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Communication in the Presence of Jamming-An Information-Theoretic Approach

McEliece, Robert J. (1983) Communication in the Presence of Jamming-An Information-Theoretic Approach. In: Secure Digital Communications. International Centre for Mechanical Sciences. No.279. Springer , Vienna, pp. 127-166. ISBN 978-3-211-81784-1.

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In traditional information theoretic studies, the channel is entirely passive, though possibly quite complex probabilistically. However, it sometimes happens in practice that the channel is partially controlled by an adversary (the Jammer) whose goal is to do everything in his power to make communication difficult. This possibility leads to a whole host of interesting mathematical and-engineering problems, and in this paper we will study a few of these. In the next section, we will introduce a two-person zero-sum game with mutual information as the payoff function. The first player (the Communicator) wants to maximize this function, and the second player (the Jammer) wants to minimize it. Since mutual information is convex-concave in just the right way, a generalization of Von Neumann’s minimax theorem turns out to guarantee the existence of jointly optimal saddlepoint strategies for the players. We show that these strategies are memory-less for both players.

Item Type:Book Section
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Additional Information:© 1983 Springer-Verlag Wien. A portion of this work was supported by the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract N00014-79-C-0424, while I was employed by the University of Illinois.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Joint Services Electronics ProgramN00014-79-C-0424
Subject Keywords:Mutual Information; Optimal Strategy; Payoff Function; Code Rate; Processing Gain
Series Name:International Centre for Mechanical Sciences
Issue or Number:279
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20200204-155745654
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:101122
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:05 Feb 2020 15:49
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:59

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