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What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

Echenique, Federico (2008) What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33 (3). pp. 757-768. ISSN 0364-765X.

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This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.

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Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© 2008 INFORMS. Received November 9, 2006; revised July 9, 2007 and October 23, 2007. The author thanks Area Editor Eilon Solan and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments on a previous draft. He is also grateful to David Ahn, Chris Chambers, Geoffroy De Clippel, Alekos Kechris, Hideo Konishi, Jay Sethuraman, Tayfun Sönmez, and various seminar audiences. Special thanks are due to Lozan Ivanov for carefully proofreading the whole manuscript.
Subject Keywords:stable matchings; revealed preference; inverse optimization
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:ECHmor08
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:12421
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:11 Dec 2008 21:23
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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