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Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games

Plott, Charles R. and Williamson, Dean V. (2001) Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games. In: Advances in Experimental Markets. Studies in Economic Theory. No.15. Springer , Berlin, pp. 159-180. ISBN 978-3-642-62657-9. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597

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Abstract

The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concems how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_9DOIArticle
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140224-140218171Related ItemJournal Article
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-145234749Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Subject Keywords:Compatibility of markets and games; Simultaneous equilibration; Dynamic adjustment processes; Institutions
Series Name:Studies in Economic Theory
Issue or Number:15
Classification Code:JEL: C72; C90
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:103150
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:12 May 2020 21:28
Last Modified:12 May 2020 21:28

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