Empirical Welfare Economics

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May 10, 2022

Abstract

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents’ past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to make counterfactual choices for a single consumer, policy comparisons by the Kaldor criterion, and determining which allocations, and which prices, may be part of a Walrasian equilibrium.

1 Introduction

Consider a social planner facing a collection of agents in a classical exchange economy. Pareto optimality is characterized by the equality of agents’ marginal

\*This paper is dedicated to the memory of Kim Border. We are grateful to audiences at the CUHK-HKU-HKUST Joint Theory Seminar, McGill University, Stanford University, the Workshop on Applications of Revealed Preferences, and Roy Allen for detailed comments.
rates of substitution, but to use this characterization our planner needs access to agents’ utility functions. Suppose instead that the planner has access to a finite set of demand observations for each individual. The planner wants to know which allocations can be Pareto efficient for the collection of agents, given these demand observations. As a minimal discipline, she asks that there are monotone and concave utilities that consistent with the demand observations, and for which a given allocation is Pareto efficient.

Our main result provides a complete characterization of those allocations that can be Pareto efficient for the observed demand, a concept we term *possible efficiency*. The characterization is easy enough to understand. Imposing rationality on the data generates implications for what preferences must look like: in particular, rational demand gives us both a direct and an indirect revealed preference. The revealed preference is, in general, incomplete; it does not rank all alternatives. Given this revealed preference, we can speak of making further inferences based on monotonicity and convexity. For example, if it is known that both $x$ and $y$ are revealed preferred to $z$, then $\frac{1}{2}(x + y)$ should also be at least as good as $z$. Further, monotonicity allows additional inferences: if $x$ is revealed preferred to $z$, and $w \geq x$, then $w$ should also be preferred to $z$. All the inferences that we can make, using indirect revealed preference, convexity, and monotonicity, define what we call a domination relation for each individual agent. This domination relation is, in a sense, the “smallest” set of inferences we can make from the data by using rationality, convexity and monotonicity alone. The domination relation is typically highly incomplete.

Our main result says that the possible efficiency of an allocation coincides with Pareto efficiency of the allocation, taken with respect to the incomplete domination relations obtained from the data. Here, incompleteness of the derived relation is a statement about positive inferences that can be made, rather than a normative statement about preferences, as in the work of Ok (2002); Dubra et al. (2004); Eliaz and Ok (2006). Efficiency with respect to this relation is the same notion as is used in the matching literature, where the incomplete relation is typically the stochastic dominance...
relation on a set of lotteries induced by a linear order on the set of degenerate outcomes. See e.g. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001); McLennan (2002); Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003); Manea (2008); Carroll (2010); Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012); Hashimoto et al. (2014); Aziz et al. (2015); Doğan and Yıldız (2016).

The paper actually uses the domination relation, and related concepts, to address a host of related questions in welfare economics. We start from individual welfare comparisons, and ask for counterfactual (unobserved) rankings that may be inferred from individual-level consumption data. In particular, given data from one consumer, and two new bundles \( x \) and \( y \), we ask when one can infer that the utility of \( x \) is greater than that of \( y \), for all rationalizing utilities. The exercise follows Varian (1982), and is related to the literature on demand bounds; see e.g. Blundell et al. (2007, 2008, 2015); Allen and Rehbeck (2020b,a). Our results imply that the counterfactual comparisons are entirely determined by the domination relations derived from the data.

Next we turn to collective decisions. Aside from the result on Pareto optimal allocations we have described, we consider the Kaldor criterion: whether an economic policy decision can be defended on the grounds that those who benefit from the policy could compensate those who lose (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939). Again the idea of domination gives us an answer, and serves to rule out whether demand data validates a policy decision.

Our methods can be used to discuss the testable implications of Walrasian equilibrium, in the spirit of Brown and Matzkin (1996). Given demand data, we characterize the prices that could be Walrasian equilibrium prices. In the General Equilibrium literature, the famous Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1982; Chambers and Echenique, 2016) can be read as saying that there are no restrictions on the sets of prices that may be equilibrium prices. Brown and Matzkin show that data on prices and endowments (observations “on the equilibrium manifold”) may be used to refute the theory, but they do not characterize the prices that are consistent with the theory. Our result provides such a characterization, when the data assumed are individual-level consumption data.
Finally, we turn our attention to the existence of a representative consumer. There are well-known impossibility results that rule out a representative consumer, unless the income distribution is severely restricted. Our result shows that if agents’ preferences may be inferred from the data, and the distribution allowed to be chosen as part of the rationalization exercise, then representative consumers may be obtained very generally. We think of this result as a caveat on the idea of endogenizing the income distribution to enable a representative consumer.

Related Literature.

The theory of efficiency in classical economic environments without completeness is studied in many works; a few of these include Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975); Gale and Mas-Colell (1975, 1977); Fon and Otani (1979); Weymark (1985); Rigotti and Shannon (2005) Bewley (2002), and Bewley et al. (1987).

Also related are concepts of testing whether certain allocations can be equilibria of a given economy. Brown and Matzkin (1996) is a canonical reference. In that paper, the authors check whether a collection of candidate objects could be equilibria of a given economy. Results in this literature usually focus on establishing a list of polynomial inequalities that must be satisfied in order for the data to be rationalizable—these inequalities are analogous to the “Afriat inequalities” of rational consumer behavior. In showing that a particular rationalization problem reduces to one of verifying whether a solution exists to a list of polynomial inequalities establishes that these problems are decidable, in an algorithmic sense. See also Bossert and Sprumont (2002); Carvajal et al. (2004); Carvajal (2004); Bachmann (2004, 2006b); Brown and Calsamiglia (2007); Carvajal (2010); Cherchye et al. (2011); Carvajal and Song (2018) for testable implications of related environments. Some of these investigate efficiency directly: Bossert and Sprumont (2002) discuss how the core correspondence varies (for fixed preferences) as endowments vary. Bachmann (2006b) considers an environment in which collections of endowments and consumption bundles (but not prices) are observed. His Proposition 5 establishes that
Pareto efficiency has essentially no testable content in this environment, even if all preferences are represented by strictly concave and continuously differentiable utilities.\footnote{The idea is that a common linear preference renders every allocation efficient. Then perturb each agent’s utility a bit to ensure strict concavity and smoothness.}

As mentioned, what these papers primarily do is provide an analogue of the result of Afriat (1967), whereby rationalizability is equivalent to the satisfaction of a set of inequalities. In contrast, our work differs in two respects: first, we provide an economic characterization of whether a given bundle could possibly be efficient—our characterization is more analogous to the characterization of rationality via absence of cycles (also discussed by Afriat (1967), and termed “Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference” by Varian (1982)). We take as the starting point of our proof a collection of “Afriat inequalities” that must be satisfied, and use these to uncover a dual system of linear inequalities that we can interpret — they have concrete economic meaning — and deliver a condition in terms of the domination relation.

Second, we focus on a single, candidate allocation. In so doing, we are able to come up with a formulation of the problem in which the equations we must solve are \textit{linear}. This formulation is what allows us to leverage well-known duality techniques. Were we to ask the same question for multiple candidate allocations, the problem would be polynomial. Importantly, there may be two candidate allocations, each of which are possibly efficient, but which cannot possibly both be efficient at the same time.

We are not the first to study representative consumers in a revealed preference framework. Cherchye et al. (2009) consider household preference aggregation in a model with a collective public good, and Cherchye et al. (2016) establish an empirical counterpart to the Gorman aggregation result. Their focus is on empirically understanding two sources of aggregation: household bargaining and linear Engel curves. Our result focuses instead on endogenous income distribution, as in Samuelson (1956), but not necessarily with the presence of a social welfare function.\footnote{In general an endogenous income distribution which ensures rational aggregate behavior need not arise from maximization of a social welfare function. See} So, the income distribution is allowed
to depend on the aggregate budget but not necessarily with a goal toward optimizing some type of social welfare. Our result establishes the inherent weakness of not restricting the income distribution.

2 The model

Definitions and notational conventions.

We use the following notational conventions: For vectors $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $x \leq y$ means that $x_i \leq y_i$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$; $x < y$ means that $x \leq y$ and $x \neq y$; and $x \ll y$ means that $x_i < y_i$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$. The set of non-negative vectors in $\mathbb{R}^n$ is denoted $\mathbb{R}^n_+$, and the set of vectors that are strictly positive in all components is $\mathbb{R}^n_{++}$. A function $f : A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ is weakly monotone increasing, or non-decreasing, if $f(x) \geq f(y)$ when $x \geq y$; and monotone increasing, if it is weakly monotone increasing and $f(x) < f(y)$ when $x \ll y$.

An agent is defined through a preference relation on $\mathbb{R}^m_+$, which we represent throughout by a utility function $u : \mathbb{R}^m_+ \to \mathbb{R}$. Given a finite set of agents $N$, an allocation is a vector $\bar{x} = (\bar{x}_i)_{i \in N} \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}_+$. If each agent is endowed with a utility function $u_i$, an allocation $\bar{x}$ Pareto dominates the allocation $\bar{y}$ if $u_i(\bar{y}_i) \leq u_i(\bar{x}_i)$ for all $i$, with a strict inequality for at least one agent. An allocation $\bar{x}$ is Pareto optimal if there is no allocation satisfying

$$\sum_{i \in N} \bar{y}_i = \sum_{i \in N} \bar{x}_i$$

that Pareto dominates it.

Next we turn to a criterion for comparing allocations based on the principle that winners may compensate the losers. The idea is that those who gain in moving from one allocation to the other may compensate those who lose in the change. Let $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{y}$ be two allocations. Say that $\bar{x}$ weakly Kaldor dominates $\bar{y}$ if there is no allocation $\bar{z}$ with $\sum_i \bar{z}_i \leq \sum_i \bar{y}_i$ that Pareto dominates $\bar{x}$. The idea is that if $\bar{x}$ does not weakly dominate $\bar{y}$, then there is a way of re-assigning (whence losers are compensated by winners) the aggregate bundle $\sum_i \bar{y}_i$ in a

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*Dow and da Costa Werlang (1988).*
way that Pareto dominates \( \bar{x} \) (see (Graaff, 1967, ch. 5) for a discussion of the Kaldor criterion).

An exchange economy is a tuple \( E = (u_i, \omega_i)_{i \in N} \), where \( i \in N \) is the set of agents in the economy, and each agent is endowed with a utility function \( u_i \) and an endowment vector \( \omega_i \in \mathbb{R}^m_+ \). A Walrasian equilibrium in \( E \) is a pair \( ((x_i)_{i \in N}, p) \) for which 1) \( \sum_i x_i = \sum_i \omega_i \) (markets clear); and 2) for all \( i \in N \), \( p \cdot x_i = p \cdot \omega_i \) and \( u_i(x'_i) > u_i(x_i) \) implies that \( p \cdot y > p \cdot \omega_i \).

Given endowment vectors \( \omega_i \) for a set of agents \( N \), we say that \( \bar{x} = (\bar{x}_i)_{i \in N} \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}_+ \) is an allocation of \( (\omega_i)_{i \in N} \) of \( \sum_i \bar{x}_i = \sum_i \omega_i \).

**Data and rationalizability.**

A pair \( (p, x) \in \mathbb{R}^{m+m}_+ \) is an observation, and should be interpreted as the datum that the consumption bundle \( x \) was chosen from the budget set \( \{ y \in \mathbb{R}^m_+ : p \cdot y \leq I \} \) in which the income, or budget, is \( I = p \cdot x \). A (possibly empty) finite list of observations \( \{(p^k, x^k)\}_{k=1}^K \) is termed an individual dataset. \( N \) is a finite set of individuals. A group dataset is a collection of individual datasets, one for each \( i \in N \). So, \( D_i = \{(p^k_i, x^k_i)\}_{k=1}^{K_i} \) denotes an individual dataset for individual \( i \), and \( \{D_i : i \in N\} \) is a group data set.

An individual dataset is rationalizable if there is an increasing and concave utility function \( u_i : \mathbb{R}^m_+ \to \mathbb{R} \) for which for all \( k \), \( u_i(x) > u_i(x^k) \) implies \( p^k \cdot x > p^k \cdot x^k \). In this case, we say that \( u_i \) rationalizes the individual dataset. Similarly, we say that a group dataset is rationalizable if each individual dataset is rationalizable.

In our paper we insist that rationalizing utilities be increasing and concave. Clearly, some structure must be assumed on utilities, or any data becomes rationalizable. The most common approach is to impose local non-satiation, and then resort to Afriat’s theorem which says that one may without loss of generality assume a rationalizing utility that is both increasing and concave. Concavity, thus, comes for free. In our paper we require rationalizing utilities to do more than just explain individual consumers’ datasets, so the assumption of monotonicity and concavity are not innocuous.

We define the direct revealed preference as: \( x \succeq^R_i y \) if \( x \geq x^k_i \) for some \( k \),
and $p_i^k x_i^k \geq p_i^k y$. We define the direct revealed strict preference as: $x \succ_i^R y$ if there is $k$ for which

$$x \succ_i^k y,$$

or $x \geq x_i^k$ and $p_i^k x_i^k > p_i^k y$.

These definitions of revealed preferences are slightly unusual, in that they already incorporate the expectation of a monotone preference. Observe that $\succ_i^R \subseteq \succeq_i^R$.

The indirect revealed preference $\succeq_i^I$ is defined as the transitive closure of $\succeq_i^R$. The indirect revealed strict preference $x \succ_i^I y$ obtains when there is a finite chain $x = z_1 \succeq_i z_2 \succeq_i \ldots \succeq_i z_L = y$, where at least one instance of $\succeq_i^R$ is $\succ_i^R$.

A dataset satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if there is no $x, y \in \mathbb{R}_+^m$ such that $x \succeq_i^I y$ while $y \succ_i^I x$.

3 Results

We consider counterfactual welfare comparisons. Given data on individual consumption, we seek to characterize which counterfactual (i.e. unobserved) welfare conclusions may be drawn on the basis of what can be inferred about agents’ preferences from the data. For individual agents, we want to evaluate unobserved bundles. For a group of agents, the welfare comparisons are about the possible Pareto optimality of some allocation, or consistency with the Kaldor criterion. The same ideas allow us to understand the possible (again counterfactual) Walrasian equilibrium prices, and when a representative agent is possible.

All proofs are relegated to Section 5.

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3See Chambers and Echenique (2009) and Nishimura et al. (2017) for such “compositions” of the revealed preference relation with the order on consumption bundles. It is easy to see that Afriat’s theorem remains true under our definition of revealed preference.
3.1 Individual welfare

We begin by discussing which individual welfare conclusions may be drawn from a single agent’s consumption dataset. Aside from the intrinsic merit of these results, they serve to introduce some of the ideas we use later in our (main) results on collective welfare.

Our first result asks when we can say that one bundle is unambiguously better than another, given what the data tell us about the agent. Specifically, given a dataset \( \{(x^k, p^k) : 1 \leq k \leq K\} \) and two bundles \( \bar{x} \) and \( \bar{y} \), when is \( \bar{x} \) ranked above \( \bar{y} \) for all utility functions compatible with the data?

The answer turns out to depend on the revealed preference relation inferred from the consumer’s choices. Say that \( \bar{x} \) bests \( \bar{y} \) if \( \bar{x} \) can be written as a convex combination of bundles \( z^l \), where for each \( l \) \( z^l \succeq^I \bar{x} \), or \( z^l \succeq^I \bar{y} \), with at least one occurrence of the latter. Say that \( \bar{x} \) strictly bests \( \bar{y} \) if it weakly bests it, and one of the revealed preference comparisons is strict (\( \succ^I \) for \( \succeq^I \)).

Now it turns out that \( \bar{x} \) strictly bests itself when it is incompatible as a choice with the existing dataset. This means that there is no price at which \( \bar{x} \) could be demanded, and for which the resulting dataset (obtained by adding \( \bar{x} \) with a price to the existing dataset) is rationalizable. So we shall focus on bundles that do not strictly best themselves.

It is easy to see that if \( \bar{x} \) strictly bests \( \bar{y} \), then it is ranked above \( \bar{y} \) by any rationalizing concave and monotone increasing utility function. Indeed, if \( \bar{x} = \sum_l \lambda_l z^l \) is as above, then for any concave, increasing, rationalizing utility:

\[
u(\bar{x}) \geq \sum_l \lambda_l u(z^l) \\
\geq \alpha u(\bar{x}) + (1 - \alpha) u(\bar{y})
\]

with \( \alpha < 1 \) because at least one of the \( z^l \) corresponds to a comparison with \( \bar{y} \). Given that at least one inequality is strict we conclude that \( u(\bar{x}) > u(\bar{y}) \).

Our first result says that the condition is not only sufficient for the conclusion, but also necessary.

**Theorem 1.** Let \( \{(x^k, p^k) : 1 \leq k \leq K\} \) be a dataset and \( \bar{x}, \bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^m_+ \) be two
unobserved bundles so that $\bar{x}$ does not strictly best itself. Then $u(\bar{x}) > u(\bar{y})$
for all concave and monotone rationalizing $u$ if and only if $\bar{x}$ strictly bests $\bar{y}$.

Besting is useful to compare two counterfactual bundles, but we shall need
a somewhat different concept for our results on collective choices. Our next
result is a warm-up for the analysis of collective welfare because it will involve
the same notion of “besting,” which we term “domination.” The question
is not about ranking two consumption bundles, but instead we are given an
unobserved bundle $\bar{x}$, and wish to know when there exists a rationalizing utility
for which this new bundle is at least as good as anything that was observed
in the data.

Say that a bundle $y$ weakly dominates $\bar{x}$ if it is a convex combination of
some collection $z^l$ of bundles, $1 \leq l \leq L$, such that, for each $l$, $z^l \succeq R \bar{x}$.

A bundle $y$ strictly dominates $\bar{x}$ for agent $i$ if it weakly dominates it and,
moreover, if in the defining convex combination there is $l$ with $z^l \succ R \bar{x}$.

**Theorem 2.** Let $\{(x^k, p^k) : 1 \leq k \leq K\}$ be an individual dataset and $\bar{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m_+$
an arbitrary bundle. There exists a rationalizing utility for which $u(\bar{x}) \geq \max\{u(x^k) : 1 \leq k \leq K\}$ if and only if, once we add $\bar{x} \succeq R x^k$ for all $k$ to the
revealed preference relation, as well as as well as $x^k \succeq x^k$ when $p^k \cdot (\bar{x} - x^k) \leq 0$
and $x^k \succ R \bar{x}$ when $p^k \cdot (\bar{x} - x^k) < 0$, we have

1. GARP is satisfied.

2. There is no bundle $y \leq \bar{x}$ that strictly dominates $\bar{x}$.

In contrast with Theorem 1, which wanted something to be true of every
(concave, increasing) utility, Theorem 2 asks about the existence of a rationalizing utility with a certain property. The latter sort of result is, of course,
most conclusive when the condition fails, and thus certifies that the property
is incompatible with any rationalizing utility.

### 3.2 Collective welfare

Our next and main result asserts that a candidate allocation $\bar{x}$ is “possibly efficient,” meaning that we cannot rule out that it is efficient given the
available data, if and only if it is efficient for the (incomplete) empirical domination relations. Theorem 3 asserts that if a candidate allocation is not Pareto efficient, then there is another allocation which strictly Pareto dominates it according to the empirical domination relation we have defined. Formally, an allocation \( \bar{y} \) empirically dominates the allocation \( \bar{x} \) if \( \sum_i \bar{y}_i \leq \sum_i \bar{x}_i \) while \( \bar{y}_i \) weakly dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) for all \( i \) and strictly dominates it for at least one \( i \).

**Theorem 3.** Let \( \{(x^k_i, p^k_i) : 1 \leq k \leq K_i\} \), for \( i \in N \), be a rationalizable group dataset, and \( \bar{x} \) an allocation. There are rationalizing utilities for which \( \bar{x} \) is Pareto efficient if and only if \( \bar{x} \) is not empirically dominated by any other allocation.

Empirical domination ensures the existence of a common supporting price at the allocation \( \bar{x} \), essentially the equality of marginal rates of substitution for a collection of rationalizing utilities. If we additionally require that this price supports the Scitovsky contour at \( \bar{x} \), then the ideas behind Theorem 3 can be used to provide an empirical basis for the Kaldor criterion.

**Corollary 4.** Let \( \{(x^k_i, p^k_i) : 1 \leq k \leq K_i\} \), for \( i \in N \), be a rationalizable group dataset. Let \( \bar{x} \) and \( \bar{y} \) be allocations. There are rationalizing utilities for which \( \bar{x} \) weakly Kaldor dominates \( \bar{y} \) if there is no allocation \( (\bar{z}_i) \) that weakly dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) for all \( i \), and strictly dominates it for at least one \( i \), and a scalar \( \kappa \geq 0 \), for which

\[
\sum_i \bar{z}_i \leq \sum_i \bar{x}_i + \kappa (\sum_i \bar{y}_i - \sum_i \bar{x}_i)
\]

Observe that Corollary 4 only offers a sufficient condition for Kaldor domination. When the condition holds, then we may say that there are rationalizing utilities for which a switch from \( \bar{x} \) to \( \bar{y} \) could not be defended on the basis of the Kaldor criterion.

Given Theorem 3, one may use the Second Welfare Theorem to decentralize a possibly efficient allocation \( \bar{x} \) by means of taxes and subsidies. But one may

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4Given utilities \( (u_i) \), the Scitovsky contour at \( \bar{x} \) is the set \( S(\bar{x}) = \{\sum_i z_i : u_i(z_i) \geq u_i(\bar{x}_i) \text{ for all } i \in N\} \). If a price \( q \) supports all individual upper contour sets at \( \bar{x} \) and \( q \cdot \sum_i \bar{y}_i < q \cdot \sum_i \bar{x} \), then \( \sum_i \bar{y}_i \notin S(\bar{x}) \).
also want to know when \( \bar{x} \) is a potential Walrasian allocation without any transfers. Suppose then that we have access to individual endowments \((\omega_i)\), for which \( \sum_i \omega_i = \sum_i \bar{x}_i \), and we want to know if there are prices \( q \) for which \((\bar{x}, q)\) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium of the exchange economy defined by the endowments and some rationalizing utilities.

Say that a bundle \( \bar{y}_i \) \( \omega_i \)-dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) if \( \bar{y}_i \) is the convex combination of bundles \( z^l_i \) where, for each \( l \), either \( z^l_i = \omega_i \) or \( z^l_i \succeq_I \bar{x}_i \). Say that a bundle \( \bar{y}_i \) strictly \( \omega_i \)-dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) if \( \bar{y}_i \omega_i \)-dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) and one of the inequalities in the convex combination is strict: so there is \( l \) with \( z^l_i >_I \bar{x}_i \).

**Theorem 5.** Let \( \{(x^k_i, p^k_i) : 1 \leq k \leq K_i\} \), for \( i \in N \), be a rationalizable group dataset. Suppose given a collection \((\omega_i)_{i \in N}\) of endowments, and an allocation \((\bar{x}_i)_{i \in N}\) of \((\omega_i)_{i \in N}\). There exists a price vector \( q \), and rationalizing utilities \((u_i)_{i \in N}\) so that \((q, (\bar{x}_i))\) is a Walrasian equilibrium of \((u_i, \omega_i)_{i \in N}\) if and only if there is no allocation \((\bar{y}_i)_{i \in N}\) of the endowments so that 1) \( \bar{y}_i \omega_i \)-dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) for all \( i \), and 2) strictly \( \omega_i \)-dominates it for some \( i \).

### 3.3 Walrasian equilibrium

Motivated by the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, which implies that nothing can be said about the sets of prices that can be Walrasian equilibrium prices, Brown and Matzkin (1996) famously argued that general equilibrium theory has testable implications for data on prices and individual-level incomes. Brown and Matzkin’s result relies on the decidability of certain systems of polynomial equations, but they do not provide a characterization of the data that are consistent with Walrasian equilibrium.

Here we shall provide such a characterization, but under somewhat different assumptions. We take as given a group dataset, a collection of individual endowments, and a price vector that is a candidate for equilibrium price. Our result provides a condition that describes when the price can be a Walrasian equilibrium price.

Formally, we have access to a group data set and we are given 1) agents’

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5 They do provide such a characterization, in terms of what they call the Weak Axiom of Revealed Equilibrium, for the special case of \( N = 2 \) and \( K_i = 2 \).
endowments \((\omega_i)_{i \in N}\), and 2) a proposed Walrasian equilibrium price \(\bar{p}\). We want to know if there is an allocation \(\bar{x}_i\) such that \(((\bar{x}_i), \bar{p})\) constitutes an Walrasian equilibrium in the exchange economy \((u_i, \omega_i)_{i \in N}\), for some collection of rationalizing utilities \((u_i)_{i \in N}\).

Note that for any given price \(\bar{p}\) we can say whether an observed bundle \(x^k_i\) would be affordable at the budget defined by \(\bar{p}\) and endowments \(\omega_i\): this will happen when \(\bar{p} \cdot x^k_i \leq \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i\). So we can think of \(\bar{p}\) as a “partial” observation, to be added to the data of each individual agent, which describes a new price and budget, but not a chosen consumption bundle. We may say that, whatever a consumer chooses to buy at this budget, it would be revealed preferred to \(x^k_i\) if \(\bar{p} \cdot x^k_i \leq \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i\), and strictly revealed preferred to \(x^k_i\) if \(\bar{p} \cdot x^k_i < \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i\). Now, with \(\bar{p}\) in hand, such revealed preference comparisons should be added to those already defined from the existing data. Then we may take the transitive closure of the revealed preference relations thus augmented by \(\bar{p}\), and say that a bundle \(x\) is empirically worse than consumption at prices \(\bar{p}\) if, whatever would be consumed at \(\bar{p}\) would be indirectly revealed preferred to \(x\). Similarly we may say that a bundle \(x\) is strictly empirically worse than consumption at prices \(\bar{p}\) if the revealed preference relation is strict. Let \(L_i\) be the set of observations for which the consumption bundles are empirically worse than \(\bar{p}\).

We adopt the following notation: \(I_i = \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i\) is \(i\)'s income when prices are \(\bar{p}\) and her endowment \(\omega_i\); \(I^k_i = \bar{p}^k_i \cdot x^k_i\) is agent \(i\)'s implied income in observation \(k\), and \(\bar{\omega} = \sum_i \omega_i\) is the economy’s aggregate endowment. We say that \(\bar{p}\) is consistent with the group dataset if there is a choice for individual consumption at prices \(\bar{p}\) that does not violate GARP. It is possible to provide a characterization of consistent prices, essentially along the lines of our results in Section 3.1. In the statement of the theorem, \(a\) and \(b\) are the first two letters of the alphabet; they are disjoint from \(\bigcup_i L_i\).

**Theorem 6.** Consider a rationalizable group dataset, a consistent price \(\bar{p}\), and endowments \((\omega_i)_{i \in N}\). There are rationalizing utilities \((u_i)\), and consumption bundles \(\bar{x}_i\), for \(i \in N\), so that \(((\bar{x}_i), \bar{p})\) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium of

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\(^6\) A similar result is possible if we assume given individual incomes instead of endowments. The same is true of Brown and Matzkin (1996).
the exchange economy \((u_i, \omega_i)_{i \in N}\) if and only if there is no price \(q^* \in \mathbb{R}^m_+\) and probability \(\mu_i\) on \(L_i \cup \{a, b\}\) such that

1. \(E_{\mu_i} \tilde{p}_i \leq q^*\) for all \(i\),
2. and \(\sum_i E_{\mu_i} \tilde{I}_i > q^* \cdot \bar{\omega}\),

where \(\tilde{p}_i\) and \(\tilde{I}\) are random price and incomes that equal, respectively, \(p^k_i\) and \(I^k_i\) on \(k \in L_i\), \(\bar{p}\) and \(I_i\) on \(a\), and 0 on \(b\).

The condition in the theorem means that there is a “social,” or common, price \(q^*\) that all agents agree is undesirable, but makes total income cheaper: meaning that \(q^*\) is bad because it makes goods more expensive than at an average of either \(\bar{p}\) or at prices that are already revealed to be worse than \(\bar{p}\), and at the same time makes aggregate endowment (= total income) cheaper than the average observed or proposed income. More specifically, suppose that \(v_i\) is agent \(i\)'s indirect utility function. Then \(E_{\mu_i} \tilde{p}_i \leq q^*\) for all \(i\) implies that \(E_{\mu_i} v(\tilde{p}_i) \geq v(E_{\mu_i} \tilde{p}_i) \geq v_i(q^*)\), as \(v_i\) is convex and nonincreasing. The condition in Theorem 6 says that, to rule out that \(\bar{p}\) is an equilibrium price, the unfavorable price \(q^*\) would still price aggregate endowment below the agents’ aggregate expected income.

### 3.4 Representative consumer

We now turn to the existence of a representative consumer. It is well-known that a representative consumer is impossible under other than very stringent assumptions: Antonelli’s Theorem (Antonelli, 1886) and Gorman’s Theorem (Gorman, 1953) deliver clear impossibility results when one insists on the representative consumer being valid for all price vectors and individual budgets (see for example Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982)). The literature has therefore turned to situations where the income distribution is endogenously determined by some efficient allocation rule. Our next result looks at this question when all we know about consumers comes from data on their consumption choices.

For convenience we assume that all observed prices are the same. The more important substantive assumption is the existence of a “small” agent, who
always consumes less than the aggregate bundle in every observation. Our result says that endogenizing an income distribution in this setting enables the existence of a representative consumer quite generally.

**Theorem 7.** Let $D_i = \{(x^k_i, p^k_i) : 1 \leq k \leq K_i\}$, for $i \in N$, be a group dataset with the property that $K = K_i$ and $p^k_i = p^k$ for all $i$, and that, for some agent $i^*$, $x^l_{i^*} < \sum x^k_i$ for all $k, l$. Let $D_a = \{(\sum x^k_i, p^k) : 1 \leq k \leq K\}$ be the associated aggregate dataset. Then the datasets $D_a$ and $D_i$, for all $i \in N$, are rationalizable if and only if there are rationalizing utilities $u_i$ for each agent $i \in N$, and $v$ for the aggregate dataset $D_a$, so that for any price vector $p \in \mathbb{R}_+^m$ and income $I > 0$ there are $(x_i) \in \mathbb{R}^{mN}_+$ such that

1. $\sum x_i \in \text{argmax}\{v(z) : z \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \text{ and } p \cdot z \leq I\}$
2. $x_i \in \text{argmax}\{u_i(z) : z \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \text{ and } p \cdot z \leq p \cdot x_i\}$

In Theorem 7, $p \cdot x_i$ should be read as agent $i$’s endogenous income. So the property that $x_i \in \text{argmax}\{u_i(z) : z \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \text{ and } p \cdot z \leq p \cdot x_i\}$ means that $i$ is optimizing by choosing $x_i$ at prices $p$ and income set to $I_i = p \cdot x_i$.

One interpretation of Theorem 7 comes from the property of rationalizability. If we are interested in aggregation, it is natural to consider a situation where a group dataset and the resulting aggregate dataset $D_a$ are rationalizable. Theorem 7 describes what may be inferred theoretically from such a situation.

### 4 Remarks

They key to our results is an observation based on Afriat’s theorem, which says that an individual dataset $\{(p_i^k, x_i^k) : 1 \leq i \leq k\}$ is rationalizable if and only if there is a solution $U_i^k, \lambda_i^k > 0$ to the following system of linear “Afriat inequalities”:\footnote{See Chambers and Echenique (2016) for a discussion of Afriat’s theorem and this system of linear inequalities.}

$$U_i^l \leq U_i^k + \lambda_i^k p_i^k \cdot (x_i^l - x_i^k).$$
The observation is that we may normalize such a solution so that \( \lambda_i^{k^*} = 1 \) for some specific observation \( k^* \). As a result we obtain that system that remains linear, even if the prices \( p_i^{k^*} \) at this particular observation were unknown.

With this observation in hand, we can now approach a problem like that in Theorem 3. For the allocation \( \bar{x} \) to be Pareto optimal, agents’ utilities would need to have a common supporting price \( q \) at \( \bar{x} \). The existence of such a price \( q \) may be added to the above system of inequalities as if it were a new observation. Assuming that the corresponding value of \( \lambda \) has been normalized to 1, the system is still linear. See Bachmann (2004) or Bachmann (2006b) for related constructions. Now the work in proving the theorem amounts to interpreting the dual linear system.

The results obtained in Section 3 exemplify the power of our approach, but there are also clear limits. Given a dataset, one may ask a related question for a collection of allocations: whether there exists a single economy capable of generating all such allocations as Pareto efficient ones. It is natural to conjecture that there is such an economy if and only if each of the allocations is undominated. This conjecture turns out to be false, as shown by the following example:

**Example 1.** Let \( N = \{1, 2\} \), and suppose there are two commodities, so that \( m = 2 \). Individual 1 has an empty individual dataset. Individual 2 has four observations: \((p_1^2, x_1^2) = ((2, 1), (1, 2)), (p_2^2, x_2^2) = ((2, 1), (0, 4)), (p_3^2, x_3^2) = ((1, 2), (2, 1)), and (p_4^2, x_4^2) = ((1, 2), (4, 0))\).

Now, suppose we want to consider the allocations \( \bar{x}_1^1 = (1, 0), \bar{x}_2^1 = (0, 4), \) and \( \bar{x}_1^2 = (0, 1), \bar{x}_2^2 = (4, 0) \). Observe that because individual 1 has an empty individual dataset, each of these allocations are possibly efficient by Theorem 3. On the other hand, they cannot both be efficient for the same economy. To understand why, observe that if \( q^1 \) supports \( x_1^1 \), then \( q^1 \cdot (0, 4) \leq q^1 \cdot (1, 2) \), as the individual data set for individual 2 is rational. If \( q^1(2) = 0 \) (the second coordinate of \( q^1 \)), then this inequality is obviously strict as \( q^1 \geq 0 \).

So, if \( q^1(2) = 0 \), we conclude that \( q^1 \cdot (1, 2) - q^1 \cdot (0, 4) > 0 \), so that \( q^1 \cdot (1, -2) > 0 \), from which we conclude \( q^1 \cdot (1, -1) > 0 \), or \( q^1 \cdot x_1^1 > q^1 \cdot x_1^2 \). Similarly, if \( q^1(2) > 0 \), then we know \( q^1 \cdot (1, -2) \geq 0 \), so that (as \( q^1(2) > 0 \),
$q^1 \cdot x_1^1 > q^1 \cdot x_1^2$. 

So, $q^1 \cdot x_1^1 > q^1 \cdot x_1^2$; symmetrically, $q^2 \cdot x_1^2 > q^2 \cdot x_1^1$. These inequalities obviously cannot simultaneously hold for a rational decision maker.

In our discussion, we reduced the problem of testing whether an allocation $\bar{x}$ could be efficient to the question of the existence of a supporting price $q$. Were we to ask that multiple allocations be efficient, we would need a different supporting prices for each such allocation, but more to the point, the scale factors could differ across individuals, thus rendering the system nonlinear. In other words, we would need different $\lambda$ for the different allocations, and the normalization would no longer help us.

So there are obvious limits to our approach, but there are also additional applications that we have not exhausted. One of these is envy-freeness. Suppose given a group dataset, and consider the existence of rationalizing utilities that render some proposed allocation $\bar{x}$ envy-free: meaning rationalizing utilities ($u_i$) with the property that $u_i(\bar{x}_i) \geq u_i(\bar{x}_j)$ for all $i, j \in N$. Our methods, based on working through the dual of augmented system of Afriat inequalities, provide an answer to this question.

A sketch of the solution follows: the trick is to add supporting prices for each agent at the proposed consumption of other agents in the allocation $\bar{x}$. The normalization idea keeps the system linear, and we just need to include utility values $u_{i,j}$ for $i$’s utility at the bundle intended for $j$:

1. For all $i \in N$ and all $k, l \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$ for which $p_i^k \cdot (x_i^k - x_i^l) \leq 0$, we have $u_i^k \leq u_i^l + \lambda_i^k p_i^l \cdot (x_i^k - x_i^l)$.

2. For all $i, j \in N$ and all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$ for which $p_i^k \cdot (\bar{x}_j - x_i^k) \leq 0$, we have $u_{i,j} \leq u_i^k + \lambda_i^k p_i^k \cdot (\bar{x}_j - x_i^k)$.

3. For all $i, j \in N$ and all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$, $u_i^k \leq u_{i,j} + p_{i,j} \cdot (x_i^k - \bar{x}_j)$.

4. For all $i, j, h \in N$, $u_{i,j} \leq u_{i,h} + p_{i,j} \cdot (\bar{x}_j - \bar{x}_h)$.

5. For all $i, j \in N$, $u_{i,i} \geq u_{i,j}$. 

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We omit the details, but hope that it is clear how to proceed on the basis of this system.

5 Proofs

5.1 Proof of Theorem 3

We begin with the following lemma, which is stated in Chambers and Echenique (2016), Remark 3.6.

Lemma 8. Let \( i \in N \). Suppose that for all \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i \} \), there are \( u^k_i \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( \lambda^k_i > 0 \) for which for all \( k, l \in \{1, \ldots, K_i \} \) satisfying \( p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) \leq 0 \), we have

\[
  u^l_i \leq u^k_i + \lambda^k_i p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i).
\]

Then the individual dataset \( \{(p^k_i, x^k_i)\}_{k=1}^{K_i} \) is rationalizable.

Proof. Suppose that the condition in the statement of the Lemma is satisfied. Define the pair of binary relations \( x^k_i \succeq R_i x^l_i \) if \( p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) \leq 0 \) and \( x^k_i \succ R_i x^l_i \) if \( p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) < 0 \).

A cycle is a finite list \( x^l_{i1} \succeq R_i x^l_{i2} \succeq R_i \ldots x^l_{ia} \succ R_i x^l_{i1} \). We claim that there can be no cycle. For, if there were, then we would have:

\[
  u^{l_{j+1}}_i - u^{l_j}_i \leq \lambda^{l_j}_i p^{l_j}_i \cdot (x^{l_{j+1}}_i - x^{l_j}_i),
\]

for all \( j = 1, \ldots, a - 1 \) and

\[
  u^{l_1}_i - u^{l_a}_i \leq \lambda^{l_a}_i p^{l_a}_i \cdot (x^{l_1}_i - x^{l_a}_i).
\]

Reading addition of indices as modulo \( a \), observe that

\[
  0 = \sum_{j=1}^{a} (u^{l_{j+1}}_i - u^{l_j}_i) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{a} \lambda^{l_j}_i p^{l_j}_i \cdot (x^{l_{j+1}}_i - x^{l_j}_i) < 0.
\]

The first equality is by telescoping, the weak inequality by summing the original inequalities, and the strict inequality because of the right hand sides of
the original inequalities are nonpositive (and at least one strictly negative). So, we arrive at a contradiction and there can be no cycle. Conclude by Afriat’s Theorem (Afriat, 1967; Chambers and Echenique, 2016) that the individual dataset is rationalizable.

Now we proceed with the proof of the theorem.

That the conditions are necessary for \( x \) to be possibly efficient is straightforward.

Now suppose that the conditions are satisfied. We will demonstrate that there exists some \( q \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \) so that, for all \( i \in N \), the individual dataset given by \( \{(p_i^k, x_i^k)\}_{k=1}^{K_i} \cup \{(\pi_i, q)\} \) is rationalizable. This then implies (by Afriat’s Theorem) the existence of a concave, increasing utility function for which for all \( y \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \) satisfying \( q \cdot y \leq q \cdot \pi_i \), we have \( u_i(y) \leq u_i(\pi_i) \), and consequently that \( u_i(y) > u_i(\pi_i) \) implies \( q \cdot y > q \cdot \pi_i \). Consequently, it also follows that \( u_i(y) \geq u_i(\pi_i) \) implies \( q \cdot y \geq q \cdot \pi_i \), by continuity and monotonicity of \( u_i \). It then follows that \( \pi \) is efficient for these utility indices.

The proof relies on a homogeneous Theorem of the Alternative: see Kim C. Border (2020).

The content of Afriat’s Theorem is that for each \( i \in N \) and \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \), there is \( u_i^k \) and \( \lambda_i^k > 0 \) for which for all \( k, l \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \),

\[
u_i^k \leq u_i^l + \lambda_i^l p_i^l \cdot (x_i^k - x_i^l).
\]

What we would now like to find are additional unknown parameters. Namely, for each \( i \in N \), a scalar \( \pi_i \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( q \in \mathbb{R}^m \). The vector \( q \) is required to be common to all individuals and will reflect the common prices supporting the hypothesized efficient allocation \( \pi \).

Our task is then to find \( q \in \mathbb{R}^m \), and for each \( i \in N \), a real number \( \pi_i \in \mathbb{R} \), and for each \( i \in N \) and \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \), \( u_i^k \in \mathbb{R} \) and \( \lambda_i^k \in \mathbb{R} \) for which the following linear inequalities are satisfied:

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8If not, then there is \( y \) for which \( \sum_i y_i = \sum_i \pi_i \) and for all \( i \in N \), we have \( u_i(y_i) \geq u_i(\pi_i) \), with inequality strict for some \( j \in N \), implying \( \sum_i q \cdot y_i > \sum_i q \cdot \pi_i \), a contradiction.
1. For all $i \in N$ and all $k, l \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$ for which $p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) \leq 0$, we have $u^l_i \leq u^k_i + \lambda^k_i p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i)$.

2. For all $i \in N$ and all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$, $u^k_i \leq \bar{u}_i + q \cdot (x^k_i - \bar{x}_i)$.

3. For all $i \in N$ and all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$, for which $p^k_i \cdot (\bar{x}_i - x^k_i) \leq 0$, we have $\bar{u}_i \leq u^k_i + \lambda^k_i p^k_i \cdot (\bar{x}_i - x^k_i)$.

4. For all $i \in N$ and all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$, $\lambda^k_i > 0$.

5. $q \geq 0$ and $q \neq 0$.

The inequalities can be represented in matrix notation. We display part of the matrix below, as the matrix itself is quite large. The matrix below displays four horizontal blocks. The first two correspond to vectors corresponding to weak inequalities, the latter two to strict. This matrix has, for each agent $i$, $2(K_i + 1)$ columns, and an additional $m$ columns; in total the number of columns is $m + \sum_i (2K_i + 1)$. Observe that, in the matrix written below, the column labelled by $q$ actually represents $m$ columns; for example, $1_{m'}$ is an indicator function of the dimension $m' \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$.

As to rows, the matrix has, for each agent $i$, one row for each ordered pair $(l, k)$ where $l, k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}$, $k \neq l$, and $p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) \leq 0$. When agent $i$ is understood, the row is labeled $(l, k)$, as in the displayed matrix below. Continuing with the rows for agent $i$, there are also three rows for each $k$: one labeled by $(k, *)$, one by $(*, k)$ and one by $k$. The row labeled $(k, l)$ for agent $i$ is meant to capture inequality (1): there is a 1 in the column $k$ for agent $i$, a $-1$ in column $l$, and $p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i)$ in the column for $k$ among the second set of $K_i$ columns. The rest of the entries in that row are zero. In a similar vein, the rows labeled by $(k, *)$ and $(*, k)$ are there to encode the inequalities in (2) and in (3). The row labeled $k$ is meant to capture the basic non-negativity constraint (4), and has a one in column $k$, among the second collection of $K_i$ columns.

Finally, the matrix has a collection of rows $m + 1$ that are not specific to any agent and seek to capture (5). There is then one column for each
\( m' \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \) (labelled \((*, m)\)), expressing the nonnegativity of \( q \), and a row asserting that \( \sum_{m' = 1}^{m} q(m') > 0 \); the row labelled \( M \).

Because this matrix is large, we only show certain portions of it. The rows listed in the matrix have zeroes everywhere for every remaining column.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & \cdots & k & \cdots & l & \cdots & K_i & \cdots & * & 1' & \cdots & k' & \cdots & K'_i & q \\
(l,k) & 0 & \cdots & 1 & \cdots & -1 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
(*,k) & 0 & \cdots & 1 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & -1 & 0 & \cdots & p^k_i \cdot (x^l_i - x^k_i) & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
(k,*) & 0 & \cdots & -1 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & x^k_i \cdot \bar{x}_i \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
(*,m') & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1_{m'} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
M & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1_{\{1, \ldots, m\}} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
k & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \vdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We are searching for a vector in \( m + \sum_i (2K_i + 1) \) dimensional real space which, when multiplied with this matrix to yield a linear combination of its columns, results in a vector whose coordinates in the first two horizontal blocks are nonnegative, and in the last two are strictly positive. Such a vector would represent a solution to the system of inequalities (1)-(5). This is the system to which we will apply a duality result.

By Motzkin’s transposition theorem (a version of the theorem of the alternative, see Theorem 47 in [Kim C. Border (2020)]) there is no solution to the set of inequalities (and consequently to the enumerated list of inequalities above) if and only if there is, for each row of the matrix, a nonnegative weight, where for some row corresponding to a strict inequality (either in the third or fourth horizontal block), one of the weights is strict, for which the weighted
sum of rows is the zero vector.

So, let us suppose by means of contradiction that there is no solution to the linear system. Therefore, there exists a solution to the dual system. Interpret the solution as a collection of weights on the rows of the matrix. For the rows corresponding to agent \(i \in N\) (any row except the one labelled \(M\)), we let \(\xi_i^A \geq 0\) denote the weight for the row labelled by \(A\). For example, in the row of the above matrix labelled \((l, k)\), \(\xi^{(l, k)}_i\) is the associated weight. We let \(\xi^M \geq 0\) be the weight associated with row \(M\) (which is common to all \(i \in N\)), and we let \(\xi^{(*, m')} \geq 0\) be the weight associated with row \((*, m')\).

The matrix has a special structure. Observe that, restricted to the first \(\sum_i (K_i + 1)\) block of columns on the left, and the rows labeled \((k, l)\), \((k, *)\), or \((k, *)\) for some agent \((\text{and some } k, l)\), the matrix becomes the incidence matrix of a graph with vertexes that can be identified with these \(\sum_i (K_i + 1)\) columns. So each vertex is identified with a pair \((i, k)\), of an agent and an observation \(k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\}\), or with a pair \((i, *)\) for the hypothesized efficient bundle. An edge goes from a node \((i, k)\) to \((i, l)\) when \(p_{ki} \cdot (x_{ki} - x_{li}) \leq 0\). An edge goes from \((i, *)\) to \((i, k)\) when \(p^k_i \cdot (x_i - x_{ki}) \leq 0\). An edge always goes from \((i, k)\) to \((i, *)\).

Now, the solution to the dual, when restricted to the incidence submatrix, provides a non-negative linear combination of rows that equals the null vector. The Poincaré-Veblen-Alexander theorem (Berge, 2001) claims that for any non-negative weighted sum of incidence vectors of a directed graph which is zero, there is a collection of positively oriented cycles in the graph, each cycle being associated with a weight, and the total weight ascribed to an incidence vector is the sum of all weights associated to cycles in which the incidence vector appears. Here, a cycle includes no repetitions of nodes.

Because the individual dataset \(\{(p^k_i, x^k_i)\}_{k=1}^{K_i}\) is rationalizable, we may assume without loss of generality that every such cycle involves an edge of the type connecting \((i, k)\) to \((i, *)\). This is because otherwise, along all elements of the cycle, rationalizability implies that \(p^{k_j}_i \cdot (x^{k_{j+1}}_i - x^{k_j}_i) = 0\), and thus the weighted sum of vectors across that cycle is zero. Removing them does not affect the total weighted sum of rows.
Let us now represent the cycles associated with agent \( i \in N \) by \( C_i \), as described, each of them comes with a weight \( \mu(c) \geq 0 \). What we just claimed is that for each \( c \in C_i \), there is some \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \) and an edge connecting \((i, k)\) to \((i, *)\). This implies, in particular, that \( x_i^k \succeq_l \bar{x}_i \). To see why, let the cycle be written via a sequence of nodes: \((i, *)\), \((i, k_1)\), \ldots, \((i, k_l) = k\), \((i, *)\). Because \((i, *)\) is connected to \((i, k_1)\) by an edge, it means that \( p_{ik_1} \cdot (\bar{x}_i - x_i^{k_1}) \leq 0 \), so that \( x_i^{k_1} \succeq_R \bar{x}_i \); similarly, \( x_i^{k_{j+1}} \succeq_R x_i^{k_j} \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, l - 1 \). Consequently, by definition, \( x_i^k \succeq_{l} \bar{x}_i \).

What we have just claimed is that if \( \xi_i^{(k, *)} > 0 \), it must be that \( x_i^k \succeq_{l} \bar{x}_i \).

Now, again by Motzkin’s transposition theorem, one of the following must be true: either \( \xi^M > 0 \), or there is \( i \in N \) and \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \) for which \( \xi_i^k > 0 \).

Let us consider each of the two cases in turn.

**Case 1: There is a dual solution with \( \xi^M > 0 \).**

The only columns for which row \( M \) are nonzero are the last \( m \) columns. Rows of type \((*, m')\) add (potentially) non-negative terms to these last \( m \) columns. Since the weighted sum of rows equals zero, it follows that

\[
\sum_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \xi_i^{(*, k)} (x_i^k - \bar{x}_i) = - \sum_{m'=1}^m \xi_i^{*, m'} \mathbf{1}_{m'} - \xi^M \mathbf{1}_{1,...,m} \ll 0. 
\]

(1)

In other words, for each \( i \in N \) and each \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \), there is a number \( \theta_i^k \geq 0 \) for which

\[
\sum_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \theta_i^k (x_i^k - \bar{x}_i) \ll 0,
\]

where by the preceding discussion, \( \theta_i^k > 0 \) implies \( x_i^k \succeq_{l} \bar{x}_i \). Furthermore, there is \( i \in N \) and \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \) for which \( \theta_i^k > 0 \), since equation (1) is strictly negative in every coordinate.

Without loss of generality (since the system is homogeneous), we may assume that \( \sup_{i \in N} \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \theta_i^k = 1 \).

For each \( i \in N \), let \( \theta_i^0 = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \theta_i^k \). Then

\[
\sum_i \sum_k (\theta_i^k x_i^k + \theta_i^0 \bar{x}_i) \ll \sum_i \sum_k (\theta_i^k \bar{x}_i + \theta_i^0 \bar{x}_i) = \sum_i \bar{x}_i
\]
so we can define
\[ y_i = \theta_i^0 \bar{x}_i + \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \theta_i^k x_i^k, \]
for all \( i \neq 1 \). If \( \theta_i^0 > 0 \), choose \( y_1' > \bar{x}_1 \) so that \( y_1 = \theta_1^0 y_1' + \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \theta_1^k x_1^k \) and \( y_1' > l^l_1 \bar{x}_1 \); otherwise choose \( y_1^* > x_1^* \) so that \( y_1 = \theta_1^0 \bar{x}_1 + \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \theta_1^k x_1^k + \theta_1^*(y_1^* - x_1^*) \) and \( y_1^* > l^l_1 x_1^* \). Either way the allocation \( \bar{y}_i \) weakly dominates \( \bar{x}_i \) all agents, and strictly dominates it for agent 1.

**Case 2: There is a dual solution with \( \xi_i^k > 0 \).**

This means that there is \( i \in N \) and \( k \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \) for which \( \xi_i^k > 0 \). Fix such an \( i^* \in N \) and a \( k^* \in \{1, \ldots, K_i\} \). Because \( \xi_M = 0 \) is possible, we may only conclude in this case that
\[ \sum_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \xi_i^{(s,k)}_i(x_i^k - \bar{r}_i) \leq 0. \]

On the other hand, we may conclude, since \( \xi_i^{(s,k)}_i > 0 \), that there is also \( l \in \{1, \ldots, K_{i^*}\} \) with \( \xi_i^{(s,k)}_i > 0 \) and \( p_i^{(s,k)} \cdot (x_i^k - l^l_x) < 0 \); or in other words, \( x_i^k \succ R_{i^*} x_i^l \). In particular, the edge \((i^*, k^*)\) to \((i^*, l)\) belongs to some \( c \in C_i \), which has a corresponding \( \xi_i^{(s,k)} > 0 \); we may conclude then that \( x_i^k \succ l^l_{i^*} \bar{x}_{i^*} \).

Now \( \sum_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \xi_i^{(s,k)}_i(x_i^k - \bar{r}_i) \leq 0 \) implies that we can again as in Case 1 set \( \theta_i^k = \xi_i^{(s,k)}_i \), assume without loss that \( \sum_k \theta_i^k \leq 1 \), and define \( \theta_i^0 = 1 - \sum_k \theta_i^k \).

Then we may set \( z_i^0 = \bar{x}_i \) when \( \theta_i^0 > 0 \) and \( z_i^k = x_i^k \) when \( \theta_i^k > 0 \) and then we have (ignoring terms where \( \theta_i^k = 0 \))
\[ \sum_i \sum_{k=0}^{K_i} \theta_i^k z_i^k \leq \sum_i \bar{x}_i \]
so that if we define an allocation by \( y_i = \sum_{k=0}^{K_i} \theta_i^k z_i^k \), and recall that \( x_i^k \succ l^l_{i^*} \bar{x}_{i^*} \), we conclude that the allocation \((y_i)\) empirically dominates \((\bar{x}_i)\).

**5.2 Proof of Theorem 2**

For this proof we start by constructing the same matrix as in the proof of Theorem 3 but with \( N = 1 \), and where we now add a row \( \bar{1}_s - 1_k \) for each \( k \) to capture the inequality \( u^k \leq \bar{u} \). The idea is to consider the same collection of linear inequalities as before, but where we in addition require that the level of utility in the new observation exceeds that of any existing observation in the
data. Consider a solution to the dual. Again when restricted to the incidence matrix there is a collection of oriented cycles in the graph, each cycle being associated with a weight, and the total weight ascribed to an incidence vector is the sum of all weights associated to cycles in which the incidence vector appears. A cycle includes no repetitions of nodes.

Because the individual dataset \( \{(p^k_i, x^k_i)\}_{k=1}^{K_i} \) is rationalizable, we may assume without loss of generality that every such cycle involves an edge of the type connecting \((i, k)\) to \((i, *)\). This is because otherwise, along all elements of the cycle, rationalizability implies that \( p_i^{k_j} \cdot (x_i^{k_{j+1}} - x_i^{k_j}) = 0 \), and thus the weighted sum of vectors across that cycle is zero. Removing them does not affect the total weighted sum of rows.

By the same argument as in Theorem 3, if \( \mathcal{C} \) denotes the set of cycles, each of them with weight \( \mu(c) \), we know that a cycle has an edge connecting (say) \((k)\) to \((*)\), where \( \xi^{(k,*)} > 0 \) and that in consequence \( x^k \succeq I \bar{x} \). What is different from the proof of Theorem 3 is that now the cycle may involve an edge going from (say) \((l)\) to \((*)\) which was added from a row \( 1_* - 1_l \) due to the inequality \( u^l \leq \bar{u} \).

Now as before there are two cases to contend with. First, when \( \xi^M > 0 \) we obtain as before that \( \sum_k \xi^{(k,*)}(x^k - \bar{x}) \ll 0 \). This means that there is a convex combination \( \theta^- \bar{x} + \sum_k \theta^k x^k \ll \bar{x} \) with support in \( \bar{x} \) and the \( x^k \succeq I \bar{x} \) (as \( \theta^k = \xi^{(k,*)} > 0 \) means that the argument in previous paragraph applies).

Second, when \( \xi^M = 0 \) then we must have \( \xi^k > 0 \) for some \( k \). This may again lead to the same case as in Theorem 3 or it may be the case that \( \xi^{(k,*)} = 0 \) for all \( k \) and we have a strict cycle involving the new \( \bar{x} \succeq R x^l \) edges. This would be a violation of GARP.

### 5.3 Proof of Theorem 1

The starting point for proving this theorem is the system of linear inequalities introduced by Varian (1982) for this problem. Indeed, by Varian’s Fact 4 (Varian (1982)), \( \bar{y} \) is revealed worse than \( \bar{x} \) if and only if there is no solution \( q > 0 \) to the system of linear inequalities comprised by:
1. \( q \cdot \bar{x} \leq q \cdot x^k \) for all \( k \) with \( x^k \succeq^I \bar{x} \)

2. \( q \cdot \bar{x} \leq q \cdot x^k \) for all \( k \) with \( x^k \succeq^I \bar{y} \)

3. \( q \cdot \bar{x} < q \cdot x^k \) for all \( k \) with \( x^k \succ^I \bar{x} \)

4. \( q \cdot \bar{x} < q \cdot x^k \) for all \( k \) with \( x^k \succ^I \bar{y} \)

Set up a matrix to capture this system, with one row for each \( q_m \geq 0 \) constraint and one row for the constraint that \( \sum_m q_m > 0 \); where the row is of form \( x^k - \bar{x} \). Consider a dual solution with weights \( \theta^k \geq 0 \) for each of the inequalities involving \( \bar{x} \), and \( \eta^k \geq 0 \) for the inequalities that involve \( \bar{y} \). Let \( \xi^m \geq 0 \) be the dual variable for the \( q_m \geq 0 \) inequalities and \( \xi^M \geq 0 \) for the last \( \sum_m q_m > 0 \) inequality.

Suppose first that \( \xi^M > 0 \). Then we get that \( \sum_k (\theta^k + \eta^k) x^k \ll \bar{x} \sum_k (\theta^k + \eta^k) \), which means that \( \sum_k \theta^k + \eta^k > 0 \) and that we may normalize so that \( \sum_k \theta^k + \eta^k = 1 \). Set \( z^k \gg x^k \) for some \( \theta^k_* + \eta^k_* > 0 \), and \( z^k = x^k \) for all other \( k \neq k_* \), so that \( \bar{x} = \sum_k (\theta^k + \eta^k) z^k \) with \( z^k \succeq^I \bar{x} \) or \( z^k \succeq^I \bar{y} \) for each \( k \), and where the comparison becomes \( \succ^I \) for \( k = k_* \). Note that this combination must place positive weight on a bundle that is revealed preferred to \( \bar{y} \), otherwise we would have that \( \bar{x} \) strictly bests itself.

If instead \( \xi^M = 0 \) then we must have \( \theta^k + \eta^k > 0 \) for some \( k \) with either \( x^k \succ^I \bar{x} \) or \( x^k \succ^I \bar{y} \). Again this allows us to assume that \( \sum_k \theta^k + \eta^k = 1 \) and we get that \( \sum_k (\theta^k + \eta^k) x^k \leq \bar{x} \).

5.4 Proof of Theorem 5

We shall omit some details as all these proofs involve similar ideas. Set up the problem as in Theorem 3. The same system of Afriat inequalities for the observed choices, and the unknown price \( q \) that supports the new allocation \((\bar{x}_i)\). Now, however, we add inequalities to capture that \( \bar{x}_i \) must be affordable at the income that agents derive from selling their endowment at equilibrium prices. In fact impose the inequality \( q \cdot (\omega_i - \bar{x}_i) \geq 0 \). Let \( \alpha_i \) be the dual variable associated to this inequality. Since \( \bar{x}_i \) is an allocation of \( \omega_i \) these will
ensure that the inequality holds with equality for all agents. Now we obtain, reasoning as before, that a dual solution implies

\[ \sum_i \sum_k \theta^k_i (x^k_i - \bar{x}_i) + \sum_i \alpha_i (\omega_i - \bar{x}_i) + \sum_m \xi^m 1_m + \xi^M 1 = 0 \]

Suppose first that \( \xi^M > 0 \) and normalize so that \( \sum_k \theta^k_i + \alpha_i \leq 1 \). Let \( \bar{y}_i = \sum_k \theta^k_i x^k_i + \alpha_i \omega_i + (1 - \sum_k \theta^k_i - \alpha_i) \bar{x}_i \). Then we obtain

\[ \sum_i \bar{y}_i \ll \sum_i (1 - \alpha_i) \bar{x}_i \leq \sum_i \bar{x}_i. \]

And as in the previous proof, when \( \xi^M = 0 \) then one of the strict revealed preference comparisons must get strictly positive weight.

5.5 Proof of Theorem 6.

Normalize the data so that income in each observation equal 1, so we have \( I^k_i = 1 \) for all \( k \) and \( i \). Define the revealed preference relation as before, but now add the comparisons \( 0 \succeq^R_i k \) when \( \bar{p} \cdot x^k_i \leq \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i \) and \( 0 \succ^R_i k \) when \( \bar{p} \cdot x^k_i < \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i \). Then we abuse notation by denoting by \( \succeq^R_i \) and \( \succ^R_i \) the resulting transitive closures.

Consider a linear system with the following inequalities:

1. \( p^k \cdot \bar{x}_i \geq 1 \) for all \( i \) and \( k \) with \( 0 \succeq^R_i k \).
2. \( p^k \cdot \bar{x}_i > 1 \) for all \( i \) and \( k \) with \( 0 \succ^R_i k \).
3. \( \bar{p} \cdot \bar{x}_i \geq \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i \) for all \( i \).
4. \( \sum_i \bar{x}_i = \sum_i \omega_i = \bar{\omega} \) (market clearing).
5. \( \bar{x}_i \geq 0 \).

Set this up as a homogenous system with \( NM + 1 \) columns: the first \( M \) correspond to the unknowns \( \bar{x}_{i,m} \) for \( i \in N \) and \( 1 \leq m \leq M \). The last column is used for a normalization variable that will be required to be strictly positive,
and then normalized to 1 in any solution. The rows of this matrix correspond to the 5 categories of inequalities in the system. So the last column has $-1$ for the first two collection of rows, $-I_i$ for the second collection of rows, where $I_i = \bar{p} \cdot \omega_i$, $-\bar{\omega}_m$ for the following set of rows; then 0 for the non-negative inequality, and finally 1 for the last added row. Let $\pi$ be the dual variable for the last “normalization” inequality.

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
0 \geq R_{i,k} & 0 & \cdots & p_{i,m}^k & \cdots & 0 & -1 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 \geq R_{i,l} & 0 & \cdots & p_{i,m}^l & \cdots & 0 & -1 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
i & 0 & \cdots & p_{i,m}^k & \cdots & 0 & -I_i \\
\vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
m & 0 & \cdots & 1 & \cdots & 0 & -\bar{\omega}_m \\
\vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
(i,m) & 0 & \cdots & 1 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
$$

Let the dual variables be $\theta_i^k$ for the first two collection of inequalities, $\alpha_i$ for the next set of inequalities, $\eta^m$ for the market-clearing inequalities, $\xi_i^m$ for the non-negativity constraint, and $\pi$ for the very last “normalization” inequality. Now the dual system is

$$
\sum_k \theta_i^k p^k + \alpha_i \bar{p} + \eta + \xi_i = 0 \text{ for all } i,
$$

and

$$
-\sum_i \sum_k \theta_i^k - \sum_i \alpha_i I_i - \eta \cdot \bar{\omega} + \pi = 0
$$

Clearly the primal system has a solution if the last inequality is ignored, so we must have $\pi > 0$ in any dual solution. The first system implies that $\eta \leq 0$, so the last system implies that $\sum_i \theta_i^k + \sum_i \alpha_i > 0$. Define $\beta = -\eta$ and
normalize the dual variables so that $\sum_k \theta_i^k + \alpha_i < 1$ for all $i$. Then we have that

$$\sum_k \theta_i^k p^k + \alpha_i \bar{p} + (1 - \sum_k \theta_i^k - \alpha_i)\xi_i' = \beta$$

for all $i$, as well as

$$\sum_i \sum_k \theta_i^k \sum_i \alpha_i I_i = \beta \cdot \bar{\omega} + \pi.$$

This means that there is a probability measure $\mu_i$ for each $i$ on

$$\{k : \bar{p} \succeq^R x_i^k \} \cup \{a, b\}$$

such that $E_{\mu_i} \tilde{p} = \beta$, where $\tilde{p}$ equals $p^k$ on $k$, $\bar{p}$ on $a$ and $\xi_i'$ on $b$. And

$$\sum_i E_{\mu_i} \tilde{I}_i < \beta \cdot \bar{\omega},$$

where $\tilde{I}_i$ is 1 on $k$, $I_i$ on $a$ and 0 on $b$.

5.6 Proof of Theorem 7

It is obvious that the existence of these utilities imply that the datasets are rationalizable. We prove the opposite direction.

Let agent $i$ be the consumer $i^*$ in the hypothesis of the theorem. First we argue that the union $D_i \cup D_a$ is rationalizable. Indeed each of the datasets $D_i$ and $D_a$ is rationalizable, so any revealed preference cycle would have to involve an edge $p \cdot x \geq p' \cdot x'$ for $(p, x) \in D_i$ and $(p', x') \in D_a$. This is, however, not possible as $x < x'$ by definition of the consumer $i$.

Now let $u$ be a rationalization of $D_i \cup D_a$ and define $u_i = v = u$. Let $u_j$, for $j \neq i$ be an arbitrary rationalization of $D_j$. For any observed price $p^k$, the observed allocation $(x_i^k)$ and these utilities satisfy the property in the statement of the theorem. For any unobserved price $p$, let $x \in \text{argmax}\{v(z) : z \in \mathbb{R}^m_+ \text{ and } p \cdot z \leq 1\}$ and choose $x_i = x$ and $x_j = 0$ for $j \neq i$. Since $u_i = v$ the resulting allocation satisfies the statement in the theorem.
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