Supporting Information
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SI Text

Notation and External Results. The following definitions and external results will be used extensively throughout the proofs and are included here to provide a self-contained presentation.

**Definition 1:** A quantum state $t$-design is a probability distribution over pure quantum states $(p_i, |\psi_i\rangle)$ (or $(p_i, |\psi_i\langle\psi_i|)$) such that

$$\sum_i p_i (|\psi_i\rangle\langle\psi_i|)^\otimes t = \int_{\text{Haar}} (|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)^\otimes t d\psi. \quad [S1]$$

In other words, a quantum state $t$-design duplicates the properties of the unique unitarily invariant Haar measure over quantum states for all polynomials up to degree $t$. Alternatively, the discrete average and continuous measure of definition 1 may be taken over pure density matrices given that they are insensitive to phases. The equality of the $2^t$ legs tensors expressed in definition 1 is actually exploited by contracting each sides of the equal-}

**Claim 1.** (3-design over $\mathcal{H}_2$) The set of pure states

$$\tilde{Q} = \{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle, |i\rangle, |-i\rangle\} \quad [S2]$$

with equal weights $p_i = 1/6$ constitutes a quantum state 3-design over $\mathcal{H}_2 (1)$. By abuse of notation, we will also use $\tilde{Q}$ to denote the associated set of normalized pure density matrices.

The average fidelity for a channel quantifies how well the channel preserves quantum states.

**Definition 2:** The average fidelity of a map $M$ is defined as

$$F(M) = \int_{\text{Haar}} \langle\psi|M(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)|\psi\rangle d\psi = \frac{1}{6} \sum_{|\psi\rangle \in \tilde{Q}} \langle\psi|M(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)|\psi\rangle. \quad [S3]$$

The last expression is not part of the definition but is derived from the fact that the average fidelity can be expressed as a Haar average of a degree 2 polynomial in $|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|$ and that $\tilde{Q}$ is a 3-design (and hence also a two-design).

Throughout the text, boolean values $\mathcal{B} = \{\text{True}, \text{False}\}$ will be represented as $\text{True} = 1$, $\text{False} = 0$ and the negation $\overline{b} = 1 - b$. We will also use the variable $b$ to denote boolean strings (i.e., ordered sequences of values in $\{0, 1\}$) with $\text{len}(b)$ denoting the length or number of components of a sequence and $\text{tl}(b)$ denoting the string obtained from removing the last element from $b$. We will denote by $\text{Pr}[e]$ the probability of an event $e$ and $\text{Exp}[v]$ the expectation value of an expression $v$. Note that according to our convention, if the expression is a boolean formula they may be used interchangeably.

The relative entropy is a distinguishability measure between two probability distributions. It will be used extensively (particu-}

**Theorem 1.** (Generalized Chernof–Hoeffding bound) Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be Boolean $\{0, 1\}$ random variables, such that for some $\delta_i$ and every $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$, it holds that $\text{Pr}[\bigwedge_{i \in S} X_i] \leq \prod_{i \in S} \delta_i$. Then for any $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, we have that $\text{Pr}[\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \geq \gamma n] \leq e^{-nD(\gamma\delta|\delta)}$, with $\delta = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_i$.

A further generalization to real valued random variables will also be required. This is adapted to our purpose from theorem 3.3 of Impagliazzo and Kabanets (3).

**Theorem 2.** Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be real valued random variables, with each $X_i \in [0, 1]$. Suppose that there is a $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$ s.t., for every set $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $\text{Exp}[\prod_{i \in S} X_i] \leq \delta^{|S|}$ and $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ s.t. $\delta \leq \gamma \leq 1$ and $\gamma n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then we have that $\text{Pr}[\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \geq \gamma n] \leq 2e^{-nD(\gamma\delta|\delta)}$.

**Quantum Tickets (Qtickets).** We first provide a rigorous definition of tickets and how they are verified. We then proceed to our claims and the soundness, security, and tightness of our security bound (accompanied with respective proofs). Namely, we show that tickets may be successfully redeemed by an honest holder achieving a sufficiently good storage fidelity. We then show that a dishonest holder will have a negligible chance of producing two tickets that are accepted by verifiers from a single valid ticket, even after repeated verification attempts. Finally we show how a simple counterfeiting strategy has a high probability of producing two such tickets if the verification tolerance is set below the threshold value. As an extension, we consider how our results generalize to producing multiple identical tickets.

**Definition of tickets.** Each ticket consists of a serial number $s$ and an $N$ component pure product state $\rho^{(s)} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^N \rho_i^{(s)}$. For each serial number $s$, ticket components $\rho_i^{(s)}$ are chosen uniformly at random from $Q$ (the set of pure density matrices of the 3-design presented in definition 1). This means tickets $\rho^{(s)}$ are uniform at random from the set $Q = \mathcal{Q}_2^{\otimes N}$ (where by abuse of notation, the elements of $Q$ are density matrices corresponding to the $N$ component pure product states in $\mathcal{Q}_2 = \mathcal{H}_2^{\otimes N}$, with components taken from $\tilde{Q}$). The verifiers store a database containing, for each $s$, a classical description of $\rho^{(s)}$ kept secret from ticket holders and the general public. In order to simplify notation, the serial number $s$ associated to individual tickets will be omitted from now on.

In order to use tickets, they are transferred to a verification authority who can either accept or reject them. In both cases, however, the ticket is not returned, only the binary outcome of verification. The ticket protocol is additionally parameterized
by the fraction $F_{\text{tol}}$ of quantum bits (qubits) that a verification authority requires to be correct in order for verification to succeed. In order to verify a submitted qticket $\tilde{\rho}$, a full measurement will be performed in the product basis associated to the original qticket $\rho$ and the number of correct outcomes is then counted. If more than at least $F_{\text{tol}}N$ are correct, the (possibly noisy) submitted qticket $\tilde{\rho}$ is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected.

For any pure product state $\rho = \bigotimes_{i=1}^N \rho_i$ we define a projector $P_{\text{acc}}^\rho \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H}_Q)$ associated to the subspace of states that would be accepted if $\rho$ were a qticket (i.e., states coinciding with $\rho$ in at least a fraction $F_{\text{tol}}$ of the qubits). The projector $P_{\text{acc}}^\rho$ offers a more abstract interpretation and may be rigorously defined as follows.

**Definition 3: (Acceptance Projector)** Given a pure $N$ qubit product state $\rho = \bigotimes_{i=1}^N \rho_i$ and a security parameter $0 \leq F_{\text{tol}} \leq 1$, we define the acceptance projector

$$P_{\text{acc}}^\rho = \sum_{\tilde{\rho} : \bigotimes_{i=1}^N b_i \in E_{F_{\text{tol}}}N} \left( b_i \rho_i + \tilde{\rho} (\rho_i^+) \right),$$

where $\tilde{\rho} \in \{0, 1\}^N$ is a boolean string.

By abuse of notation, $\rho_i$ and its orthogonal complement $\rho_i^+ := 1 - \rho_i$ are used as rank 1 projectors in $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H}_i)$.

**Soundness.** The soundness result states that even under imperfect storage and readout fidelity, legitimate qtickets work well as long as the fidelity loss is not too severe. The completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) maps $M_i$ will be assumed to represent the encoding, storage and readout of the $i$-th qubit component of the qticket. In this sense, the soundness statement takes place at the level of single qubits. This is necessarily the case because legitimate qtickets are ruined if a significant fraction of the qubits fail in a correlated way. Given $F_i = F(M_i)$, the average fidelity of the qubit map $M_i$, we define $F_{\text{exp}} = N^{-1} \sum_i F_i$ to be the average qubit fidelity of the full map $M = \bigotimes_i M_i$ over all components. The probability that the “noisy” qticket resulting from this map is accepted as valid is given by $P_{\text{acc}}(M) = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{\rho \in Q} \text{Tr}[P_{\text{acc}}^\rho M(\rho)]$.

**Theorem 3. (Soundness of qtickets)** As long as $F_{\text{exp}} > F_{\text{tol}}$, an honest holder can successfully redeem qtickets with a probability

$$P_{\text{acc}}(M) \geq 1 - e^{-ND(F_{\text{tol}} - F_{\text{exp}})}.$$

**Proof:** Consider the boolean random variables $\tilde{X} = (X_1, \ldots, X_N)$ with joint distribution given by

$$\Pr[\tilde{X} = \tilde{b}] = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{\rho \in Q} \text{Tr}\left[ M(\rho) \left( \bigotimes_{i=1}^N b_i \rho_i + \tilde{\rho} (\rho_i^+) \right) \right].$$

Because $M = \bigotimes_i M_i$, we may recast Eq. S2 as

$$\Pr[\tilde{X} = \tilde{b}] = \prod_{i=1}^N \sum_{\rho_i \in Q} \text{Tr}[M_i(\rho_i)(b_i \rho_i + \tilde{\rho} (\rho_i^+))].$$

Because $\tilde{Q}$ is a quantum state two-design over qubit space, each factor coincides with the definition of the average fidelity $F_i$ of $M_i$ if $b_i = 1$ and with $1 - F_i$ if $b_i = 0$. Hence the $X_i$ are independent boolean random variables with probability

$$\Pr[X_i] = F_i.$$

Moreover, according to definition 3, we have

$$\frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{\rho \in Q} \text{Tr}[P_{\text{acc}}^\rho M(\rho)] = \Pr[\sum_{i=1}^N X_i \geq F_{\text{tol}}N].$$

Because the $X_i$ are independent, a standard Chernoff–Hoeffding bound allows us to conclude.

**Security.** Consider the probability of producing two tokens, both passing verification by means of the most general possible transformation, a CPTP map $T$, applied on a single genuine qticket.

**Definition 4: (Counterfeiting fidelity)** We define the average counterfeiting fidelity of a map $T \in \mathcal{H}_Q \rightarrow \mathcal{H}_Q$ as

$$p_d(T) = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{\rho \in Q} \text{Tr}[(P_{\text{acc}}^\rho)\otimes^2 T(\rho)].$$

Note that definition 4 can also be thought of as $N$ nested averages over the qubit state 3-design $Q$ of each tensor factor $\rho_i$ of $\rho$.

One of our main results states that as long as the verification threshold $F_{\text{tol}}$ is set sufficiently high (>5/6), a counterfeiter will have negligible (exponentially small in $N$) chances of producing two verified tokens from a single genuine original.

**Theorem 4. (Security of qtickets)** For $F_{\text{tol}} > 5/6$ and for any CPTP map $T \in \mathcal{H}_Q \rightarrow \mathcal{H}_Q$ we have that

$$p_d(T) \leq e^{-ND(2F_{\text{tol}} - 1)[2/3]}.$$

Most of the work for proving this theorem goes into excluding the possibility that a nonproduct counterfeiting strategy could perform significantly better than any product strategy such as performing optimal cloning on each individual qubit. That is, we take into account the fact that if the map $T$ need not factorize with respect to the different components of the qticket. Note also that $D(2F_{\text{tol}} - 1)[2/3] = 0$ precisely for $F_{\text{tol}} = 5/6$ and is positive otherwise. Finally, we prove that even if the holder of a qticket attempts to perform $v$ successive verification attempts (each time possibly using information learned from the acceptance/rejection of previous attempts) the chances of having two or more submitted qtickets accepted grows by no more than a factor of $\left(\frac{v}{2}\right)$.

**Theorem 5. (Security of qtickets with learning)** If the holder of a valid qticket submits $v$ tokens for verification, the probability of having two or more accepted is upper bounded by

$$p_{ds}(T) \leq \left(\frac{v}{2}\right) e^{-ND(2F_{\text{tol}} - 1)[2/3]}.$$

Note that because $\left(\frac{v}{2}\right)$ is a polynomial of degree 2 in $v$, this bound still allows for an exponentially large number (in $N$) of qticket submissions $v$, while preserving exponentially good security.

**Proof Outline.** We now outline the proof for theorems 4 and 5. First, the claim in theorem 4 is equated to an equivalent one, which averages over the set of all pure product states instead of $Q$. We then bound the average cloning probability by $(2/3)^N$ for the set of pure product states following the lines of R. F. Werner (4) for the optimal cloning of pure states. From there, the generalized Chernoff bound from theorem 1 for dependent random variables allows us to derive the desired result. The result of theorem 5 is obtained from a counting argument relating the security.
of multiple verification attempts with the static counterfeiting fidelity bound of theorem 4.

**Equivalence with Continuous Statement.** For the qticket protocol, drawing each component from a discrete set of states is required in order to provide an efficient classical description. However, certain statements are simpler to analyze over the full set of pure product states. This is the case for the counterfeiting fidelity, which can also be expressed as a uniform average over all pure product states.

**Lemma 1. (Counterfeiting fidelity)** The average counterfeiting fidelity of a map \( T \) can be expressed as

\[
p_d(T) = \int d\tilde{\rho} \text{Tr}[(\rho_{\text{acc}} \otimes \rho_{\text{tol}})(\tilde{\rho})] \tag{S8}
\]

where \( \int d\tilde{\rho} \) represents \( N \) nested integrations on the Haar measure of qubit components \( d\rho_1 \cdots d\rho_N \) and \( \tilde{\rho} = \rho_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes \rho_N \) is the resulting product state.

**Proof:** Definition 4 and lemma 1 express \( p_d(T) \) as the average of the same expression over a discrete (respectively continuous) set of product states. Our claim is that the nested continuous averages of lemma 1 can be transformed one by one into nested discrete averages over the 3-design \( Q \), eventually coinciding with definition 4. To prove this claim using the definition of 3-designs, we must ensure that, as a function of any tensor factor \( \rho_i \) of \( \tilde{\rho} \), the expression \( \text{Tr}[(\rho_{\text{acc}} \otimes \rho_{\text{tol}})(\tilde{\rho})] \) can be expressed as a polynomial of degree at most 3.

Definition 3 may seem unnecessarily cumbersome, yet it serves to make explicit that the projector \( \rho_{\text{acc}} \) is statically defined by \( F_{\text{tol}} \) and each monomials has degree at most 1 in each of the tensor components \( \rho \). Furthermore, note that regardless of what the multiqubit map \( T \) is, its application \( T(\rho) \) has degree 1 on \( \rho \) and hence on every tensor factor \( \rho_i \) of a product state \( \rho \). Hence, the integrand of lemma 1 is a polynomial of degree at most 3 in each of the qubit components \( \rho_i \) of \( \rho \). We may hence replace the nested integrals one by one by averages over \( Q \) reaching the expression of definition 4 after \( N \) steps.

**Optimal Cloning for Pure Product States.** R. F. Werner (4) obtained a tight upper bound for the average probability of a CPTP map producing \( n \) clones from \( n \) copies of an unknown pure quantum state \( |\psi\rangle \). Our statement is that if one attempts to clone an \( N \) component pure product state, the optimal cloning probability is achieved by independently cloning each of the components; neither generating entanglement nor correlations may help with the cloning. We present this statement for the case of cloning two copies from a qubit product state, but the derivation is fully generalizable.

**Lemma 2. (Optimal cloning of pure product states)** The average cloning fidelity over \( N \) qubit component pure product states of a CPTP map \( T \) is bounded by

\[
\int d\tilde{\rho} \text{Tr}[\tilde{\rho} \otimes (T(\rho))] \leq \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^N.
\]

**Proof:** One possible derivation of this lemma is by following the lines of the original proof for optimal cloning of pure states (4). First one shows that if there is a CPTP map \( T \) achieving average cloning fidelity \( F^* \) then there is a covariant CPTP map \( T^* \) achieving the same average cloning fidelity. This map can be explicitly constructed as

\[
T^*(\tilde{\rho}) = \int d\tilde{g} \tilde{g} \otimes (T(g \rho \tilde{g})) \tilde{g} \otimes 2,
\]

where the integral \( \int d\tilde{g} \tilde{g} \) averages over all possible local rotations \( \tilde{g} \) on \( N \) subsystems. This covariant map achieves exactly the same cloning fidelity for any initial pure product state because all pure product states are equivalent up to local unitaries.

Finally, we observe

\[
0 \leq \text{Tr}[\tilde{\rho} \otimes (T(1_{2^n} - \rho))] \tag{S10}
\]

because \( 1_{2^n} - \rho \) is positive and \( T^* \) positivity preserving. We then obtain

\[
F^* \leq \text{Tr}[\tilde{\rho} \otimes (T(1_{2^n}))] \tag{S11}
\]

and may now average this inequality over \( \tilde{\rho} \) and use

\[
\int d\tilde{\rho} \rho \otimes (T(1_{2^n})) \leq \frac{\text{Tr}[T^*(1_{2^n})]}{3^N}, \tag{S12}
\]

where \( S_2 \) is the rank 3 projector onto the symmetric space of two qubits. The operator norm of this expression is \( 1/3^N \) whereas \( \text{Tr}[T^*(1_{2^n})] \leq 2^N \) leading to \( F^* \leq \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^N \), as desired.

**Pigeonhole Argument and Chernoff Bound.** We are now ready to prove the first no-counterfeiting result for qtickets.

**Proof of Theorem 4:** Consider the boolean random variables \( \bar{E} = (E_1, \ldots, E_N) \) with joint distribution given by

\[
\text{Pr}[\bar{E} = \bar{b}] = \int d\tilde{\rho} \text{Tr} \left[ T(\tilde{\rho} \otimes \rho_{\text{tol}} + \tilde{b}(1_{4} - \rho_{\text{tol}})) \right]. \tag{S13}
\]

Intuitively, the variable \( E_i \) represents the event of measuring the \( i \)-th component to be correctly cloned. In order for the two qtickets to be accepted, there must be a total of at least \( F_{\text{tol}} N \) components yielding the correct measured outcome in each qticket. By the pigeonhole principle, there are at least \( 2 F_{\text{tol}} N - N \) components that were measured correctly on \( N \) steps.

**Optimal Cloning for Pure Product States.** R. F. Werner (4) obtained a tight upper bound for the average probability of a CPTP map producing \( m \) clones from \( m \) copies of an unknown pure quantum state \( |\psi\rangle \). Our statement is that if one attempts to clone an \( N \) component pure product state, the optimal cloning probability is achieved by independently cloning each of the components; neither generating entanglement nor correlations may help with the cloning. We present this statement for the case of cloning two copies from a qubit product state, but the derivation is fully generalizable.

**Lemma 2. (Optimal cloning of pure product states)** The average cloning fidelity over \( N \) qubit component pure product states of a CPTP map \( T \) is bounded by

\[
\int d\tilde{\rho} \text{Tr}[\tilde{\rho} \otimes (T(\rho))] \leq \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^N.
\]

**Proof:** One possible derivation of this lemma is by following the lines of the original proof for optimal cloning of pure states (4). First one shows that if there is a CPTP map \( T \) achieving average
mitted qtickets where the production strategy (CPTP map) for the latter submissions can depend on whether previous submissions were accepted or not. The counterfeiter may learn valuable information about how to construct valid qtickets from the feedback provided by the verifiers. The content of theorem 5 is that even with a valid qticket and the information learned from \( v \) repeated submissions it is very unlikely for a counterfeiter to produce more than one accepted qticket.

**Proof of Theorem 5:** According to theorem 4, the probability \( p_d(T) \) for any CPTP map \( T \) to produce two valid counterfeit copies from a single one is upper bounded by \( B = e^{-ND(c+1)\mathcal{F}_{sec}} \). We bound the counterfeiting probability of an interactive strategy \( S \) submitting \( v \) tokens for verification by the sum of the counterfeiting fidelity of \( \binom{v}{2} \) CP maps \( T_{k,l} \). Each of these maps corresponds to the case in which a specific pair \( \{k, l\} \) of the \( v \) submitted tokens are the first to be accepted by the verifiers.

Without loss of generality, we assume that in an interactive strategy the holder waits for the outcome of the \( j \)-th verification in order to decide how to continue and produce the \( j+1 \)-th submission. We model a \( v \) step interactive strategy \( S \) as a collection of CPTP maps \( \{S_j\} \) with \( b \) a boolean string of length between 0 and \( v-1 \) representing what the counterfeiter does after receiving the first \( \text{len}(b) \) verification outcomes.

Each \( S_j \) is a CPTP map from \( \mathcal{H} \) to \( \mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H}_j \), where \( \mathcal{H}_j \) is a Hilbert space accommodating qtickets and \( \mathcal{H}_j \) is a larger space representing the memory of the holder. Fig. S1 illustrates information flow as understood for both the interactive and non-interactive scenarios.

For any partial verification result \( \bar{b} \) we may write the CPTP map which produces the \( \text{len}(b) \) submissions as \( S_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b}) \), which is composed of successively applying \( S_j \), for all initial substrings \( b^i \) of \( \bar{b} \). That is

\[
\hat{S}_{\bar{b}} = \prod_{j=1}^{\text{len}(b)} S_j(\bar{b}).
\]

For an interactive strategy \( S \) the probability that the first \( \text{len}(\bar{b}) \) verification outcomes are given by \( \bar{b} \) is expressed as

\[
p_{\bar{b}}(S) = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{\rho \in Q} \text{Tr} \left[ \hat{S}_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b}) \langle \text{len}(\bar{b}) \rangle \otimes \left( b_1 P_{\text{sec}}^n + \bar{b}_1 P_{\text{rej}}^n \right) \otimes 1_H \right].
\]

where \( P_{\text{sec}}^n = 1_Q - P_{\text{sec}}^n \). The probability for the interactive strategy \( S \) to succeed at counterfeiting in \( v \) steps can be described as the sum of these probabilities over all possible full verification outcomes, including at least two acceptances:

\[
p_{d,v}(S) = \sum_{\bar{b} \neq 0} n \geq 2 \sum_{\text{len}(\bar{b}) \geq c+1} p_{\bar{b}}(S).
\]

The key idea now is to use \( p_{\bar{b}}(S) = p_{\bar{b}0}(S) + p_{\bar{b}1}(S) \) to provide an alternate expression for this sum. Namely, we combine verification outcomes starting in the same way into a single summand while avoiding the inclusion of failed counterfeiting attempts. Each full verification outcome containing two or more successful verifications has a unique shortest initial substring containing exactly two successful verifications. That a given substring is the shortest can be guaranteed by taking the last verification of the substring to be one of the two accepted.

\[
p_{d,v}(S) = \sum_{\bar{b} \neq 0} \sum_{\text{len}(\bar{b}) \geq c+1} p_{\bar{b}}(S).
\]

Each of the \( \binom{v}{2} \) summands on the RHS of Eq. S19, may be characterized by two indices \( k, l \) s.t.

\[
\bar{b} = 0...010...1 \text{ for some } k < l \leq v. \quad \text{[S20]}
\]

For each one of these summands, we construct a static strategy \( T_{k,l}(\rho) = \text{Tr}_{k,l}[S_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b})(\rho)] \) that takes as input a single valid qticket \( \rho \) and submits exactly two tokens. The counterfeiting probability of this map on \( \rho \)

\[
\text{Tr}[(P_{\text{sec}}^n)^{\otimes 2} T_{k,l}(\rho)] = \text{Tr}[(P_{\text{sec}}^n)^{\otimes 2} \text{Tr}_{k,l}[S_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b})](\rho)]
\]

\[
= \text{Tr} \left[ \hat{S}_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b}) \langle \text{len}(\bar{b}) \rangle \otimes \left( b_1 P_{\text{sec}} + \bar{b}_1 P_{\text{rej}} \right) \otimes 1_H \right]
\]

\[
\geq \text{Tr} \left[ \hat{S}_{\bar{b}}(\bar{b}) \langle \text{len}(\bar{b}) \rangle \otimes \left( b_1 P_{\text{sec}} + \bar{b}_1 P_{\text{rej}} \right) \otimes 1_H \right]. \quad \text{[S21]}
\]

By averaging over \( \rho \in Q \) we obtain \( p_d(S) \leq p_d(T_{k,l}) \leq B \) and invoking Eq. S19 we obtain \( p_d(S) \leq \binom{v}{2} B \).

**Tightness.** For \( F_{\text{tol}} < 5/6 \) applying an optimal qubit cloning map \( (A(p) = \frac{1}{2} I \otimes p + \frac{1}{2} I \otimes 1 + \frac{1}{2} I \otimes p) \) on each of the individual qubits of the qticket provides a good counterfeiting probability. The plot in Fig. S2 illustrates the probability of counterfeiter to actually get two qtickets accepted when taking this approach. For each of the two counterfeited qtickets, the probability of failing verification is the cumulant of a binomial distribution \( B(N,5/6) \) up to \( F_{\text{tol}}N \) and rejection probability may be upper bounded by \( \frac{1}{2} \exp(-2N(5/6 - F_{\text{tol}})^2) \) using Hoeffding’s inequality. Even when failure of the two qtickets is anticorrelated, the probability of either of them failing verification cannot exceed the sum. Hence, the scheme cannot be made secure for \( F_{\text{tol}} < 5/6 \). Although such a scheme provides optimal forging probability when \( F_{\text{tol}} = 1 \), other schemes could in principle outperform it in terms of counterfeiting capability. However, our security result shows that asymptotically in \( N \), no other strategy may work for \( F_{\text{tol}} > 5/6 \).

**Extension: Issuing multiple identical qtickets.** Our results admit generalization to a scenario where the \( c \) identical copies of each qticket are issued and successful verification of \( c+1 \) is to be excluded. To obtain an analog of lemma 1 requires the individual qubits composing a qticket to be drawn at random from a state \( t \)-design with \( t = c + (c+1) \) (for example, \( t = 5 \) would already be needed if two identical copies are issued). The optimal \( c \to c+1 \) cloning probability for \( N \) component product states is in this case bounded by \( (\frac{c+1}{c+2})^N \). The threshold fidelity required to guarantee security is then given by \( F_{\text{tol}} > 1 - \frac{1}{N(\frac{c+1}{c+2})^N} \). For such an \( F_{\text{tol}} \), the analogous result to theorem 4 one obtained is

\[
p_{c\to c+1}(T) \leq e^{-\eta D(c+1)\mathcal{F}_{sec}}. \quad \text{[S22]}
\]

Finally, if \( v > c + 1 \) verification attempts are allowed, the probability of counterfeiting can be proven not to grow faster than \( \binom{v}{c} \). The proofs of these claims completely follow the lines that have been presented. Striving for legibility, we have limited the proof presented to \( c = 1 \), thus avoiding the notational burden imposed by the extra indices required.

**CV-Qtickets.** In this section we provide a proof that cv-qtickets are secure, not only against counterfeiting but also against any other possible double usage. We first present definitions for cv-qtickets and their verification. We then state the associated soundness and security guarantees and outline the security proof. Only the proof...
of the security statement is provided because proving soundness for cv-qtickets requires no additional techniques as compared to soundness of qtickets.

**Definition of CV-qticket.** Each cv-qticket is composed of $n \times r$ qubit pairs. Each qubit pair is prepared by choosing a state from

$$\{0, +\}, \{0, -\}, \{1, +\}, \{1, -\}, \{+, 0\}, \{-, 0\}, \{+, 1\}, \{-, 1\}$$

uniformly at random.

A full verification question for the cv-qticket will consist of $n$ randomly chosen axes from $\{X, Z\}$ each corresponding to a specific block of $r$ qubit pairs. In principle, the holder of the cv-qticket then measures the polarization of every qubit component along the corresponding requested axis and communicates the measurement outcomes to the verifier. The criterion to consider an answer correct is the following: within each of the $n$ blocks, at least $F_{tol}$ of the reported outcomes corresponding to qubits prepared in a polarization eigenstate of the inquired axis should be given correctly.

**Soundness.** The soundness result states that even under imperfect storage and readout fidelity, legitimate cv-qtickets work well as long as the fidelity loss is not too severe. Again, the CPTP maps $M_f$ will be assumed to represent the encoding, storage, and read-out of the $j$-th qubit component of the cv-qticket, with the full map over all components given by $M = \otimes_{j=1}^{n} M_f$. In the case of cv-qtickets, sufficiently many $F_{tol}$ correct answers should be provided within each block, demanding that a sufficiently good average fidelity be implemented for every single block. A random remapping of the Cartesian axes for each qubit component of a cv-qticket is also necessary and can be achieved via a random unitary (possibly from a unitary 2-design). This is required, for example, in the case where an actual physical polarization, say X, is lost faster than other components. In this case asking for the stored X polarization for all qubits in a block may yield a large failure probability even though the average storage fidelity among the qubits is sufficiently high. A random unitary remapping solves this problem and allows to connect with the average qubit storage fidelity, even in the case where only two nominal axes are used.

Given $F_I = F(M_f)$, the average fidelity of the qubit map $M_f$, we define $F_{exp,b} := N^{-1} \sum_{b} \langle \sigma_{-b} | F_{I} | \sigma_{-b} \rangle$ to be the average qubit fidelity within block $b \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Furthermore, to simplify the final expression, let us define $F_{exp} = \min_b F_{exp,b}$.

**Theorem 6. (Soundness of cv-qtickets)** As long as $F_{exp} > F_{tol}$ an honest holder implementing a map $M$ can successfully redeem cv-qtickets with a probability

$$p_{cv}^s(M) \geq \left(1 - e^{-\varepsilon D(F_{exp}||F_{tol})}\right)^n.$$

Observe that one may reduce this statement to $n$ independent statements within each block that are completely analogous to the soundness for qtickets theorem 3.

**Security.** A naive security statement expresses that the holder of a single cv-qticket is unable to produce copies from it, each with the potential of passing a verification. Because the verification of cv-qtickets is achieved by sending a classical message to a verifier, a stronger security statement is needed for cv-qtickets; it states that even with simultaneous access to two randomly chosen verification questions, the holder of a cv-qticket is exponentially unlikely to provide satisfactory answers to both. We further extend our security claim, to an even more adverse scenario; the holder of a cv-qticket has simultaneous access to $v$ independent verification questions and may proceed to answer them in any chosen order. Moreover failing in verification attempts does not forbid the holder from further attempts that may possibly be performed relying on the information accumulated from previous verification outcomes.

Let $S$ be a mathematical object denoting the counterfeiting strategy taken by the holder of a valid cv-qticket. We will denote by $p_{cv}^s(S)$, the probability that strategy $S$ leads to two or more successful verifications when engaging in $v$ verification attempts with possibly independent verifiers. The probability is taken over the random generation of cv-qtickets, of verification questions and of measurement outcomes (Born’s rule). The security statement is then as follows.

**Theorem 7. (Security of cv-qtickets)** For any counterfeiting strategy $S$ and tolerance parameter $F_{tol} > \frac{1}{1+1/\sqrt{v}}$ we have

$$p_{cv}^s(S) \leq \left(\frac{v}{2}\right)^2 \left(1 + e^{-\varepsilon D(F_{exp}||F_{tol})}\right)^n.$$
Bob needs to choose an answer \( a \in A \) and may use his copy of state \( \rho_a \) to do so. The most general strategy that Bob can take according to the laws of quantum mechanics is to perform a positive operator valued measurement (POVM). We will consider post-selected POVMs, as opposed to a physical POVM, as those that may fail to produce a measurement outcome. That is, whereas a physical POVM always produces an outcome from the expected set, for post-selected POVM some “invalid” outcomes are discarded and excluded from statistics.

In order to express the random preparation of states by Alice we first define the notion of an indexed ensemble.

Definition 5: (Indexed Ensemble) We will say that \( q \) is an ensemble on \( \mathcal{H} \) indexed over \( S \) iff \( \forall s \in S : q(s) \) is a positive operator on \( \mathcal{H} \) and \( \sum_{s \in S} \text{Tr}[q(s)] = 1 \). Note that if \( q \) is an indexed ensemble, then \( \rho = \sum_s q(s) \) is a normalized density matrix. Although Alice gives a specific state \( q(s) \) to Bob, because Bob does not know \( s \), he does not know which one has been received. The state \( \rho = \text{Tr}_{\text{Alice}}[\sum_{s \in S} \otimes q(s)] \) will be called the reduced density matrix of \( q \) because it corresponds to tracing out Alice’s classically correlated subsystem containing the index \( s \).

In other words, a physical/selective projection \( \mathcal{P} \) indexed over \( A \) is simply a physical/post-selected POVM equipped with an interpretation for each possible measurement outcome in terms of possible answers in \( a \in A \).

Definition 6: (Selective and Physical Projections) We will say that \( \mathcal{P} \) is a selective projection indexed over \( A \) iff \( \forall a \in A, \mathcal{P}(a) \) are bounded positive semidefinite operators on \( \mathcal{H} \). It will also be a physical projection iff \( \sum_a \mathcal{P}(a) = 1 \).

Note that no normalization has been imposed for selective projections because induced probability distributions are normalized a posteriori. An indexed ensemble and a projection on the same Hilbert space induce a joint probability distribution over the indexes \( S \times A \) of prepared states and provided answers.

Definition 7: (Induced Probability Distribution) Let \( q \) be an ensemble on \( \mathcal{H} \) indexed over \( S \) and let \( \mathcal{P} \) be a projection on \( \mathcal{H} \) indexed over \( A \). Then

\[
p(s_0, a_0) = \frac{\text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a_0)q(s_0)]}{\sum_a \text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)q(s_0)]}, \tag{S23}\]

is a probability distribution over \( S \times A \) that will be denoted by \( p = (q, \mathcal{P}) \) and is undefined unless \( \sum_a \text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)q(s)] > 0 \).

Furthermore, note that for physical projections the denominator in Eq. S23 is 1 and the marginal of the resulting distribution over \( S \) is \( p(s) = \sum_a p(s, a) = \text{Tr}[q(s)] \), which is independent of \( \mathcal{P} \).

Definition 8: (Weighted Quantum Retrieval Games) Let \( q \) be an ensemble on \( \mathcal{H} \) indexed over \( S \). Consider a utility function \( \sigma \in S \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \). Then the pair \( \mathcal{G} = (q, \sigma) \) is a weighted quantum retrieval game. A WQRG is also a QRG when \( \sigma \in S \times A \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \).

The value of a game \( \mathcal{G} \) w.r.t. a projection \( \mathcal{P} \) is the average utility obtained by Bob by using a certain measurement strategy \( \mathcal{P} \). This value is given by the expectancy of the utility function \( \sigma \) over the joint distribution of prepared states and measurement outcomes.

Definition 9: The value of game \( \mathcal{G} = (q, \sigma) \) w.r.t. projection \( \mathcal{P} \) is defined as

\[
\text{Val}(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{P}) = \sum_{s,a} p(s,a)\sigma(s,a), \tag{S24}\]

where \( p = (q, \mathcal{P}) \) is the induced probability distribution.

We now define the optimum value achievable by Bob for two distinct conditions depending on whether selective or physical projections are allowed.

Definition 10: The selective (respectively physical) value of a game \( \mathcal{G} \) are defined as

\[
\text{Sel}(\mathcal{G}) = \sup_{\mathcal{P} \in \text{Selective projections}} \text{Val}(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{P}), \tag{S25}\]
\[
\text{Phys}(\mathcal{G}) = \sup_{\mathcal{P} \in \text{Physical projections}} \text{Val}(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{P}). \tag{S26}\]

Note that according to this definition \( \text{Sel}(\mathcal{G}) \geq \text{Phys}(\mathcal{G}) \) because the supremum is taken over a larger set. However, for certain tailored games, the selective and physical values will coincide. The advantage of selective values is that they may be straightforwardly computed and are more amenable to computational results. If Bob is forced to provide an answer, he can only achieve the physical value of a game. If Bob is allowed to abort the game after measuring his state \( \rho_a \) and aborted games are not considered when calculating his expected utility then he will be able to achieve the selective value.

The following result provides an explicit formula to calculate the selective value of a game. In this sense, it is a generalization of lemma 4.3 in (5).

Theorem 8: (Selective Value of a Game) Let \( \mathcal{G} = (q, \sigma) \) be a WQRG with \( \sum_s \sigma(s) = 1 \). Define \( O(a) = \sum_s \sigma(s,a)p^{-1/2}q(s)p^{-1/2} \). Then the selective value of \( \mathcal{G} \) may be calculated as \( \text{Sel}(\mathcal{G}) = \max_a \|O(a)\| \), where \( \| \cdot \| \) denotes the operator norm.

Proof: We first use the definition of the value of a game \( \mathcal{G} \) w.r.t. \( \mathcal{P} \), expand the induced probability distribution and move the sum over \( s \) inside the trace

\[
\text{Val}(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{P}) = \sum_a \frac{\text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)\sigma(s,a)q(s)]}{\sum_s \text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)q(s)]}. \tag{S27}\]

We define \( \mathcal{F} \) such that \( \bar{\mathcal{P}}(a) = p^{1/2}P(a)p^{1/2} \). Using this definition and that of \( \rho \) and \( O_a \) we may rewrite

\[
\text{Val}(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{P}) = \sum_a \frac{\text{Tr}[\mathcal{F}(a)\sigma(a)\rho]}{\sum_s \text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)q(s)]} \leq \max_a \frac{\text{Tr}[\mathcal{F}(a)\sigma(a)\rho]}{\text{Tr}[\mathcal{P}(a)]} \leq \max_a \|O(a)\|. \tag{S28}\]

The first inequality uses the positivity of all summands. For the second inequality we note that \( \mathcal{P}(a) \) must be positive semidefinite and the variational definition of operator norm of the positive semidefinite operator \( O(a) \). Equality can be achieved by taking \( \mathcal{F}(a_0) \) to be a projector onto the highest eigenvalue subspace of \( O(a_0) \) if \( \|O(a_0)\| = \max_a \|O(a)\| \) and taking \( \mathcal{F}(a_0) = 0 \) otherwise.
The theorem provides an explicit construction of a projection achieving the selective value of a game. Furthermore, the proof allows us to derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the selective and physical values of a game coincide.

**Corollary 9.** Given a retrieval game \( G \), we have that \( \text{Sel}(G) = \text{Phys}(G) \) if and only if there exist positive \( \mathcal{P}(a) \) such that

\[
O(a)\mathcal{P}(a) = \text{Sel}(G)\mathcal{P}(a) \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_a \mathcal{P}(a) = \rho \quad \text{[S29]}
\]

We now turn to the systematic composition of retrieval games in the form of product and threshold games. Composition provides a way to construct more elaborate retrieval games together with bounds on their associated values. A natural definition of tensor product may be given for indexed ensembles, projections, and utility functions.

\[
(q_1 \otimes q_2)(s_1, s_2) = q_1(s_1) \otimes q_2(s_2) \quad \text{[S30]}
\]

\[
\mathcal{P}_1 \otimes \mathcal{P}_2(a_1, a_2) = \mathcal{P}_1(a_1) \otimes \mathcal{P}_2(a_2) \quad \text{[S31]}
\]

\[
(\sigma_1 \otimes \sigma_2)((s_1, s_2), (a_1, a_2)) = \sigma_1(s_1, a_1)\sigma_2(s_2, a_2) \quad \text{[S32]}
\]

These definitions have the property that the tensor product of physical projections is a physical projection and that the induced probability distribution of two tensor product is the tensor product of the individual induced probability distributions:

\[
\langle (q_1 \otimes q_2), (\mathcal{P}_1 \otimes \mathcal{P}_2) \rangle = \langle q_1, \mathcal{P}_1 \rangle \otimes \langle q_2, \mathcal{P}_2 \rangle.
\]

**Definition 11: (Tensor Product WQRG)** Let \( G_1 = (q_1, \sigma_1) \) and \( G_2 = (q_2, \sigma_2) \). We define the tensor product WQRG \( G_1 \otimes G_2 \) as

\[
G_1 \otimes G_2 = (q_1 \otimes q_2, \sigma_1 \otimes \sigma_2).
\]

**Proposition 10. (Tensor Product Selective Value)** The selective value of a tensor product game is the product of the selective values of the independent games.

\[
\text{Sel}(G_1 \otimes G_2) = \text{Sel}(G_1)\text{Sel}(G_2)
\]

**Proof:** By using the definition of \( O(a) \) in theorem 8 with respect to the WQRG involved we obtain

\[
\|O(a_1, a_2)\| = \|O_1(a_1) \otimes O_2(a_2)\| = \|O_1(a_1)\|\|O_2(a_2)\|.
\]

Maximizing over \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) on both sides theorem 8 provides the desired equality.

The selective value of the product game is attained by the tensor product of projections, each achieving the respective selective values.

**Corollary 11. (Tensor Product Physical Value)** If \( \text{Phys}(G_1) = \text{Sel}(G_1) \) and \( \text{Phys}(G_2) = \text{Sel}(G_2) \) then \( \text{Phys}(G_1 \otimes G_2) = \text{Sel}(G_1 \otimes G_2) \).

Given a direct product game and a projection for it one may consider the inverse procedure of defining a projection on one of the subcomponents of the game.

**Definition 12: (Restriction of a Projection)** Let \( \mathcal{P} \) be a projection on \( \mathcal{H}_1 \otimes \mathcal{H}_2 \) indexed over \( A_1 \times A_2 \). Furthermore, let \( \rho_2 \) be a normalized density matrix on \( \mathcal{H}_2 \). We define the restriction \( \mathcal{P}_1 \) with respect to \( \rho_2 \) and \( A_2 \) as

\[
\mathcal{P}_1(a_1) = \sum_{a_2} \text{Tr}_2(\mathcal{P}(a_1, a_2)I \otimes \rho_2).
\]

By abuse of notation, if \( \rho = \rho_1 \otimes \rho_2 \) is a normalized product state in \( \mathcal{H}_1 \otimes \mathcal{H}_2 \), we may define the restriction of \( \mathcal{P} \) with respect to the normalized tensor factors of \( \rho \). This is the case for the reduced density matrix of product indexed ensembles. By restricting a projection one obtains a new projection that induces the same reduced probability distribution.

**Lemma 3. (Restriction of a Projection)** Let \( \mathcal{P}_1 \) be the restriction of \( \mathcal{P} \) with respect to \( \rho_2 \) and \( A_2 \), where \( \rho_2 \) is the reduced density matrix of \( \rho \). Then

\[
\langle q_1, \mathcal{P}_1\rangle(s_1, a_1) = \sum_{s_2, a_2} \langle q_1 \otimes q_2, \mathcal{P}\rangle(s_1, s_2, a_1, a_2).
\]

**Theorem 12. (Selective Value of Threshold QRG)** Let \( G_j = (q_j, \sigma_j) \) be WQRGs s.t. \( \sigma_j \in (S_j, A_j) \to [0, 1] \) and \( \text{Sel}(G_j) = \delta_j \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Furthermore take \( \delta = n^{-1} \sum_j \delta_j \) and \( \delta \leq \gamma \leq 1 \). Define the QRG \( G = (\otimes q_j, \sigma_j) \) with a tensor product ensemble distribution and boolean utility function

\[
\sigma_j(s, a) = \left( \sum_{j=1}^n \sigma_j(s_j, a_j) \geq \gamma n \right).
\]

Then we have \( \text{Sel}(G) \leq 2e^{-nD(\gamma||\delta)} \).

**Proof:** The direct product indexed ensemble \( \rho = \otimes q_j \) and projection \( \mathcal{P} \) induce a normalized probability distribution over \( S \times A \) given by

\[
p(s, a) = \sum_{s_j} \text{Tr}(\mathcal{P}(a|s)\rho(s_j|s)).
\]

Define the dependent random variable \( X_j \) to be \( \sigma_j(s_j, a_j) \) where \( s_j \) and \( a_j \) are taken according to this probability distribution. For any \( S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\} \), we may define \( \mathcal{P}_S \) as the restriction of the projection \( \mathcal{P} \) to the subsystems specified by \( S \) with respect to \( \rho_2 \). By proposition 10 we have that

\[
\text{Exp} \left[ \prod_{j \in S} X_j \right] \leq \text{Val}(\otimes G_j, \rho|S) \leq \prod_{j \in S} \delta_j. \quad \text{[S33]}
\]

Using theorem 1 and definition 9 we obtain

\[
\text{Val}(G_j, \mathcal{P}) = \Pr \left[ \sum_j X_j \geq \gamma n \right] \leq 2e^{-nD(\gamma||\delta)}. \quad \text{[S34]}
\]

Because this is true for arbitrary \( \mathcal{P} \) we conclude that \( \text{Sel}(G_j) \leq 2e^{-nD(\gamma||\delta)} \).

**CV-qticket qubit pair building block.** Consider a game in which Alice transfers to Bob one of the following states chosen at random:

\[
S = \{(0, +), (0, -), (1, +), (1, -), (+, 0), (-, 0), (+, 1), (-, 1)\}.
\]
each with probability 1/8. Alice then asks Bob for the Z polarization of both qubits, possible answers being $A = \{00, \text{10}, \text{11} \}$. An answer is correct if it coincides in the polarization of the qubit prepared in a Z eigenstate. Bob can always answer the question correctly by measuring both qubits in the Z basis.

The quantum retrieval game formalism applies to this problem although one must admit that it is like cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. We call this game $\mathcal{G}_Z = (q, \sigma_Z)$ where we have $\sum q(s) = p = 1/4$, and $\text{Tr}(q(s)) = 1/8$ for all $s \in S$. A formal definition of the utility function $\mathcal{G}_Z$ can be given as $\sigma_Z(s, a) = (s_1 \equiv a_1$ or $s_2 \equiv a_2)$. We first define the operators $O(a)$ from theorem 8. Due to symmetry we may restrict to considering one such operator

$$O(00) = 4(q(0, +) + q(0, -) + q(+, 0) + q(-, 0)) \quad [S35]$$

and find that $\|O(00)\| = 1$ that is a nondegenerate eigenvalue for all $O(a)$. The fact that the four corresponding eigenspaces are orthogonal confirms that 1 is also the physical value of the game.

The same trivial value of 1 can be achieved for the game in which Alice requests the X direction polarization of the states. We will call this game $\mathcal{G}_X = (q, \sigma_X)$. The problem becomes interesting if Bob is requested provide a guess for both complementary polarizations. There are two relevant possibilities, both of which will require Bob to give an answer twice as long as before. The first scenario describes the best case probability of Bob answering both questions correctly and may be modeled by a QRG with utility function

$$\mathcal{G}_\Lambda = (q, \sigma_\Lambda) \quad \sigma_\Lambda(s, a, a' z) = \sigma_X(s, a) \land \sigma_Z(s, a', z).$$

In the second scenario we are interested in the average number of questions answered correctly when two complementary questions are posed and may be modeled by the WQRG with utility function

$$\mathcal{G}_{\text{avg}} = (q, \sigma_{\text{avg}}) \quad \sigma_{\text{avg}}(s, a, a' z) = \frac{\sigma_X(s, a) + \sigma_Z(s, a', z)}{2}.$$ 

Thanks to symmetries one need only calculate a single $\|O(a)\|$ and for concreteness we choose $O(+0)$. For the conjunction QRG we obtain

$$O(+00) = 4(q(0, +) + q(+, 0)) \quad \text{and} \quad \|O(+00)\| = 3/4.$$ 

For the average WQRG we obtain

$$O(+00) = 2[2q(0, +) + 2q(+, 0) + q(0, -) + q(-, 0)$$

$$+ q(+, 1) + q(1, +)] \quad [S36]$$

and $\|O(+00)\| = 1/2 + 1/\sqrt{8} \approx 0.8536$, precisely the optimal fidelity for covariant qubit cloning (i.e., cloning of equatorial qubits). On the other hand, if Bob is asked the same question twice instead of complementary questions it is clear that he will be able to repeat two correct answers. All in all, if Bob is asked complementary question half of the time and coinciding questions half of the time he will be able to emulate an average fidelity of $3/4 + \sqrt{2}/8 \approx 0.927$.

Indeed, once we have defined a concrete WQRG, calculating its selective value becomes an exercise thanks to theorem 8. Furthermore, if the game has sufficient symmetry it will be possible to prove a coinciding physical value for the game.

**CV-ticket.** We will first bound the probability of answering two of these randomly chosen questions by bounding the selective value of the corresponding retrieval game. As an auxiliary initial step, we bound the value of a game where $r$ complementary questions are asked on $r$ qubit pairs (corresponding to the case in which the two random questions in a block are complementary).

$$\sigma_{F_{\text{rel}}}(\tilde{s}, \tilde{a}(X)) = \left( \sum_{j=1}^r \sigma_j^{(X)}(s_j, a_j^{(X)}) \right) \geq F_{\text{tolr}}$$

$$\sigma_{F_{\text{rel}}}(\tilde{s}, \tilde{a}(Z)) = \left( \sum_{j=1}^r \sigma_j^{(Z)}(s_j, a_j^{(Z)}) \right) \geq F_{\text{tolr}}$$

$$\sigma_{F_{\text{rel}}}(\tilde{s}, \tilde{a}(\bar{Z})) = \left( \sum_{j=1}^r \sigma_j^{(\bar{Z})}(s_j, a_j^{(\bar{Z})}) \right) \geq F_{\text{tolr}} \quad [S37]$$

We will not calculate the selective value exactly but give a bound in terms of theorem 12. In order for the two block answers to be correct, among the two, at least $2F_{\text{tolr}}$ answers should have been provided correctly for individual qubit pairs. Such a condition is weaker because it only imposes that the sum among the two block answers be sufficiently large, not necessarily implying that they are both above the threshold.

$$\sigma_{F_{\text{rel}}}(\tilde{s}, \tilde{a}(\bar{Z})) \leq \left( \sum_{j=1}^r \sigma_j^{\text{avg}}(s_j, a_j^{(X)}), a_j^{(Z)}) \right) \geq F_{\text{tolr}} \quad [S38]$$

The description on the right hand side has precisely the form required for theorem 12. We conclude that the selective value and hence the probability within any strategy of providing valid answers to two complementary questions for the same block is upper bounded by $2 \exp[-rD(F_{\text{tol}})/1/2 + 1/\sqrt{8}]$ (for $F_{\text{tol}} > 1/2 + 1/\sqrt{8})$.

Given two randomly chosen questions for a block there is a probability of $1/2$ that they will coincide and a probability $1/2$ that they will be complementary. Taking this into account, the probability for a dishonest holder to correctly answer two such randomly chosen block questions is upper bounded by $1/2 + \exp[-rD(F_{\text{tol}})/1/2 + 1/\sqrt{8}]$. By taking $r$ sufficiently large, this value can be guaranteed to be smaller then 1. Hence, the probability of correctly answering $n$ such randomly chosen threshold question pairs will be upper bounded by $B = (1/2 + \exp[-rD(F_{\text{tol}})/1/2 + 1/\sqrt{8}])^n$, which can be made exponentially close to 1 in $n$.

**Combinatorial bound on choosing and learning.** The formulation presented adequately models a scenario in which the holder of a cv-ticket does not receive any feedback from the verifiers. However, if the holder of a cv-ticket can engage in several verification protocols, new possibilities arise that should be taken into account.

Firstly, by simultaneously engaging in several $(v)$ verification protocols with different verifiers, the holder may simultaneously have access to $v$ challenge questions. The holder may then, for instance, choose the most similar questions and attempt to answer these. Furthermore, by successively participating in $v$ verification protocols the holder can choose to perform verifications sequentially and wait for the outcome of the $k$-th before choosing which question to answer as the $k + 1$-th and providing an answer for it.

In general, if the holder engages in $v$ verification attempts, he will receive $v$ random questions providing no additional information on the cv-ticket. There are $(v)$ possible question pairs among these, each of which can be seen as randomly chosen. Thus if no feedback is used the probability of answering at least one of these pairs correctly is upper bounded by $(v)/B$. An example scenario where this bound is relatively tight is when $r$ is very large and $n$ is relatively small. In this case, the probability of answering two randomly chosen questions is well approximated by the collision probability $2^{-n}$ (i.e., the probability that two ques-
or more accepted answers is upper bounded by the interactive strategy with a rate answer up to that point). Hence, the total probability for an answer, each of which can be simulated statically (i.e., by assuming the given feedback and fixing a corresponding POVM to generate answer up to that point). Hence, the total probability for an answer, each of which can be simulated statically (i.e., by assuming the given feedback and fixing a corresponding POVM to generate answer up to that point). Hence, the total probability for an answer, each of which can be simulated statically (i.e., by assuming the given feedback and fixing a corresponding POVM to generate answer up to that point).

It may seem artificial for verifiers to select a random question each time. Randomness is important in order to avoid revealing information about the issued cv-qticket. However, the verifier may choose a random question once and for all and ask it until it is answered correctly. Once it has been answered correctly, the verifier knows that the cv-qticket has already been redeemed and can thus reject all subsequent verification attempts. Such a scheme resembles existing protocols for prepaid telephone cards. However, the quantum case provides an advantage because one may have multiple verifiers that do not communicate. In a simple example with two verifiers, two composite questions may be chosen such that they are complementary on every qubit pair (i.e., one question is chosen at random and uniquely determines the other).

Applications. Our quantum information application attempts to reduce quantum requirements to a minimum. However, even prepare and measure qubit memories remain technologically challenging. For problems admitting a classical solution, such an approach is likely to be technologically less demanding. In other words, relevant applications for prepare and measure quantum memories will be those solving problems for which no classical solutions are known. In this section we discuss some problems with classical solutions and propose refinement of such problems for which no classical solution is possible.

Enforcing single usage with a single verifier. For some applications, the no cloning of quantum information is only an apparent advantage. Our ticket and cv-qticket constructions can guarantee an exponentially small double usage probability. However, such a guarantee may be trivially enforced classically for scenarios where there is a single verifier or if the verifiers have access to realtime communication with a centralized database. In this case, a randomly chosen classical ticket has equally good properties. After a ticket is successfully redeemed once, it can be removed from the central database, making it invalid for any successive verification attempt. In fact this classical strategy is widely used for credit: prepaid phone lines with a client calling a toll free number and typing the purchased ticket number in order to credit a telephone account. Thus in such scenarios, the quantum strategy does not provide additional protection with respect to a classical solution.

Multiple noncommunicating verifiers. In scenarios with multiple noncommunicating verifiers, (cv-)tickets provide a solution to a problem where all classical approaches fail. We describe a witness protection program as an example of how such a scenario might look.

In a witness protection program, a governmental institution decides to give asylum to a key eyewitness to whom an unforgeable quantum token is issued. This token can be used by the witness (holder) to claim asylum in any of a set of participating hotels (verifiers). The issuer also provides all hotels with the necessary information to verify the tokens. When using the token, neither the eyewitness nor the chosen hotel wish to divulge the locale where the witness is hosted, thus protecting both from being targets of an attack. In particular, communication is suspended between participating hotels as well as with the issuing authority. Any classical solution cannot prevent a sufficiently resourceful holder from making copies of the received token, thus hotels are forced to communicate in order to avoid its double use. In this case, a quantum solution based on unforgeable tokens is the sole possibility to satisfy these unique constraints. A protocol satisfying such constraints is illustrated in Fig. S3.

Reduced availability under sporadic verification. In principle, a centralized database may guarantee that classical ticket is only redeemed once. However, there are situations where the ticket should be available only to one holder at a time and the nonclonable nature of a qticket allows enforcing this. One such example is the sporadic control of tickets required for a given service. For concreteness, imagine a qticket that is valid for making a payment in a transportation network. Commuters are sporadically controlled, at which point if they are found to have an invalid qticket they are charged an important fine, whereas if they are found to hold a valid qticket, they are provided with a fresh substitute. If the transportation tickets are classical, sporadic control cannot avoid counterfeited copies in the hands of colluding commuters from circulating simultaneously. The deceiving commuters need only communicate classically among each other before and after they are controlled, effectively sharing a single classical ticket to make use of the service multiple times*. In contrast the unavailability of long distance quantum communication would disallow their sharing a qticket in such a way (i.e., each valid qticket may only be at one place at a time).

The quantum credit card. Having developed a single verification, noise tolerant, nonforgeable token, such as the cv-qticket, it is now possible to examine generalizations to interesting composite protocols. For instance, Gavinsky's proposal ([5]) allows for multiple verification rounds to be performed on a single token, while also ensuring that the token cannot be split into two independently valid subparts. Such a construction may be seen as a quantum credit card. Indeed, the classical communication that takes place with the issuer (bank) to verify the cv-qticket (via "challenge" questions) may be intentionally publicized to a merchant who needs to be convinced of the card’s validity. An alternate possibility is to follow the original interpretation as a quantum cash token where verification is performed by the receiver each time the “money” changes hands.

Excluding eavesdroppers. Although qtickets do not provide additional advantage against dishonest holder in the scenario of a single verifier quantumness may provide an advantage against eavesdropping and untrusted communication. In order to make online banking more secure, Banks routinely use TANs (transaction authentication numbers) as an additional security measure. The bank sends its client a list of TANs via postal service in addition to an online password that is set up via another channel. Each time a bank transaction is requested online by the client, the bank requests a TAN from the list to guarantee the authenticity of the transaction. An impostor then needs to know both a secret password used by the user and some TANs, thus increasing the difficulty to successfully impersonate a transaction with respect to any single security measure. However, because TANs are classical objects it is conceivable that an eavesdropper may learn them while remaining undetected (imagine an eavesdrop-

*If the classical ticket is not renewed upon control even communication is unnecessary.
per taking X-ray pictures of the correspondence). As a result, the additional security measure becomes ineffective with some effort of the eavesdropper.

This problem can be straightforwardly resolved by using quantum prepare and measure memories. Even if a cv-qticket is sent via an untrusted optical fiber or postal service, the receiver may openly communicate with the issuer and sacrifice some of the received qubits in order to obtain a bound on how much information could have leaked to eavesdroppers. Quantum key distribution (QKD) takes precisely such an approach to obtain a statistical bound on the information that has leaked out. Gavinsky’s Q scheme, allowing multiple verification rounds may be re-interpreted as quantum TAN lists. The holder of a quantum TAN list may verify its validity and perform a transaction by publicly communicating with the bank. If the quantum TAN list is verified to be legitimate, then the probability of an eavesdropper getting verified by using the leaked information will be negligible (exponentially small). In turn, the cv-qtickets described in the main text and appendix may be used as basic building blocks for such a scheme in the presence of noise.


Fig. S1. (A) We schematically illustrate how a dynamical strategy \( S \) works. Each step of a strategy (gray rectangles) is a CPTP map \( S_\emptyset \) that depends on the classical outcome \( b \) of previous verifications. The first map \( S_\emptyset \) takes an original qticket \( \rho \) as input, whereas subsequent steps rely on an internal memory state of the holder. The content of internal memory could range from no information at all to a full original qticket and a detailed register of previous submissions. The verifiers have a fixed strategy \( \Pi^\emptyset \) that consists of applying the measurement \( f_{\text{acc}}^\emptyset, f_{\text{rej}}^\emptyset \) and only returning the classical boolean measurement outcome. (B) By fixing the classical input \( b \) to the strategy, a CPTP map \( \rho \rightarrow H_{\otimes \text{len}(b) + 1} \) is constructed, corresponding to one possible partial application of the strategy \( S \). This CPTP map produces \( \text{len}(b) + 1 \) possibly entangled outputs in \( H_{\otimes \text{len}(b) + 1} \) from a single input qticket.

Fig. S2. We numerically calculate the probability of accepting two copies of a qticket when the adversary strategy is assumed to be independently cloning each of the \( N \) qubits using an optimal cloning map. We see that the probability of producing two accepted qtickets approaches a step function at \( \frac{5}{6} \) with \( N \).

Fig. S3. 1) The issuing entity hands a qticket to the key witness. 2) It provides the hotels with the secret classical description that will be used to verify it. 3a) An honest witness chooses a hotel and physically transfers the qticket for verification. It will be accepted as long as the level of accumulated noise is below threshold. 3b) A dishonest witness will fail to counterfeit his/her qticket to provide accommodation for an additional guest. However, there is no way of avoiding a valid qticket from changing hands.