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Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study

Agranov, Marina and Buyalskaya, Anastasia (2022) Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study. Management Science, 68 (5). pp. 3573-3589. ISSN 0025-1909. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220201-345209300

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Abstract

Private and public organizations are interested in finding effective ways to reduce crime and promote ethical behavior without investing heavy resources into monitoring and compliance. In this paper, we experimentally study how revealing different information about a fine distribution affects deterrence of an undesirable behavior. We use a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method to observe subjects lying (the undesirable behavior) and quantify the extent to which this behavior responds to information structures. We find that punishment schemes that communicate only partial information (the minimum fine in particular) are more effective than full information schemes at deterring lying. We explore the mechanism driving this result and link it to subjects’ beliefs about their own versus the average expected fine in treatments with partial information.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036DOIArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Agranov, Marina0000-0002-0642-7975
Buyalskaya, Anastasia0000-0002-1848-1661
Additional Information:© 2021 INFORMS. Received: April 23, 2020; Revised: November 10, 2020; January 24, 2021; Accepted: February 3, 2021; Published Online in Articles in Advance: June 4, 2021. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. The authors benefited from helpful feedback from three anonymous referees, Devdeepta Bose, Colin Camerer, Federico Echenique, Lindsey Gailmard, Sera Linardi, Luciano Pomatto, Pietro Ortoleva, Stephanie Wang, and audience members at the Los Angeles Area Theory Workshop and the Economic Science Association conference in Dijon (2019) and Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics virtual conference attendees (2020).
Issue or Number:5
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20220201-345209300
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220201-345209300
Official Citation:Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study. Marina Agranov and Anastasia Buyalskaya. Management Science 2022 68:5, 3573-3589; https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:113199
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:01 Feb 2022 20:42
Last Modified:29 Jun 2022 14:23

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