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General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions

Plott, Charles R. and Cason, Timothy N. and Gillen, Benjamin J. and Lee, Hsingyang and Maron, Travis (2022) General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions. Economic Theory . ISSN 0938-2259. doi:10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7. (In Press) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220725-157131000

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Abstract

The paper reports on the methodology, experiments, design and outcome of a large auction with multiple, interdependent markets constructed from principles of general equilibrium as opposed to game theoretic auction theory. The auction distributed 18,788 entitlements to operate electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing gaming establishments subject to multiple policy constraints on the allocation. The multi-round auction, conducted in one day, produced over $600M in revenue. All policy constraints were satisfied. Revealed dynamics of interim allocations and new statistical tests provide evidence of multiple market convergence hypothesized by classical principles and theories of general equilibrium. Results support the use of computer supported, “tâtonnement–like” market adjustments as a reliable empirical processes and not as purely theoretical constructs.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7DOIArticle
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-170008373Related ItemWorking Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Plott, Charles R.0000-0001-8363-3628
Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022. Received 15 September 2021. Accepted 18 April 2022. Published 31 May 2022. The financial support for analyzing the data and developing this report provided to Plott by the Rising Tide Foundation (Grant Number: RTF-19-500) and the John Templeton Foundation (Grant Number: 58067) are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economic and Political Science for technical support and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. The Victorian government allowed limited data analysis for scientific purposes. The cooperation and help of William Stevenson of Intelligent Market Systems LLC were fundamental. The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. Financial support for this research is indicated in the acknowledgement footnote.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Rising Tide FoundationRTF-19-500
John Templeton Foundation58067
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Auction design · Testbed experiments · Stability
Classification Code:JEL Classification C60 · D44 · D47
DOI:10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20220725-157131000
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220725-157131000
Official Citation:Plott, C.R., Cason, T.N., Gillen, B.J. et al. General equilibrium methodology applied to the design, implementation and performance evaluation of large, multi-market and multi-unit policy constrained auctions. Econ Theory (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01431-7
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:115839
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: George Porter
Deposited On:27 Jul 2022 15:58
Last Modified:27 Jul 2022 15:58

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