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THE NEW ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

by Kenneth W. Grundy

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by Kenneth W. Grundy

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The Report is edited by Raymond Louw, well known for his prize-winning editorship of the Rand Daily Mail. The trustees include Ernest Wentzel of the Institute of Race Relations; Lawrence Gandar, ex-Editor of the Mail; and Dr. G. R. Bozzoli, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Witwatersrand. The Report is published weekly and sent airmail. There are a number of useful newsletters of this nature covering Africa. This report cannot be bettered for timely and accurate comment on political and economic affairs in the region.
KENNETH W. GRUNDY got his start in Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love, and he has been fascinated by the absence of Brotherly Love in human affairs ever since. He is Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. He has also taught in Ireland, the Netherlands, Uganda, and Zambia. His professional interest in military affairs is reflected in his election to the Executive Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and in his published work, which includes three monographs and four books about security and strategic affairs. His most recent studies of the South African armed forces have led to Soldiers Without Politics (University of California Press, 1983), The Rise of the South African Security Establishment (S.A. Institute of International Affairs, 1983), and a forthcoming book, Defending Apartheid (Indiana University Press, 1985), from which this monograph is drawn. We are grateful to the Indiana Press and to its Director, John Gallman, for permission to publish this in advance of their own more extensive volume.
The New Role Of South Africa's Security Establishment:
Centralization of State Power and the Centrality of the
South African Security Establishment

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

I. Governmental Rationalization

It has become popular, of late, to consider the armed forces in South Africa as a dominant, if not the dominant institution in central political decision-making. Not only is that an exaggeration; it is also too narrow a perspective on the question. Thus, it is my intention to cast my net wider, to examine the entire security establishment. "Total national strategy" does not easily permit a disaggregation of the generic problem of security. In each of the recent governmental and institutional shifts, the security establishment and especially the defense services have gained influence at the expense of other bodies.

P. W. Botha personally has been responsible for many of the changes. His leadership style is considerably different from that of his predecessor. And his principal governmental experience as Minister of Defence accounts partially for the phenomena described in this monograph. To begin with, P. W. Botha is an organizational virtuoso, a leader who places great stock in expert advice, planning, preparation, structure, and follow-through, a "forceful managing director," in
contrast to J. B. Vorster's "chairman of the board" style. Where John Vorster's lead was slack, Botha's is firm. His moves have not gone unchallenged. From time to time he has been forced to slow the pace of executive consolidation, to modify his policies, and even to retreat in the face of vocal and concerned opposition. But the trend is unmistakable -- government is being enlarged, centralized and streamlined. Efficiency and performance as well as loyalty matter.

Botha has simultaneously reorganized the cabinet, developed an interlocking and focussed system of cabinet committees to devise policy and coordinate its implementation, engaged and broadened the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister, launched a President's Council charged with the monumental task of advising government on constitutional development and racial relations, and embarked on a difficult, controversial and potentially momentous reconstitution of the South African political system, including a new constitution and new parliamentary/executive structures.

Several conclusions from Botha's reorganization or "rationalization" of government and the public service are self-evident. Decision making at the top has been tightened and centralized. Policy decisions are more likely to be enforced and implemented than in the past with interdepartmental coordination the norm rather than the exception. The managerial revolution has arrived in Pretoria, and the vanguard of that revolution has been P. W. and "his" SADF.
II. Reliance On Defense Specialists

To a large extent these managerial reforms reflect P. W. Botha's own personality. His career has been as an organization man, a manager. He rose to prominence as a party careerist, identified for years with the cadre of the Cape branch of the National Party where he gained a reputation as a brilliant organizer and administrator. In April 1966 he was appointed Minister of Defence, a post he held until 1980. Although it is hard to say who influenced whom, it is apparent that Botha presided over the modernization and expansion of the SADF. The professional military technocrats he admired and promoted in the SADF, in turn, taught Botha some lessons about managerial efficiency, planning, professionalism, and hierarchical organizations. The cross-fertilization process has been salutary for both the armed forces and for Botha's evolution as an executive. During his tenure as Minister, Botha was able to identify and elevate officers of intellectual and administrative promise. Most significant, of course, was his association with General Magnus Malan, who Botha promoted rapidly up the hierarchy. The Prime Minister clearly relies upon the General for advice on strategic matters, as well as on a number of domestic political concerns. Malan has not, as yet, proven to be particularly adept at parliamentary or intraparty politics. Botha's long association with the SADF has also enabled him to identify gifted administrators and thinkers in "his" ministry. Thus it was natural that on becoming Prime Minister he should turn to individuals whose skills he had already observed first hand, or who share his
But it is equally understandable that as Botha becomes familiar with the detailed affairs of other departments, he will begin to recognize individual talents outside the SADF and move these individuals into more responsible positions in his government, thereby diluting SADF influence. So it is no accident and no apparent conspiracy that catapulted high-ranking SADF men into political and advisory positions close to the Prime Minister. There SADF personnel have an advantage in the definition of social issues and the establishment of the agenda of state. The challenge of "total onslaught" is superficially a military problem. Those who view it as such quite comfortably turn to the military for guidance. In effect, the SADF are experts in control and the exercise of coercion, but not normally experts on political matters. But by demonstrating certain technical-managerial skills, the SADF is involved in affairs of state outside their normal portfolio at high levels.

Botha has been a leader anxious to have expert input into decisions and policy execution. This has led to an enlarged role, not just for the military elite, but for other top-level civil servants and public officials and even to involvement for specialists in private industry, the universities, and the independent tanks. To the chagrin of politicians outside the inner circle and others with narrow regional bases, it has become in many ways government by professionals. One should not, however, exaggerate the extent of professionalism and efficiency. These qualities exist only in relation to predecessor
governments and regimes in South Africa. Cumbersome and uncooperative bureaucracies and irrational and inefficient behavior still dog the Botha regime at many turns.

Finding experts to provide counsel understandably has been resisted by the rank-and-file career administrative cadre who have not always promptly and dutifully carried out decisions taken by Botha and his associates, especially when they involve the downgrading of a particular office or function or changing already familiar routines.

III. Rise Of The "Executive State"

This centralization of executive power in the Cabinet and particularly in a few departments, an inner circle or inner Cabinet as it has been called, grows out of a personal hierarchical approach to management, as opposed to a representative mode marked by compromise, consensus and delay. Personalized though it may be in its South African garb, it is a phenomenon common to many western democracies.

The rise of the "executive state" in South Africa in turn has meant the decline of two institutions representative of the exclusive white community -- the National Party and Parliament. Government from above, especially when it seeks to fashion policies likely to be unpopular with one's narrow and privileged constituency, has led to a paternalistic, centralist regime, a departure from the casual "democracy for the Herrenvolk," as it was once described by Pierre van den Berghe. Among right-wing Afrikaners, Botha is accused of erecting, especially with the proposed executive presidency, a verligte
dictatorship. Other institutions too have gained or lost power and influence in the movement toward the executive state, some within the executive branch. The Department of Foreign Affairs seems to have fallen on hard times in the early 1980s. The Information Department has been downgraded (now merged into Foreign Affairs) as has what once had been called Bantu Affairs (now the Department of Co-operation and Development) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Institutions so sloppily managed that autonomy and individuality led to embarrassment or worse and organizations with less than cost-effective procedures and structures have been marked for reorganization, reduction, or dismantlement.

IV. The New Constitutional Dispensation

A question arises as to how these trends toward governmental centralization and executive power will be affected by the implementation of the new constitution. More specifically, will the elaborate security management system so painstakingly molded by P. W. Botha need to be substantially modified to the new constitutional dispensation?

Generally, the changes are perfectly compatible with the evolving security system. It has been claimed that the initiative for the current constitutional proposals came from SADF planning as far back as 1978. The implication is that this was done to justify call-up for Coloured and Indian youth -- a manpower issue. More likely, constitutional revision involves the ever larger issue of political
structure and executive authority and would not turn on the questionable argument that the SADF needs to expand its ranks. Parliamentary democracy has been fairly watered down in the past five years or so. The potential for authoritarian executive leadership is greater now than before. In this sense, the criticisms of the Conservative Party have been incisive. Presumably a centralized security management system under a State Security Council (SSC) dominated by military leaders need not be altered in the new order. It can easily evolve into a secretariat for the State President, especially in that the new cabinet will find its role ambiguous and the parliaments' roles are unclear. A cabinet with Coloured and Asian members is unlikely to be brought into the most sensitive security issues, especially if they are defined in terms of the maintenance of white power. Will Coloureds and Asians be included in the SSC? Will the SSC's decisions be put before the mixed-race cabinet? If so, will cabinet be given the full data to discuss critically these matters? Certainly if government members have in the past said that the white opposition parties cannot be trusted with security information, would they be any more likely to share that information with Coloured and Asian ministers? And will Coloured and Asian cabinet members be free to share security data with their own party caucuses?\textsuperscript{5} One cannot imagine P. W. Botha and his lieutenants undermining white power by getting into foolish structural binds of their own design. More than likely, they already have in their minds eye or even more concretely a security management system to replace the old one, and probably not
significantly different from the old one. The new dispensation fits well into their model of executive government for a dynamic defense of the status quo.

V. The Security Establishment

It would be helpful to outline in more detail what is meant by the term, the security establishment. This fortuitous aggregation of institutions and groups can be divided into six identifiable components, although there is some functional and membership overlap. First and most obvious is the SADF and the Department of Defence, and principally those Permanent Force officers charged with shaping overall defense strategy and especially with applying it in Namibia/Angola. Particularly important to the present discussion are those elements of SADF responsible for tasks with strategic planning groups, Civic Action, Intelligence and, as will become apparent shortly, those segments of the SADF that liaise regularly with governmental, political and business elites in agencies such as the State Security Council and the Defence Manpower Liaison Committee.

The hierarchy of the SADF at the policy-making level is fairly straightforward. The chiefs of the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Medical Service) report to the Chief of the Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen. General Viljoen assumed that position in September 1980 succeeding General Malan, who then was appointed Minister of Defence. Now General Viljoen, who is also the head of the Department of Defence, is responsible to Malan.
Other Defence Force institutions specialize in high level training and in the generation of strategic ideas. At an academic level is the Military Academy at Saldanha Bay. If there is an intellectual elite in the SADF, Saldanha Bay produces it. Candidates for study there are carefully screened and only the reliable survive its regimen. The South African Defence College in Pretoria also trains selected middle level and upwardly mobile officers for senior command and staff assignments.

In the Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, is the planning subdivision of the operations division. Since its establishment in 1977, it has been charged with defining the SADF's role in national strategy, with formulating coordinated strategies involving various governmental departments and with undertaking and supporting strategic research.

The second component of the security establishment is the intelligence community. Presently it consists of the Military Intelligence Section of the SADF (MIS), the NIS (successor to BOSS), and the Security Police. Relationships among these three groups and with other governmental and political bodies have been in continual flux. Each is represented on the State Security Council.

A third segment of the security establishment is that element of the intellectual community that serves parts of the security establishment on an ad hoc contractual basis. There are, for example, various centers of strategic studies. Faculty and researchers from these centers (at the University of Pretoria, the Rand Afrikaans University, and UNISA) participate in discussion groups, planning
sessions and advisory bodies, and they regularly address various classes in diverse military and police training programs. They also do contract work for the SADF and other security bodies and have been included in delegations to foreign governments and institutions.

Likewise, private independent firms are engaged increasingly in research and policy advice on security and strategy. Many firms are anxious to cash in on the provisions of the National Key Point Act and the growing concern of executives about corporate and personal security. Pages of the trade journals are filled with their advertisements, and during the initial implementation phases of the Act, business is growing.8

Individual academics interested in strategy and security are also drawn into the policy process, usually remotely, occasionally directly. They testify before governmental commissions, undertake contracted research, help train security and government personnel, write for government and private publications (on behalf of government’s line), and in general make their advice and reputations available to the authorities. On a more technical level individual university faculty members and departments, especially at the Afrikaner universities, have undertaken defense related research. Particularly through the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Human Science Research Centre (HSRC), students and academic staff investigate subjects of value to the SADF and Armscor. Some are funded by grants presumably emanating from the Department of Defence.

The armaments and related industries are involved in the
security establishment, too. Frankel sees this as a "lower-order version" of C. Wright Mills' concept of the "military-industrial complex." The analogy is not inappropriate. Most prominent are the parastatal corporations directly a part of the security enterprise. The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) exists solely to improve the material defense capabilities of the state. Like SADF itself, Armscor comes directly under the authority of the Minister of Defence. It is one of the biggest industrial undertakings in South Africa. Armscor directly employs around 23,000 and provides work for over 100,000 people through its nine subsidiaries and its 3,000 private subcontractors.

The upshot of this growth and size is that Armscor is now the world's tenth largest arms manufacturer. Where twelve years ago about 70 per cent of the defense budget went to material imports, today military imports represent only about 15 per cent of the defense budget. Imports can be expected to increase as operational expenses are reduced and the need to replace obsolescent material increases.

Through Armscor subsidiaries Armscor has deep links with private sector firms and research companies. Indeed, it is Armscor's stated policy to make "maximum utilization of the private sector." Around 70 per cent of Armscor's production is contracted out to the private sector. This partnership with private enterprise dates from the time when P. W. Botha was Minister of Defence. He gathered around him advisors from private firms, and that closeness persists today. Armscor tends to touch practically every sector of modern industry.
Some of the country's top industrialists and managers serve on various
group boards. The concept of private-state cooperation for state
security is well advanced by Armscor and is regarded by some planners
as a model to be applied elsewhere.

Other parastatal corporations, Sasol (oil) and Iscor (steel)
for examples, also have defense and security links through planning
bodies and through sales to security forces and other state organs.
CSIR, among other state-run bodies, is totally tied to defense
research, especially in the technologies of communications, rocketry,
radar, and armor. Moreover, the terms of legislation such as the
Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1979 and the National Supplies
Procurement Act of 1970 as amended in 1979, require that firms not
disclose certain data about their operations. These laws, for their
part, commit the private sector to the total national strategy.

It may be a bit overdrawn to speak of a military-industrial
complex in Millsian terms. The American model is so deeply entrenched
and so much larger and more elaborate. But the "partnership" as Deon
Geldenhuyys calls it is genuine and mutually supportive. Many firms now
have vested interests in seeing their links with the Defence Department
flourish and in the process they may help to influence government
decisions on armament questions as government has been able to
influence the firms. On logistical matters the interaction is
undeniable. Whether it extends to larger strategic questions is
doubtful. If Armscor should begin to develop an export capacity, then
business input into foreign policy decisions might expand.
A fifth component of the security establishment is the South African Police (SAP). There is no need to detail the role of SAP in maintaining state security.\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps less public are the paramilitary formations that patrol the borders, that are used to put down internal unrest, and that have been deployed in the operational areas of Namibia and Rhodesia. In all of these activities and others, there is a high level of interaction and cooperation between SAP and SADF.\textsuperscript{13} Although SADF has sought to avoid the stigma of repressing the civil population, in fact the SADF has widened its range of domestic deployment and in the process finds its popular image more closely identified with the apartheid policies of the government and hence of the National Party.

VI. The State Security Council

Many of these organizations and their functions are brought together in the workings of the sixth element of the security establishment — the State Security Council (SSC). The SSC has become the central organization through which security policy is determined and its implementation is coordinated. The SSC perceives its assignment broadly, with military matters just one, albeit the most important, facet of state security. The SSC, in addition, serves as the most important cabinet committee in a variety of other issue areas, including foreign policy, many economic decisions, some issues of justice, and even key apartheid and constitutional questions.

Technically the SSC is but one among four pivotal cabinet committees. In fact, it is \textit{primus inter pares}. In the first place, it
is chaired by the Prime Minister (now the State President) himself. Secondly, it is the only cabinet committee established by law with a fixed membership, and although this in itself was not enough to make the SSC so vital in the Vorster regime, it adds to the impact of the body when coupled with other factors. Thirdly, it is apparent that the SSC's range of interests has been wider than other cabinet committees largely because its members subscribe to and propagate the necessity of a "total national strategy" to combat a "total onslaught" aimed at South Africa. Each of the other three cabinet committees have only five full-time employees in their secretariats. The SSC has around 50.

Thus, the SSC has a complex of supporting agencies and committees more extensive and complete than any other cabinet committee. Seen from this vantage, practically no facet of state policy can be excluded from some aspect of security affairs. In addition, the meetings of the three other cabinet committees are open to ministers who are not formally members. In the SSC, non-primary members may not attend unless explicitly invited to the meeting. In short, an air of importance and exclusivity is attached to SSC meetings that does not apply to other cabinet committees.

In September 1983 the Government sought to deflect such assertions about the SSC in a most unusual press conference. In direct response to academic and popular publications that claimed that the SSC, or more generally the security establishment, was effectively shaping state policy in a variety of non-strategic fields as well as in strategy,\textsuperscript{14} the Prime Minister called a conference at which the SSC's
Secretary, Lieutenant General A. J. van Deventer, did most of the talking. He argued, in effect, that the SSC was just one among four cabinet committees. It had no executive authority and all its recommendations were subject to final cabinet approval. To be sure, the SSC has chiefly advisory functions by law. So does the Politburo of the CPSU but who would deny its power? But the SSC is empowered to make decisions (as are other cabinet committees) and thus it is an integral part of South Africa's decision-making machinery.

Part of van Deventer's message was an effort to show that there is nothing unusual in the present arrangements — that in South Africa, in the past, Prime Ministers have been advised on security matters (which is true) and that in other countries (he used the example of the US's National Security Council) state security is an important policy area (which is also true). What he failed explicitly to state was how central security has become in South Africa. This, too, may not be unusual, but it is a change in emphasis for South African governments. Yet in the process of denying inordinate importance for the SSC, a picture was painted of a decision-making system very much centered around an executive government the hub of which is the SSC. Van Deventer sought to justify this concentration of power in terms of a full-fledged offensive aimed at South Africa and directed from Moscow.

The reality that did emerge, and there were new disclosures and insights into the inner-workings of the executive, tended to confirm the strong SSC military-centric theses that the press conference was intended to dispell. The disclosures also confirmed the contention
that virtually all foreign and domestic matters are fit subjects for
the SSC. Because of the massive threat against South Africa, the SSC
has become the needed "coordinating forum" in respect of national
security.

Although the full membership of the SSC has never been publicly
disclosed, it includes at least the following: the Prime Minister and
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Police (now Law and Order),
Justice, and the most senior cabinet minister. In SSC nomenclature,
the standing members are known as "primary members." At present,
"primary members" include some others who regularly attend but are not
so named in the law, such as the Ministers of Finance, Cooperation and
Development and Planning. Each are ministers who chair the other three
cabinet committees and thus are coopted members.

The SSC also includes the top-ranking civil servants/career
professionals in each of those key departments. Thus, a number of
important people not directly responsible to parliament participate in
the decisional process at the highest levels. Others in government and
in private life may be invited to attend individual meetings, depending
on the subject at hand and the nature of the expertise they might be
expected to provide. If, for example, weapons development is on the
agenda, the Director of Armscor may be asked to attend. If the topic
is regional economic growth or transport planning as it impacts on
foreign policy the General Manager of the S.A. Transport Services may
be coopted. The SSC is a body composed of political heavyweights
supplemented by the highest-ranking political and governmental experts
in security and strategy. When they recommend policy, cabinet is not likely to deny them. It is the prestige and influence associated with the individuals and their offices that assure that the SSC continues at the hub of governmental decision making in so many areas of state policy.

The operation of the SSC and the entire security management system has evolved markedly since the 1972 legislation creating the SSC went into force. Originally the SSC's function was to advise the government with regard to the formulation of national policy and strategy and to determine intelligence priorities. It was, at that time, just one of twenty different cabinet committees. Cabinet committees under Vorster operated in an ad hoc fashion. If a problem arose, a committee was called to deal with it. Thus the SSC met sporadically, as did other cabinet committees. There was little coordination of committee actions. In the Vorster years, the SSC was clearly subordinate to the cabinet, politically as well as legally.

In 1973 an investigation was held into the shortcomings of the state machinery for security. A 1975 report recommended, inter alia, the establishment of an active security management system to link national, interdepartmental, departmental and subdepartmental levels of operation. A full-time national security staff would be needed. For regional and local levels, area and regional committees were created to facilitate coordination. Fifteen functional areas of concern were identified within the security field and committees were established for each. The wide-ranging areas covered virtually every facet of
state policy, from culture to civil defense, from economy to manpower.

South Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war confirmed Botha's desire to reorganize. According to General Malan, the Angolan war "focussed the attention on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a much fuller role in the national security of the Republic than hitherto." An interdepartmental committee on the issue of national strategy formulation and organization recommended the creation of a Working Committee of the SSC. This was to consist of senior representatives from each department permanently a part of the SSC. Others could be coopted. In addition a permanent secretariat of the SSC was recommended to be headed by the Secretary of the SSC. He would also serve as Chairman of the Working Committee. Lieutenant Governor van Deventer thereby provided the continuity at the core of almost all security planning activity. The Secretariat was instituted in 1979.

The Working Committee and behind it the Secretariat are poised to shape agendas, develop position papers, formulate alternatives, take and circulate minutes, and, once the SSC and the cabinet have acted, to see to it that each operational department and bureau knows what is expected of it, that decisions are circulated to relevant officials, and that cooperation and coordination are assured. The Secretariat consists of four branches, with perhaps 50 to 60 employees (not counting its subordinate working committees), many full-time (which accounts for the decline of seconded SADF personnel) and others seconded from relevant departments of state.
When P. W. Botha became Prime Minister the process of change in the Security Management System was speeded up and extended. To begin with, Botha reduced the number of cabinet committees from twenty to five permanent committees. He introduced regular (fortnightly) meetings and rearranged their timing so that SSC meetings precede cabinet meetings. The appearance of the SSC presenting cabinet with fait accompli decisions has been noted. In addition, SSC holds meetings when parliament is in recess and when the cabinet is inactive. The SSC again would seem to provide executive continuity, particularly on matters of security, even though in formal terms the cabinet is paramount.

To be sure, not all top cabinet officers share an identity with the SSC in preference to a political base in their department or in the provincial or central Party apparatus. Most would prefer to retain all their political options in an as yet fluid situation. South African politicians are too individualistic, their styles too practical to conform to some analytical model developed to explain political patterns elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the aggregate this tendency to identify with the institution of the SSC should not be ignored.

By the nature of governmental and administrative reorganization, the SSC has the advantage of being the principal originating and coordinating organ for the total national strategy. The SSC's agenda has widened as awareness of "total onslaught" has grown and as commitment to "total national strategy" broadly constructed takes root. It is an atmosphere where, if you don't
believe in "total onslaught" you ipso facto contribute unwittingly to that onslaught. It is inherently a polarizing outlook, and it applies even with the down-play of the term and the diplomatic openings to marxist neighboring states.

Other changes in executive organization have, by default, given the SSC and its ancillary Secretariat further advantages. The number of government departments has been reduced. The Office of the State President has been expanded and organized to parallel the structure of cabinet committees. A cabinet secretariat has been established. There are agendas for cabinet meetings and minutes are kept. The decision-making process has been centralized, and placed firmly at the hub of the process is the State President, the SSC and its Secretariat.

To add to the importance of the military establishment, SADF officers are prominent in all high-level interdepartmental committees of the SSC. DFA is represented on only four of those interdepartmental committees. SADF has also had a direct input into diverse governmental commissions and investigatory bodies through petition, testimony, submission of evidence, and deputation. Often representatives of SSC (not always military persons) sit on these panels. Although there is nothing inherently pernicious about these SADF links to governmental bodies, they do illustrate the ubiquity of such security ties and their potential for influence. They also exemplify a salient departure from past practice. The national security management system represents the triumph of the SADF in its ongoing battle with civilian intelligence bodies, SAP, and of course
the DFA. How long it can retain that ascendancy is probably a function of the political staying power of P. W. Botha himself, especially now that he occupies the new position of Executive State President.

As P. W. Botha devises these organizational changes one cannot help but think that there is, indeed, purpose and design to his steps. Agreed that there is a good deal of rationalization in these measures and that efficiency has its own rewards. But underlying these changes is a widely held belief that the Prime Minister is clearing the decks for action — not merely for fighting a war with violent opponents of the regime, but for fashioning significant political changes in order to outflank those opponents.
FOOTNOTES


5. Many of these questions are posed by Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political Decision-Making in South Africa,"


11. 1983 employment had been allowed to fall from 29,000 by not filling vacancies. Subsidiaries were urged to undertake business outside the defense sector. See: RSA, DOD, *White Paper on Defence, 1984*, p. 19.


14. The publications are chiefly: Geldenhuys & Kotzée, "Aspects of


16. "Security Intelligence and State Security Act," *Statutes of the Republic of South Africa*, No. 64 of 1972. This provides that the Prime Minister must be chairman and that membership include the senior Minister of the Republic, the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, and any other Ministers whom the Prime Minister asks to attend. In: "Reaching into Government," *Financial Mail*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (8 October 1982), p. 145, the SSC was reported also to include the Ministers of Finance, Co-operation and Development, Internal Affairs and Constitutional
Affairs plus a number of specified coopted senior civil servants.


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