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Games Played by Teams of Players

Kim, Jeongbin and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Zeidel, Jeffrey R. (2022) Games Played by Teams of Players. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (4). pp. 122-157. ISSN 1945-7669. doi:10.1257/mic.20200391.

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We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription
Kim, Jeongbin0000-0003-1440-8691
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:John Asker was coeditor for this article. The financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES- 1426560) and The Ronald and Maxine Linde Institute of Economics and Management is acknowledged. We are grateful for comments from audiences at the 2018 World Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Berlin, the 2018 Southwest Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop at Caltech, the 2019 PECO Conference in Washington, DC, and at several departmental seminars. We thank Erkut Ozbay for his helpful discussion of the paper. We thank the reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the manuscript. Any remaining errors are our own.
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Linde Institute of Economic and Management ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20230103-818063100.37
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:118633
Deposited By: Research Services Depository
Deposited On:07 Feb 2023 20:22
Last Modified:07 Feb 2023 20:22

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