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Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice

Echenique, Federico and Root, Joseph and Sandomirskiy, Fedor (2022) Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice. . (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220707-170628097

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Abstract

We study efficiency in general collective choice problems when agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We establish the equivalence between welfare maximization and ex-ante efficiency for general domains. We relate ex-ante efficiency with ex-post efficiency, characterizing when the two notions coincide. Our results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2203.06353arXivDiscussion Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Sandomirskiy, Fedor0000-0001-9886-3688
Additional Information:We are grateful to (in alphabetic order) Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Hervé Moulin, Luciano Pomatto, and Omer Tamuz for discussions that inspired this work, and the Linde Institute at Caltech for its financial support. Federico Echenique thanks the National Science Foundation for its support through the grants SES 1558757 and CNS 1518941. Joseph Root was partially supported by PIMCO. Fedor Sandomirskiy was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (grant CNS 1518941) and the HSE University Basic Research Program.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Linde Institute of Economic and Management ScienceUNSPECIFIED
NSFSES-1558757
NSFCNS-1518941
PIMCOUNSPECIFIED
HSE UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20220707-170628097
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220707-170628097
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:115382
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: George Porter
Deposited On:08 Jul 2022 22:27
Last Modified:08 Jul 2022 22:27

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