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Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2008) Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections. American Economic Review, 98 (2). pp. 194-200. ISSN 0002-8282. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BATaer08

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Abstract

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Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.194PublisherUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:Copyright © American Economic Association 2008. Reprinted with permission. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0418150, SES-0617820, and SES-0450712), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, PLESS at Princeton, CESS at NYU, and SSEL at Caltech. We We also thank Stephen Coate, participants at the 2006 Wallis Political Economy Conference, the 2007 meetings of the Public Choice Society, David Austen-Smith and Massimo Morelli for comments. Rajeev Advani, Anna Bassi, Karen Kaiser, Kristin Michelitch, Uliana Popova, Anwar Ruff, and Stephanie Wang provided valuable research assistance.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0418150
NSFSES-0617820
NSFSES-0450712
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
PLESS at PrincetonUNSPECIFIED
SSEL at CaltechUNSPECIFIED
CESS at NYUUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:VOTER TURNOUT; VOTING-BEHAVIOR; PARADOX
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:BATaer08
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BATaer08
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:11122
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:16 Jul 2008 16:51
Last Modified:04 Mar 2016 22:35

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