Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 1 . pp. 259-287. ISSN 1094-2939 http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98
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We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata.
|Additional Information:||"Reprinted, with permission, from the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 1 copyright 1998 by Annual Reviews, www.annualreviews.org" This paper was completed while the second author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant SBR-9601236.|
|Subject Keywords:||core existence, Nash equilibrium, minimal democracy|
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|Deposited By:||Archive Administrator|
|Deposited On:||14 Sep 2005|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 08:41|
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