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Fake News, Information Herds, Cascades, and Economic Knowledge

Butkovich, Lazarina and Butkovich, Nina and Plott, Charles R. and Seo, Han (2018) Fake News, Information Herds, Cascades, and Economic Knowledge. Social Science Working Paper, 1442. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220209-220523090

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Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of “fake news” through a well-known and widely studied experiment that illustrates possible uses of economics and game theory for understanding the phenomenon. Public news is viewed as an aggregation of decentralized pieces of valuable information about complex events. Success of news systems rests on accumulated investment in trust in news sources. By contrast, fake news involves cases in which news source reliability is not known. The experiment demonstrates how fake news can destroy both the investment in trust and also the benefits that successful news systems provide.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3217603DOIWorking Paper
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220209-296325000Related ItemJournal Article
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Plott, Charles R.0000-0001-8363-3628
Seo, Han0000-0002-5116-3286
Additional Information:The insights of David Grether and the help of B. Atsavapranee, are gratefully acknowledged. All experimental programs were designed by Travis Maron. The financial support of the John Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
John Templeton FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1442
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20220209-220523090
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220209-220523090
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:113356
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Feb 2022 22:29
Last Modified:09 Feb 2022 22:29

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