A Caltech Library Service

A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency

Jackson, Matthew O. (2005) A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency. In: Group formation in economics: networks, clubs, and coalitions. Cambridge University Press , Cambridge, UK, pp. 11-57. ISBN 0521842719.

PDF - Accepted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.

Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:This was written for the volume Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, which is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. I thank Jernej Copic, Gabrielle Demange, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anne van den Nouweland for comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Lee Center for Advanced Networking, CaltechUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Networks, Network Games, Network Formation, Game Theory, Allocation Rules, Pairwise Stability, Efficient Networks
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:JACgfe04
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:12791
Deposited By: Archive Administrator
Deposited On:24 Dec 2008 17:01
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 00:31

Repository Staff Only: item control page