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An explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation

Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A. (2005) An explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation. American Political Science Review, 99 (2). pp. 201-213. ISSN 0003-0554. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051609.

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This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.

Item Type:Article
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Goeree, Jacob K.0000-0001-9876-3425
Additional Information:© 2005 by the American Political Science Association. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-0094800), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Bankard Fund at the University of Virginia, and the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI 453.03.606). This paper benefited from comments provided by three anonymous referees, Rebecca Morton, Howard Rosenthal, and participants at the quantal response workshop at Caltech and the politics seminar at NYU.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Bankard Fund, University of VirginiaUNSPECIFIED
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)VICI 453.03.606
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:GOEapsr05
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:11621
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:13 Sep 2008 02:19
Last Modified:08 Nov 2021 22:01

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