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Preferences for the resolution of uncertainty and the timing of information

Nielsen, Kirby (2020) Preferences for the resolution of uncertainty and the timing of information. Journal of Economic Theory, 189 . Art. No. 105090. ISSN 0022-0531. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200716-095432931

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[img] PDF (Instructions that were read out loud to subjects in the Lottery treatment) - Supplemental Material
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[img] PDF (Instructions that were read out loud to subjects in the Information Structure treatment) - Supplemental Material
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[img] PDF (Instructions that were read out loud to subjects in the Risk and Time Preference Elicitation. These instructions were the same in both the Lottery and Information Structure treatments) - Supplemental Material
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[img] PDF (An example screenshot of the interface subjects used to make their decisions) - Supplemental Material
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[img] PDF (An example screenshot of the coloring task subjects saw between the two stages of uncertainty resolution) - Supplemental Material
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Abstract

We present results from a laboratory experiment designed to elicit preferences over the resolution of uncertainty and timing of non-instrumental information acquisition in a rich choice set. Treatments vary whether the uncertainty is framed as a compound lottery or information structure. We find that individuals prefer to delay uncertainty resolution when the choice is framed as a compound lottery and prefer to expedite uncertainty resolution when framed as an information structure. Preferences are strict, as individuals are willing to pay for information in one treatment and they pay to avoid information in the other. We find no evidence of an aversion to gradual resolution in either context.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105090DOIArticle
Additional Information:© 2020 Elsevier Inc. Received 3 April 2018, Revised 24 March 2020, Accepted 26 June 2020, Available online 7 July 2020. I am very grateful to the Co-editor and two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the paper. I thank Yaron Azrieli, Doug Bernheim, Puja Bhattacharya, Alex Brown, Evan Calford, Katie Coffman, Sean Hofland, Ritesh Jain, John Kagel, Ian Krajbich, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Matthew McMahon, Muriel Niederle, Ryan Oprea, Pietro Ortoleva, Collin Raymond, and John Rehbeck for many helpful conversations and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Paul J. Healy for his time, advice, and encouragement. I also thank participants at the Sixth Annual Bounded Rationality in Choice Conference, 2018 Spring School in Behavioral Economics, Summer School of the Econometric Society 2017, Midwest Economic Association 2017 meeting, the Economic Science Association 2017 North America Meeting, and the Ohio State Theory Colloquium for many helpful comments. Research support was provided by the Decision Science Collaborative and Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking Small Research Grants, Ohio State University. This experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board at The Ohio State University.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ohio State UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Resolution of uncertainty; Information preferences; Anticipatory emotions
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20200716-095432931
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200716-095432931
Official Citation:Kirby Nielsen, Preferences for the resolution of uncertainty and the timing of information, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 189, 2020, 105090, ISSN 0022-0531, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105090. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053120300843)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:104401
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:16 Jul 2020 17:37
Last Modified:21 Jul 2020 22:37

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