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Many inspections are manipulable

Shmaya, Eran (2008) Many inspections are manipulable. Theoretical Economics, 3 (3). pp. 367-382. ISSN 1555-7561. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:SHMAte08

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Abstract

A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the expert’s reliability. If the test function is Borel and the inspection is such that a true expert always passes it, then it is also manipulable by an ignorant expert. The proof uses Martin’s theorem about the determinacy of Blackwell games. Under the axiom of choice, there exist non-Borel test functions that are not manipulable.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
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http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20080367PublisherUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:Copyright © 2008 Eran Shmaya. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 3.0. Available at http://econtheory.org. Submitted 2007-10-28. Final version accepted 2008-7-6. Available online 2008-7-6. This paper was written while I was a research fellow in the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory at California Institute of Technology. I am grateful to Federico Echenique for detailed comments and suggestions that substantially improved the paper, and also to Chris Chambers, Eddie Dekel, Yossi Feinberg, Nabil Al-Najjar, Wojciech Olszewski, Alvaro Sandroni, and Leeat Yariv.
Subject Keywords:Forecasting, calibration, zero-sum games
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:SHMAte08
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:SHMAte08
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:11690
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:19 Sep 2008 20:14
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 00:21

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