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Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

Arieli, Itai and Babichenko, Yakov and Sandomirskiy, Fedor and Tamuz, Omer (2021) Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. Journal of Political Economy, 129 (9). pp. 2546-2594. ISSN 0022-3808. doi:10.1086/714993.

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We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann’s agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a “no-trade” condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper ItemACM Conference Paper
Arieli, Itai0000-0001-8663-5776
Babichenko, Yakov0000-0002-6970-1601
Sandomirskiy, Fedor0000-0001-9886-3688
Tamuz, Omer0000-0002-0111-0418
Additional Information:© 2021 by The University of Chicago. Electronically published July 7, 2021. This paper greatly benefited from multiple suggestions and comments of our colleagues. We are grateful to (in alphabetic order) Kim Border, Ben Brooks, Laura Doval, Piotr Dworczak, Nikita Gladkov, Sergiu Hart, Kevin He, Aviad Heifetz, Yuval Heller, Matthew Jackson, Eliott Lipnowski, Jeffrey Mensch, Benny Moldovanu, Inés Moreno de Barreda, Stephen Morris, Alexander Nesterov, Abraham Neyman, Michael Ostrovsky, Thomas Palfrey, Jim Pitman, Luciano Pomatto, Doron Ravid, Marco Scarsini, Eilon Solan, Theodore Zhu, Gabriel Ziegler, and seminar participants at Bar-Ilan University, Caltech, Hebrew University, the Higher School of Economics St. Petersburg, Technion, Tel Aviv University, Stanford, and the University of California San Diego. Arieli is supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology (2028255). Babichenko is supported by a BSF (United States–Israel Binational Science Foundation) award (2018397). Sandomirskiy is supported by the Lady Davis Foundation, by grant 19-01-00762 of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (740435), and by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. Tamuz is supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (419427), by a BSF award (2018397), and by a Sloan Fellowship.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Science and Technology (Israel)2028255
Binational Science Foundation (USA-Israel)2018397
Lady Davis FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Russian Foundation for Basic Research19-01-00762
European Research Council (ERC)740435
National Research University Higher School of EconomicsUNSPECIFIED
Simons Foundation419427
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:9
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20210727-175655408
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:110032
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:28 Jul 2021 19:44
Last Modified:13 Aug 2021 20:40

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