Learning competitive equilibrium in laboratory exchange economies

Crockett, Sean (2008) Learning competitive equilibrium in laboratory exchange economies. Economic Theory, 34 (1). pp. 157-180. ISSN 0938-2259. doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0142-2. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200325-091200709

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Abstract

A laboratory market for two goods is instituted to examine the hypothesis that individuals will eventually coordinate on the induced competitive equilibrium. The mechanism for exchange strongly restricts the space of agent actions, facilitating the identification of decision rules. Evidence for learning competitive equilibrium is mixed due to strong heterogeneity in decision making. Some subjects forego immediately available gains when they expect the market to move in a more favorable direction, a condition necessary for coordinating on the competitive outcome. However, a majority do not, and many are content to satisfice, though the means to do better was reasonably transparent.

Item Type:

Article

Related URLs:

URL	URL Type	Description
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0142-2	DOI	Article
https://rdcu.be/b3eo8	Publisher	Free ReadCube access
https://ssrn.com/abstract=929184	SSRN	Discussion Paper

Additional Information:

© 2007 Springer-Verlag. Received: 22 February 2005; Accepted: 26 June 2006; Published online: 21 July 2006. I gratefully acknowledge the advice and tutelage of John Duffy and Stephen Spear, and would also like to thank David Grether, Dan Houser, Michael Peress, Bryan Routledge, Shyam Sunder, and participants at the Midwest Theory meetings (Bloomington) and the ESA regional meetings (Tucson) for useful feedback. Two patient and insightful anonymous referees have helped to greatly improve this paper and my future written endeavors. This project was financially supported by the Department of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University, the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics at George Mason University, and the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory at Caltech, as well as by Stephen Spear. Finally, special thanks is owed to Allen Geary, Jr. for co-developing the software used in these experiments, and to the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory for use of its facilities.

Funders:

Funding Agency	Grant Number
Carnegie Mellon University	UNSPECIFIED
George Mason University	UNSPECIFIED
Caltech Social and Information Sciences Laboratory	UNSPECIFIED
Stephen Spear	UNSPECIFIED

Subject Keywords:

Disequilibrium; Learning; Zero intelligence; Experimental economics

Issue or Number:

Classification Code:

JEL: C91; C92; D50; D83

DOI:

10.1007/s00199-006-0142-2

Record Number:

CaltechAUTHORS:20200325-091200709

Persistent URL:

https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200325-091200709

Official Citation:

Crockett, S. Learning competitive equilibrium in laboratory exchange economies. Economic Theory 34, 157–180 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0142-2

Usage Policy:

No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.

ID Code:

102102

Collection:

CaltechAUTHORS

Deposited By:

Tony Diaz

Deposited On:

25 Mar 2020 17:16

Last Modified:

16 Nov 2021 18:08

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