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Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation

Tanaka, Tomomi (2007) Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 7 (1). art 7. ISSN 1935-1682.

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This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small.

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Additional Information:Copyright ©2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. Submitted: May 19, 2006. Accepted: December 4, 2006. Published: January 23, 2007. I thank Colin Camerer, Sang Hyop Lee, Jim Roumasset, Jim Richardson for helpful comments. I am indebted to Katerina Sherstyuk and John Ledyard for their guidance throughout the course of this research. Financial supports were provided by the Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory and the University of Hawaii Experimental Laboratory.
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Caltech Social Science Experimental LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
University of Hawaii Experimental LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:mechanism design, two-sided combinatorial auction, holdout
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:TANbejeap07
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Official Citation:Tomomi Tanaka (2007) “Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 7: Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 7. Available at:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:11571
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:07 Sep 2008 03:52
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 00:20

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