WILL BOPHUTHATSWANA JOIN BOTSWANA?
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Chief Minister Lukas Mangope
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For 23 years Ms. Fairchild was the distinguished editor of the Geographical Review, a scholarly journal with an international reputation in the social sciences.

Black-and-white photographs by Floyd Clark

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Introduction

The position of the Bantustans, or "Separate Homelands," in the political evolution of South Africa has shifted significantly in the last year, owing largely to the emergence of the Bantustan leaders as positive political personalities. The National Party government now appears to recognize that, at best, the Bantustans can only be a basis for political realignment. The amount of land available for Bantustans, assuming that all the land authorized under the 1936 legislation is purchased, will leave the majority of Africans outside the "Homelands." African participation in the government of the urban areas in which many Africans live, adjacent to or a part of the major cities in so-called "white South Africa," is now official policy, but implementation so far is limited. Urban leaders, representing sophisticated and educated African elites as well as workers, are almost certain to be more militant than are the Bantustan leaders, who have primarily rural and little-educated constituents. It is still too soon to predict how much status the new urban leaders will achieve, particularly since the South African government has the power to limit their rise.

The emergence of dynamic Bantustan leaders, however, was not anticipated by the government or by its liberal critics, black and white. The government is far from pleased with the political speeches of most of the Bantustan leaders. But silencing them would be difficult and would run the real risk of the "Homelands" policy being hoisted by its own petard.

The concept of eight "Separate Homelands" reflects the National Party's concern that a one man/one vote policy would allow the African majority in South Africa to "dominate" white citizens in general and Afrikaners in particular. Although the leading Afrikaner businessman, Anton Rupert, encourages his peers to aid African development because, as he says, "if they don't eat, we won't sleep," most Afrikaner political thinkers believe that only by giving Africans the controlling vote in separate states can Afrikaners control the votes in the "white" area. The Bantustans are sometimes paraded on the surface as an example of Afrikaners acting idealistically toward Africans, but the underlying thrust is for group
preservation. This is a more realistic basis on which to justify, at least to white voters, the buying of white farms to turn over to Africans and the investing of huge sums to try to make the Bantustans viable.

The concept of Bantustans, then, has a racial, and to most Afrikaners a cultural, context. The policy was originally viewed by almost all Africans with suspicion and distrust, and it was thoroughly denounced by all the white opposition groups from the days of the Tomlinson Report in 1955.* Indeed, in my judgment, the majority of Afrikaners and of National Party supporters would have opposed Bantustans in any referendum right up to 1970. Most of the opposition focused on economic grounds--too much money would be taken from the white taxpayer--but others objected to giving Africans too much land and too much control, with the natural concomitant of moving away from the traditional *baaskap* (master and servant) relationship between white and black.

The cabinet maintained its policy although development, both political and economic, was much slower than planned. A major acceleration came in 1970 when the Zulus, long intransigent and divided about a Bantustan, finally agreed to establish one. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, college educated, changed from adamant opposition to effective leadership of the new Bantustan.** Buthelezi had been politically close to the more liberal whites in Natal and in South Africa, and his change of attitude (which he described as "tactical") went far toward making Bantustans semi-respectable in some African and white circles.

Criticism of the limited political autonomy of Bantustans, and the demand by Bantustan leaders for a better definition of future prospects (a challenge stimulated by charges from some of their own people that they were "stooges" or "Uncle Toms"), forced the South African government to be more and more explicit about the future of these "states" within South Africa.

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Current policy is now reflected in Prime Minister Vorster's statement that "It is the policy of the government to grant full independence to these various nations." He says that the timing depends on economic development and on when the various states ask for independence. When queried as to the degree of independence concerned, Vorster replied, with irritation: "If you are independent you are independent. Independence for a Bantu homeland when the time came would be exactly the same as the situation in Botswana and Lesotho for example, or, for that matter, in any other African state or European country."

In the past few years the idea of Bantustans has taken on a political dynamic. The whole policy is evolving and changing. New and strong African leaders have made a profound impact. On several fronts the Nationalist government is on the defensive under the repeated demands of Bantustan leaders. In a recent report Spro-Cas, the staunchly liberal interracial Christian study group, takes cognizance of the growth of black consciousness and the groundswell for exclusively black organizations. Other liberal groups now accept Bantustans as having a role in the drive for a just society.

Changing attitudes are even more marked among the white opposition groups in South Africa. Alan Paton, who embodies the views of the now extinct Liberal Party, today sees the Bantustans as an essential part of a peaceful political evolution in South Africa. Paton is frank in his disagreement with the black power advocates in South Africa who oppose Bantustans as fraudulent, and who condemn the new leaders for cooperating with the government. Paton says, "I understand these arguments but I do not agree with them. For the fraudulence and idealism of the theory of Separate Development are not to me the important things about it. The most important thing about it is that it has given official status and an official platform to black leaders, and they have been using this platform to talk to white Africa in a language which has not been heard since the days of Nelson Mandela, now imprisoned for life, and the late Albert Luthuli."

The Progressive Party, long a foe of Bantustans because they conflict with its platform of votes for all primary school graduates, was stung by criticism from Bantustan leaders who do not want to

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give up the degree of decision-making their ethnic groups have achieved. The Progressives now accept the Bantustans as territories under varying degrees of African control (which they would not lessen), and they would also enfranchise Africans in the so-called 'white areas.'

The United Party's policy for Africans during the 1960s—that is, limited parliamentary participation—is in a shambles, largely because of the Bantustans. The new African leaders insist that they would not contemplate exchanging their present territorial autonomy for a handful of seats in the now all-white parliament; the United Party was not prepared to offer more than token representation of Africans by Africans. Today the party envisions a kind of superparliament to which the Bantustans and the present white parliament would send representatives. But the proponents usually flinch before the National Party contention that such a superparliament would be the end of white control.

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The diagram shows how the United Party's new federal plan will work.

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Africans criticize the plan because three key powers are in all-white hands. Nevertheless, the United Party plan represents a radical shift from the status quo.

Thinking in National Party circles does involve some idea of federation. White politicians who expect to keep or to acquire power from the white electorate cannot now admit to a political future in which Africans would hold the balance of power. But the actions of the National Party, and the proposed actions of the other political parties, continue to move in a direction in which decisions affecting all of present South Africa would be made by men elected by black citizens as well as by whites.

The range of political possibilities emerging from the evolution of the Bantustan concept is extremely broad. For example:

--The Bantustan legislatures would have a role in the United Party plan, as indicated.

--The new leader of the Progressive Party in Natal has come out in favor of a Natal/KwaZulu independent state with "full democratic rights for Whites and Blacks." Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu says he would support such a new nation.

--Buthelezi and Chief Minister Matanzima of the Transkei have jointly proposed that all of the "Separate Homelands" unite, starting with KwaZulu and the Transkei.

--Chief Minister Mangope of BophuthaTswana takes a startlingly different tack. He favors a formal political linkup of his people with independent Botswana.

--Chief Minister Matanzima has issued a call for a Greater Xhosaland, in which whites and blacks would have equal rights in a new superstate much larger than the Transkei and stretching from the Fish River to the Natal border. The talented opposition leader in the Transkei, Mr. Knowledge Guzana, told me that he strongly supports Matanzima's proposal because he sees it as Matanzima's "confession upon the altar of multiracialism."

--Chief Matlala of Lebowa, which expects to have a Transkei type of constitution by 1974 for the more than one million Peds in the territory, has forecast that "the ultimate dramatic step of
independence for South Africa's Bantustans may be in the form of a federation of black homeland territories," though he expects Lebowa to achieve separate representation in the United Nations.

However lacking in practical power the Bantustans may be—and they clearly have no military power, have relatively little in the way of economic development, and are heavily dependent on financial subsidies from the South African government—the Bantustan leaders have gained genuine bargaining power vis-a-vis the white oligarchy. But independence is relative to the ability of a nation to exercise it, and the geopolitics of southern Africa significantly affect the exercise of independence. It is not by chance that President Khama and his Botswana nation have been more independent of South African policy than have Swaziland, situated between Mozambique and South Africa, or Lesotho, an enclave totally surrounded by South Africa. Botswana's growing economic strength also helps it to be more independent of South Africa, just as Malawi's finally being able to forego an annual subvention from the British Treasury gives it greater flexibility, not to mention self pride.

Of the eight Bantustans, three have considerably more latent strength than the others. The Transkei has the largest amount of territory consolidated into one piece, and its civil service has been largely Africanized without the sacrifice of efficiency. KwaZulu's people have known greatness, at least in the military sense; less than a century ago, they defeated trained British troops in open battle. But KwaZulu is divided into many fragments, and even the optimum consolidation now planned makes for an almost insoluble problem in government. The people of Bophuthatswana have less education than those in the other two Bantustans, and fewer are qualified for civil service positions. Moreover, Bophuthatswana is divided among ten noncontiguous pieces of territory in both the Transvaal and Cape Provinces, with an anomalous eleventh piece—Thaba 'Nchu in the Orange Free State—some 500 miles away. However, Bophuthatswana, like KwaZulu, has an advantage in that part of it lies close to a rapidly growing industrial area, and an even greater advantage, perhaps, in that part of its territory is contiguous with Botswana. This geopolitical fact could well lead to Bophuthatswana being the paradigm for all eight Bantustans in exercising a projected freedom to make political decisions.

Although Alan Paton is right about the Bantustan leaders having a
valuable platform, it is a structure precariously built by the Nationalist government. One may ask not whether the Bantustan concept will succeed as the African leaders direct it, but whether the government, under pressure from its white voters, may not abandon it and resort to undiluted baaskap. The National Party has been in power for twenty-five years. It was fifty years ago that an outstanding Afrikaans poet, Toon van der Heever, commented on the suppression of the Bondelswart uprising in South West Africa: "This isn't pleasant work. These people are fighting for the same thing we fought the English for 20 years ago. Freedom, that's all they want." Today an observer wonders, Is anyone listening to Buthelezi, Mangope, Matanzima, and the others?

Sometimes it appears that no one is. Die Vaderland (May 10, 1973) leads off a recent editorial this way: "By their extravagant land demands and the other claims the homeland leaders are only harming their own cause. This sort of political excess merely shows up their own insight and competence in so poor a light that it verges on the ridiculous." Die Transvaler (May 9, 1973) commented that the "irresponsible utterances [of Bantustan leaders] are meeting with growing displeasure from Whites."

But there is ambivalence in the Afrikaans press. Thus Die Vaderland again: "If leaders like Chief Ministers Mangope, Matanzima, and Buthelezi, and others did not by now begin to think, consider, and speak for themselves about the future of their own peoples it would indeed be a reflection on the policy and implementation of separate development. Black politics and self-awareness among the Bantu have come to stay. The ideas and techniques it is throwing up and the utterances of the Bantu politicians will not always be to our liking. But we shall have to learn to live with them as a new and effective element in the South African situation." (Die Vaderland, August 10, 1972.) And a few months later the same paper declared: "The biggest immediate challenge to South Africa is the development of the Bantu Homelands. So far their progress has been disappointingly slow." (Die Vaderland, December 12, 1972.)

On the issue of consolidation of land, almost all of the Bantustan leaders have spoken out. Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi of Machanganga says that they "will only be listened to by Pretoria if we talk with one voice." (Drum, June 22, 1973.) In the same
issue of Drum, Cedric Phatudi, Chief Minister of Lebowa, in an interview, commented: "A state must be given one mass of area for effective control. Whatever incidents there are in human history where a state has bits and pieces have proved how difficult it is to control a fragmented state."

The situation in KwaZulu is recognized by almost all concerned parties as not being tenable. Buthelezi has spoken strongly against it, saying he cannot rule a ten-part country and the idea is "nonsensical." (Sunday Times, London, May 5, 1973.) Die Vaderland in Johannesburg, one of the more conservative pro-government Afrikaans papers, has said that the consolidation of 188 fragments into 10 pieces represents "at the moment the maximum consolidation which is practicable." This is political shorthand for saying, "We can't move more whites now and compensate them." The paper editorializes further: "But it is clear that it will be necessary to have another look at the consolidation of the Homelands. The new borders can hardly be the final ones. To administer a country which lies in ten fragments within the area of another country and to rule it as an independent state is something hard to conceive." (Die Vaderland, May 1, 1973.)

Bophuthatswana's consolidation has been held up by disputes between the territorial authorities and the South African authorities. Politically, it is potentially more difficult to buy out farms long held by Nationalist Afrikaners in the northern Cape and the Transvaal, than to take over land in Natal for KwaZulu from whites who generally vote against the National Party.

And not all the pressure for consolidation is coming from Africans. Professor H. Grobler, chairman of the newly established Western Transvaal Bantu Administration Council, says: "We want one region for Bophuthatswana instead of the proposed six including Thaba 'Nchu." He criticizes economists who "advocate a 'crawl development.' ... The development of the homeland should be by means of decentralization 'leap development.'" (Die Vaderland, June 4, 1973.)

The national Afrikaans paper, Rapport, asserts with ringing faith that: "Nowhere in the world is there a society which holds the prospect of making such fundamental adaptations in its traditional way of life as the White South African Society." (Rapport, April 29, 1973.) Also in Rapport (January 6, 1973), the outspoken Afrikaans journalist Otto Krause directed a column to those who use the word "never" in
race relations. He pointed out that in the 1960s the Vietnamese
wife of an Afrikaans poet could not get a visa, Maoris on New
Zealand sporting teams could not come in, black athletes from
Europe were barred, and Japanese jockeys had racial problems.
In the 1970s all these "never" conditions have been reversed. In
all cases color was the obstacle. White "public opinion" or "the
time wasn't ripe" were only excuses. Krause concludes: "If that
assessment was correct at the time, we must be grateful that
public opinion and the time have so quickly become ripe. And one
must wonder if it is frequently not riper than we think." Since
the column was published, the spread of interracial sports in
South Africa on the national level, and even in some areas on the
local level, has mushroomed in rugby, soccer, tennis, golf,
swimming, boxing, cricket, and track.

Political independence is almost always influenced by economic
independence. The Bantustans as a whole depend on the South
African government for some 80 percent of their revenue.
Paradoxically, the more the government puts into modern agriculture,
routes, industrial development, education, and so on in a Bantustan,
the more the Bantustan becomes financially dependent on the central
government. But there are clear signs that the stronger and longer-
established Bantustans are getting on their feet. The Transkei,
in particular, is far less dependent on seconded white civil servants,
and the salaries of its own black civil servants and the profits of
the black traders who have virtually replaced white traders in rural
areas are creating a rapidly growing middle class among the Xhosa.

The South African government is sensitive to the charge that he who
holds the purse strings dictates policy. Prime Minister Vorster
answers a critic as follows: "Naturally people and nations are
economically interdependent. But I suppose what you have in mind
is the old, old story that they will not be economically viable. There
are at least 20 or 30 completely independent nations represented in
the United Nations which are far, far poorer than South African
nations."

As Alan Best and Bruce Young point out in a study of Bantustan
capitals, **it will be many years before Heystekrand, the new-
capital site, can emerge as a viable element in BophuthaTswana.

*Quoted by former cabinet minister Blaar Coetzee in the

**Alan C.G. Best and Bruce S. Young: Capitals for the
Homelands, Tydskrif vir Aardrykskunde (Journal for Geography),
The commission to select the site ran into intratribal differences over where the capital should be. Chief Minister Mangope tends to scorn Mafeking for his capital on the grounds that it is a second-hand white city. However, if he does not want to wait long years for a new city to be built almost from scratch, he might be well advised to accept Mafeking and get on with the problems of economic development.

It is indubitable that the average Motswana, like the average African in all of the Bantustans, thinks first of feeding and maintaining himself and his family. About 610,000 Tswana live in Bophuthatswana, as compared with about 1,107,000 who live outside. Some of the outsiders had their land taken away by whites in the last century, but most of them have moved to cities in search of employment. Bophuthatswana will not achieve even partial success unless it can create more jobs for its citizens.

Progress on the industrial front is not likely to be easy. However, there are already some successes. The Renaud Engineering firm took the plunge of moving its operation from Pretoria to Babalegi in Bophuthatswana a year ago. Their investment is $500,000 and the monthly gross is $60,000. The company has some 80 skilled African employees, including machine-tool operators. Mr. Renaud, the Managing Director, estimates that within a year the skilled workers achieved an efficiency ratio of 70 percent that of experienced whites. He comments: "The men are keen to learn and are learning fast. The white artisan has got to get rid of his apathy or get left behind."

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Chief Minister Lukas Mangope, whose views on the problems and prospects of his homeland are presented in this issue, was born in Mafeking. He attended an Anglican Mission school and then took a teacher's certificate at Bethel College. From 1948 to 1958 he taught in secondary schools. Thereafter he succeeded to the Chieftainship of the Motswedi-Barutshe-Boo-Manyane on the death of his father. From 1961 until the present, he was an effective politician in the successive organizations that led up to the formation of the present Bophuthatswana government.

Chief Minister Mangope is married to a former nurse, Leah, and they have seven children. His recent visit to the United States marks the fifth time he has been abroad. He is a member of the
Assemblies of God Church and finds relaxation in tennis and music, and in reading history. His special interests include motivating young people, especially those inclined to drop out of school; self-help economic schemes; and the promotion of education, including technical education, at the secondary level, with English as a second language. Reports of his speeches in the United States led a number of American teachers to apply to him for teaching posts. He has encouraged such applications, and has requested that they be sent to his office address: Private Bag 5, Mafeking, South Africa.

Among most Africans in South Africa, Chief Minister Mangope acquired a conservative image because of his general lack of militancy vis-à-vis the South African government. This image was reinforced three years ago when he undertook to raise contributions from some of his supporters to oppose the incursions of black guerillas across the northern border of South Africa. Mangope has been opposed politically by Chief Thidimane Pilane, a former ally who is now head of the Seoposegwe Party in BophuthaTswana and is a man considered to be more in the pattern of the outspoken Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu. However, Mangope has proved to be more powerful than Pilane at the polls. Many radical Africans recognize that he stands for a number of worthy goals. He has been particularly keen on a Tswana university, for instance, and helped raise a sum of $70,000 from the Tswana people for this project.

Those who have known Mangope over a few years, as I have, almost all agree that he has changed considerably. He has gained self-confidence as a leader. At one stage he believed he was too old and too conservative successfully to lead his Tswana kinsmen to a better life, and he looked around for a possible younger leader. But with experience in office, Mangope has grown far more assertive and more confident of his own abilities. He feels that he is throwing off the psychological handicap of any African who has been forced to think of whites as superior leaders and, a man of great pride and tenacity, he is becoming increasingly dynamic.

It has been charged by right-wing groups in South Africa, and by some who are in the middle of the road, that Bantustan leaders who

*See, for example, B. A. Khoapa, edit.: Black Review (Durban, 1972; 227 pp.).
visit the United States pick up all kinds of "liberal ideas" and are never quite the same--or quite so "tame"--again. These critics are surely correct. Travel abroad is broadening. The opportunity to talk with a variety of people and to observe less racially discriminatory societies can mark a man and his ideals for life.

Die Transvaler (June 20, 1973) suggested in a somewhat sarcastic editorial that "there should be someone who can sober homeland leaders after their 'information visits' to the United States." Without doubt, Chief Minister Matanzima has spoken differently on land and other issues since his American visit. The four key Bantustan leaders who have traveled to the United States--Ntsanwisi, Buthelezi, Matanzima, and Mangope--are among those pressing hardest for greater rights in the Bantustans.

That may be the price the South African government must pay if it is to gain credibility for the Bantustans and for the independence of their leaders. If the South African authorities say the leaders are free men, then their movements can scarcely be restricted. Leaders who travel abroad are a public relations asset to Pretoria, and not least among those most critical of conditions in South Africa.

Paradoxically, the greatest pressure against such visits comes from the political left in the United States, including the many academics who would bar all such cultural exchange between the United States and South Africa, and from the political right in South Africa, whose members would prefer to keep white American liberals and almost all black Americans out of South Africa and the Bantustan leaders out of America.

It is too early in the evolution of the Bantustans to predict their final impact on the pattern of racial injustice in South Africa. But critics from all perspectives can benefit from learning the candid views of an honest, if troubled, man such as Chief Minister Mangope.

E. S. M.
WILL BOPHUTHATSWANA JOIN BOTSWANA?

Professor: I welcome all of you to the seminar. Chief Minister Lukas Mangope of BophuthaTswana is the fourth of the main leaders, the chief executives, of the territorial authorities popularly known in South Africa as Bantustans, who have been here within the last year. The others were Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Matanzima of the Transkei, and Professor Hudson Nsantwisi of Machangana.

Chief Minister Mangope is 49 years old; he was a chief and a schoolteacher before he became a politician. We welcome his wife as well, who comes from Zeerust in the western Transvaal. They have seven children, two at different universities in South Africa. And here let me say formally, in Sechuana, "Goroga na pula!" Welcome!

Mangope: Thank you very much. We are pleased to be here. This visit to America has been a stimulating one.

Q: My first question concerns education. Under the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, the South African parliament has provided for "self-governing territories in areas in which legislative assemblies have been established." Chief Minister Mangope's area, BophuthaTswana, has a legislative assembly. And the Constitution Act also says, under Amendment 23 of 1972, that such an assembly "may legislate in regard to African education below the university level." A lot of doubt is expressed from time to time about the freedom that your party and your government have to decide courses of action for yourselves, not dictated by the white South African government. Now, here is an area--namely, primary and secondary school education--where you have legal control. So my first question is: What have you done about it? And is what you have done any different from what the South African government would do? In other words, what difference does it make that you have some measure of political control?

Mangope: I would like to start off by saying that ours is a unique position. We are not really a government in the generally accepted sense of the word. But the South African government is in my opinion attempting to prove its sincerity by allowing us complete
control over those areas of government which it has said we can control. Education is one of them, with works, justice, and agriculture. To be specific in my answer with regard to education, we have been very much dissatisfied and unhappy with Bantu education since its inception in 1953. Unhappy because it is not the quality of education that we received from mission schools which were then run by the churches. People have all the time wished, among other things, to have the medium or language of instruction changed, because under Bantu education we have had to be taught in Sechuana. And we have not been happy with this at all. One of the first things that we have done since attaining this Constitutional status has been to resolve that as from next year we are going to have English as the medium of instruction beginning with Standard III. I may state that we only became a self-governing territory as from the 1st of June of last year. Our first legislative session was last March. At this we passed a number of important bills—in our opinion important—and one of them is an education bill, which as I say will make English the medium of instruction.

Now, the South African government in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act has provided that we may repeal a South African law which in our opinion interferes with those fields of government which they say we have control over. We have now repealed five parts of the Bantu Education Act. In addition to the medium of instruction, we have felt that we need to have an English-medium private high school, in which we will particularly emphasize the teaching of English, mathematics, and the sciences, because in terms of policy we have to have our own people serving us. And we cannot have doctors, engineers, and so on unless we have people who have a background of mathematics, science, and English. We say we need to have this school as a private school because we feel that then it will be free of interference by the South African government. If we have the funds, we are going to run it as we see fit. The South African government does not interfere with our schools—even government schools—but they provide the funds for our education and they could very well feel that they are not going to make funds available for the costs of a private school. Especially if it is an English-medium private high school.

I have been saying to people here, especially black Americans, that we would very much welcome teachers who could come and teach in this school and in our high schools generally, because we don't have suitably qualified teachers. But then we are not going to have money. I will give you an idea of our financial position as a
government. Our financial year begins the 1st of April, and for the year 1972-1973—this last financial year—we had 18 million Rand* to run our entire administration, including education. Now, we had 5 million of this money to use for education. We have 352,000 children in the lower, secondary, and high schools, and 4,000 teachers. This money is not nearly enough, since the tribes have to provide for private teachers in many instances. The tribes have a local committee, or council, which has to meet the salaries of teachers. This present financial year, 1973-1974, we requested the South African government to make available 29 million Rand, because the services we give must be funded. But they have provided 18 million, the same amount as last year, and we have 22,000 children beginning school. When I left we were in need of 900 classrooms and 900 teachers, and we couldn't employ one additional teacher.

Q: If you are interested in getting teachers from America—black or white, it doesn't matter—how do you get around the fact that your educational bill, in Section 15.1.e, says that a teacher cannot be appointed in a permanent capacity unless "he is a Bantu person who is a South African citizen"? How would you be able to use Americans?

Mangope: This would be exactly the same as the white teachers that we have now in our schools. I am going to be saying a few things about our teacher-training colleges, where we have whites seconded to us.

Q: They are not permanent, then? They are temporary?

Mangope: They are temporary.

Q: But an American teacher could be temporary for 10 or 15 years?

Mangope: Yes. We could decide how long he could stay there. The white teachers we have in our teacher-training colleges are not citizens of BophuthaTswana. They are actually employees of Bantu education in Pretoria, where they are seconded to us. We feel the same could be done with respect to teachers from America. I want to say something about these white teachers in our schools now. Under mission schools most of the teachers in the high schools and in the teacher-training colleges were English-speaking. But now the white teachers, almost to a man, are Afrikaans-speaking, so that the atmosphere is very much like that in the South African

*1 Rand=$1.40
schools. One of the men who came to work with us in 1951 or
1952, I think, commented that the mission schools produced black
Englishmen. I have listened in vain for someone to complain
that the present schools produce black Afrikaners.

May I say also regarding education that there is a clause in
this education bill that we passed that makes education for our
children compulsory. Now, this is daydreaming, because we are
not going to have the funds to provide the classroom accommodations
and to provide for the teachers. The whites have compulsory
education, and the Coloured and the Indians are going to have
compulsory education beginning next year.

Q: Some of us have been reading about the strikes around Durban
earlier this year. I noticed that when you opened a pilot factory
in your territory you said, "Africans who represent their fellow
workers must be truly and genuinely elected and in regular communication
with the management. They must establish and function in a spirit
that must be democratic on the factory floor." What do you see as the
future of African works committees or African unions?

Mangope: Now, this is a very topical issue in South Africa: whether
we should have trade unions and how we should extend the interests
of the black workers. But I think that since Durban things will never
be the same in South Africa, because at long last the giant that has
been asleep for so long has awakened. It is difficult for me to say
what would serve the best interests of the workers. On the one
hand, I fear the trade unions might be used as political weapons. As
is the case in my homeland, for instance, where we have the platinum
mines. The mine workers' union is white. In spite of assurances we
were given by the South African government that our people could
advance to any job in the mines, the mine workers' union has made
this impossible. It has laid down job reservations—certain jobs
cannot be done by my people. Currently the South African government
is not in a position to do anything about this, because this trade union
is very powerful. Now, I am just fearing that if we had a union it
would do exactly the same. In my position as the leader of a homeland
which is very much underdeveloped, I am very cautious about advocating
the establishment of trade unions. I don't know what the best thing is.
Under the Industrial Conciliation Act we are committed to represent
the interest of the workers. But there are complaints by my people
that if members of the works committees become too articulate they
are victimized. They may only speak of minor things such as toilet
facilities and refreshments, not of wages and working conditions.
Q: You gave a speech to a group of white businessmen in Johannesburg not long ago, and as I recall you emphasized that it wasn't so much the starting wage of your people you were concerned about, it was the rate at which they could be promoted and also the spirit in which people gave training and opened up skilled jobs and managerial jobs. You appealed to the white businessmen—I think it was at the Carlton Hotel where there was a luncheon or a dinner—and told them you were concerned about this promotion and so on. Have you had any response from these white businessmen?

Mangope: I have a letter now from the people who organized this affair—they brought it to the airport—and they have said that they will get in contact with me as soon as I get back. The response was very good. And the meeting was attended by more than 160 industrialists in Johannesburg. In New York I was told by people that the best thing American firms in South Africa could do for the blacks in South Africa is to disengage, to pull out of the country. Now, I have said I believe that the best thing you can do for us is to disengage from the traditional patterns of treatment meted out to my people, because in South Africa black workers are regarded just as numbers. They are known as numbers in the office. They are hired and fired just as though they were pieces of maintenance. And people here have said, for instance, the General Electric people invited me to talk with them and there was a long discussion of this sort of thing—people here have said that American firms should either pull out or pay a living wage. I have no quarrel with a living wage. But I don't think my people are interested in handouts. I think that they want to deserve a good wage. They want to be productive. And to be productive you have got to get the skill, and to get the skill—because skill is power—to get the skill, we need the training. Now, I have been emphasizing that the American companies in South Africa should set an example in training my people and paying them a living wage. It is difficult to train people who are illiterate, and a large percentage of my people are illiterate. I feel that in the training program a literacy campaign should be included for the people. And this I feel is the best way of bringing about change in South Africa.

Q: One of the problems of black workers that you mention is job reservation. How do you feel about job reservation in BophuthaTswana itself?

Mangope: Well, I don't think we need it. We are not going to
countenance it at all. But it is useless my saying this because we
don't have industries. I have said even to the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development that we are totally opposed to
job reservation. He in answer has said that only 3 percent of the
total number of jobs in South Africa are reserved. Now, my
argument is that if it is such a small percentage why have it at
all?

Q: How do you feel about African workers from the rest of South
Africa coming and working in BophuthaTswana? Are you going to
have jobs for your own local citizens first and then let other
Africans come in?

Mangope: No, we are not going to turn away anyone, even white
South Africans. Anybody can come in.

Q: They are welcome for any job or only for jobs that your own
citizens can't do?

Mangope: For any job. For any job that is available. But this is
all very hypothetical, because we don't have jobs right now.

Q: When you speak of literacy do you mean industry should be
responsible for training?

Mangope: There are firms in Johannesburg who have embarked on
what is known as "Operation Up-Grade," which originally, I am told,
was founded by Dr. Frank Laubach. It is a method where people
have been able to learn to read and write in five days—elderly
people.

Q: But I mean is it the responsibility of the factories actually to do
this, rather than the government?

Mangope: I say both. [Finance Minister] Diederichs this year
said that the government in its budgetary fiscal term was considering
the creation of training facilities, pre-service and in-service
training, for people, especially in urban areas and from the border
industries. Of course, I have been told that this literacy training is
a difficult thing, because even if you teach a man to read in five
days he forgets because there is no literature for him to read. This
has been cited as a big problem. But I think it is easier to train a
man who is literate than one who is completely illiterate.
Q: What about the million Batswana—if we take those in Botswana and in your territories—how do you feel emotionally, culturally, those of you who are within the confines of the Republic of South Africa, how do you feel about the Tswana-speaking people in Botswana?

Mangope: You know that my colleagues, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Chief Kaizer, have been speaking of a federation of the homelands. I am not very keen about it.

Q: Federation just of the South African homelands?

Mangope: Yes. In any case, in the first place I think my people have never really been tested as to the popular feeling about this question. I feel that we must have some sort of referendum if we were to have it. But I think, personally, that we would prefer to incorporate with Botswana, since we share a common border and we are the same people in almost all respects.

Q: Have you discussed this with leaders in Botswana?

Mangope: No, I have not. It would be better politically for us to consolidate our own area first. I know Seretse Khama and I know Vice President Quett Masire very well. Seretse is an outstanding man. He is pragmatic and uncompromising in principle, and he isn't the noisy type.

Q: Did you know him at Tiger Kloof?

Mangope: Yes, we were in high school together.

Q: Do you call the people in Botswana by a different name? They are different clan groups, aren't they? The Bamwaketse, for example, you don't have any of that clan in your territory, do you?

Mangope: Yes, we do. We have many clan ties and there are members of the same family divided by the border. My father was born in the town of Gomokhibidu in Botswana, on the border between the Bakwena and the Mohurutshe peoples.

Q: In Professor Schapera's discussion of the Tswana, he makes a distinction between the western Tswana and the eastern Tswana who came from a Nguni people. Do you draw a distinction between the eastern and western branches? Are these people originally of different stock?
Mangope: The dialects of the language are not the same.

Q: Are they all equal citizens?

Mangope: Yes.

Q: Apropos of that, your people have been here in this general area since about 1500, more or less. If I read history correctly, you have had an awful lot of people who have split off from time to time. You had those long civil wars between 1810 and 1840, and you have had lots of clans breaking away. Is this a tendency of the Tswana-speaking people? If so, would it affect the stability of your unity in your homeland? Is this a Tswana characteristic, perhaps?

Mangope: This was the tendency in the past, but no more. Especially under the present official policy, it has decreased very much.

Q: You won your election in October by a big majority, but was the opposition in one part of the territory more than in another? Was there a regional split?

Mangope: I don't know what to say about that, because the opposition was so very small.

Q: Why are so many of these areas on the map isolated little islands? How did that come to be?

Mangope: That is the work of the white man. That is purely the work of the white man. I have been asked, for instance, would I regard whites in South Africa as settlers or as expatriates? I have been saying that they have been there since 1652. I would hate to regard them as settlers. But it is their attitude which is going to make up my mind what they are. Most of these parts before 1913—for instance, you see this white area—it belongs to whites now. Before 1915, even before 1936, this we regarded as our land, as our territory. The white man passed the Land Act, and said, well, these areas are no more yours. This is going to be the boundary. I speak now the truth to the South African. We blacks own 13 percent of the land and we are 16 million, and 4 million whites own 87 percent. If they want to change our attitude there will have to be a much more equitable distribution of land. This is not our fault at all, it is the white man's.
The areas comprising Bophuthatswana (with the exception of one outlier in the Orange Free State to the south).
Q: Is this land used for farming now?

Mangope: Yes. The methods are very poor. The South African government, especially the Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs, has kept on saying to me: "You keep saying you want more land, but you don't use your land properly." Now, this is true. Our methods are poor. But it is also because we don't have the facilities the white farmers have. We don't have the land bank, for instance, which has brought the white farmers credit facilities for implements and fertilizers. In times of drought the military defense trucks are used to transport water for the white farms and for their animals, but this is not the case with us. Our territory would be well suited for cattle ranching, and of course it falls within the maize triangle. But the land tenure system is also poor---it has to be improved. It is still the chief who has the final say as to who may own the land, and this has the effect of making people feel, "Why do my best on this land because it is after all not my land but community owned?"

Q: Was not one of the successes of the white farmers that they have so many dams on their farms, and larger dams for a whole region? You have lots of areas where dams could be built, and yet you have very few dams.

Mangope: We don't have a single river in the whole territory.

Q: But you have catchment areas.

Mangope: Water is our problem. We have good catchment areas, but we don't have the money to construct the dams. This goes also for electricity. And it is true also for the roads. You won't find a single tarred road in our homeland.

Q: You mean that the roads are tarred right up to the border and then the tar stops when they cross into your area?

Mangope: Most of these white areas are white-owned. And most of the roads there are tarred. But as soon as a road gets to the border the tar ends. The same goes for electricity. As soon as it gets to the border there it ends.

Q: So really your people have no incentives, either in the agricultural sector or in the industrial sector? No motivation?
Mangope: None at all. We have passed an Agricultural Bill at this last session the aim of which is to establish aid for farmers. We have to have our money to be able to get more land for farmers and money to improve our farming generally.

Q: What is the average size of a farm?

Mangope: It is about 6 morgen [1 morgen = 2.2 acres] and 10 head of cattle. But in actual fact this is just not the case. People have different sizes of fields. We would have to change the land tenure. This to me is very, very important.

Q: Is this going to be politically difficult?

Mangope: Yes, it is going to be difficult. Under this Agricultural Bill we have set up what we call a land forum, composed mainly of chiefs. I am going to try to get them to accept the change in the land tenure system, so that we can get people who aren't willing to change to see things differently. Because unless we change the land tenure I cannot see that we can improve our agricultural productivity.

Q: What exactly is the problem in land tenure--that if a man does a good job with a field, the chief may take it away from him and give it to somebody else? So he has no incentive to have rotation of crops or investment in cattle. He has no security of tenure at all. Of course, that is a problem throughout the developing world.

Q: What happens if you have a poor farmer? Can you get him off the land?

Mangope: There are people in Johannesburg, you know, and who have been in Johannesburg for the last 30 years, who still own land in the homelands--land which is not used and which may not be, because the chief still regards that land as theirs.

Q: It is not farmed at all?

Mangope: Not at all.

Q: So you have absentee landownership of Tswana-speaking people?

Mangope: It depends on the chief, if he still regards the land as
somebody else's. But he may take it at will.

Q: Speaking of absentees, do you have a lot of talented people, Botswana, who are in Johannesburg and Pretoria and other places and whom you need to provide some of the education and skills and administrative ability? Do you have a brain drain of your best young men and young women going out to white South Africa? I know Botswana had this, and when they became independent they sent representatives to South Africa and said, "Come home, all is forgiven; we want you to come back and get a job in our own African administration."

Mangope: Yes, this is a problem.

Q: Are you getting some people back?

Mangope: If we had the facilities, many people would be willing to come back. For instance, there are people who, in spite of job reservation, have acquired skills in Johannesburg--welders and others--who would like to come back. But because there is no electricity they feel that they cannot use their skill. There are many such people.

Q: When you speak of things being perhaps more modern, can we talk for a moment about your capital city. I know your headquarters are now in Mafeking, which is a pretty good sized community for southern Africa. You had a commission to investigate sites and you considered Heystekrand, Taungstat, Saulsport, and Madikwe. Why did you pick Heystekrand? It doesn't have any modern buildings or any development--it would seem to be many years before it would. Where is it, by the way?

Mangope: Near Pretoria.

Q: Was it selected for political reasons?

Mangope: It was selected because it had a rail line from Johannesburg and Pretoria to the northern Transvaal. And because there is a rail line there is also electricity. This was the main reason why. But since I saw that the South African government is still working on consolidation proposals while I have been here, I have written to my people to consider whether to take any decision until the final consolidation, because I feel we might find that included in our homeland is a better site for a capital than Heystekrand.
Q: It would take a long time to develop Heystekrand. It isn't central, is it?

Mangope: No.

Q: Would you consider Mafeking?

Mangope: We would rather not have a white man's second-hand town.

Q: I get the impression that your area hasn't been as fortunate as the Transkei in terms of separate development. Transkei is an older community in the sense of its political structure, I suppose. Does the Transkei have problems about the same as yours?

Mangope: I don't know. It might have advantages that we don't have. But on the other hand I think we have advantages that the Transkei doesn't have. For instance, we know for a fact that our homeland is rich in minerals--chrome, manganese, and platinum*--and most of these areas have not been explored at all. We also have, I think, a great advantage in being close to Pretoria and Johannesburg.

Q: You said in a speech about a year ago that you were depending on mining firms in Johannesburg to provide you with the capital and the know how to develop some of these mineral resources. Have they been responding to this?

Mangope: It is only the Anglo-American people that have--the company which mines platinum there.

Q: Do they operate your Impala mine?

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*South African platinum is in increasing demand, since it is now being used in the manufacture of exhaust gas converters--antipollution devices--for American automobiles. The Rustenburg Platinum Mine, not far from Pretoria, last year signed a contract with the Ford Motor Company to supply 500,000 ounces of platinum a year for three years, which at current prices would total some 140 million Rand. Negotiations were also going forward with General Motors and Chrysler, and it was thought that British, German, and Japanese car manufacturers would soon follow suit. (South African Digest, July 14, 1972.)
Mangope: Yes.

Q: But now you are not allowed to tax that?

Mangope: Under the terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act we cannot, because they have to have their headquarters in the homeland in order for us to tax them. And also 51 percent of the shareholdings must belong to my people.

Q: You said at the time of your election that the English-language press and most of the English-speaking people in South Africa were very much opposed to you. Why do you think this was so? You won the election by a large margin. Why was the big Johannesburg press against you?

Mangope: I don't think they are any more.

Q: Is that because you are more and more unpopular with the South African government and therefore you are more and more popular with the English-language press?

Mangope: I think the reason was that I was not articulate at the time. I didn't see any reason to be then; I feel I have reason to be much more articulate now. At that time the question of the boundaries for the homeland, for instance, was not an issue. At that time we were not a self-governing territory. The attitude of the Afrikaans press has now changed toward me.

Q: I take it this is fairly recent, because in the Afrikaans press—in an editorial in *Die Vaderland* on October 9 last year—they came out strongly in praise of you as an outstanding leader. Do you ever find it embarrassing inside South Africa with your people or abroad that the pro-government press has in the past been very much on your side? Do your people ask why *Die Vaderland* has supported you and the *Star* has opposed you in the past?

Mangope: I am sorry to have to say what I am going to say, but in fact I really don't mind what the whites in South Africa say, whether they be English or Afrikaans—this doesn't affect me at all. I don't see the difference in their attitude toward us as blacks. For instance, where the Afrikaner--the Nationalist Party, which is mainly Afrikaner—says no, the United Party—which is mainly English—says yes after 200 years. I don't mind at all what the white South Africans say, including the government. If it went
according to the attitude of the press I would never have been elected. I am trying to say that my people also don't regard much what the press says, whether it be Afrikaans or English.

Q: Do your people read the English and Afrikaans press very widely? That is, do the educated people read them?

Mangope: Yes, they are both read.

Q: A lot of your people speak better Afrikaans than they do English, don't they?

Mangope: Yes, since Bantu education. Now, I want to qualify so that I am not misunderstood. I have a son at Fort Hare University College, and just a week before we came this way he wrote to say that they have there a professor who comes from Spokane. And he was very much taken with this man, very happy with this man, not only his efficiency but his attitude toward the students. I am saying this to try and show the difference in attitude in us toward the white South African and whites from elsewhere who treat us as human beings. I mustn't be understood to mean that we are anti-white, irrespective of where the white comes from.

Q: What are the prospects of a Tswana-speaking university?

Mangope: Yes, we are interested in this. Very much interested. Not because we are interested in a tribal college but because from experience we have realized that, for instance, with Fort Hare--which has been there for many, many years--there are more university graduates in the Xhosa group than in any other group. In the University of the North we have more Vendas because they are near the university. We feel that if we are almost 2 million people we really need a university. We are thinking of having it somewhere near Pretoria, where we would have the interest not only of Pretoria University but also of Witwatersrand University.

Q: Do you think it is better for your students to go to a university in South Africa or are there advantages to their going to Botswana, or farther afield?

Mangope: I would prefer Botswana. If they came to a country like America, there is the danger that they may not return. I would rather have people come here for postgraduate studies and people who have families back home. As for young people, I don't know
"Back... back... still more... farther... still farther... back some more... much farther..." (Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu is telling beetle-browed Prime Minister John Vorster to expand the land devoted to Bantustans.) Cartoon courtesy of David Marais of the Cape Times.

"Stop complaining! This has all been worked out for you. It's called Parallel Plural Coexistence." (A characteristic effort of the anti-government press in South Africa to ridicule the concept of "separate development.") Cartoon courtesy of David Marais of the Cape Times.
about that. It is not easy to return to South Africa. But I really feel that we need to send some of our people to this country.

Q: Do you already have the problem that some of your young people go from the homelands to a university and then because they pick up different political ideas or political philosophy they don't want to come back to the homeland? Or they may go and come back and be critical of you because they say you haven't gone fast enough or been outspoken enough in one way or another?

Mangope: I don't think that is a problem in itself. I have had my two sons sometimes argue with me until three in the morning, and they have told me that I am the most stupid man in South Africa to have anything to do with the South African system. I don't think it is wrong for them to do that. Some of the things that they say are very true. They are critical, but they are true. And they are our children—we must accept that. One thing I think the SASO—the South African Students Organization, which pulled out of NUSAS*—is doing which I cannot do, which I have not been able to achieve at all, is to get my people to divest themselves of their complex of inferiority. I just cannot achieve this. Now SASO is preaching that the white man is not superior to you, you can do things yourself. You don't have to have the white man supervise you. And I think that this is a very good thing. In spite of what they say of us, the homeland leaders—that we are stooges and that they will have nothing to do with us. One of my sons is a member of SASO and I accept it.

Q: You speak of understanding their point of view and sympathizing with it to the extent that some of the things they say are true. Do they also understand and sympathize to a degree with your point of view?

Mangope: No, no. They have solutions for all the problems.

Q: Some things are universal throughout the world!

Q: One of the things that they are most critical of is the question of removals—of taking Africans away from some areas in order to consolidate. What position does your government take on removals?

*National Union of South African Students (a strongly liberal, white-led organization, largely English-speaking).
Mangope: The South African government came forward with a consolidation program and proposal for the consolidation of our areas into one area. But this would have involved the removal of some 245,000 families from one place to another.

Q: That is about one-quarter of the people in BophuthaTswana.

Mangope: Yes, and we rejected this proposal. We have made it clear to the South African government that we are totally opposed to the removal of people. Because in any case you find that we are being removed and whites are not.

The land exchange is not working. People don't appreciate how hard it is to move a whole town. I asked the Minister of Bantu Affairs if a whole white town had been moved—that is, huge army trucks come and are piled high with furniture and belongings with white women sitting on top of their possessions and moved to a new area. He got very cross. I'm very unpopular with the South African government. They thought they liked me because I am a reasonable man. But I keep asking why there are free books for white children and not for black children? Why do they try to divide and rule by this year making Coloured and Indian education compulsory, but not African?

Now, you know, this same Resettlement Board said, "We are offering you Mafeking, a whites' town." We said, "What do you mean, you are offering us Mafeking? Do you mean that the whites are going to be removed?" They said, "No, we are going to buy their property from them." We wanted to know what it would cost, because we feel that that money, if they want to use it for our welfare, should be given to us. We have many priorities, other than having people removed. In any case, we are not interested in getting their Mafeking as a second-hand capital. So this we turned down, and I don't know now what they are thinking. That was shortly before I came here.

Q: When one thinks of all the priorities you have in terms of need for dams, for roads, secondary schools, loans to farmers, industrial development, it would seem that these demands not only for your territory but for all other territories would certainly be far beyond the ability of even four million relatively affluent whites in South Africa to pay enough taxes to do all your development and buy out part of their own land. Therefore, if the amount of capital that they could give under the best of circumstances is
limited, some of the money to ship people around might in a sense be wasted. Better to put the money into productive development so that your people can earn more money and therefore can pay more taxes. In that way you could finance your own development, which obviously the whites cannot do. Four million people cannot really finance a development of 20 million other people and undertake their own development as well. If the United States tried to ship 25 percent of its people to a new location fifty miles away over a few years' period, wouldn't that absorb a large percentage of our whole GNP?

An economist: Yes, I'd say the cost of our freeways has been dominated by the cost of taking up the land. Removing the people who were in the path of the freeways was a big cost item.

Q: Politically probably the most difficult single thing in terms of South African politics is to move out the whites. It was possible in the Transkei because these were mostly English people who voted United Party. Do you think it is practical in the future that the separate areas of BophuthaTswana could be linked up in some way? Do you think it is feasible within the next decade?

Mangope: Well, I have already said that this is my personal opinion. I don't know what my people would say about it, but I really feel that it would be to our advantage if we federated with Botswana.

Q: Do your people talk about it much?

Mangope: No, we haven't talked much about it. I feel that we must not be a liability to Botswana. If we join Botswana, first of all we must have sufficient land of our own and we must be fairly economically reliable.

Q: Do you think that you are a liability now?

Mangope: You mean if we joined Botswana now? Yes, I feel we would be.

Q: Why is that, I mean, compared to Botswana?

Mangope: I feel that we don't have sufficient land, taking into account our people in urban areas who in terms of policy are there as temporary residents.
Q: What do the people of Botswana think? Botswana is going to have a lot of money within the next decade with the diamond mines and the nickel development. Botswana will be one of the prosperous African countries. They may be willing to share their economic strength with you.

Mangope: I don't know, because, as I say, I have never really taken this matter up in any way. But I am personally very much interested.*

Q: What are you going to do about people down in the Free State? That is one of the conundrums of the South African plan or scheme—way down here in the Orange Free State there is a Tswana-speaking area, Thaba 'Nchu. How many thousands of your people are there?

Mangope: About 80,000.

Q: Can you just pick them up and move them?

Mangope: We have no intention of having these people removed from there. None whatsoever.

Q: Do they have any desire to move?

Mangope: No.

Q: If they should want to come, would you accept them as individuals?

Mangope: They wouldn't come because they can provide for themselves. They have two harvests a year—wheat and corn—and it is a good cattle area. They wouldn't like to leave there.

*Ed. Note: Subsequent to this seminar and after Mangope's return to South Africa, the Afrikaans press generally welcomed reports that he had stimulated investment offers for BophuthaTswana. One Johannesburg paper spoke euphorically of foreign investors securing golden opportunities before South African investors. More important politically was the frank statement by Die Transvaler (June 27, 1973) that: "There is no reason why some Bantu states who are ethnically related to peoples in neighboring states should not be able to decide to link up. This is within the framework of the political possibilities of the future, but for the moment there are more important matters that demand attention. The most important is the speeding up of the tempo of homeland development."
Q: Then you think that idea is pretty much dead now?

Mangope: Yes, completely.

Q: Do you go and visit them from time to time? Technically, did they vote in your election?

Mangope: One of my ministers is from this area. And yes, they voted in my election.

Economist: The emphasis of your attention is on the political status of the area. Now, my interest is economics. I would say if economic forces are moving, if you could improve the economic position of your people, the political status is secondary. Harry Oppenheimer with his platinum mine is giving employment there. If other companies move into areas where your people could get good work, it would seem to me that would be more important.

Mangope: It is, I agree.

Q: And are the doors open for investment by anybody—including American companies?

Mangope: General Electric opened an enterprise in Babelegi in February.

Q: What did they open?

Mangope: A factory. The policy of the South African government regarding investment in the homelands is that the investors enter into a contract for a given number of years with the government, with the understanding that after twenty to twenty-five years their factory may be taken over by our people. To me, this is not popular with industrialists. I don't go along with it at all. I personally feel that if a businessman wants to remain, he should be allowed to remain. Now, we have been told that it is the Bantu Investment Corporation which is the body that negotiates with the industrialist before he can establish a factory in the homeland. As far as I am concerned, I welcome investment in the homeland. I was saying to somebody the other day I feel that these people who are coming should be free to carry out feasibility studies before they establish their industries.
Q: There would be problems, but the way things are now, there are many areas there where border industries could be established. They would be outside the homeland and still give employment to the people of the homeland.

Mangope: Just here, around Pretoria, about 58,000 of my people are working in border industries.

Q: Isn't there a real danger for you or your people in allowing direct purchase of lands? You have little enough land now. If General Electric, for instance, went in and said, "We would like to buy up 100 acres here and have title to it forever," it seems to me there is a danger there. Some of your people may say, "Oh, we have little enough land, and it is the old story. Now we are selling off our land to the white man again, or to the foreigner." Those who have argued with Prime Minister Verwoerd about this recall his answer: "Look, we have taken the African land once. We are not going to take it again. And therefore no white man can own land in an African area. What we have to do is get more land for Africans." Is this not a difficult choice?

Mangope: But if a factory needs a hundred acres and it is always going to need that hundred acres, who else is going to be using that hundred acres?

Q: Maybe 99-year or 199-year leases would be the same thing. Maybe in theory the land is yours, but in practice they use it.

A businessman: If I were to advise anybody to come into your area, I would say, "Twenty years, that's a fast-buck deal. Let the fast-buck artist come in." Now, he's going to pay you dirt. He's going to maintain that he doesn't want to put out anything for training. He's going to say, "Your people are illiterate and therefore I am going to pay them a nickel a week if I can get away with it. Otherwise they can go out and farm. If I can only be here for twenty years, I am going to make my money and I am going to get out. Because I have to pay for my entire investment. I don't want to have to move out this twenty-year-old equipment, because it isn't going to be any good any more; it is going to be obsolete." Even if you take over the factory, you'll find out you can't make money running it. You just can't operate that way. It's fine on paper, but what you are really attracting is the fast-buck artist.

Q: So you are arguing for actually letting some of the land on a
long-term basis to get a man who comes in and says, "I'll get my investment back in thirty or forty years and I can afford to be a good citizen and I can afford to give training."

A businessman: Speaking as a businessman, I feel that if I were going to go into such an area, it would be because I wanted to make my home there. Not because I am going to go in there and after twenty or thirty years I am going to retire and then go back where I came from. I think that has been the pattern.

Mangope: Most of the industries that have established themselves especially around Pretoria and in that area are extensions of industries in Johannesburg or on the Rand.

Businessman: But if they send in supernumeraries, really--people seconded from Pretoria for a limited amount of time--those people when they retire probably are not going to stay in the homeland areas. They are going to move back to Pretoria or Europe, or wherever. In other words, they don't have any feeling that they are there and they had better do good where they are because they have a feeling for the land. As a company gets larger, you just don't have respect for the company. You work there for a wage and take the money and you run somewhere else. I think to get industry organized it really has to come from the people who live there. Somebody has to say, "I want all this stuff. I want a television, a car, a motorcycle. I'm going to figure out how I can manufacture it out of my own brain in my own area." If you have a large company, which you have invited in there, either the people are going to work for that company because it is easy to do, or else if they try to compete with it they won't be able to have the facilities it does. And I don't know where you would get the capital.

Q: I understand you are going to visit a doll factory in Watts. Maybe they will set up a branch in the homeland, or maybe you can find a distributor here and sell black dolls, which are very successful. The American government does just what the South African government does, for the same high-minded principles. Nobody wants to be accused of giving away the land, even though it might be best. The same problem arises with the Navajo. Who would want to sell part of the Navajo reservation to General Motors?

Businessman: I had an experience with the United States government on Samoa. They wouldn't let a watch company buy as little as ten
acres to establish a factory, with all the jobs that meant, for fear of alienating Samoan land.

Mangope: That is the same problem that we experienced with respect to the establishment of industries. For instance, around Johannesburg, especially with the white workers—the key workers—in the factory. They say, "Well, my children have better schooling facilities in Johannesburg. My wife does not agree to my moving to the homeland."

Q: Won't television make a difference? When you can sit in the middle of the homeland and you can watch the Orlando Pirates play soccer on Saturday afternoon without going to Johannesburg, and without having someone in Soweto beat you up afterwards, then you may prefer to stay in the homeland. If you would take an ordinary beerhall in one of the homelands and put a television set in it, wouldn't it make life a lot more inviting?

Mangope: I hope so. We will see what happens.

Q: You have said that much of BophuthaTswana's territory is close to Pretoria, which is a rapidly industrializing area. Together with some of the Swazi area and part of KwaZulu, these are the Bantustan areas closest to the white industrial centers. Is this an advantage in terms of jobs? Is it also a disadvantage in terms of labor being drawn off and working for wages in the white industrial areas and then coming back, in a dormitory arrangement?

Mangope: Yes, and may I just add that one other disadvantage is that in South Africa we have what are known as influx control regulations. People from the homelands are not allowed to work in urban areas such as Pretoria and Johannesburg, even if they have found jobs there and even if they have a place to stay there. Now, the disadvantage I refer to is that people from Lebowa and from the Shangaan and Venda homelands come in the hope of finding employment in Pretoria and Johannesburg and they are ordered out, because of influx control. And they settle in my homeland as illegal squatters. We have at the present moment about one million such people who are illegal squatters, living in shacks. This makes it extremely difficult because the housing is not nice and sanitation is very poor. At the moment it is one of the problems.

Q: Do you have to provide for them in any way?
Mangope: We have to provide for them because it is difficult to reject them. We don't know what to do. We have got to provide housing for them.

Q: What do you say to the whites in South Africa who fear for their future?

Mangope: I do not share the view of some that the whites are some sort of settlers or colonialists. They have been in South Africa for 300 years and have a right to share the country just as we have a right. But they must give us more education and training and more economic opportunities. With more skills we will earn more money and deserve it. Our economic power will make us indispensable and can be translated into political power. Education is a catalyst for us. All this is important because white South Africa is in a political ferment and there are important changes taking place. But if a white man wants me to think of him as a settler or a colonial, then he should continue as he has been doing. But if he accords me human dignity and opportunity, then I am no threat to him. But he must change his mind.

Q: Is the South African government concerned about your visiting the United States?

Mangope: Yes, they were worried when I was invited. Radio Bantu came for an interview and asked me what I expected in America. I said I would take those good things which apply to BophuthaTswana home to my people. The things I would see which were not relevant or were bad, I would not tell my people.
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