African Protest Movements in Southern Rhodesia Before 1930

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AFRICAN PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA BEFORE 1930. An Ideological Appreciation of the Socio-Political Roots of the Protest Movements

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PREFACE

The author of this double issue, Dr. E.P. Makambe, is a 34-year-old Zimbabwean, who has followed a long academic road. He began his education in Zimbabwe, moved on to Lesotho, and finally to Great Britain. There he was awarded a doctorate in history by the University of York, in 1979, for his two-volume research thesis entitled *The African Migrant Factor in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1930: The Origin and Influence of External Elements in a Colonial Setting.*

In his short career, Dr. Makambe has already written on diverse African topics. One article in particular received favorable comment: "The Nyasaland Labour 'Ulendos' to Southern Rhodesia and the Problems of the African 'Highwaymen,' 1903-1923: A Study in the Limitations of Early Independent Labour Migration," in *African Affairs* (October, 1980). The article points out more clearly than was previously realized the role of migrants from both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the economic growth and in the black and white interactions in Southern Rhodesia.

Dr. Makambe began his academic employment by lecturing in history at the Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria, in Northern Nigeria. Later, he moved to the University of Botswana, where his appointment is also in history.

While on a visit to Zimbabwe in early 1982, this editor was again impressed by the need for revisions in the history of Southern Rhodesia as previously written by "Europeans." There are probably more historical myths flying about in Zimbabwe than in any other African country. A longtime friend, Jasper Savanhu, onetime Member of Parliament, commented somewhat wryly: "When the Europeans came to our country, they thought it was a palimpsest and that there was no history of our people. They denied that our forefathers were the builders of the magnificent Zimbabwe stone structures. And they paid a price for their ignorance. Unfortunately, there are some contemporary politicians who are inclined to make the same mistake. They imply that before independence Zimbabwe was politically a clean state and that there was no African nationalism."

As Dr. Makambe's detailed analysis of protests over a long period make clear, Africans never acquiesced to being conquered and dominated.

We are once again grateful to Wilma Fairchild for her careful editing of a long manuscript and to Linda Benjamin for feeding the word processor accurately, so that it could telephonically feed the typesetter at Castle Press.

Ned Munger
African Protest Movements in Southern Rhodesia Before 1930

E. P. Makambe

Arguments put forward concerning the rise of the modern African nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s and 1960s tend to complicate rather than to clarify this political development. John Day, for example, portrays the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress of the late 1950s as an impotent and somewhat inert organization which inexcusably benefited, during the Central African Federation, from the "long record of activism" associated with its sister movement, the Nyasaland National Congress. Nyasaland is said to have "provided practical lessons in militancy to the less politically mature Africans of Southern Rhodesia."¹ In a less deprecatory but still rather apologetic tone, L. W. Bowman concludes that the Southern Rhodesian African nationalist parties of the late 1950s were weak because they "... emerged from an indigenous African tradition that had waivered between resistance and accommodation of the European settlers."² This line of argument finds support from O'Meara, who sees the weaknesses of the parties in question as having arisen essentially from the peculiar political proclivities of their forbears, the protonationalist organizations of the 1920s and 1930s, which are depicted as having been "... minimally effective pressure groups ... that ... operated on a restricted level in both recruitment of members and political action."³

The O'Meara argument may be regarded as a more realistic, though inadequate, assessment of the political tradition on which the ethos of the African nationalist movement of the 1950s and 1960s was founded. However, more detailed examination of the composite colonial society of Southern Rhodesia in the pre-1950 period is at the same time essential to better understand those political forces that were to become operative during the 1950s and 1960s.

Owing to a tendency to draw parallels between the Southern Rhodesian African nationalist movement and those of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it is tempting to argue in legalistic terms on the qualitative differences relating to the several political systems that obtained in these territories during the colonial era, as Palley does so ably.⁴ These differences pertain to the system of indirect

A short draft of this paper was written for the Southern African Universities Social Sciences Conference held at the University College of Botswana, Gaborone, in June 1980. (C.O. and D.O material in the footnotes refers to the Colonial Office and Dominions Office correspondence, respectively, in the Public Record Office, London.)

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rule that existed across the Zambesi, with the colonial paternalism implied in London's control, as opposed to the regimen of domestic colonialism applied by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. But this approach is essentially simplistic, and we must look elsewhere for more credible expositions on the features and issues that distinguish these particular societies as individually identifiable entities.

Previous views tend either to overlook or to underplay the resilience of the tradition of protest and resistance in Southern Rhodesia between 1898 and 1957. True, some writers have acknowledged the survival of this tradition of protest—which derives from what is now commonly known as the First Chimurenga War (1896-1897)—but they have failed to blend the "invisible" or informal movements of protest with the more structured forms that characterize the modern organizations among the colonialized peoples. Moreover, the fact that Southern Rhodesia is virtually an extension and replication of the South African political and economic systems, and was therefore a more truly plural society in the Furnivall tradition, has not been sufficiently appreciated.

Because of the South African connection, the social and political dynamics underlying Southern Rhodesia's plural society were much more pronounced and diversified than was the case in any of the trans-Zambesian territories. However, it should be added that these dynamics produced profound effects that were not infrequently a mixed blessing for this particular society.

Finally, the idea of assessing the existence and success of a militant political tradition in any given territory on the basis of current formal political organizations, which some students of the African colonial period have been prone to do, is both farcical and irrelevant. Indeed, pursued to a logical conclusion, it could be argued that the African people of South Africa should have achieved independence before any others on the continent, since they have had one of the longest traditions of formal political organization in Africa, as symbolized, for instance, by the history of the African National Congress of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, by the Industrial Commercial Workers Union of Africa.

In Southern Rhodesia, the African nationalist movement of the 1950s and 1960s derived its inspiration and ideological trimmings from several political antecedents, particularly from those informal and formal organizations that surfaced during the years between 1898 and 1930. In essence, both types of protest movements were in turn governed by a number of factors that formed the salient features of the colony's plural society.

First, there was in early colonial Southern Rhodesia a strong loyalist tradition which had been deliberately engendered in response to two crying needs: the "pacification" of the indigenous African people of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and the security of the new colony's white settler community. In trying to meet the need for the so-called "pacification" of the indigenous people, foreign African elements, especially from South Africa, were drawn into the process of colonizing the Ndebele and the Shona territories as "collaborators" in what was essentially a white political enterprise. In the long run, these foreign Africans proved to be a somewhat problematic force insofar as the forging of effective,
ideologically integrated movements among the colonized African peoples of Southern Rhodesia as a whole was concerned.

Secondly, there also appeared in Southern Rhodesian African circles in the early part of the century a tendency for individual groups to preoccupy themselves inordinately with the pursuit of narrow particularistic interests. This development reflected several circumstances: the initial patron/client relationship that had existed between the white colonist community on the one hand and the African immigrants from the South on the other; the rise of social stratification within the subject African camp as a result of the process of economic differentiation; and lastly the emphasis that some of the African segmental groups placed on the protection of their economic and political interests by maintaining their corporate distinctiveness while at the same time revamping the symbolic formations that characterized their corporate ideologies.

The upshot was that those factors which could have encouraged positive, intensive group interaction and communication were stunted among the African subject peoples of Southern Rhodesia, whereas, on the other hand, informal interest grouping, often defined along social and cultural lines, emerged to foster intensive intergroup struggles over strategic positions of influence and power within the limited framework allowed them by the territory's colonial setting. Thus when the African nationalist movement of the 1950s and 1960s surfaced, it had to reckon with those constraints that had characterized and influenced the organizations of the pre-1930 phase in the country's social and political history. So far as the movements of protest of the pre-1930 period are concerned, perhaps their greatest flaw arises from the fact that they failed to overcome the obstacles associated with the colonial mechanisms and strategies in question. For its part, the modern African nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia inexorably took over an inheritance as dubious in value as the mythological golden apples of the Hesperides. Consequently one of this movement's main tasks was either to modify the existing political tradition or to cut itself adrift from the sociopolitical perspectives so closely linked with the organizations of the past.

THE LOYALIST TRADITION IN THE EARLY MOVEMENTS OF PROTEST

Colonial annexation through military conquest, as occurred in early Southern Rhodesia, posits a type of political pluralism whereby the colonizing class could maintain its position only through sheer domination, since the centrifugal factors underlying the societal structures of this kind of state are more pronounced than the centripetal ones. The authorities in Salisbury, Cape Town, and London who were responsible for the administration of Southern Rhodesia were certainly alive to the enormity of the problem of maintaining the security of the colony's white settlers, owing to their numerical inferiority and their vulnerability to physical attacks and challenges by insurgent subject elements. It became necessary not only to strengthen the defense mechanisms on which the white colonists had hitherto depended, but also to supplement those
foreign African auxiliary elements already in the country, notably the “black pioneers” who had served the new colony and their white patrons so well between 1890 and 1897 as a reliable labor force, as religious assistants and evangelists through which the white missionaries were able to reach the indigenous African peoples, and as military aides in the 1893 and 1896-1897 wars. These “black pioneers” from the South, who were later to be led, as an informal interest group, by John Hlazo and his son, Stephen, up to 1923, were accordingly supplemented by the “black settlers” of Chief Garner Sojini. In bringing into Southern Rhodesia this latter group, who were predominantly Mfengu in origin, the authorities concerned were to harp over and over again on the primacy of white security considerations in the post-1897 period. For instance, in April 1898, Frank Thompson of Rudd Concession fame, popularly known as “Matabele” Thompson, informed the potential Mfengu emigrants at Butterworth in the Transkei:

Now, do not misunderstand me, I am not going to take the Fingles [to Southern Rhodesia] to look at them. I want labour and I want defence. That’s all I want from them. Understand clearly. We do not love one another so much as to give land without any return.

J. W. Sauer, a prominent nineteenth-century Cape parliamentarian and politician, echoed “Matabele” Thompson’s views in his support of the scheme on Mfengu emigration to Southern Rhodesia. Sauer supported this scheme on the grounds that the Mfengu “... have always been loyal, and are most reliable people. In intelligence and education, of course, they are far in advance of the natives of [Southern] Rhodesia, and they could be relied upon, should unhappily any fresh difficulties [similar to the 1896-1897 uprisings] arise in [Southern] Rhodesia, to support law and order.” In Southern Rhodesia itself, the Mfengu immigration scheme and its relevance to white colonist security requirements were also seen in terms of the viability of adopting divisive strategies to fragment the subject African peoples. Thus one anonymous correspondent of the Bulawayo Chronicle, who was very much taken in by this divide-and-conquer approach to white colonial domination, commented in March 1898 that:

It must... be remembered that bringing [into Matabeleland] two or three fresh tribes would add to the security of the country. The whites hold Africa by the feuds between various native races, and if we have several thousand Zambesis and Shangaans the Matabele will remain quiescent.

Promoting African factionalism was certainly a bizarre method of achieving Pax Britannica in early Southern Rhodesia, but it nevertheless tallied with current administrative opinion over security matters in the colony.

The significance of the administrative policy adopted in Southern Rhodesia up to 1930 is the manner in which it crystallized the loyalist tradition within some of the African segmental groups. Those groups among the African immigrants from the South who had been introduced into Southern Rhodesia under the aegis of this scheme began increasingly to see their salvation as being closely wedded to their patron/client relationship with the dominant white
colonist society. This relationship is indeed strongly reflected in the various tenets of, for example, the “Fingo Agreement” entered into by “Matabele” Thompson and the Mfengu at Butterworth in the Transkei in April 1898. In categoric terms, those Mfengu clients who were committed to emigrating to Southern Rhodesia were promised land in the amount of 10 acres for every male immigrant above twenty-five years of age, free transportation of stock and personal effects to Southern Rhodesia, minimum official interference in Mfengu internal social and political organization, and restriction on liquor traffic in the areas in which these immigrants were settled. These concessions were granted in return for the services the emigrants were expected to render in the fields of labor and defense and, above all, for their loyalty to the white settler society in Southern Rhodesia. By implication, the Fingo Agreement was thus a package deal expressing some form of semi-institutionalized patron/client relationship based on short- and long-term mutual obligations on each side. In reality, it was a contractual instrument, hinged on strong elements of inequality between patrons and clients, but at the same time exciting certain visible forms of mutual solidarity and interpersonal attachment—this in spite of differences in interests and the combination of potential coercion and exploitation that the relationship also portended.

The political implications generated by both the Fingo Agreement itself and the patron/client relationship between the white colonists and the Mfengu immigrants are well captured in the sentiments of the immigrants themselves during the pre-1930 period. In their utterances, the Mfengu exhibited such an exaggerated degree of loyalty to the British South Africa Company’s administration in Southern Rhodesia that one can only marvel at the manner in which the patron/client relationship had achieved some success even from the beginning. Expressions of Mfengu ultra-loyalism to early Southern Rhodesian colonial authorities and institutions may be gleaned from contemporary utterances. For example, one William Mzinjane, a Bulawayo clerk who, in the course of his trial in March 1898 for forging himself a pass to purchase liquor, asserted that:

I am not a native of Matabeleland, but am a colonial native. I can boast of being a British subject before I was born [in April 1859]; in fact all and every one of the nation commonly called the Fingoes took the British yoke upon their necks at the first possible opportunity, and have ever since been loyal under the British rule; they never rebelled whatever.

Chief Nzimande Mbula Mndondo may be regarded as another paragon of the general endorsement by the Mfengu and related immigrant communities of the peculiar syndrome of domination and subordination to which these immigrants were subjected once they arrived in their country of adoption. Chief Nzimende, a former police sergeant of seventeen-years’ standing in the Cape, had unsuccessfully applied to join the staff of the Chief Native Commissioner in Bulawayo on coming to Matabeleland, but had instead been appointed the overall head of the Mfengu community at Bembe by 1905. Toward the end of 1909, when Lord Selborne, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, had visited Southern Rhodesia and had on this occasion apparently failed to
elicit the traditional "Bayete" royal salute from the Ndebele people, a favor which the High Commissioner thought he was naturally entitled to in his capacity as the regional representative of the British monarch, it was Chief Nzimende who made an offer to the British peer in a move that proved highly embarrassing even to the local colonial authorities. Conveying his own kind of exaggerated loyalty, Nzimende addressed the vexed British representative in the following manner:  

Bayete Nkosi,

...we [the Mfengu] feel very ashamed that at the meeting in Bulawayo the Matabele refused to salute you in the proper way. We were amazed at this that the High Commissioner was not saluted in the usual order as is done to every person of his rank.

We Fingoos are not in the same spirit as they [Matabele]. Our desire is that we should be let free from Pass Regulations.

The Fingoos are very small in number in this country [Southern Rhodesia] and are not friends of the natives of this country although we have never quarrelled with them or they with us.

Our only friend is the British Government who kept our Grandfathers and still looks after us, and treats us with good hands and whose mouth is full of love to us its children.

We beg to ask to be allowed to have guns that is every person of us whom his magistrate trusts.

As time went on, Nzimende persisted in his loyalist gimmickry and in the spirit of abject submissiveness to, and collaboration with, the colonial authority structure. Although most of this Mfengu leader's activities were undertaken in return for favors of one kind or another, at the same time they went a long way to demonstrate the special relationship that existed between the Mfengu immigrants and the white colonist community in Southern Rhodesia and the manner in which the relationship in question was manipulated by some interested parties. Thus when World War I broke out, Chief Nzimende in May 1915 forwarded two batches of Mfengu volunteers to Major A. J. Tomlison of the British South African Police for service in German East Africa (Tanganyika) as noncombatants. In Nzimende's view, and in accordance with true Mfengu loyalist tradition dating back to the beginning of the nineteenth century in the Cape, 23 the Mfengu volunteers in the 1914-1918 war expected to receive material rewards either from the British authorities or from the Southern Rhodesian government at the end of their period of service. 24 But contrary to those expectations, all that the Mfengu volunteers had gained by 1923 were such poor substitutes as the 1914-1915 Star and the British and Victory Medals awarded to most African participants. 25 This was indeed a far cry from the land grants that Nzemende and his followers had anticipated as of old.

Chief Nzimende's activities and the extremism with which he was associated also proved a disturbing factor insofar as Mfengu internal affairs were concerned. In the final analysis, a process of internal fragmentation of the Mfengu immigrant and related communities began to show up because of Nzimende's
actions. This is particularly true with regard to the stance taken by Chief Nzimende toward the protracted Ntabazinduna land dispute between John Hlazo’s “black pioneers” and the B.S.A. Co. At the height of the dispute, between 1917 and 1923, Nzimende had apparently become so fed up with the “black pioneers” that he came out openly in favor of the Southern Rhodesian Administration against his own kinsmen. In mid-1918 Nzimende and his supporters denounced not only the cause of the “black pioneers” on the grounds that “...there [was] no [land] title that was given to them that they may use it today,” but also the manner in which the aggrieved Hlazo camp was operating. Hlazo’s followers had antagonized Chief Nzimende through the invitation they had made to Alfred Mangena, the Zulu lawyer based in Johannesburg, and the nocturnal meetings that they organized for the purpose of collecting subscriptions to the Mangena fund. From Nzimende’s point of view, the activities of the “black pioneers” and their sympathizers could only be interpreted as “a danger to the peace of the [Mfengu] community...” and therefore deserved to be discouraged.

In retaliation, Hlazo’s “black pioneers” and their supporters threatened to burn down the home of the ultra-loyalist Mfengu leader, particularly when their legal adviser, Mangena, was declared a prohibited immigrant by the Southern Rhodesian authorities and subsequently deported. For his part, Mangena wrote Nzimende a long letter, worth quoting at length, admonishing the latter over his transgressions.

I am now leaving [Southern] Rhodesia for Johannesburg having been found by the Administrator to be a prohibited immigrant.

Having been in terms of friendship with you during my stay here [at Bembezi], I feel that I must thank you for all your kindnesses and valuable advices freely rendered. And on the other hand, I am sure, you have appreciated my warning you against concealment of true character, especially in matters of great importance, even in small things. You are placed as I said before in a position of implicit trust by the authorities and, I am sure you will, I hope, never abuse it. One thing I have heard (among other things) which I think as a friend I must tell you. It may not be true, but at all events you must know it. It is said that you are going about telling the [white] farmers [at Bembezi] that you are against the Fingo Land Claim, if that is the case, knowing you as well as I do, it would be putting them [the white farmers] in a false position. I am told that even the white police (I heard nothing about the Government) you are making them to understand that you are opposing the movement of the Fingoes: that is feigning to be what one is not: I do not think for a moment my friend, if the Government find you as such would tolerate you a bit. Speak out, as a man considering the implicit trust imposed upon you by those who hired your services. Dangling between two stools to my opinion is a fallacy, and [an] incurable disease. Your kind information as to the boundaries of the Fingo land given to them by Cecil Rhodes and your acknowledgement of the quarantine [line of 1906], these are very valuable to me. Lastly the way in which you were so candid in explaining to the [Mfengu] people their legitimate claim. The only drawback is you personally, you are [hiding] behind the bush. However diplomacy is useful sometimes.
With the expulsion of Mangena from Southern Rhodesia in August 1918, Chief Nzimende may have won his day but his victory was both costly and short-lived. The rift Nzimende's actions produced within the Mfengu community was difficult to repair. In the long run, this neo-traditional leader began to lose his credibility among his own people. In fact, so serious was the rift that by 1921, when Prince Arthur of Connaught, the High Commissioner for South Africa, visited Southern Rhodesia, the Mfengu communities of Bembesi and Selukwe refused to include the ultra-loyalist leader in the delegation that was to wait on the royal British representative. Only the intervention of the Department of Native Affairs saved Nzimende from the consequent embarrassment.30

Yet Nzimende, like the Bourbons of nineteenth-century France, never learned anything from the mistakes wrought by his own antics. He persisted with his old game. For example, he extended lavish expressions of gratitude to the Department of Native Affairs in connection with the relief provided to the African communities during the devastating 1922 famine,31 and also, in April 1923, requested the authorities concerned to allow the Mfengu residents at Bembesi to form a local council of their own. Because of the commendation that Nzimende repeatedly won from the Southern Rhodesian authorities, it may be argued that his activities in the early 1920s constituted different components of the swan song of a loyalist of outstanding pedigree. Indeed, the official acknowledgement in June 1921 that Nzimende was "a most intelligent, loyal and able chief..."32 as well as the invitation extended to him in October 1923 to attend, along with other African chiefs, a ceremony welcoming the first governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Chancellor,34 may be viewed as marking the fruition of the special relationship that was forged between the leader of the Mfengu community and his colonist patrons for their mutual benefit.

However, the activities of Mzinjane and Chief Nzimende should not be viewed in isolation insofar as their place in the general progression of African social and political perspectives in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia is concerned. Even within the context of the Mfengu and associated African immigrant circles, Mzinjane and Chief Nzimende can only be regarded as individuals who took the opportunity to express, on a personal basis, some fundamental features of the then existing patron/client relationship that bound together the white colonist society and the African immigrants from the South in Southern Rhodesia. The loyalist sentiments of the two luminaries quoted above may have differed only in degree from those of their fellow men; otherwise they were generally shared by a large proportion of the African émigrés from the South.

It may be pertinent to observe that most African émigrés from the South were quite prepared to don a loyalist mantle in one form or another as the most effective approach in dealing with the Southern Rhodesian Administration, once their corporate political and economic interests were under pressure. The "black pioneers," an informal but highly effective pressure group led by the Hlazo Between 1898 and 1923, provide the best example. As early as January 1898, just before Hlazo moved from the Wesleyan Methodist mission station at Tegwani to take over the leadership of the "black pioneers" at Bembesi, a
meeting was convened by these people in the Bulawayo Location (now called Makokoba Township) under the leadership of David Magunya, then Acting Chairman, and George P. Mpondo, Acting Secretary. The aim of the meeting, it appears, was “to petition… the Authorities of Bulawayo with reference to the rights [the ‘black pioneers’] ought to enjoy as loyal subjects of Her Majesty [Queen Victoria].” Indeed, in the view of Henry Mangesana, a veteran of both the 1893 and 1896/1897 Wars, the whole issue of “the privileges [the black pioneers] ought to enjoy as British subjects” was incontrovertible because:

It is well known that there are large tracts of country given to people in the colony of the Cape during the Kaffir [Xhosa Wars. And although we [the “black pioneers”] have done the same for the Chartered Company [B.S.A. Co.], yet we are deprived of the privileges we, as loyal subjects of Her Majesty, ought to enjoy.

The tendency to project the part they had played in the wars of “pacification” between 1893 and 1897 in early Southern Rhodesia as irrefutable proof of their loyalty to the British cause, and then to draw comparisons between Southern Rhodesian colonial proceedings and those of the Cape before 1878 when African collaborators had often gained tremendous material rewards, was a technique which the “black pioneers” and their fellow émigrés were to exploit repeatedly with great skill. In 1905, for example, Jeremiah Hlazo, the eldest son of John Hlazo, wrote the Salisbury authorities at the behest of his father on matters relating to the granting of land titles to the “black pioneers.” In the process, the young Hlazo also took the opportunity to remind the authorities in question that he too had taken an active part in suppressing the Ndebele rising in 1896, during the course of which he had done “… all his best… fighting for the [B.S.A. Co.] Government [and] was wounded on the left arm and on the left leg…” By 1916, when the Hlazo pressure group had been introduced to the Aborigines Protection Society through the medium of Alick Brade, a Bulawayo white colonist who sympathized with this humanitarian body, Hlazo once more emphasized the relationship between African immigrant loyalty and material rewards in the form of land grants which such loyalty deserved. In April 1916 he informed the Reverend John Harris, Organizing Secretary of the A.P.S., that:

…the [land] we are claiming [the whole of Thabazinduna area] was given as a reward by the Government [of Southern Rhodesia] for the services rendered during the Matabele Wars. We are pioneers who came here [to Southern Rhodesia] before the Fingo immigration [in 1898].

a) Some of us fought against the Matabele in the [first] Matabele war of 1893.

b) Some of us also took part in the Matabele rebellion of 1896.

c) We again took part in the Mashona rebellion of 1897. Some of our men were killed during these wars, and my son Jeremiah Hlazo was also wounded. The men who fought in these wars were asked to appoint one man as their leader or chief. They appointed me as chief and this appointment was sanctioned by the [Southern Rhodesian] Government.

In time, the activities of John Hlazo’s “black pioneers” were to influence great-

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ly the outlook of Chief Garner Sojini’s “black settlers.” In their interaction with the Southern Rhodesian authorities on the controversy arising from the boundaries of the Fingo location at Bembesi, the “black settlers” were also to resort to the technique of abundant expressions of loyalty to the colonial authorities as a way of either retaining or acquiring more land. The only difference between the Hlazo and the Sojini groups is that while the former based their loyalty to the colonial authority structure on their role in the colony’s early wars of conquest, the Sojini camp brought in Cecil Rhodes, the founder of the territory’s colonial society, as the fountain of their inspiration. This invoking of Rhodes and his influence as the basis of African immigrant loyalism was of course not at all misplaced. In fact, because Rhodes so forcefully represented the most sacred ideals of British imperialism in nineteenth century Southern Africa, it was inevitable that he should come to be regarded by the Mfengu, both below and beyond the Limpopo, not only as a personal friend, but also as a benefactor and godfather of the Mfengu people, especially those who were settled in Southern Rhodesia between 1898 and 1902. The persistence of this feeling within the Mfengu community up to more recent times in colonial Rhodesia is a clear indication of the depth of Mfengu loyalty to this historical figure.

Below the Limpopo, this extraordinary relationship between Rhodes and the Mfengu people is best gleaned from the statements of Captain Veldtman Bikitsa, the leader of Mfengu opinion in the Cape, when in May 1897 he welcomed Rhodes from an overseas trip.

I am glad to hear . . . that you [Rhodes] have returned from Europe. My son has also written to tell me about your arrival.

The great thing I wish to put before you is the survey of Fingoland. We Fingoes of Butterworth [Transkei] are one in wishing the survey to take place. I know that you are the Greatest friend and father of the Fingoes to help them on this survey question.

We Fingoes are in one feeling with [the Cape] Government to have . . . Fingoland surveyed. . . . The survey will enable the Fingoes to build the fence, cultivate their lots in full trust that [they] belong [entirely] to them; . . . But we would beg your kindness to see Sir Gordon [Sprigg, the Prime Minister] and help him. Because he told us that it was your thought and wish to make this good thing [land survey] for Native nations.

You will perhaps have heard that several deputations have been sent to Cape Town in the name of all Fingoes. It is not so. They are a few red heathen Headmen wishing for their old customs of their several wives and concubines.

Captain Bikitsa’s correspondence with Rhodes vividly reflects the evolution of a semi-institutionalized personal dyadic relationship in which a large degree of submissiveness and loyalty was required on the part of the Mfengu clients on the one hand, only to be counterbalanced by the personal patronage of the towering figure of Rhodes on the other. Indeed, so solid was the client/patron relationship between the Mfengu and Rhodes destined to become that when the Mfengu immigrants at Bembesi were seen by the authorities to
be behaving in a refractory manner, they were quickly reminded, in September 1899, that Rhodes would not be pleased by their behavior.\textsuperscript{44} To strengthen this godfather image of the founder of Southern Rhodesia's colonial society, the Mfengu immigrants were also assured that their immigration scheme was a move undertaken as "absolutely a work of love" for them.\textsuperscript{45}

It was against this background that the loyalism of the "black settlers" of Sojini asserted itself on the Southern Rhodesian pre-1930 social and political scene. Accordingly, in April 1916 the "black settlers" complained to the A.P.S. over what they saw as a systematic campaign by the Southern Rhodesian government to undo what Rhodes had done for them by depriving them of access to tenure over all the land originally bought for them at Bembei, Nyamandhlolovu, and Matopo with what they called "his [Rhodes'] own private money."

In the opinion of the "black settlers," the Southern Rhodesian government had, since the death of Rhodes in 1902, set out to deliberately swindle the Mfengu and other immigrants. For this reason, Sojini narrated to Rev. Harris the story of Mfengu woes, pointing out that: \textsuperscript{47}

After we had arrived in [Southern] Rhodesia the Boer War [1899-1902] then broke out and the Chief Native Commissioner [for Matabeleland] said to us "you better remain here [at] Bembei and not go to the other lands [Nyamandhlolovu and Matopo] at present. You are still few," and so we remained according to his word.

Since the B.S.A. Co. authorities would not accept the fact that the Mfengu aggregation at Bembei was not the wish of these immigrants, but instead wanted to use what was originally a simple historical accident as a convenient excuse for denying these immigrants further land grants, Sojini and his followers demanded in more emphatic terms that "We... want all our lands as we forfeited all our lands at the Cape Colony and Mr. Rhodes had told us that these lands would never be taken away from us and that they would be the inheritance of our children." The petitioners continued, "We left our lands and privileges [in the] Cape Colony as it was said we were purchased lands here in [Southern] Rhodesia by the late Mr. Rhodes." \textsuperscript{48}

Ultra-loyalism, whether it was based on participation in the wars of conquest and "pacification" as in the case of the "black pioneers" or on Rhodes' personal patronage as in the case with the "black settlers," may have been logical within the context of the pursuit of certain particularistic interests. But at the same time it had fundamental implications for the history of social and political organization in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia. It should be stressed, for instance, that the proto-nationalist organizations in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia unwittingly caught the loyalist contagion of such earlier pressure groups. The very fact that most of these proto-nationalist bodies were also dominated either by the black émigrés from the South or by their Southern Rhodesian-born descendants could only strengthen the sentimental connection between these two distinct fronts for African organizational articulation. It is within these parameters that the activities of organizations such as the Union Bantu Voters'
Association (U.B.V.A.), the Union Native Voters Association (U.N.V.A.), the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association (R.B.V.A.) and the Rhodesia Native Association (R.N.A.), to name only a few, operated.

A month after the U.B.V.A. had been formed in February 1914, it began to call for the exemption of its predominantly South African immigrant members from the general run of Southern Rhodesia's pass legislation and for the provision of better railway facilities for third class passengers on the grounds that most U.B.V.A. members had rendered loyal service during the Anglo-Ndebele War (1898) and the Shona/Ndebele risings (1896-1897) and therefore merited such consideration. In due course, the U.B.V.A. was to confirm its loyalist mould and convince the authorities in Salisbury and Bulawayo that, like Hlazo's "black pioneers" and Sojini's "black settlers," it was more a toy than a threat to the fundamentals of colonial authority structure. The fact that it was to receive official commendation over its constitution and procedural matters (as happened when W. S. Taberer, the Superintendent of Natives for Salisbury, concluded in March 1914 that the U.B.V.A.'s affairs were "reasonable and in order") could only strengthen both the loyalist and the impotent aspects of this organization. To live up to this image, the U.B.V.A. was sooner or later to become preoccupied with such trivia as permission for Africans to walk on pavements in urban centers, irritations arising from the nightly curfews in the African urban areas, the wearing of hats by Africans in public places, and the charging of lodging for visitors by the municipal authorities in the African locations. As a matter of fact, the Salisbury and Bulawayo authorities were encouraged to assume an increasingly paternalistic attitude in their dealings with the U.B.V.A. For this reason, H. M. G. Jackson, the Superintendent of Natives for Bulawayo, reporting to his superiors in Salisbury after a meeting he had held with the U.B.V.A. executive in June 1922, outlined what he had told the delegation in question with regard to their grievances.

... Europeans occupied a superior position to them [Africans] similar to that of teachers of children, and that there was no humiliation in showing respect [to Europeans]; that the law called upon them to show respect to officials [and] superiors; that the lack of acknowledgement of salutes [by the whites] was probably due to the Zulu system by which salutes are not customarily acknowledged.

The U.N.V.A., which appears to have operated as the Salisbury opposite number of the Bulawayo-based U.B.V.A., operated within a similar praxis. But the U.N.V.A. did not confine itself to the general trivia with which the U.B.V.A. was so closely associated. As it demonstrated in April 1917, the U.N.V.A. included in its purview such subjects as World War I, over which it took the opportunity to express its faith in the British imperial cause.

We have... a few words to say to you [Taberer] Sir, with regard to the present war, in which our [British] Empire has taken part. England, as far as we have read from the papers... [has] entered the war for the protection of the weak ones, and in this war she is right. We therefore hope that she may be victorious in this just war on her part. We hope that the Living God may hasten the Victory on our [British] part.
By the early 1920s, when the African émigrés from the South who had hitherto dominated Southern Rhodesia’s proto-nationalist organizations began to blend with both indigenous and quasi-indigenous elements in these movements, the loyalist posture had already established itself as the most fashionable approach in dealing with government officials. In this context, it is easier to appreciate the assertions of the R.B.V.A. (formed in 1923 as a broader front replacing both the U.B.V.A. and U.N.V.A.) and the R.N.A. and the Mandebele Patriotic Society (also known as the Loyal Mandebele Society or Ilhlo Lo’muzi). Although the loyalist perspectives of the R.B.V.A. may easily be rationalized in terms of its political ancestry, the same could not be said with respect to the R.N.A. and the Mandebele Patriotic Society. These organizations, with a mixture of both black émigrés or their descendants and indigenous elements in their leadership, reflected the extent to which the influence of the African émigrés from the South had seriously pervaded various African circles in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia. To verify this statement, it is perhaps pertinent to identify the loyalist trend in the activities of, for example, the Mandebele Patriotic Society as early as mid-1916 when it demonstrated its faith in the British imperial cause by lamenting the death of Lord Kitchener, the leader of the British military forces in World War I. The Manderbele Patriotic Society informed the Southern Rhodesian government that:

We, the members of the Mandebele Patriotic Society, mourn on account of this calamity which has descended upon the nation with regard to the warrior of warriors, the fighter who made war with weapons, whose days have been numbered and whose guidance of our [British] armies will be remembered by whites and blacks.

We pray that Providence will give us another leader who will direct our forces until the end.

The boot-licking attitude of the Mandebele Patriotic Society as an expression of its loyalist sentiments was by no means confined to matters related to the British imperial cause. Even in its dealings with the B.S.A. Co. officials, this organization went all the way to appease such officials as a way of promoting its objectives. Thus when Jackson had agreed to hold an interview with a delegation of “about nine earnest young men” from the Mandebele Patriotic Society in January 1916 and also forwarded to the higher authorities in Salisbury their grievances concerning general African moral decay and the spread of venereal diseases and prostitution involving white males and African women in Matabeleland, this society openly extolled the virtues of the Bulawayo Superintendent of natives in the following manner:

The Nkosi [Jackson] may not believe it if we say that we lack a sufficient number of mouths to thank the Nkosi for this thing he has done for us in forwarding our letters [of grievances] to the Government. We thank the Administrator for the tidings that he had already seen the evil that exists among the black people. Let him not [be] weary in his care, for a child is always soothed in his troubles by his father. We ask the Nkosi to present our great thanks to the Administrator for the great thing he has done for us [in] receiving the petition of us who are things so far beneath him... To the Gwadha Elimhlope li ka Jackson, who is our fountain
on which we rely for refreshment and rest — in you our fountain and shade — we
trust greatly that you will fight for us in all native affairs and troubles.

The ideological position of the R.N.A. was clearly demonstrated in January
1922 when it approached the Salisbury Administration for the exemption of its
members from carrying passes, arguing that by such a move the “Government
[would] teach the Natives to respect themselves before they [were] recognised
[as responsible people].” By August 1923, the R.N.A. was also requesting the
authorities that its members be invited “to see His Honour [F. D. Chaplin,
outgoing Administrator] and Lady Chaplin at the Government House
to bid them goodbye, . . .” prior to their departure in September of that year. In
view of such an attitude, it is not surprising that the government officials could
hardly utter a bad word against the R.N.A., which, in the view of the Chief
Native Commissioner, was accordingly classified as “a reputable organisation
that was largely “a nonpolitical body.”

Yet to understand the evolution and subsequent fruition of the loyalist tradition
within such quasi-indigenous organizations as the Mandebale Patriotic
Society and the R.N.A., we have also to bring into focus those attitudes and
beliefs that their leaders prized most. This is particularly true of such stalwarts
as Thomas Maziyane, the founding chairman of the Mandebale Patriotic Soci-
ety, and of Johannes Seroki Mokwile, the first president of the R.N.A. when it
was formed in 1922.

Maziyane was a Sotho immigrant in Matabeleland who had acquired some
measure of education and, through the job he held with the railways, had pur-
chased for himself a six-acre piece of land on the Tревance Plot near Bulawayo
that he shared with two other African landowners. To mark his progress in
social and economic mobility in Matabeleland, Maziyane on two occasions
married women of mixed race. He was easily assimilated into the Ndebele soci-
ety, apparently on the strength of that historical affinity which had developed
between the Sotho people and the formative Ndebele nation during the early
nineteenth century in the Transvaal. In any case, Maziyane was to make
the most of his relationship with the Ndebele, and it is reasonable to assume
that he was largely responsible for injecting a sizable dose of loyalism into the
proto-nationalist movements that emerged among the Ndebele. For instance,
Maziyane’s choral group, the Surprising Singers’ Association, consisting of six
female and nine male members of both South African and Matabeleland origin,
may be viewed as one of the instruments he used to promote loyalism among
the Ndebele. In mid-1917, Maziyane himself, as the choir’s conductor, applied
for permission from the authorities to tour the Salisbury-Shamva region of
Mashonaland, holding concerts here and there in order to “encourage and in-
crease the patriotic spirit of the natives towards helping the good cause of the
British Empire in every way.” The funds raised in the course of the tour
were in fact placed at the disposal of the African regiments then on military
duty in East Africa. Such a move was of course a practical demonstration of
the ideals that Maziyane and his choral group stood for, ideals that were also to
affect some circles of the people of Matabeleland, especially when Maziyane
assumed leadership of the proto-nationalist organizations of that province.
Like Maziyane, Johannes Mokwile was of Sotho origin. He was the son of Lucas Mokwile, a Sotho evangelist from the Transvaal who had arrived in Southern Mashonaland during the pre-colonial era to promote the missionary work of the Dutch Reformed Church there. Johannes Mokwile had been born at Madzivire, in the Chibi district of Mashonaland, in 1894. Subsequently he was educated at the famous London Missionary Society institution, Tiger Kloof, in the northern part of Cape Province. Perhaps because of his civil service job with the Department of Public Works, starting at Ndanga in Victoria where he was based in 1922, Mokwile had come to accept the racially stratified colonial society of Southern Rhodesia as a fait accompli. Moreover, he was much afflicted by the race complex syndrome and the social Darwinism which it implied, especially in terms of general racial interaction in the territory. Thus after a train journey between Gwelo and Fort Victoria in 1924 in the company of an Indian passenger who had apparently denounced the country’s African landowners for not using their landholdings effectively, particularly by hiring out these holdings for rent in order to make a profit, Mokwile became spiteful of his own race. He declared that “... unless we [Africans] who live side by side with these white men resolve to depart from primitive conditions, progress is impossible.” He wanted to see the Africans “... move with the times, use their opportunity, talk less [and] work more.” He particularly disapproved of the educated Africans of the Tengo Jabavu stamp, then advocating for African participation in the political processes of their respective countries, whom he called men of “extravagant talk ... who [made] leadership their only profession.” To Mokwile, the African’s salvation lay only in hard work and Christianity and not in aping white men, as he suspected educated Africans were then doing. With a leader like this, the loyalism of the R.N.A. needed no further blessing.

FAITH IN CHRISTIAN SOLUTIONS
IN EARLY PROTEST MOVEMENTS

But loyalism was not the only heritage that the protest movements were to inherit from the black émigrés in the pre-1930 period. Another was the belief in Christian solutions as the proverbial open sesame to the whole gamut of problems that affected the African subject peoples of Southern Rhodesia at the time.

This heritage should be seen against a background of Mfengu numerical dominance among the immigrants discussed in this work. The Mfengu had since the early nineteenth century operated within a framework of collaboration with the white forces of conquest and change in the Cape, including both white colonists and missionaries. Indeed, the role of the missionaries in introducing the Mfengu into a maze of white colonist economies, ideals, and values is highly significant. In due course, these people responded massively not only to the opportunities and incentives provided by the colonial market economy of the Cape, but also to the process of social development which the missionaries then nursed especially through the encouragement of peasant agriculture.66

From the Mfengu point of view, the developments ushered in by the
missionaries were positive in every way. In addition to embarking on a process of capital accumulation, the Mfengu were enabled to improve and recast a new self-image since their so-called “liberation” from Xhosa patronage in 1835. Thus in the end the Mfengu, like the Creoles of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Sierra Leone, began to idealize their association with everything that Britain and its colonial agencies stood for. They tended to identify themselves with the aims of British imperialism in the African subcontinent and were often wont to rationalize such empathy in terms of their gratitude for what the British had done for their Mfecane-riven ancestors in the first half of the nineteenth century. From another angle, they simply basked in the perception that the missionaries and anthropologists had conceived in the Mfengu’s role as an important arm of British colonial expansion in Southern Africa as well as being living examples of the success of British “civilizing” endeavors in that part of Africa. For the white colonists of Southern Rhodesia, this general view of the Mfengu people was a source of comfort when these people were imported into the country at the close of the nineteenth century. However, what worried some Southern Rhodesian colonial officials was the possibility that through emphasizing the labor value of these new immigrants, the colonial employers were risking the danger of reinforcing the already inflated Mfengu self-image and therefore of creating problems for undisputed white domination in the territory. For example, in October 1898 P. A. Stuart, the highly negrophobic Natal-born Acting Native Commissioner of the Bubi district of Matabeleland, had queried the whole ethos of the Mfengu immigration scheme:

Why should we import Fingoes [into Southern Rhodesia]—give them good fertile land to live on, and in other words, bribe them to come and live here?

They are good workers I am told, but won’t they be a nuisance, knowing as they must do, how highly their labour will be valued here?

Stuart was partly right in terms of Mfengu self-image and the manner in which it impeded smooth social interaction with the other African subject peoples of that colony. From the beginning, African émigrés elements from the South had gone out of the way not only to project their inflated self-image in their dealings with the indigenous Africans of Southern Rhodesia, but also to protect their corporate social, economic and political interests against the invasion of the latter. In this instance, both religion and marriage were employed deliberately to foster individual group distinctiveness and ideologies and thus to exaggerate those sociocultural factors that divided the two groups. On the one hand, Christianity was used by the black émigrés as an informal mechanism whereby religious beliefs were manipulated as a divisive strategy. On the other hand, marriage became a strategy for intensifying internal distinctiveness. Exogamy was often discouraged in favor of endogamy and homogamy (marriage between equals), particularly within the African immigrant community from the South.

Before the 1896/1897 war, those African émigrés from the South who had come into early Southern Rhodesia especially as missionary assistants and
agents were, with a few exceptions, noted for their social exclusiveness. They remained alienated and marginal to the indigenous African communities of the territory, and because they were wont to assume the cultural arrogance of their white compatriots, most of these early émigrés were killed during the rebellion. Yet even after these traumatic events, some of the early African émigrés maintained the same social distance between themselves and the indigenous peoples as they had done before. Frank Ziqbub, a Zulu missionary aide in Mashonaland, is a good example. Ziqbub arrived with the Anglican missionaries in Mashonaland in 1891 but had not married by 1925 after 34 years’ stay in that province.

Ziqbub’s compatriots, the Zulu missionaries brought to work in the Melsetter district of Eastern Mashonaland with the American Board of Foreign Missions, provide another interesting illustration. Because of the sketchy educational and technical skills they had acquired in Natal before they came to Melsetter, they severely restricted all forms of social interaction between themselves and the Ndua (Shona) people of the area, particularly between 1888 and 1912. Indeed so rigid was this social stratification that when in 1912 a Ndua man married a daughter of one of the Zulu missionaries, the latter disparagingly compared the event to “pigs raiding a garden.” Elsewhere in the Shona areas, similar restrictions prevailed. In the Selukwe district, for example, a Mfengu immigrant to the area, Stephen Silwana, took great offense when in 1912 his daughter, Flora Silwana, was made pregnant by John Chidoda, a Karanga (Shona) man of the same area. In a subsequent civil suit brought by the father, Stephen Silwana made great play of the class differences between himself and Chidoda as the basis of his refusal to allow the marriage declared:

I am a Fingo and a Christian. I am not prepared to allow the Defendant [Chidoda] to marry my daughter. I told him I would not allow him to do so. . . . I am a Registered Voter in this District [Selukwe]. I hire 150 morgen of land in this District from Willoughby’s [Company] at £4.50 p.a. I have 38 head of cattle and two wagons. My father was a Christian. I can read and write. I take in a newspaper. The Defendant is [Karanga]. I was a Telegraph Messenger at Gwelo for several years.

The class aspect underlying the dispute is clearly portrayed in the evidence of John Pidcock Ngono, another Mfengu immigrant in the Selukwe district, who stated in his support of Silwana’s claims against Chidoda that “the lobola usually claimed [by the Mfengu] from a person of low standing [for marrying one of their daughters] is from 20 to 30 head of cattle,” whereas in the case of intramfengu marriages, the charge was usually “ten or eight head of cattle” only.

On a collective level, the U.N.V.A., as a front whose task it was to articulate the interests of the South African black émigrés in Southern Rhodesia, was actively concerned by the problem of intermarriage between its members and the local Shona people. In 1917 it appealed to the government for legal measures to curb such occurrences, informing the Salisbury authorities that “...our people [are] marrying Mashona girls, and at the same time when they go home
[to South Africa] cannot go with them, because parents at home cannot allow them, on any account. We therefore do not see the use of marrying a girl who cannot be accepted at home.”75 In Matabeleland, such self-imposed restrictive norms in the field of group social interaction might have been operational, but they were less pronounced, as Chief Nzimende and his followers at Bembesi indicated in November 1923.76 This mood of more relaxed social relations between the Ndebele and the black émigrés from the South was obviously associated with factors of cultural and historical import which intruded now and again on the sociopolitical scene.77

The manipulation of marriage by the black émigrés from the South as a symbolic strategy for maintaining group exclusiveness of course had some salient religious overtones in its application. But at the same time there were occasions when Christianity per se was employed by these people, not only as a demonstration of their faith in Christian solutions, but also to promote their specific objectives. This was especially true, for instance, with respect to the “black pioneers” of John Hlazo and the “black settlers” of Chief Sojini. Thus when the Hlazo group of immigrants was locked in a struggle with the Southern Rhodesian Administration over the Ntabazinduna land issue, Stephen Hlazo pointed out, in an interview with the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury in May 1913, that his father, John Hlazo, and his followers would not accept living in the Ntabazinduna reserve under the control of Chief Mhangwa, the Ndebele traditional leader of the area, because “they did not like the idea of being placed under a heathen Chief who held different ideas from the Christian Fingoes,” adding that “John Hlazo [himself] was a gospel preacher and had always behaved himself.”78

Stephen Hlazo’s view was of course quite in harmony with that of Angus Fletcher, the lawyer of the “black pioneers,” who had previously advised the elder Hlazo to move from the disputed Ntabazinduna area to the Belingwe district as the most convenient way of solving his ongoing conflict with the B.S.A. Co. authorities. Yet in spite of this advice, Fletcher himself was well aware of the difficulties the move to Belingwe would involve, owing to the ideological incompatibilities between the Hlazo people and the Shona communities of the Buhwa region in Belingwe Reserve No. 2. For this reason, Fletcher had alerted the Native Department officials in Bulawayo at the end of 1912 to the effect that:79

You will remember, however, that this man [John Hlazo] and his people are considerably in advance of the local raw Native in point of education and civilization generally [and] in addition they have been for years converts of Christianity with strong religious beliefs and it is these very facts that make his relationship with a raw heathen chief extremely difficult if not impossible.

In early 1916, when Hlazo had been given a choice by the Southern Rhodesia government either to move into the nearby Fingo location and place himself under Chief Nzimende or to remain in the adjacent Ntabazinduna area but under Chief Mhangwa, one studious observer in Downing Street had, without any proper understanding, supported Hlazo’s ideological objections by
asserting that "...it is difficult not to sympathise with a semi-civilized Christian who, having settled down where he was told and having enjoyed 'independence' for 12 years, is moved... because he objects to make a choice between two heathen savages [Mhangwa and Nzimende] as master."\textsuperscript{80}

For their part, the "black pioneers" themselves strongly stressed this Christian connection whenever the opportunity arose. For example, at the beginning of 1916, when the A.P.S. had undertaken to pursue the cause of these immigrants at the highest official level, John Hlazo was quick to point out his side of the Ntabazinduna land dispute to this Christian body in a language that was highly appropriate for the consumption of its members.\textsuperscript{81}

I showed him [the Native Commissioner, Inyati] the sketch that was given to me by the [Southern Rhodesian] Government, and I said, At the beginning God created heaven and earth and created one man. God gave the sketch the Garden of Eden. He fixed a law that this man should not break. This man broke the law of God. When God came he removed him from the Garden that he gave him. Adam went away for he found that [it] was true that he [had] broken the law of God.

I would like to know which law did I break under the Government? Because when this land was given to me [in 1898] I was told that nothing would trouble me unless I rebel against the Government.

Again, when in early 1921 the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland sent its deputies to Southern Rhodesia, Stephen Hlazo (who had succeeded his father as the leader of the "black pioneers") seized the chance to bring the land problem of his followers to the attention of this church as well. Since most of his followers had currently become members of Isabe Yase Scotland, as this particular denomination was then called at Bembesi,\textsuperscript{82} the younger Hlazo was quick to emphasize that the attitude of the Southern Rhodesia government was seriously hampering the progress of the church amongst the "black pioneers."\textsuperscript{83} In this manner, Stephen Hlazo effectively put the Free Presbyterian Church onto a warpath against the Salisbury authorities for the sake of his followers.

In any case, it should be noted that just as the loyalist sentiments of the black émigrés generally had exercised great influence on the proto-nationalist organizations of the 1910s and 1920s in Southern Rhodesia, so also did those symbolic strategies on marriage and religion which the black émigrés from the South resorted to during the same period. These symbolic formations considerably sharpened the particularist trend in the South African immigrant circles in Southern Rhodesia, with the result that when the early movements of protest emerged under the direction of these same elements, they inexorably adopted an exclusivist rather than a hegemonic posture. This is certainly true of the activities of the U.B.V.A., the U.N.V.A., and the R.B.V.A. for instance.

Under the influence of the black émigrés to tighten those boundaries that marriage and religion defined as existing between them and the local African peoples, the quasi-political associations that appeared in the 1910s and 1920s used for their purposes the same trivia: exemption from passes; entrenchment of rights of African voters;\textsuperscript{84} removal of hats by all Africans in the
presence of white colonists; walking on pavements in urban areas; better railway passenger facilities; and provision of special prison clothing for certain African social classes. Owing to the belief that the black émigrés from the South were a veritable middle class within the African circles of Southern Rhodesia and therefore deserved special treatment from the authorities, the U.B.V.A. in early 1914 appealed to the officials concerned, calling not only for the exemption of its members from passes, but also for the improvement of the lot of those among them who were capable of paying for third class tickets on the trains.⁶⁵

By 1922, the grievances of the U.B.V.A. had hardly changed either in substance or tone. The U.B.V.A. worried about moral decline among the African women in the urban areas, an issue that was of vital importance for the black émigrés, since direct control over the marital affairs of their women essentially guaranteed the survival of their distinctiveness as a group. It showed concern in the railway travel aspect once more, arguing that the waiting room facilities provided for African passengers were inadequate and basically “suitable for the use of [Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau] natives [only]. . . .” Hence the U.B.V.A. called for the provision of new and better travel facilities to suit Africans of a “superior and progressive class. . . .”⁶⁶ Similarly, the organization appealed once more for the exemption of its members from the rigors of the pass legislation, pointing out that “The privileges of this pass [exemption] should be extended to all natives from the Union of South Africa as they are, in almost all cases, comparatively educated men.”⁶⁷

But it was on the question of the provision of special prison clothing for its members that the U.B.V.A. was hard pushed to justify its exclusivist posture. The U.B.V.A. totally disapproved of the ordinary hempen wear issued to those of its members required to serve some time in prison. In June 1922, its Bulawayo branch accordingly appealed to Jackson, the Superintendent of Natives for the Bulawayo division, stressing how proud the black émigrés from the South were of their status as a class apart from other African subjects in Southern Rhodesia, even under the somewhat humiliating circumstances that imprisonment entailed. “We natives from the South are accustomed to wear European clothing such as a shirt, coat, trousers, socks and boots. civilized offenders should not suffer this additional degradation.”⁶⁸ In dwelling on this prison issue as part of its campaign between 1914 and 1922, the U.B.V.A. was obviously ingratiating itself with its supporters, since this concern was indeed close to the hearts of the black émigrés in Southern Rhodesia. As far back as 1909, the Mfengu and the so-called “civilized natives” of Bulawayo had complained to Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner, on the same question. They objected strongly to the practice by the prison authorities of Southern Rhodesia of issuing to “civilized natives” “…a sort of calico dressing gown…like prisoners who [had] worn no clothing all their lives. . . .” These Mfengu and their compatriots then resident in Bulawayo wanted to see their kinsmen in prison provided with clothes “like a Cape Boy and not like a naked savage.”⁶⁹ a request that was considered “reasonable” at the time by Lord Selborne.⁷⁰ In due course, individuals of standing such as Moses Mfazi and Moses Maribi, two
Wesleyan Methodist ministers then working in Matabeleland, also expressed concern over the provision of what they considered a wrong type of dress to "civilized natives" in jails, which they alleged, in January 1922, to be the cause of pneumonia among prisoners.91

In the long run, even the Southern Rhodesian authorities succumbed to the demands for special clothing by the black émigrés and other educated Africans in case of their imprisonment. In succumbing to these demands, the authorities unwittingly gave official blessing to, and appreciation of, the value of special prison clothing as another symbol of the group distinctiveness of the black immigrants from the South. The part played by the Southern Rhodesian officials in this saga comes out quite clearly in the circulars of various magistrates in response to the U.B.V.A. demands on this issue in mid-1922. In Salisbury, for instance, prisoners from the indigenous African communities and the trans-Zambesian labor migrants were given "canvas garments" for their wear, whereas the treatment of the "natives from the Union" was admittedly different.92 In Fort Victoria, a higher clothing scale was issued to "... quasi-civilized natives which [included] all colonial [Cape] born natives, Somalis and others, who [had] been used by their own customs to [wear] clothes only." A standard of education, based on "the requirement of some other language rather than their [the African prisoners'] own; coupled with a refinement of habit alien to most of the negroid races inhabiting equatorial Africa,"93 was also required for an African prisoner to qualify for the special prison clothing.

In short, special prison clothing served the same function as exemption from passes, licenses to possess firearms and cartridges, acquisition of land by purchase and retaining it on the basis of individual tenure, and the right to vote, to name only a few of those symbolic formations that were highly regarded by the black émigrés. These badges of status defined the dimensions of the special interest group to which the black émigrés belonged and also determined the informal social structures within the African subject circles on the basis of which the distribution of social, political, and economic privileges was supposed to be undertaken.

INFLUENCE OF BLACK ÉMIGRÉS ON EARLY PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Against this background, it is easier to appreciate the role played by the South African-oriented African associations in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia. The activities of the U.B.V.A. and the U.N.V.A. in particular laid down a framework within which kindred organizations later operated, especially during and after the 1920s. The U.B.V.A., the U.N.V.A. and the organizations they spawned were by no means polemical movements noted for their Africanist approach to the problems arising from the Southern Rhodesian colonial situation. Neither were they in any way comparable to the latter-day movements all over Africa that concentrated on issues of political control and on reforms in the existing land and labor policies in the colonial setting of the time.94 In fact, the members and leaders of the proto-nationalist organizations in pre-1930
Southern Rhodesia were virtually comedians in the theater of the absurd. The U.B.V.A. and the U.N.V.A. were, as has already been demonstrated, exclusivist organizational fronts geared toward articulating particular sectional interests and thus also toward seriously truncating the general African front in the colony. The R.B.V.A. and the R.N.A., the successors of the U.B.V.A. and the U.N.V.A., were for their part quite confused as to the nature of their modus operandi. They wavered between an exclusivist trend on the one hand and, especially in their dealings with non-African groups, a universalist approach on the other. In essence, these organizations were by no means representative of the aspirations of the ordinary African peoples of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

By the 1920s it had become evident that the proto-nationalist associations of Southern Rhodesia were also significantly influenced by the political traditions associated with the early African National Congress and related bodies in South Africa. This is well reflected in the political philosophy they adopted to put more emphasis on the universalist trend in their strategies and objectives and by so doing conform with the multiracial nature of Southern Rhodesia's colonial society of the time. This political philosophy was one of “Southern Rhodesianism,” which fitted very tightly with the “South Africanism” then operating below the Limpopo, and purported to achieve such ideals as the creation of a society advocating common citizenship for everybody irrespective of race, creed, or occupation. To achieve this goal, these early African leaders, nurtured in a quasi-Christian liberal tradition, hoped to influence the white colonists in the subcontinent to change their attitudes by appealing to what these leaders considered “to be [the] common Western values” they shared with the white colonists. In short, the members of Southern Rhodesia's African middle class that patronized the proto-nationalist organizations of the 1910s and 1920s in the colony were people who were seriously conditioned and inhibited by their simulated Western ways of life and thought, by their alienation from the African masses, and by their incredible faith in the implications of Christian liberal democracy. In the words of Fatima Meer, these early African leaders believed that “…the process of [social and political] evolution was working in their favour, that their problem was fundamentally one of appealing to the Christian and liberal conscience inherent in white men and of raising the living standards of Africans to accord with the Western values. They expected equality to follow as a matter of course once Africans attained required standards of education and [Western] civilization.”

The R.B.V.A., which was formed in March 1923, reflected in many ways the characteristics discussed above. It believed in a Christian solution to the problems not only of its members, but also those of the Southern Rhodesian composite colonial society in its entirety. For this reason, the preamble of the R.B.V.A. constitution stated, on behalf of its members, that “…we believe that only by means of industrial education, a test of Christianity our people will rise gradually in the scale of civilization and that religion must be fostered to grow as the true foundation of a man's character.” The association's motto was also revealing; its members were bound to “Honour all men, Love the Brotherhood, Fear God and Honour the King [George V of England].”
The "Southern Rhodesian" philosophy of the R.B.V.A. was actually more concretely demonstrated by the presence at its inauguration ceremony in Gwelo of white colonists, ranging from members of the Legislative Council to missionaries, as well as one delegate from the territory's Indian population. Because "Southern Rhodesianism" as a political philosophy implied that only those members of the African subject communities who had been tested and vetted were bound to qualify for inclusion in a process of political cooperation with the other racial groups of Southern Rhodesia's plural society, the U.B.V.A. did not forget to reassert the need, even during its inauguration, for promoting African education and the encouragement of their fellow men to register as voters. The R.N.A., which had been formed a year earlier than the U.B.V.A., said much the same things, with the addition of a large dose of ultraloyalism to the Establishment.

Owing to their political ideology and concern with their own self-image, the R.B.V.A., the R.N.A., and related organizations that were either a legacy of, or were still dominated by, the black émigrés from the South tended naturally to ally themselves with what they considered to be the best from the country's indigenous African population. This is particularly true with regard to Matabeleland, where the R.B.V.A. was most active. Here this organization found a natural ally in the Ndebele aristocracy and other members of the Ndebele neotraditional elite. The Ndebele aristocracy for instance boasted not only of its B.S.A. Co.-sponsored education in South Africa, at a time when even lowly elementary education was scarcely available in Southern Rhodesia, but also of the fact that it counted within its ranks several individuals who, as a prelude to vertical social mobility, had actually tasted the fruits of English life in the metropolitan country itself. Nguboyenja and Peter Lobengula are pertinent examples on this point.

Nguboyenja Lobengula had spent a part of his student life at Denstone College in England between 1907 and 1908 before he returned to Southern Africa in the wake of a difference of opinion between himself and the B.S.A. Co. concerning this Ndebele prince's career. Peter Lobengula, on the other hand, was the controversial "son" of the former Ndebele monarch and had apparently gone to England in 1899, in connection with a play on the pre-1893 Ndebele state staged during the great imperial jamboree, the Earls Court Exhibition. Thereafter, Peter Lobengula, popularly known as "Prince Lobengula," had lived in England and in 1901 had married an Irish woman. Until 1913, when he was unearthed by the Manchester Guardian, this Ndebele nobleman had for several years lived in Manchester and Salford, working as an ordinary collier at Agecroft Colliery, an occupation that was obviously responsible for the consumption from which he was suffering at the time and also the tuberculosis which had in turn afflicted all of his four children. Because of his condition, Peter Lobengula and his family remained heavily dependent on charity up to his death in November 1913 at the age of 38 years. The refusal of the officials in London, Cape Town, and Salisbury to recognize this errant Ndebele's claim was indeed largely responsible for his tragedy.

In Southern Rhodesia, however, the social standing of the Ndebele aristocra-
cy grew from strength to strength during the 1910s and 1920s. This state of affairs was obviously exacerbated by the activities and achievements of the sons of Njube Lobengula, Albert and Rhodes. The brothers had a number of factors in their favor so far as their relationship with the black émigrés from the South was concerned. First, they were born of a Mfengu mother, Njube Lobengula’s first wife whom he married in 1902 and who died in 1905. Second, because of their father’s banishment to the Eastern Cape, these two Ndebele princes had benefited greatly from the fairly good educational environment in which they were brought up and on the basis of which they were later able to claim some measure of recognition within the African social circles of Southern Rhodesia. For these reasons, it is not surprising that by the late 1920s the black émigrés in Matabeleland should have desperately sought an alliance with the grandsons of Lobengula, especially with Rhodes, the youngest.

Rhodes Lobengula was in every way the more enterprising and worldly-wise of the two sons of Njube by his first marriage. Toward the end of 1926, for instance, he applied for permission from the authorities in his district to open a school of his own at the Queen’s Location farm where he was living, near Lonely Mine. The application was refused on the grounds that Rhodes was too young and inexperienced for the task. The authorities were also worried about the already inadequate European supervision for African schools in general, and moreover they were not convinced that Rhodes Lobengula, who had just opened a shop for himself, could adequately divide his time between the proposed school and his private commercial venture. Perhaps as a consolation, the Salisbury officials instead renewed their offer for the young Ndebele prince to teach at Domboshava, near Salisbury, a post Rhodes had himself applied for earlier, stressing the fact that he preferred to teach in a government school rather than in a mission school. Dissatisfied by the state of affairs in the teaching field and in the bureaucracy allied with it, Rhodes decided to immerse himself more deeply in the business world. To this end he applied, in 1927, for a five-year allowance advance from the Southern Rhodesia government to supplement his savings from the Queen Losikeyi estate. With these funds he intended to set himself up as a “General Dealer and Eating House Keeper” in Kimberley in the Cape Province. Albert Lobengula, on the other hand, was more concerned with recovering what still remained of the Lobengula estate, especially the former Ndebele royal herds. In this way, Albert was overshadowed by his younger brother.

Rhodes Lobengula’s spirit of enterprise, his versatility, and above all his invaluable role as a champion of the African modernizing element in pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia inevitably captured the attention not only of his Ndebele followers, but also of the black émigrés from the South. Accordingly, by 1930 both the Ndebele National Home Society (known also around Bulawayo as the Ilihlo Lo’muzi) and the R.B.V.A. were determined to recruit Rhodes to the ranks of leadership in their respective associations—in the former as Secretary General and in the latter as Chairman. In view of the growing popularity of Rhodes Lobengula in Matabeleland, it may perhaps have been justifiable for the
Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Cecil Rodwell, to have concluded as he did in a secret communication to the Dominions Office at the beginning of 1931 that.¹⁰⁹

Of the surviving descendants of Lobengula, Rhodes is the only one who appears to exercise any influence or to be likely to cause the [Southern Rhodesian] Government trouble. Albert, the brother, . . . is employed in the Native Department and, although he is not entirely trusted, does not seem to be politically inclined. Rhodes has a second brother who resides in the Union [of South Africa] and is believed to be out of touch with Rhodesian affairs. He also has two surviving uncles, Sitesjwia and Ngubezenja [Nguboyenja], but neither is of any account and the latter is mentally deficient.

But by the late 1920s the political situation in Southern Rhodesian was changing rapidly. This was evident in the volte face within the official circles toward associations led by the black émigrés who were by then accused of preaching the doctrine of “Africa for the Africans” associated with the African National Congress and with the growing trend of race consciousness among the blacks in South Africa.¹¹⁰ Consequently, there was in Salisbury a marked preference for indigenous-led African organizations. For this reason, the black émigrés were by then becoming aware, for the first time, of the new challenges they faced in their traditional role as the sole index of African modernizing influence in Southern Rhodesia. In Mashonaland, the R.B.V.A. was rapidly losing ground to the R.N.A., a motley clique of both semi-indigenous and indigenous African elements.¹¹¹ In Matabeleland, too, the Ndebele National Home Society was gradually growing in strength, a development that undoubtedly had its climax in the Bulawayo riots toward the end of 1929, in which the Home Society was said to have been the brains behind the mobilization of the Ndebele residents of that town and the surrounding area against the non-Ndebele peoples, especially the Shona, who lived there.¹¹²

Owing to these developments, the Bulawayo branch of the R.B.V.A. was compelled to abandon its particularist posture and to broaden its activities to include the grievances of the rural African masses. An example was the R.B.V.A. campaign in the Gwanda region, where the government was about to start systematic destruction of cattle at the beginning of 1930, as a precaution against the spread of East Coast Fever.¹¹³ For an organization that in the past had been so closely identified with exclusivist issues, the sudden change of emphasis was dramatic to say the least. But also it has to be viewed as an overt attempt by the R.B.V.A. to steal the limelight from the Ndebele National Home Society, which was then becoming a force to reckon with in Matabeleland. It was certainly against this background that Sir Rodwell aptly concluded in early 1931 that “The Home Society appears to have taken the place, as far as the Matabele are concerned, of the Rhodesia Bantu Voters’ Association, which included Fingoess as well as Matabele.”¹¹⁴ The struggle of the R.B.V.A. against the Ndebele National Home Society was obviously a battle by the black émigrés to maintain their position of influence not only in Matabeleland, but also in Southern Rhodesia at large. But by 1930, this end was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve.
In Mashonaland even the R.N.A., which comprised a number of African indigenous elements, failed to influence the lives of the African communities of the province. The reasons for this failure are manifold. In the first place, those historical and cultural factors that played an important role in creating rapport between the black émigrés and the Ndebele people were conspicuously absent in Mashonaland. Second, there was no traditional educated elite in pre-1930 Mashonaland with whom the elitist-black émigrés could have associated in their quest for modernization. This state of affairs had more to do with the nature of colonial rule in the Shona country than with anything else. Whereas in Matabeleland the Native Department encouraged the Ndebele chiefs to send their children to South Africa for education, in Mashonaland, its attitude was openly repressive and geared toward the mobilization of maximum labor supply. Finally, the manner in which the black émigrés had interacted with the people of Mashonaland before and after the 1896/1897 war was such as to rule out any pretense of harmony between them. Thus when organizations such as the U.B.V.A., the U.N.V.A., and the R.B.V.A. came into prominence on the Southern Rhodesia social and political scene in the 1910s and 1920s, they remained marginal and ineffectual in the Shona country.

In fact, the organizations that had some measure of influence in the Shona country were the sectarian religious bodies and the labor movement, which appear to have been dominated by the trans-Zambesian immigrants. But even these organizations had their limitations. Watch Towerism, for example, failed to produce any impact in those parts of Mashonaland where it appeared, notably on the mines and farms of the northern and central parts of the province, simply because of the faulty mechanics of its operation and its controversial doctrinal teachings which cut against the grain of Shona traditions and culture in those areas. The labor movement, in the form of the Industrial Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.), failed in turn because of the constraints generally associated with composite colonial societies. In this particular case, the restrictive nature of Southern Rhodesia's colonial rule was clearly manifested in the deportation of Robert Sambo, the founder of I.C.U. Yase Rhodesia in 1927, allegedly for creating disorder in the country, for spreading communism, for promoting Afro-American movements, and for embezzling I.C.U. funds.

On the other hand, the framework within which the trans-Zambesian-led organizations operated in the 1920s in Mashonaland was also restricted. The doctrinal prescriptions of Watch Towerism and the narrow economism of the I.C.U. Yase Rhodesia were indeed far removed from the world of the Shona. This world was characterized by colonial violence, mobilization of forced labor legitimized by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau, and expropriation of livestock and agricultural surplus. Because these grievances generally remained outside the mainstream of those activities associated with the proto-nationalist organizations of the 1910s and 1920s, it was only natural that the people of Mashonaland should resort to the pre-colonial religious beliefs that had served them quite well in the past as a means of meeting the new challenges spawned by colonial rule. In this respect, the revival of the frenzied Mwari cult in southwestern Mashonaland between 1903 and 1915 should be viewed as a
covert attempt to articulate those grievances that affected the Shona communities in a fundamental way before 1930. But with the rise of Samuel Mutendi's Zion Apostolic Faith Church in southern Mashonaland in 1925, and of John Maranke's Vapostori movement in eastern Mashonaland in 1932, the Shona were compelled to look in other directions for alternative forms of informal organizational articulation rather than relying solely on the precolonial belief systems. In this way, the Shona were removed even farther from the influence of those organizations patronized by the black émigrés.

From another perspective it may be argued that the failure of the proto-nationalist organizations to influence events more effectively and to lay down a more credible foundation for the African nationalist movement in the post-1930 period is not altogether unconnected with the process of social transformation and economic differentiation that was beginning to sprout within the African social and political circles of the period. Social stratification within the African subject communities of pre-1930 Southern Rhodesia seems unfortunately to have followed ethnic lines, with the result that cultural differences merged with class interests and thus deepened the cleavage between the African indigenous communities and the black immigrants from the South in particular. This naturally had serious implications for the African movements of protest in early Southern Rhodesia.
NOTES


7. On the tendency to compare African nationalist movements in Southern Rhodesia with contemporary ones north of the Zambesi, see Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia, Chapter 3; and Day, International Nationalism, Chapter 4.


10. For a detailed discussion on colonialism and pluralism and their implications, see L. Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1971), pp. 3-4.


13. Ibid., vol. 2, Chapters 7 and 8.


15. Cape Argus (Cape Town), 4 May 1898.


17. This analysis on the "Fingo Agreement" is based on the following material: C.O. 417/393, "Matabele" Thompson's address, April 1898; Written Evidence of Colonel Raleigh


19. Hereafter called the B.S.A. Co.

20. Cape Argus (Cape Town), 16 March 1898.


23. For the material gains made by the Mfengu in the Cape during the nineteenth century, see Makambe, The African Immigrant Factor in Southern Rhodesia 1890-1930, vol. 1, pp. 16-17.

24. NBB 1/2/1, Chief Nzimende, Bembesi, to Native Commissioner, Inyati, 20 May 1923: Bubi District (Matabeleland) General Correspondence, Zimbabwe National Archives, Salisbury.

25. Ibid., Major Pascoe, D.S.O. Defence Department, Salisbury, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 27 August 1923.

26. N 3/10/6, Chief Nzimende Ndondo, Bembesi, to Native Commissioner Inyati, 8 June 1918: Native Department Correspondence, regarding Fingoes. Zimbabwe National Archives, Salisbury.

27. Ibid., Statement of Chief Nzimende in Notes of Interview Held on August 8, 1918.


29. Ibid., Mangena, Bembesi, to Chief Nzimende, 5 August 1918.

30. Ibid., H. J. Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, to Secretary, Department of Administrator, 5 August 1921.

31. NBB 1/2/1, Chief Nzimende Ndondo, Bembesi, to Native Commissioner, Inyati, 9 April 1923.

32. NBB 1/1/1, W. E. Farrer, Native Commissioner, Inyati, to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 3 April 1923.

33. Ibid., J. W. Richards, Assistant Native Commissioner, Inyati, to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 15 June 1921.

34. S. 607/1923, Chief Nzimende Ndondo, Bembesi, to Native Commissioner, Inyati, 4 October 1923; Bubi District (Matabeleland) General Correspondence, Zimbabwe National Archives, Salisbury.

35. NB 1/1/3, Petition of Colonial Natives of Bulawayo Native Location. Enclosed in George P. Mpondo, Acting Secretary, to Chief Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, 31 January 1898.

36. Ibid., Henry Mangesana's Speech, quoted in Petition of Colonial Natives.

37. References to the gains by Mfengu and other collaborators in the nineteenth century Cape may be found in C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London: 1979), pp. 32-43.
38. S. 924/G. 125/1, Jeremiah Hlazo, Willoughby's Consolidated Company, Byo, to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, 23 October 1905; Administrator's Correspondence, regarding John Hlazo and Follower, 1909-1933, Z.N.A., Salisbury.

39. Hereafter called A.P.S.


41. During the course of fieldwork in Rhodesia in November 1975, I was told repeatedly by Mfengu informants of "the land given to us by Rhodes," meaning the Fingo Location at Bembesi.

42. Relevant here are the Mfengu demonstrations in December 1972 against the Fingo Location Bill (1972/1973), which sought to change the land title system over the location. See D. K. Davies, Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972-73 (London: 1975), pp. 289-290.


44. C.O. 417/276, Report on an Indaba held by the Chief Native Commissioner [Matabeleland] with the Fingo, on Thursday, 21 September 1899.

45. C.O. 417/393, "Matabele" Thompson's address ... op cit., April 1898.


47. Ibid., Petition of Chief Garner Sojini and a hundred other Mfengu to Rev. Harris, 26 April 1916.


49. N 3/7/2, Quoted in H. J. Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, to Secretary, Department of the Administrator, 31 March 1914; Correspondence, Native Complaints, Z.N.A., Salisbury.

50. Ibid., W. S. Taberer, Superintendent of Natives, Salisbury, to Chief Native Commissioner, 31 March 1914.

51. Ibid., Quoted in Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner to Officer Commanding, British South Africa Police, Salisbury Town, 16 April 1917.

52. N 3/21/10, H. M. G. Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 19 June 1922; Native Department Correspondence regarding Native Associations, Z.N.A., Salisbury.

53. Also rendered as U.N.V.O.


56. N 3/21/1, Quoted in Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 10 June 1916.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., N. E. Mahlahla and A. B. Zembe, Secretaries, Mandebelo Patriotic Society, to Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 4 March 1916.

59. N 3/21/5, J. J. Bamingingo, Secretary, R.N.A., to Administrator, 23 January 1922.

60. Ibid., Bamingingo to Secretary, Department of Administrator, Salisbury, 29 August 1923.
61. Ibid., Chief Native Commissioner to Administrator, 31 August 1923.
63. N 3/21/7, Thomas Maziyane, Conductor, Surprising Singers’ Association, to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 10 June 1917.
64. Ibid., Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 12 September 1917.
68. NB 1/1/6, P. A. Stuart, Acting Native Commissioner, Bubi, to Chief Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, 22 October 1898.
74. Ibid., Evidence of John P. Ngono before Native Commissioner, Selukwe, 31 July 1912.
75. N 3/33/12, Eli P. Nare, Secretary, U.N.V.A., Salisbury, to Superintendent of Natives, Salisbury, 22 March, 12 April 1917.
76. S. 607/1923, Chief Nzimende Ndondo to Native Commissioner, Inyati, 12 November 1923.
77. See S. 96/2, Evidence of John P. Ngono and Moses Mfazi, 4 April 1925.
78. S. 924/G. 125/1, Statement of Stephen Hlazo, quoted in Interview Between His Honour the Resident Commissioner and John Hlazo, Salisbury, 13 May 1913.
79. Ibid., Angus S. Fletcher, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner Taylor, Bulawayo, 6 November 1912.
80. C.O. 417/582, Minute by J.N.T.G. (sic) to Lambert, 19 January 1916.
83. C.O. 417/675, Memorandum by Rev. N. Cameron on John Hlazo and Followers, 7 December 1921.

85. N 3/7/2, Quoted in Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, to Secretary, Department of Administrator, 31 March 1914.

86. N 3/21/10, Quoted in Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 19 June 1922.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. C.O. 417/491, Petition of Fingoess and Educated Natives of Bulawayo to Lord Selborne, 12 November 1909.

90. Ibid., Lord Selborne to Major J. Fair, Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 16 November 1909.

91. N 3/21/10, Quoted in Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, to Secretary, Law Department, 18 July 1922.

92. Ibid., Smith, Magistrate, Salisbury, to Secretary, Law Department, 18 July 1922.

93. Ibid., Magistrate, Victoria, to Secretary, Law Department, 17 July 1922.


97. N 3/21/6, Preamble to the Constitution of the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association. Enclosed in Taylor, Chief Native Commissioner, to Secretary, Department of Administrator, 15 March 1923.

98. Ibid.

99. Most of the sons of Lobengula who were born after 1870 were educated by the B.S.A. Co. as a way of alienating them from Ndebele traditional society and thus safeguarding Company interests. See Makambe, *The African Immigrant Factor in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1930*, vol. 2, pp. 846-852.

100. Ibid.

101. C.O. 417/537, Extract from the *Daily Chronicle* (Manchester), 28 October 1913.

102. Ibid., Extract from the *Manchester Guardian*, 24 October 1913, and *The Herald* (Salisbury), 8 April 1980.


105. Ibid., H. M. Jackson, Assistant Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury to S. N. G. Jackson, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 24 November 1926.


107. S. 607/1926, Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 8 October 1926.

109. Ibid.


111. N 3/21/6, Memorandum on the Formation of the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association by Chief Native Commissioner Taylor, to Secretary, Department of Administrator, 15 March 1923.


113. Ibid., Rodwell to Thomas, Secret, 16 April 1930.

114. Ibid., 18 April 1931.

115. This argument is dealt with in detail in E. P. Makambe, "Colonialism and Racism and Their Bearing on the Shona Societies in Colonial Zimbabwe, c. 1888-1930: The Dimensions of a National Tragedy," Post-Graduate Seminar Paper: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, April 1978, 36 pages.


117. D.O. 63/64, Sir Francis Newton to A. Edgecumbe, 21 September 1927.

118. Makambe, "Colonialism and Racism," passim.


120. S. 138/148, Statement of Samuel Mutende before Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, April 1925.

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