert Dilworth (PhD Caltech) Mathematics; Robert Huttenback (PhD UCLA) History; Edwin Munger (PhD Chicago) Political Geography, Editor; Robert Oliver (PhD Princeton) Economics; Thayer Scudder (PhD Harvard) Anthropology.

Assistant Editors: Monique Le Blanc (MA UCLA) African Studies; Joanne Goldmann (BA CSCLA) English.

Business Manager: Kathie Marcum

Viewpoints expressed in these occasional notes are solely the responsibility of the individual authors and may or may not have the concurrence of the editorial advisory committee.

Correspondence should be addressed to:
Munger Africana Library
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California 91109

Subscriptions are $10 per volume. (A volume consists of all the issues published during a particular school year.) Prices of individual issues vary, but the total cost of all single issues in one year will be in excess of $10.

The color reproduction on the cover is taken from the Victor Du Bois Collection of West African Art. Photo by Floyd Clark.
7 An Exploration Near Agades and Timbuktu in Advance of the 1973 Total Solar Eclipse
Dr. Jay M. Pasachoff
A Caltech scientist, who was then at Harvard, made an extensive reconnaissance of viewing sites for the eclipse of 1973, which will last longest in Mali and Niger. These travel notes relate his reactions to a new environment and offer utilitarian suggestions for those interested in the eclipse and in the scientific research problems in West Africa.

8 A Brown Afrikaner Speaks: A Coloured Poet and Philosopher Looks Ahead
Adam Small
Small is chairman of the philosophy department at the University of the Western Cape and is a widely published and acclaimed poet. He is active in many political discussions with all racial groups. He is at times startlingly optimistic about the possible course of events in South Africa, while at other times he is bitterly resentful of present conditions.

9 Dialogue on Aggression and Violence in Man
Dr. Louis Leakey, Mr. Robert Ardrey
The world-famous Kenya archaeologist engages in a face-to-face debate with the author of African Genesis, The Territorial Imperative, and The Social Contract. Leakey's belief that early forms of man were aggressive and violent is challenged by Ardrey's argument that although much personal violence has always existed, organized violence is of relatively recent origin. (Illustrated)

10 The Past and Future of the Zulu People
Gatsha Buthelezi
The Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority has long been an outspoken critic of Separate Development. The Zulus have united behind him more, perhaps, than they have since a century ago when his great grandfather was a key adviser to King Cetewayo.

11 The Anya-Nya: Ten Months Travel With Its Forces Inside the Southern Sudan
Allan Reed
Reed traveled with the guerrillas in three different parts of the South. He reports on their political and military organization, comments on their supply of arms, recalls his encounter with the mysterious Rolf Steiner, and describes the military activities of the Sudan Army in the South. (Map)

12 "Dear Franklin..." Letters to President Roosevelt from Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. Minister to South Africa 1942-1943
John Seller introduces these in-depth observations of the man who has been called the ablest American emissary ever sent to South Africa. The confidential reports cover South Africa's war contribution, General Smuts' arming of Zulus, and the activities of Hertzog and Malan. (Illustrated)