CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

Anderson, Christopher M. and Camerer, Colin F. (2001) Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games. In: Advances in Experimental Markets. Studies in Economic Theory. No.15. Springer , Berlin, pp. 209-238. ISBN 978-3-642-62657-9. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-092458495

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-092458495

Abstract

We apply Camerer and Ho’s experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model of learning to extensive-form signaling games. Since these games often have many equilibria, logical ‘refinements’ have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur. Brandts and Holt conjectured that belief formation could lead to less refined equilibria, and confirmed their conjecture experimentally. Our adaptation of EWA to signaling games includes a formalization of the BrandtsHolt belief formation idea as a special case. We find that the Brandts-Holt dynamic captures the direction of switching from one strategy to another, but does not capture the rate at which switching occurs. EWA does better at predicting the rate of switching (and also forecasts better than reinforcement models). Extensions of EWA which update unchosen signals by different functions of the set of unobserved foregone payoffs further improve predictive accuracy.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_11DOIArticle
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110208-083911443Related ItemJournal Article
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-160858318Related ItemWorking Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Subject Keywords:Learning; Game theory experiments; Signaling games; Equilibrium refinement
Series Name:Studies in Economic Theory
Issue or Number:15
Classification Code:JEL: C72; C92
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-092458495
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-092458495
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:103129
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:12 May 2020 18:59
Last Modified:12 May 2020 18:59

Repository Staff Only: item control page