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On the Benefit of Cooperation in Relay Networks

Kosut, Oliver and Effros, Michelle and Langberg, Michael (2022) On the Benefit of Cooperation in Relay Networks. In: 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE , Piscataway, NJ, pp. 1945-1950. ISBN 978-1-6654-2159-1.

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This work addresses the cooperation facilitator (CF) model, in which network nodes coordinate through a rate limited communication device. For multiple-access channel (MAC) encoders, the CF model is known to show significant rate benefits, even when the rate of cooperation is negligible. Specifically, the benefit in MAC sum-rate, as a function of the cooperation rate C_(CF) , sometimes has an infinite slope at C_(CF) = 0 when the CF enables transmitter dependence where none was possible otherwise. This work asks whether cooperation through a CF can yield similar infinite-slope benefits when dependence among MAC transmitters has no benefit or when it can be established without the help of the CF. Specifically, this work studies the CF model when applied to relay nodes of a single-source, single-terminal, diamond network comprising a broadcast channel followed by a MAC. In the relay channel with orthogonal receiver components, careful generalization of the partial-decode-forward/compress-forward lower bound to the CF model yields sufficient conditions for an infinite-slope benefit. Additional results include derivation of a family of diamond networks for which the infinite-slope rate-benefit derives directly from the properties of the corresponding MAC studied in isolation.

Item Type:Book Section
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URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Kosut, Oliver0000-0003-4779-0102
Effros, Michelle0000-0003-3757-0675
Langberg, Michael0000-0002-7470-0718
Additional Information:© 2022 IEEE. This work is supported in part by NSF grants CCF-1817241, CCF-1908725, and CCF-1909451. The full version of this work appears in [1].
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20220804-765731000
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:116093
Deposited By: George Porter
Deposited On:04 Aug 2022 23:04
Last Modified:04 Aug 2022 23:04

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