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Opportunities for Price Manipulation by Aggregators in Electricity Markets

Azizan Ruhi, Navid and Chen, Niangjun and Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy and Wierman, Adam (2016) Opportunities for Price Manipulation by Aggregators in Electricity Markets. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 44 (2). pp. 49-51. ISSN 0163-5999. doi:10.1145/3003977.3003995.

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Aggregators are playing an increasingly crucial role for integrating renewable generation into power systems. However, the intermittent nature of renewable generation makes market interactions of aggregators difficult to monitor and regulate, raising concerns about potential market manipulations. In this paper, we address this issue by quantifying the profit an aggregator can obtain through strategic curtailment of generation in an electricity market. We show that, while the problem of maximizing the benefit from curtailment is hard in general, efficient algorithms exist when the topology of the network is radial (acyclic). Further, we highlight that significant increases in profit can be obtained through strategic curtailment in practical settings.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Azizan Ruhi, Navid0000-0002-4299-2963
Chen, Niangjun0000-0002-2289-9737
Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy0000-0002-1328-4677
Additional Information:Copyright is held by author/owner(s).
Subject Keywords:Aggregators, renewables, optimal curtailment, market power, locational marginal price (LMP)
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160630-135555342
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Navid Azizan Ruhi, Niangjun Chen, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, and Adam Wierman. 2016. Opportunities for Price Manipulation by Aggregators in Electricity Markets. SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 44, 2 (September 2016), 49-51. DOI:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:68789
Deposited By: Joy Painter
Deposited On:30 Jun 2016 21:24
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 04:04

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